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Report Organisation
Each of the papers in this volume is preceded by an abstract
providing more information about its contents. The abstract also
indicates the author(s) of the original paper. For easier reference, the
abstract is labeled according to the outline scheme used above, i.e.,
II.A, II.B.1, and so forth. For case of handling, the report comprises
two volumes. Volume I contains Parts I (Executive Summary), and Part II
(Technology Transfer). Volume II contains Parts III (Communications
Policy) and IV (Space Commercialisation).
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This paper addresses problems associated with the allocation of a
scarce resource--the radio frequency spectrum. The current method of
allocation does not always allocate the resource to those most valuing its
use. Because users of the spectrum are not required to pay the opportu-
nity cost of their spectrum use (the benefits foregone when spectrum is
not employed in its best alternative use) they are, in effect, being
subsidized. Furthermore, users have little or no incentive to conserve
their use of the resource by adopting efficient technology.
A number of schemes to encourage more economically efficient use of
the resource have been proposed. The first part of the paper sets out
economic criteria by which the effectiveness of c- source allocation
schemes can be judged, and offers some thoughts on traditional objections
to implementation of market into frequency allocation.
The second part of the paper discusses the problem of allocating
orbit and spectrum between two satellite services having significantly
different system characteristics. The problem is compounded by the like-
lihood that one service will commence operation much sooner than the
other. Some alternative schemes are offered that, within proper interna-
tional constraints, might achieve a desired flexibility in the division of
orbit and frequency between the two services domestically over the next
several years.
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Abstract
This paper addresses problems associated with the allocation of
a scarce resource--the radio frequency spectrum. It is observed that
the current method of allocatior very likely does not allocate the
resource to those most valuing its use. Because users of the spectrum
are not required to pay the "opportunity cost" of their spectrum use
(defined as the benefits foregone by not employing the resource in its
best alternative use) they are, in effect, being subsidized. Further-
more, there is little or no incentive for them to improve and conserve
their use of the resource. If anything, incentives run counter to
this goal.
A number of schemes to encourage more economically efficient use
of the resource have been proposed. These range from institution of a
free market in radio frequency rights to implementation of federally
administered usage fees. The first part of the paper sets out economic
criteria by which the effectiveness of resource allocation schemes can
be judged, and offers some thoughts on traditional objections to
imnlementation of market characteristics into frequency allocation.
The second part of the paper discusses the problem of dividing
orbit and spectrum between two satellite services sharing the same band,
but having significantly different system characteristics. The problem
is compounded by the likelihood that one service will commence operation
much sooner than the other. Some alternative schemes are offered that,
within proper international constraints, could achieve a desired flexi-
bility in the division of orbit and frequency between the two services
domestically over the next several years.
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I.	 WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
a. Introduction
Much has been written in recent years about how the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Interdepartmental Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC) allocate a scarce resource - the radio
frequency spectrum. The interest in this subject stems from the
fact that radio spectrum (1] is allocated in a manner so radically
different from that for most other resources in our economy. From
the standpoint of economic efficiency, this method of allocation is
considered by many to be highly questionable.
The present method of radio spectrum allocation (2] has its roots
in the Radio Act of 1927 (Public Law 69-632), the purpose of which was
stated in the preamble as follows [3].
. his Act is intended to regulate all forms of interstate
and foreign radio transmissions and communications within the
United States, its territories and possessions; to maintain the
control of the United States over all the channels of interstate
and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of
such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals,
firms, or corporations, for limited periods of time, under
licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall
be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions,
and periods of the license."
Most of the provisions of this act were later incorporated into
the Communications Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-416), the basis of the FCC's
current authority. In effect, the federal gov ernment nationalized
the radio spectrum, apparently out of the fear that continued unregu-
lated use would result in levels of radio interference rendering the
resource entirely useless [4].
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As "trustee" of the resource, the federal government is charged
with the following significant responsibilities:
Sec. 1, ".	 . to make available, so far as possible, to all
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges"
Sec. 303(c), "Assign bands of frequencies to the various
classes of stations, and assign frequencies for each -individ-
ual station and determine the power which each station shall
use and the time during which it may operate"
Sec. 303(f), "Make such regulations not inconsistent with law
as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between sta-
tions and to carry out the provisions of this Act: Provided,
however, that changes in the frequencies, authorized power,
or in the times of operation of any station, shall not be
made without the consent of the station licensee unless,
aftc:^ a public hearing, the Commission shall determine that
such changes will promote public convenience or interest or
will serve public necessity, or the provisions of this Act
will be more fully complied with"
Sec. 303(8), "Study new uses for radio, provide for experi-
mental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the
larger. and more effective use of radio in the public interest"
These provisions underlie the present "modus operandi" of the
Federal Communications Commission. As it is now, the FCC must decide
how, and by whom, radio frequencies will be used [5].
Aside from the issue of the political implications of centralized
control of an information medium (certainly not to be ignored in this
case), the FCC faces the problem that plagues any central Allocatory
authority: insufficient genuine information to make intelligent judg-
ments on hor, to distribute the resource under its purview. This is
not to say that applicants and licensees are not eager to supply
plenty of information, but it is information inevitably colored to
reflect the vested interest of its supplier (6]. Sorting the
2
genuinely relevant information out of reams of data is an
unenviable task often far beyond the capability of an agency
with the FCC's resources.
One place market allocation appears to be generally superior
to administrative control is in the economy of information required
to guide resources to their highest valued use [1). No single en-
tity needs to know who has the greatest need or who will make best
use of a resource. All relevant information about the marginal value
of a resource to those actively competing for its use is contained in
one number--the market price, In aggregate, the amount of information
in the economy can remain -immense, but the decentralization of
decision-making eliminates the transaction cost associated with
transferring large amounts of information to a centralized authority,
and tends to ensure that decisions are based only on relevant
information [8] .
Owen set out three sericus flaws in present methods of radio
frequency allocation and assignment as follows (9]:
1) There is no formal mechanism for trading spectrum
rights among users,
2) no price is paid for use of the resource;
3) the criteria by which users are chosen are vague and,
from the standpoint of both quality and economic
efficiency, often counter-productive.
Both the first and second flaws have significant impacts upon
innovation and the development of new services that often follow it.
Spokesmen for the development of new communications services often
find themselves in conflict with the FCC over whether or not frequencie
3
`.
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will be allocated to potential new, but as yet non-existent,
services. They correctly perceive that failure to secure frequency
allocations now for future services may preclude those services
from coming into being. Without some assurance that these alloca-
tions can be obtained, people hesitate to invest in development
and construction of equipment that would be rendered useless by
shortages of usable frequencies.
One cause of this dilemma is the effective nontransferability
of either present or future radiation rights 110]. Under the present
system, there is often no incentive for old users to yield to new,
even when the new user would be willing to pay the older user much
more than the value that the old user would assign to his unit of
spectrum. If old users perceived spectrum use as having a price,
either because they paid a fee, or because they could have all or
part of their radiation rights bought out by new users, then there
would indeed be an incentive for old services to yield use of the
spectrum to more valuable new services. Iii such a world, providers
of new services would know that, when the time came, they would be
able to obtain frequencies. The only uncertainty would be over what
the price would be (even this uncertainty could be reduced by an
appropriate futures contract with a present user'). From the stand-
point of risk, this would be preferable to the current system,
where the new service has no assurance that spectrum with the de-
sired characteristics can he obtained in the desired amounts, re-
gardless of its willingness to pay the price.
4
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Certain impl cations of nontransferability of any rights can
be i)l+ -nod from the following proposition. derived from welfare
economics:
If any number of parties enter into a transaction of their
own volition, and if the transact:-n has only nonnegative
impac.:-, on nonparticipating parties, then social welfare
is. unambiguously increased by the transaction.
If there is a nonparticipating party on which there is an adverse
(negative) impact. it may still be possible to expand the definition
of the transaction to include compensation to this party and satisfy
the above criterion. If parts of such expanders transactions are allowed
to be only potential k that is, transactions that could take place but
w.n't necessarily) then the above becomes the familiar "Kaldor Criterion"
[ill.
if transactions of the type ibove .ire blocked, as present coor ynuni-
cations law dictates that they are, then society has foregone an in-
crease in its welfare. This is the primary reason for the economist's
interest in the Oortekminas of current radio frequency allocation
methods.
In a world of perfect markets, all transactions would btu of the
Type described above (to be perfect, impacts upon nonpartic-,pants
should he stric tiY revo). Furthermore, when certain familiar assump-
tions are made ;about the preferences of the participants in this
market (nons.aturation, etc.) and transactions costs (the y are Zero or
sufficiently negiigible) then the resources allocated by the m.arkM
Wr1I be AliOCAted in Ml 00011010CAIIY NttlClent manner.	 Ihrs
h
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economically efficient allocation of resources is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for maximization of social welfare
(however, within reason, it may be defined. Arriving at this
definition is the essence of the political problem.).
The stated proposition can be applied even when markets are
imperfect, though greater scrutiny of a transaction's effects upon
the welfare of third parties is generally required. The presence
of monopolies may tend to create more equity and externality prob-
lems, but it is still possible, within these constraints, to define
certain resource allocations as being "better" or "worse" than
others.
Besides inhibiting transfer of rights, "zero price" spectrum
use reduces incentive to economize on its use. Thus, spectrum (and
orbit too) is always perceived as being in short supply. NASA, for
example, sets out the coning saturation of limited spectrum and
geostationary orbit resources as the motivation for initiating a
research and development program to open the 20/30 GHz band to use
by communications satellites. Technologies that make use of the
resource more extensive (for example, higher power traveling wave
tubes making higher frequencies usable) and more intensive (multi-
beam antennas, digital compression, etc.) are seen as a way to
increase the resource supply, and thus close the gap between supply
and demand. Others, however, have noted a tendency of technology
based efforts to increase supply to also increase demand, by making
new services possible (121. Thus, the technologist becomes much
like the dog chasing its tail--running faster and faster but never
quite catching up.
6
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This perceived shortage is a consequence of the fact that
no price is paid for use of the resource. In a properly function-
ing market, no shortage would exist. In such a world, NASA would
see its objective not as closing the gap between supply and demand,
but as lowering the resource cost to the user (or, alternatively,
expanding the number of services that can be offered on a profit-
able basis). Also, there would be greater incentive for private
sector users to develop ways to use the resource more intensively,
since this would directly benefit them financially. NASA's emphasis
would probably shift towards (higher risk) extensive development.
Finally, conventional cost-benefit analysis will tend to mis-
estimate the return on communications R&D. Many of the "benefits"
measured by such analyses are, in part, measures of the test of
misallocating a resource.
	
Many of the services now excluded (or
limited) by the present spectrum allocation and assignment process
may have greater value than some of those included (a frequently
cited example of what appears to be such a case is land mobile
radio vs. UHF television frequency allocations). Likewise, costs
associated with some high value services now operating will be
overestimated due to their being required to use a suboptimal mix
of inputs. If the resource were allocated in a manner that was
"economically efficient," then one could be sure that it was only
marginal services whose costs and benefits were being compared, and
that all cost estimates were being based on optimal input mixes.
As it is now, most studies of this sort are largely "stabs in the
dark."
7
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b. Economically Efficient Spectrum Use
The word "efficiency" is generally used in several different
contexts, often leading to confusion. For example, some engineers
characterize efficient spectrum use as accomplishment of a given
task by use of technology that minimizes required bandwidth, power,
and area of unwanted spillover. Under this definition, efficient
use of the resource is identified with minimum possible use, even
though such minimal use would require state-of-the-art (expensive)
technology across the board.
Another (and I would argue more reasonable) approach to judg-
ing efficiency of spectrum use invokes economic efficiency as the
chief criterion. Economic efficiency is characterized by optimum
use of all resources required for production of a given output.
Here, "optimum" means minimization of the total opportunity cost
of all inputs used to produce a given output. Opportunity cost is
defined as the value of benefits foregone by not employing a given
input (i.e., spectrum) in its best alternative use. As an aside,
it can be noted that, in a perfect market economy, aggregate oppor-
tunity cost minimization corresponds to aggregata profit maximiza-
tion [13]. If the total opportunity cost of all inputs used in a
production process exceeds the value of output, then the activity
in question is unprofitable relative to other possible activities;
thus, one expects resources to flow to the other (more profitable)
activities.
Economic efficiency criteria treat spectrum as just one of
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substituted for each other. For example, one can use less spectrum
by using more sophisticated technology, and vice versa. to deciding
how much of each to use, the producer (here a common carrier or
broadcaster) compares the relative cost of each, and then alters
the mix of inputs so as to minimize total cost.
Under the present allocation methods, the cost of spectrum use
to the user (zero, assuming one can get the assignment) does not
reflect the opportunity cost kwhich is greater than zero, since use
of a g iven frequency necessarily excludes certain other potentially
worthwhile uses of the same frequency in the same area). The result
of this is that common carriers, broadcasters and other users of the
spectrum are motivated to substitute greater spectrum use, which
they perceive as cost-free, for use of more expensive technologies
that reduce or eliminate spectrum use. At the same time, potential
spectrum users who cannot yet an assignment from thf Federal Communi-
catins Commission (FCC) are forced to substitute alternative resources
in the production of the goods or services they wish to provide, or
forego production altogether. lender the FCC's current allocation
and assignment scheme. there is nothin g to ensure that spectrum is
allocated among potential users in such a way as to maximize its con-
tribution to society's aggregate economic product, and good reason
to believe that it is not.
The solution to this problem is not, as is often proposed, to
accommodate all possible users of the spectrum by use of technology
sophisticated enough to allow everyone who wishes to use the spectrum
to do so. This kind of approach seeks to reduce the opportunity cost
g
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of spectrum use to zero by substitution of other resources (such
as more sophisticated equipment), but fails to recognize that this
requires an increase in the opportunity cost of the other resources
used in the production of a specified level of output. The total
opportunity cost of all inputs is unlikely to be minimized by such
an approach.
the best (in the sense of economically efficient) solution to
the spectrum allocation problem can only be achieved if the cost
of spectrum use to the user can be made to reflect its opportunity
cost. If this could be achieved, competitive economic forces would
then tend to push spectrum assignments into the hands of these
groups or individuals making the most economically productive use of
the resource.
If the cost of the spectrum use truly reflected opportunity
cost, spectrum use L,v new industries (such as a Land Mobile ar
Broadcast Satellite Service) that proved to be more profitable than
existing uses would drive up the cost of spectrum use to the point
where the existing users would be forced to reduce or eliminate
their use. Thus, new communications services would not face uncer-
tainty about whether or not spectrum assignments could be acquired
that might otherwise stifle their growth.
There are a number of ways in which the cost of spectrum use
could conceivably be made to reflect opportunity cost. Among these
are institution of t free market for spectrum where assignments can
be bought and sold, institution of a spectrum use fee by a centralized
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market's approach alleged drawback resides in the difficulty of
defining and enforcing spectrum property rights (although it can
be effectively argued that this same problem plagues the current
system). The drawback to centralized allocation with usage fees
is that an overwhelming amount of information is required in order
to accurately calculate fees that reflect opportunity cost (the
shadow pricing problem).
Nevertheless, definite improvement in the current FCC alloca-
tion and assignment process can very likely be achieved, even
though a "best of all possible worlds" solution may be impossible.
Allowing parties now holding licenses to openly buy and sell all
or part of their frequency assignments would institute market char-
acteristics tending to lead to more efficient spectrum utilization.
In spite of the evident merit of applying such market mechanisms
to the allocation of spectrum, however, there remain some tradi-
tional objections that must be addressed (14].
c. The Property Rights Problem
It is generally agreed that market mechanisms cannot be
successfully introduced into spectrum allocation without first
arriving at a workable definition of spectrum property rights. It
has been argued that transferable rights for a resource as ethereal
as the radio spectrum could become very complicated indeed. For
example, determination of who is liable for interference experi-
enced by a certain party would not be trivial in the case where the
interference is caused by intermodulation (although, again, this is
11
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no different from the current situation). However, it would be
premature to conclude, based on this alone, that enforcement costs
[151 for transferable spectrum property rights need be prohibitively
high.
The relatively low cost of enforcing property rights in more
"concrete" resources, such as land, does not result from the defi-
nition of these property rights being any simpler than those proposed
for spectrum. A small amount of reflection on the nature of land
property rights reveals that they are, in fact, a very complicated
set of rights, none of which are absolute in nature. For example,
landowners may keep trespassers out, but not kill them; grow corn,
but not marijuana; make noise, but not so much that their neighbors
can never sleep. Zoning laws make these rights even more restric-
tive. Land property rights are never exclusive in the sense of
society abdicating all control over land use.
It is not so much the level of complexity in a right's defini-
tion that determines enforcement costs, but certainly what the right
entails. If A uses B's land without B's authorization, there is
little doubt that a court will find A liable for damages to B. Cer-
tainly about what the outcome of an adjudication will be tends to
deter events of this kind from occurring. The disputes most likely
to end up in court are those associated with fuzzy delineation of a
right. For example, the level of noise A is allowed to make on his/her
property is generally not well defined. If A's turbine test facility
is sufficiently close to neighbor B's recording studio, one expects
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precision in the definition of property rights would go far
towards keeping spectrum users out of court.
The other component significantly affecting enforcement cost
is the cost of detection. In the land rights example, it was
reasonable to assume that B would detect A's violation of B's
property right with high probability at very little cost. However,
if the probability of detecting A's violation (and identifying A
as the offender) is sufficiently low, and the penalty incurred by A
upon being detected is sufficiently low, one might expect A to vio-
late B's right even when it is certain that A would lose to B in an
adjudication.
This last problem can be formally illustrated in the following
manner:
a = state of the world in which A's violation
goes undetected;
b = state of the world in which no violation
takes place;
c = state of the world in which A is caught
and punished;
p = the probability A assesses of being caught;
u(x) = utility of state of the world x.
Making the assumption that U(a)>U(b)>U(c), construct the func-
tion (1-p)U(a)+pU(c). This is A's expected utility of violating
B's right, and is a strictly decreasing function of p. Furthermore,
there exists a p between 0 and 1 such that U(b)>(1-p)U(a)+pU(c) fcr
all probabilities greater than p. That is, above some minimum proba-
bility of detection, A will not wish to violate B's right. If one
accepts the notion that the perceived probability of detection tends
13
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to be positively correlated with society's actual expenditure on
detection, then one can conclude that an increase in this expendi-
ture will tend to decrease the number of people violating other
people's rights. Whether the expenditure that maximizes the net
social dividend (defined as the value of the provisions prevented
minus the cost of detection) will be within reasonable limits is
an as yet unresolved question for spectrum rights.
Also, observe that an increase in the penalty for a violation
would decrease U(c) and, therefore, the minimum detection probabil-
ity above which A would not violate B's rights. Thus, under both
the current and market techniques for spectrum allocation, there is
some flexibility in that hi gher penalties can be. to some extent,
substituted for detection capability, thereby lowering enforcement
costs (161.
DeVan y et al. (1 7 1 have proposed definition of spectrum property
rights in terms of hours of transmission. in and out of band limits
on radiated power outside a specified geographical area, ,end band-
width. The notion is that property rights defined in these "output"
terms would be much easier to transfer in whole or part than rights
specified in terms of inputs, such as transmitter power or antenna
height. In the case of satellites, system performance requirements
are alread y defined in terms of limits on power-flux-density (PFD)
over specified geographical areas. This closely approximates the
Time-Area-Spectrum (TAS) property right advocated by DeVan y et ai..
though additional complications are ithtroduced by the possibility
of interference on earth to space transmissions, especially when the
14
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power levels of these uplinks differ significantly. These
additional complications manifest themselves in the form of
the resource called "orbit." Segments of the geostationa ry arc
in spare are the counterpart of areas of geographical coverage
on earth. Any discussion of satellite systems must account for
both.
d. Spectrum Monopoly
Besides enforcement costs, concern has been voiced over the
strong possibility that markets in radio frequencies would be
largely monopolized by the national broadcasting networks in some
bands, and by AT&T in others, in an attempt to squeeze out competi-
tion. This tendency could be especially severe in the case of ATV
where regulated rate of return monopoly services could be used to
cross-subsidize services offered in competitive markets. In princi-
ple, AT&T might attempt to squeeze out competitors by buying up
spectrum, thereby raising its price to competitors and reducing the
volume of services they are able to offer. The standard response
to this concern--that antitrust laws can respond to such efforts in
the usual manner--is not entirely satisfactory in a time when many
large corporations have already demonstrated the capability to drag
such proceedings out for years. It would be far preferable to avoid
this situation if at ail possible.
On the other hand, there are numerous ways in which the tele-
phone company can cross-subsidize services without resortinc to
spectrum hoarding at all. Spectrum hoarding would succeed as a
15
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squeeze out technique either by completely excluding competitors
from use of the spect, ,um or by forcing them to charge higher prices,
allowing the monopoly to undercut them. Total exclusion would seen
to make what is occurring too obvious. Hoarding just enough to
drive up the competition's prices to where they can be undercut
would seem to be a roundabout way of achieving something that cot-ld
be more easily achieved without hoardirg spectrum (i.e. instead of
buying up spectrum to hold idle, why not just directly undercut the
competition's price?).
Finally, it is not clear that a spectrum market heavily domi-
nated by a regulated monopoly would be worse than the current situ-
ation, nor is it clear that the AT&T monopoly is any more constrained
by the current FCC from undesirable market practices than they would
be if spectrum were allocated by the market place. There is no
reason to believe that monopoly or oligopoly could not be just as
effectively regulated within the context of a market system as with-
out. This particular objection is largely beside the point.
e. Equipment Lifetimes
An oft-cited argument for maintaining the status quo is that the
rigidity of present spectrum allocation methods is necessary to pro-
tect they integrity of investment in long-lived radio equipment. The
fallacy of this argument lies in the failure to distinguish between
the "technical" and "economic" lifetime of equipment. Technical
lifetimes may be very long indeed, but it is the economic lifetime
that is relevant in econon;c decisions. Tax and depreciation policies
16
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in the United States, coupled with the rate of innovation and
resulting shifts in demands, tend to make the economic lifetimes
of most technologies significantly shorter than their technical
lifetimes. Innovation in the computer industry, for example, has
been so rapid that most machines are scrapped and replaced long
before there is any danger of their wearing out.
Economic decisions always involve the comparison of present
and expected future alternatives in the present moment. One does
not continue to fly Ford tri-motors simply because the equipment
has not worn out if conditions of demand are such that the profita-
bility of flying jet aircraft is greater. In fact, one of the
strongest arguments against the rigidity of the present system may
be that it stifles innovation in communications by favoring existing
users at the expense of innovative new users. Airlines wishing to
fly new aircraft have little difficulty obtaining pilots or fuel
used by airlines operating older aircraft when conditions of demand
warrant it, but anybody wishing to offer a new radio service may
have great difficulty obtaining spectrum from existing users,
even when the demand for the new service is high.
f. Indirect Prices for Resource Use
A not uncommonly heard objection to pricing spectrum use per
se is that users already pay an indirect price through their invest-
ment in radio equipment and operating expenses. However, attempting
to apply this argument to other analogous situations in the economy
reveals its weakness. Cars and gasoline, for example, like radio
17
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equipment and radio spectrum, are both complements aoa substitutes
(i.e., more fuel efficient cars can be substituted for greater
gasoline consumption, yet the two are always used together). One
would be on very weak ground indeed if one attempted to argue that,
because people must buy cars to use gasoline, charging a price of
zero for gasoline would not lead to inefficient use of the resource.
Based on this premise, one could make a strong case that the govern-
ment should cempletely subsidize gasoline use for reasons of equity.
If any conclusion can be reached from the ongoing debate over
the viability of spectrum markets, it is that further theorizing is
unlikely to resolve the question. The economic case has been made.
Just as the theoretical physicist must at some point take predic-
tions to the laj-, ratory before further theoretical progress can be
made, so it is that economists, both pro and con, must attempt an
"experiment" on the viability of spectrum markets before confidence
can be placed in their conclusions. Such an experiment for land
mobile radio services has already been proposed by Dunn and Owen
(181. Along these lines some thoughts on how market techniques
could be applied to the assignment of orbit-spectrum to satellites
are presented in the next section of this paper.
II. MARKET ALLOCATION OF ORBIT-SPA"TRUM FOR SATELLITE SERVICES
At the time the first man-made earth-orbiting satellites were
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of communication satellites that has occurred. Yet, problems
resulting from this rapid growth illustrate the drawbacks in the
current method of frequency allocation and assignment. There are
few places where the need for administrative flexibility is more
apparent than in the allocation and assignment of frequencies to
services undergoing rapid technologically induced changes.
From the standpoint of system performance, optimum frequencies
for satellites lie between about 1 and 10 gigahertz--the so-called
"space window." Because this part of the spectrum was already
heavily occupied by the time communication satellites went into
service, only one of the three bands currently allocated to communi-
cation satellites falls within this region (4/6 gigahertz band).
Thc other two bands (12/14 gigahertz and 20/30 gigahertz) require
substantially higher transmission powers to overcome effects of
atmospheric attenuation. Of these, the 12/14 gigahertz band is only
now cominq into use while the technology to make the 20/30 band use-
able remains in the future. It is highly doubtful that the present
approach to frequency allocation has minimized the aggregate cost of
providing all services, both space and terrestrial, using frequen-
cies above one gigahertz.
Betore proceeding with the discussion of orbit and frequency
allocation for satellite services, it is necessary to consider the
international context of the orbit-frequency allocation and assigned
problem.
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocates fre-
quencies to services on a worldwide basis. This is achieved through
Iq
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administrative radio conferences in which ITU member nations attempt
to arrive at a consensus as to how radio frequencies will be used.
Because its success is based on consensus politics, the ITU
must attempt to minimize the international constraints on domestic
decisions about frequency use within a particular country. The
United States, for one, has traditionally argued for the maximum
flexibility in determination of how a nation will use frequencies
within its borders. Services offered in one part of the world fre-
quently will not even exist in another part. Consequently, strict
worldwide allocation of frequencies would lead to tremendous waste
in resource use.
The U.S. is fortunate in the respect that, within its region
of the world, only a handful of nations are in potential conflict
over use of orbit and spectrum. This contrasts with the European
situation where many developed nations are concentrated within a
relatively small geographical region. Thus, it was tentatively con-
cluded by a 1974 Rand Corporation report that, except for Canada,
the probable demand for satellite systems of other countries in the
western hemisphere (ITU Region Z) can be met without special coordi-
nation with U.S. systems 1191. In fact, most of the orbital arc best
suited for use by South American nations does not coincide with seg-
ments best suited for U.S. and Canadian systems.
If this conclusion is indeed true, then reliance on market tech-
niques for domestic satellite orbit-spectrum assignment becomes a
much simpler political problem internationally than if domestic and
international assi gnments cannot be decoupied. More is said about
this shortly.
0
While people tend to describe satellite systems in terms of
the services they provide, it is often useful to think of them
purely in terms of their system characteristics.. Nigh-powered
satellites, such as those being considered for space broadcasting,
offer the possibility of small diameter (less sensitive) earth
station antennas, thus allowing for systems employing many rela-
tively cheap earth stations. Systems in the fixed satellite ser-
vice generally employ relatively few earth stations using large
diameter (more sensitive) antennas and low powered satellites.
Interference between the two types of systems tends to be more
severe than interference between systems of the same type. Two
reasons for this are, 1) even though larger antennas have rela-
tively high gains, they also have sidelobes that can be illuminated
by interfering satellites and, 2) when the interfering satellite is
transmitting a higher power density than the satellite transmitting
the desired signal, then illumination of the sidelobe results in
relatively more interference noise in the receiver.
Approaches to sharing between services using the two system
types described have been studied relatively extensively and are
fairly well understood [201. The unsolved problem lies not in how
to share between the two services but in how to determine, on the
basis of future utility, how much orbit-spectrum must be received
for each. If the future demand and course of technological develop-
ment for each service could be predicted with certainty, there would
be no problem in deciding how much orbit-spectrum to allocate to
each service at any given time. The difficulty arises both fi ,m the
21
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likelihood that one service--the fixed satellite service, will grow
more rapidly within the next feu, years than the other--the broadcast
satellite service, and from uncertainty about what technologies will
become available to alleviate sharing problems between the two.
One question one might ask is: Should spectrum be held idle
for the future use of a service that might possibly come into
existence but is not certain to do so? Holding spectrum idle neces-
sarily excludes its use by currently viable services. The opportun-
ity costs incurred may very well outweigh the discounted future
benefits of the service for which the spectrum is being reserved.
It is unlikely that a satellite service expected to come into exis-
tence many years down the road could be justified if this were to
require that a significant amount of usable spectrum be held idle
for this entire period.
At least one person, Dr. Charles Jackson, has propose a world-
wide orbit-spectrum market for satellites [21]. Under th o ;tkson
proposal, orbit-spectrum rights are preallotted to each ITll nation.
Nations may then lease their rights (which specify a band of frequen-
cies and a certain number of degrees of the geostationary arc loca-
tionally unspecified) to the highest bidder through a market run by
an international body (the IFRB). The rent from the lease of an
orbit-spectrum right goes to its "owner." Once a system operator
has acquired enough rights to protect himself from interference, he
registers his satellite system with the IFRB, just as at present.
Jackson's premise is that this approach would defuse much of
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of the orbit and spectrum by the developed nations without
requiring that economic efficiency be sacrificed. Jackson states
that, "the arguments for the necessity and possibility of a
spectrum market for international satellites are even stronger
than the arguments for the use of market allocation for many domes-
tic spectrum uses. Both equity and efficiency considerations are
involved in the allocation of the orbital-frequency resource. A
well designed market system should be able to separate these two
problems" [22].
Unfortunately, there is reason to question the last statement.
Much of what occurs in the international forum is heavily colored
by ideology that may not even accept the principles outlined by
Jackson and the first part of this paper. Even if orbital slots
that could be sold or leased were preallocated to every nation in a
manner deemed equitable (a proposal counter to traditional U.S.
positions), several political problems would still remain. Some
nations, initially finding relatively few buyers for their orbital
rights (and all buyers being from developed nations), might see them-
selves as victims of the monopsony power of the developed nations.
Coalitions of nations might decide that the political advantages
gained in other areas by using their allotted orbit-spectrum rights
for leverage would outwei g h the relatively small revenues they might
receive from leasing them to users.
Problems of both sorts above have stalled the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea for a number of years on the question
of deep seabed resource development. One can make a reasonable case
23
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that leasing of deep seabed tracts'by an international authority
to high technology companies for a limited term of years at a
price roughly approximating the economic rent of the activity is
an equitable way to proceed with the development of deep seabed
resources, especially when the proceeds from the lease are redis-
tributed to lesser developed nations. However, it is only recently,
after several years of negotiation, that : .ie of the lesser developed
nations have begun to acknowledge that onl- .', economic rent, and
not the entire revenue, from these activities should be subject to
redistribution. Many nations, seein g
 that they have little to gain
at best from deep seabed resource developmet-t have sought to use
the issue for political leverage. There is reason to believe that
much of the same kind of thing would make implementation of the
Jackson proposal on a worldwide scale difficult, regardless of merit.
However, it might be possible, as will be discussed. to employ a
regional or even domestic variation of the Jackson plan.
At present, three approaches to allocation of the 11.7 to 12.7
GHz (downlink) band appear to have reasonable probabilities for
adoption in ITU Region 2:
1. Rigid Allotment Plan with EIRP's, orbital spacing,
frequency assignments specified; slots, channels
assigned to nations.
2. Continuation of first-come, first-served principle;
fixed and broadcasting satellites sharing the band,
broadcasting satellites constrained to orbital arc
segments from 750 - 950 W (North America) and 1400
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3. Continuation of first-come, first-served
principle, separation of services by frequency.
The third approach listed characterizes the expected U.S.
position at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference. How-
ever, there are two ways to divide fixed and broadcast satellite
services by frequency, only one of which is acceptable to U.S.
interests. For example, the FCC's Tenth Notice of Inquiry (Docket
20271) recommended that the broadcasting satellite service be given
a primary allocation in the 12.2 to 12.75 gigahertz band (shared
with terrestrial fixed and broadcasting services), and that the
fixed satellite service be given a primary allocation in the 11.7
to 12.2 gigahertz band. This arrangement would require either a
power-flux-density limit on broadcasting satellites or a detailed
frequency coordination plan between broadcasting satellites and
terrestrial services, and would cause decreased geographical flexi-
bility. Too stringent power-flux-density limits might preclude the
use of earth terminals small enough for low-cost direct satellite-
to-home broadcasting.
While some (mostly Region 2 countries interested in satellites
primarily for broadcasting) deem this last aspect to be bad, the econ-
omist would note that if the value of the additional fixed satellite
services that can be offered because of power-flux-density limitations
outweighs the additional value of direct broadcasting from satellite
to home (as opposed, for example, to broadcast from satellite to
community area TV reception stations) then this would be the economi-
cally efficient solution. High powered broadcast satellites required
25
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for direct broadcast may require the use of more orbit and spectrum
than is justified by the additional aggregate economic value.
Lower powered broadcast satellites broadcasting to community area
TV reception stations would generally allow more fixed satellite
services to be offered in the same segment of orbit.
Although this latter solution very likely is the one that maxi-
mizes the aggregate economic value of the services using the band,
most of the benefits from this approach accrue to nations not wish-
ing to use broadcast satellites (mostly developed nations). Even
though aggregate economic value is maximized, all parties may not
be better off than under alternative schemes. Unless some way is
found to redistribute benefits among nations (Jackson's satellite
market being one possibility) under the plan proposed by the U.S.,
stiff opposition can be expected.
An alternative suggested allocation includes both broadcasting
and fixed satellites in the 11.7 to 12.75 gigahertz band, with
higher powered satellites (i.e., broadcasting) initially assigned
to the 11.7 and 12.2 band and lower powered satellites (in the fixed
satellite service) initially assigned to the 12.2 to 12.75 gigahertz
band. It has been argued that this proposal makes (technically)
efficient use of the orbit and spectrum by grouping satellites of
similar characteristics and initially constraining higher powered
satellites to those frequencies shared with few terrestrial services
(making sharing with terrestrial services easier). One objection to
this flexible assignment scheme is that accommodations for broadcast-
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services end up requiring the lower part of the band as well.
Allowing the fixed satellite service to use the lower part of the
band at all may incur international opposition from other Region 2
countries wishing to use this part of the band only for broadcasting
satellites. On the other hand, insistence by these countries that the
11.7 to 12.2 gigahertz band be held idle indefinitely, even in the
face of expanding demand for fixed satellite services, might be
unacceptable to the U.S., and very likely economically inefficient.
If frequency division of the sort proposed by the U.S. is not
adopted at WARC 79 (and this is considered by many to be unlikely),
then the U.S. will be faced with the likelihood of an orbit segmen-
tation plan (approach #2 above) or an even less desirable allotment
plan (approach #1). One conclusion from the preceding discussion
is that, however undesirable the approach ultimately adopted is, the
U.S. would be much better off if the orbit-spectrum rights adopted
are marketable (transferable) than if they are not. Then, at least,
the FCC could go into the world market to buy them or lease them
from other nations, if the domestic demand for satellite services
warranCed their doing so. If the adoption of a rigid plan appears
imminent, it might be in the best interest of the U.S. (and other
nations with similar concerns) to push for a regional market
approach.
Even if such an approach proves to be infeasible throughout
Region 2, it might still be feasible for a limited number of nations
(i.e., Canada, the U.S., Mexico, Brazil) to collude and pool their
allotments in order to achieve the maximum economic value from their
27
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allotments (the market scheme would have to, of course, distri-
bute rents so that each participating party is better off than
they would be without such an agreement, but this is one thing
the market is well suited for). Mexico, for example, could lease
their slots to a foreign party until they were ready to use it
themselves (0us, making both better off)
	 Even if no other
nations wished to participate in such a scheme, the U.S. could
still employ the market approach in domestic distribution of its
allotment. Three approaches that could be employed domestically
or regionally are described in the following pages:
Policy Option 1 - A Domestic or Regional Market for Orbital Slots
Orbit-spectrum slots are auctioned to the highest bidder. These
assignments may then be bought and sold between services if no affected
parties are bypassed. The rights auctioned could be defined in a man-
ner similar to the Time-Area-Spectrum right proposed by DeVany et al.,
but would have both earth to space and space to earth components. On
the space to earth component, both in band and out of band maximum
permissible power-flux-densities could be stated for areas outside the
designated geographical area of coverage (with the out of band limit
applying within this area as well). The earth to space component
would have analogous limits (not necessarily the same) on in band
power levels outside the designated portion of the geostationary arc
and out of band power levels generally.
Rights bought by the highest bidder would be perpetual, but
transferable. As long as nobody else's rights are affected, parties
28
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c.,,ld even agree to alter power-flux-density limits as well as the
amount of the earth's surface and geostationary arc designated by
the right [231. Furthermore, the relatively small number of systems
would make enforcement of these rights fairly easy. Thus, the fixed
satellite services, which would presumably be the initial rights
holder, could at a later date, within the limits of their ability to
share their assignment with a broadcasting party, sell all or part
of their rights to a broadcasting party for a sum of money. The
broadcasting party would presumably buy up additional orbit-spectrum
rights from fixed service parties as long as their marginal revenue
product from use of the resource exceeded that for the fixed satellite
service.
Policy Option 2 - Administered Total Services Discounted
Cost Minimization
The idea in this proposal is that both satellite services share
frequency allocations and any time a new system, whether broadcasting
or fixed, is proposed, the FCC (or the relevant multinational
regulatory authority) must include this additional system in the avail-
able orbit-spectrum at the lowest aggregate cost over all users. This
approach might require the new system to employ more expensive (spectrum
conserving) technology than had been anticipated. It could also require
previous systems using equipment requiring much orbit-spectrum to change
equipment. Which systems must change equipment depends on what combi-
nation of changes admits the new system at the lowest aggregate cost.
This policy option is essentially the approach proposed by Lusignan
and Russell, in which the party that saves the most gigahertz-degrees
29
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per dollar expended is the party required to conserve spectrum.
It differs from coordination (the current procedure for transfer
of orbit-spectrum rights) in the respect that no transfer payments
between parties need take place for the efficiency of use to be
improved. Thus, earlier users need not receive scarcity rents at
the expense of later users, as is now the case. Unfortunately, in
order for the Lusignan-Russell scheme to work, regulatory authori-
ties must have all the information about technological options and
costs available for each satellite system. It is questionable
whether this is even remotely possible, and it is the aut!ior's
opinion that the information problems associated with administra-
tive remedies in general probably make the Lusignan-Russell proposal
less attractive than the other more market-oriented policy options
presented in this paper.
Policy Option 3 - Leased Rights Distributed by Auction
This proposal is similar to Option 1, except that rights are
leased by the central authority rather than sold outright. In fact,
the two could be mixed in a hybrid "bonus bid/royalty" scheme if
this were deemed desirable.
The lease rate would be a floating rate adjusting continuously
to the market value of assignments in the relevant part of the spec-
trum. This, unlike the outright market sale, would ensure that the
go,?erning authority accrues all "windfalls" (which, however, could
be negative should the market price decline).
One argument favoring this approach over the outright market
sale is that bureaucratic organizations would be much more prone to
30
reexamine their resource needs if they leased rather than bought
spectrum. On the other hand, leasing at a floating rate would
burden the user with uncertainty over future prices that would not
be faced in an outright sale. Businesses will generally pay a pre-
mium to reduce uncertainty about the environment in which they
expect t3 be operating, especially when they are contemplating
longer-term investments. Furthermore, prices would have to increase
dramatically for a trite windfall to occur in an outright sale of
spectrum assignments. Nevertheless, this option offers an alterna-
tive for those who feel that any kind of windfall accruing to a pri-
vate party under any conditions is unacceptable.
In fact, the choice of lease or sell could conceivably be based
on the particular nature of the parties involved. Alternatively,
leasing together with encouragement of options or futures contracts
could be employed. Under either system, coalitions of parties offer-
ing different services that could share an assignment would be capa-
ble of offering higher bin's than a single service that excluded the
use of all other services 'rcv that part of the orbit spectrum. Both
would tend to lead to more efficient use of the resource.
Several observations can be made about the three policy options
described above. First, economic efficiency need not be coupled to
distributional equity. In fact, because economically efficient use
maximizes the aggregate economic value derived, it is possible that
nations participating in an economically efficient allocation scheme
could all be better off than they would be under an inefficient
31
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alternative (such as nontransferable nation by nati
of channels and orbital slots). This last observation suggests
the possibility of multilateral collusion to adopt market or quasi-
market techniques in ITU Region 2 for assignment of orbit-spectrum.
Such a scheme could even be embedded by agreeing nations within
the rigid plan being advocated by some nations, provided transfera-
bili_jy of allotted orbital slots or frequencies is maintained. Stich
an approach should be examined as a possible fallback, should U.S.
positions at WARC 79, or at the proposed 1983 Region 2 conference
be rejected.
A more important observation is that all three schemes give
the designers/operators of satellite systems the incentives to
make correct trade-offs between technology and orbit-spectrum re-
source use--incentives that are either absent or distorted in the
present (zero-price rationing) administrative approach. Instilling
the correct incentives will be especially important if the number of
satellite orbital slots available to the U.S. is severely limited
by international orbit-wide planning. In fact, it is possible that
the same mechanisms that instill these incentives (payment of scar-
city rent by users) could play a role in reducing the attractiveness
of such worldwide planning evin to those nations most enamoured with
it. Once the appearance of users gettin g something for nothing is








Orbit-Spectrum is the only commercially useful space resource
developed by mankind so far, hut, hopefully, not the last. For
those who believe other space resources will indeed be developed,
orbit-spectrum serves as a useful protot ype highlighting some of
the problems development of other space resources can expect to
encounter.
Fifty years ago, orbit-spectrum was a worthless resource.
Today. this is far from being the case, as the continuing political
conflict between nations over its allocation so vividly illustrates.
Many of the lesser-developed nations have demanded that they be
apportioned their fair share of the resource. even though they have
no real intentin., of using it themselves. But, what made this once
worth l ess resource so valuable?
The answer to this last question is, of course, technology--
specifically. technology developed by a handful of industraiized
nations. One mi g ht argue that, since orbit-spectrum is a nondeplet-
able resource made useful only by the investment of these nations,
it is onl y fair that they use it as they see fit. According to this
view. leasing of orbital slots through an international authority
would lead to accrual of eco ►-nmic rents b y lesser developed countries
(LDC's) not truly darned--thus. a leasing arrangement would be really
quite generous to the LDC's.
Unfortunately, the LDC's don't see it this wa y . Some believe,
riqhtly ov wrongly, that the wealth of the industrialid-ed nations was
33
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accumulated b y exploitation of what are now lesser developed
nations during the colonial period. They view orbit-spectrum as
one of many "common heritage" resources (i.e.. not by their loca-
tion naturall y belonging to any one nation) that should be evenly
distributed among the nations of the earth, but are likely to be
appropriated by the (first-come) industrial " nations. That the
resource is now rationed free of charge strongly reinforces the
plausibility of the view that a "common heritage" resource is being
unjustly appropriated by the industrialized nations
An international leasinq market would result in income redistri-
bution that might defuse the militance characterizinq
 same LOC's
rocentl y
 but riot destrov the incentives of the industralized ►►ations
to continue technological development improvin g resource utilization.
It would be naive to believe. given whet has transpired in the
case of the first renewable space resource, that the U.S. would not
receive a great deal of political heat for exploiting nonrenewable
space resources. such as space minerals. Any future "space policy"
must be prepared to address this problem on at least the rhetorical
level, thouuh it's not so far-fetched to imagine world politics
leading to the creation of an international authority to lease space
mineral rights 1461.
The ether question of interest only briefly discussed in the
body of the paper concerns how the channeling of research and devel-
ottoivnt funds is affected by the assessment of a resource's value.
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a tendency to improperly c,mpare different parts of the same
resource. For example, tine 30/20 gigahertz band is not as
easily usable (hence valuab l e) as the 6/4 band. Yet, the two
are described as almost perfect substitutes in R&D discussions.
Proper valuation would give a better measure of the return on
both extensive and intensive development, and thereby a better
idea of where to spend public R&D moneys.
35




I. Rather arbitrarily defined as frequencies between 0 and 300
gigahertz (GHz). 1 gigahertz = 1 billion cycles per second.
2. The word "allocation" has two meanings in this paper. The
usual meaning refers to the distribution of economic resources
in general. The specific meaning refers to the process by
which classes of services are allotted a region within the
spectrum. It is hoped that which meaning is intended will be
clear from the context.
3. Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 contains essen-
tially the same language.
4. Ronald Coase argues that the Congress overreacted by passing
the Radio Act of 1927, adopting a solution far more encom-
passing than avoidance of destructive interference required.
He argues that the courts would have, in time, arrived at a
workable definition of radiation rights optimizing the level
of destructive interference even with no legislation at all.
Coase, Ronald H., "The Federal Communications Commission,"
Journal of Law and Economics, II (Oct., 1959). Charles
Jackson counters that the importance of interference-free
radio communications to the safety of maritime operations (the
primary user of radio spectrum in the early part of the century)
and the then relative simplicity of an administrative solution
(prior to an era when billions of dollars could hinge on the
outcome of a decision, or for that matter, when s pectrum was
even noticeably scarce) makes the "press for goverment monopoly
more understandable." Jackson, Charles L., "Technology for
Spectrum Markets," PH.D. Dissertation, MIT, 1976.
5. Descriptions of the allocation and assignment process appear in
Coase, op. cit., and Robinson, John 0., "An Investigation of
Economic Factors in F.C.C. Spectrum Management," F.C.C. Report
No. SAS 76-01.
6. A discussion of this information overload problem appears in
Robinson, Glen 0., "F.C.C.: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs,"
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, 1978.
7. There are, of course, a number of nontrivial assumptions being
made here about what constitutes "highest value" in a social sense.
However, even when social value is somehow determined to differ
from market price, there are still ways to employ market mecha-
nisms, and their attendant information economies, to the distribu-
tion of resources. For a discussion of this problem see Schultz,
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8. In fact, many view pricy
 systems as nothing more than a
highly efficient information system serving to promote
mutually beneficial transactions between parties.
9. Owen, Bruce M. "Spectrum Allocation: A Survey of Alterna-
tive Methodologies," Office of Telecommunications Policy
Staff Paper, April, 1972.
10. Coase, in a footnote on page 27 of his article (op. cit.
note 4), remarks that his most fundamental complaint is
that certain desirable market transactions are impossible
under current law.
11. Henderson and Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, 2nd ed., p. 279,
McGraw Hill, 1971.
12. Robinson, John 0. "Introduction to Economic Factors into
Spectrum Management," Masters Thesis, p. 28, Annenberg
School of Communications, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1974.
13. Note that opportunity cost minimization is not the same as
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U(b*)>(1-q)U(b)+gt(1-p)U(a)+pU(c)J
If a depends on q in an appropriate way (i.e., q>O then a>O
and b*>b) and U(a)>U(b)>U(c), then there will always be a p
between 0 and 1 such that for all probabilities greater than
this p, A will expend a to guarantee that he is violating no-
body's rights. If feelings of guilt accom pany a violation
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16. (continued)
of somebody else's rights then it may be that U(b)>U(a).
If this were true for everybody in society, then, according
to the simple model, no violations would occur, even if
society spent nothing on detection (p-o). Thus, the social
purpose of guilt may be largely that of keeping enforcement
costs down.
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Journal of Political EconMy, , pp. 169-217, March-April, 1968.
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XXI, pp. 1499-1561, June, 1969.
18. Dunn, Donald A., & Owen, Bruce M. "Policy Options in Mobile
Radio Spectrum Management, Report to the F.C.C., Sept., 1978.
19. Reinhart, Edward E. "Orbit-Spectrum Sharing Between the
Fixed-Satellite and Broadcasting-Satellite Services with Appli-
cations to 12 GHz Domestic Systems," NASA Report R-1463, p. 189,
May, 1974.
20. For- example, Reinhart's report, previously noted.
21. Jackson, Charles L. "Technology for Spectrum Markets," Ph.D.
Thesis. p. 71 ff., MIT, 1976.
Ibid 21.LL.
23. How negotiations of this kind might be effected is extensively
described in the article by DeVanv, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, and
Scott, referred to in note 17.
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Compatibility, Vol. EMC-19, No. 3. p. 351, Aug., 1977.
25. This approach is discussed in detail by Jackson in "Technology
for Spectrum Markets," op. cit. note 21.
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26. For those to whom this seems too "far out," I would
only point out that the same could have been said 100
years ago about the idea that apportionment of deep
seabed resources would someday become the politically
heated issue it has in fact become in recent delibera-
tions at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea.
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Market-like techniques have been advocated as substitutes for direct
regulation of the radio spectrum. However, one of the most frequent objec-
tions to such techniques is that they are technically unworkable because of
the complexities associated with assuring electromagnetic computability
between spectrum users. This paper reports on an existing technique of
spectrum management: "frequency coordination." Although many spectrum
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institutionalizes an implicit economic market, with attendant property
rights, and thus promotes economically as well as technically efficient
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INTRODUCTION
It is striking how often professionals from different disciplines,
while considering the same problem, emphasize different aspects of its solu-
tion. Such is the case, we believe, with formal frequency coordination
procedures, particularly those used by the Fixed and Fixed-satellite ser-
vices in the 4 and 6 GHz frequency bands. Most engineers see frequency
coordination rules as a practical way of ensuring technically efficient
spectrum use. In short, the riles are technologists' response to a tech-
nical problem.
The authors, however, see frequency coordination as an economic activ-
ity with some technical aspects. As we explain below, the rules of fre-
quency coordination institutionalize an implicit market in "property
rights." The cumulative effect of the frequency coordination process is to
transfer these rights to the users whc value them the most. This is an
economically efficient outcome even though it is not achieved using a formal
market arrangement, such as an auction. In short, although technical and
economic etficiency are different concepts, I we believe frequency coordina-
tion promotes both. Indeed, as far as we know, it provides one of the few
successful working examples of an economically efficient technique for spec-
trum management. As such, it deserves consideration when procedures must be
devised for ensuring electromagnetic compatibility in new services.
Economic techniques for spectrum management are often thought to
involve formally organized markets. In recent years auctions [21 "shadow
prices" ((31[4](51), markets of "output rights" [61, geostationary "orbital





VOLUME H, PART III.A.2
organized markets are not the only possible, useful spectrum management
technique. Economically efficient use has much more to do with use than
with markets. Loosely, economic efficiency means obtaining a good or ser-
vice whose quality is acceptable to its users in a least-cost manner-2
While formal markets can be shown theoretically to promote such use, less
highly structured arrangements can also serve this purpose. In fact, the
earliest proposals for economically efficient spectrum use [91,[101
envisioned markets operating more along the lines of frequency coordination
than did later proposals.
From an economic standpoint, frequency coordination (as a requirement
for the issuance of a construction permit and license) works becauas,
provides everyone using it with incentives to use spectrum effic ,„
Coordination's rules are based on the principle that existing users should
be protected from harmful interference caused by later users. This prin-
ciple effectively gives limited property rights in a portion of the spectrum
to whomever uses it first in a given geographic area. These rights include
permission to transmit a signal with specific technical characteristics from
a particular point. Subsequent applicants for that portion of the spectrum
must demonstrate to existing users that they will not cause interference
above a specified level to any of them. Thus, coordination assigns the
liability for harmful interference to new users, while simultaneously giving
those users a mechanism for "coordinating" (i.e., discussing and amending as
necessary) their plans with existing users. This combination of (1) well-
defined liability rules with (2) simple procedures for identifying and
resolving conflicts makes frequency coordination effective from an economic
standpoint.	 j
-2-
VOLUME II, PART III.A.2	 K3
The principles just summarized need not be restricted to the 4 and 6
GHz frequency bands or to the Fixed and Fixed -satellite services. The ideas
are transferable to other bands and services, and, in fact, recent proposals
have been made to use these ideas in Mu^tipoint Distribution Service (MDS)
[11], and in FM broadcasting ( [ 8], Chapter VI).
BACKGROUND
When communication satellites first became feasible, desirable frequen-
cies for such systems were already allocated to point-to -point microwave
relay systems operating in the Fixed service. These allocations were
heavily used in many urban areas, and it wax thought that little additional
use could be made of them. However, it soon was discovered that the tech-
.iical characteristics of the satellite and terrestrial services were suffi-
ciently different to permit earth stations to be installed not only in parts
of the country whe-e there was little Fixed service operation, but even in
congested areas white another radio-relay system could not be accommodated.
Coordination procedures to facilitate the sharing of the bands by these
services were first developed by the International Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR) of the ITU. These procedures were subsequently adopted
internationally and are currently embodied in Appendix 28 of the Radio
Regulations. These procedures have also been incorporated into the FCC
Rules and Regulations ("Rules") with only a few changes in interference
criteria and assumed system characeristics.
The F+--ed-satellite service ( FSS) shares the 500 MHz wide 4 and 6 GHz
bands ( among others) with the Fixed ( terrestrial microwave) service. To
-3-
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make such sharing possible, interference must be prevented between the two
services. Among the possible interference situations are signals from the
Fixed service (terrestrial station transmitters) to the Fixed-satellite
service (earth station receivers) and from earth station transmitters to
terrestrial station receivers. 3 These two interference cases, which are
subject to the rules for coordination provide a clear and interesting illus-
tration of the economic aspects of this technique and will be discussed
here.
International and Domestic Coordination Rules
As noted, interference between the earth stations of satellite systems
and fixed stations, and the associated requirement to coordinate the estab-
lishment of a new earth station or radio-relay station with other users, is
covered by Appendix 28 to the Radio Regulations. Appendix 28 gives a
"worst-case" method for calculating the so-called "coordination area" within
which harmful interference may occur. These calculations are based on
assumed characteristics for existing systems and the actual characteristics
of the proposed system. The Radio Regulations, which have treaty status,
then call for coordination (that is, discussion) between the operator of the
proposed new station (whether earth or terrestrial) and the operator(s) of
existing station(s) within the coordination area (whether terrestrial or
earth, respectively). However, this requirement does not set a specific
limit on how much interference a new station can cause--that is up to the
existing users in the coordination area.`'
-4-
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The FCC Rules (specifically, 47 CFR §25.203) contain :he requirement
for coordination. The procedures set forth in Appendix 28 are incorporated
in Sections 25.251-254. The Rules also require coordination with the fixed
(terrestrial) service (47 CFR §25.203(c)-(d)). The requirements for the
Fixed service [47 CFR 21.100(d)] are typical:
All applicants ... shall, before filing an application or major
amendment, ... coordinate proposed frequency usage with existing
users in the area and other applicants with previously filed
applications, whose facilities could affect or be affected by
the new proposal in terms of frequency interference or
restricted ultimate system capacity.
Thus, in the U.S. an applicant for a construction permit must
(a) determine if harmful interference may be caused to existing users,
(b) inform those users potentially affected of his plans, and if possible
(c) take whatever steps are needed to obtain these users' agreement to the
proposed operation. Under point (b), every applicant must communicate the
technical details of his proposed station to every existing user within the
coordination area with whom calculations show the possibility of harmful
interference, and obtain the concurrence of all such users in his plan.
Following the successful coordination, and the grant of a construction
permit by the FCC, the station is protected in turn.5
Effect of Coordination Calculations
Coordination distance calculations are, as noted, based on a number of
worst-case assumptions, which depend on the frequencies involved and the
state-of-the-art in the service, as well as an allowable incursion into the
noise budget of a particular type of system. Given a par`icular level of
-5-
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conflicting stations, or where the antenna pointing directions would be more
favorable. Alternatively, other alternatives could be employed:
•	 Restricting the directions in which the earth station
antenna might point (thereby limiting the orbital locations
of satellites with which the station could communicate).
•	 Restricting the frequencies on which the station would
operate (i.e., coordinate less than the full 500 MHz band,
thereby limiting the total number of channels that could be
carried by the station, and therefore both the maximum
communication capacity of the station and the flexibility
in assigning channels to and from the station and within
the system it serves),
•	 Constructing artificial barriers to transmitted and/or
received interference (e.g., pits, earthen embankments, and
metallic shielding fences), or
•	 In certain cases, ° :stalling a more directional or better
shielded antenna at the proposed and/or one or more exist-
stations.
In fact, the last remedy is embodied in the FCC Rules (47 CFR
§25.2S1(d)), which states that although a less discriminating, so-called
"Standard B" antenna may be used in areas of low-traffic density, an exist-
ing operator must install a better, "Standard A° antenna if this would
eliminate the harmful interference. However. antennas even more discrim-
inating than "Standard A" are available from several manufacturers at prices
considerably higher than "Standard A."
-7-
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1n many cases, use of such antennas oy a rixea station woula eliminate
the possibility of interference between a new station (either a fixed
terrestrial or a satellite earth station) and an existing one, but the
installation of such antennas are not required under current FCC Rules.
However, these super-directive antennas are sometimes installed with the
newcomer voluntarily paying some or all of the cost even if the antenna is
installed on an existing system. As we demonstrate below, such economically
efficient and technically desirable solutions to an interference situation
are to be expected in a market system.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COORDINATION
Having reviewed the operation of coordination, we now can use the
economic theory of property rights to analyze coordination's effects. 8 The
basic idea is simply stated: achieving economically efficient use involves
finding an allocation of goods to users in which no further gains from trade
are possible. However, before such an allocation can be found there must be
well-defined goods, and it has to be possible to trade them. The rules of
frequency coordination define a tradable good, i.e., the right to operate a
system with known characteristics, free from harmful interference.
Although we refer in this paper to "spectrum," the property rights
involved in coordination do not involve some abstract "invisible resource"
131, "ether," (suggested in [91) or a right to use some "time-area-
frequency" combination (as in [61). The rights provided under coordination
guarantee the reception at one or more receivers of the signal from a
particular transmitter which is free from harmful interference. Harmful
-8-
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interference can be prevented by any technically feasible means, including
separation of systems in space, time or frequency, but the means used are
not a part of the right. In short, an existing user has a right to a
"clear" communications channel- 9 This right must be respected by newcomers,
although the existing user is free to surrender all or part of it if this is
in his best interest. The trading of rights occurs when the characteristics
of one or both systems are modified. Since such trades are voluntary, only
those that leave at least one trader better off than without the trade will
be made. Each completed coordination thus moves one step toward more
efficient use of the spectrum.
An Example of the Economics of Frequency Coordination
To demonstate how coordination promotes efficient use, consider the
following example. Suppose the coordination calculations determine that
if an operator A builds a new earth station at some location, harmful inter-
ference will be caused to an existing Fixed system operated by B. Install-
ing a super-directive antenna on B's system to protect it from the interfer-
ence has a net cost of $100. However, if the interference is not reduced by
the antenna, A's earth station must be located at another site further from
its intended service area. The additional cost of using this location is
$200.
First, what is the economically efficient outcome? We assume, in doing
this, that costs to either A or B represent costs to society, i.e., the
value of resources diverted from some other use is $100 in one case and $200
in the other. If the antenna is installed, society is better off by $100
-9-
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(the difference between the $200 cost saving for the earth station and the
$100 cost of the antenna). Installing the antenna and allowing the new
earth station to operate is therefore the economically efficient solution to
this spectrum management problem. This solution also makes more intensive
use of the spectrum in this area, so installing the station would probably
be judged technically efficient as well. (Moreover, the performance of B's
system will often be improved in other ways than interference rejection to
A's signals: the new antenna typically increases the signal-to-noise ratio,
or the margin against fading and, hence, increases system quality or avail-
ability.)
Under the coordination rules, A is liable for harmful interference
caused to B's fixed system. When notified by A of the potential
interference, it is in B's interest to refuse to allow A to operate unless
compensated in some way by at least enough to pay for the installation of
the antenna. That is, the compensation must be worth at least $100. Since
this amount costs A less than the $200 required to relocate the earth
station, it is in A's interest to make m1rh compensation. For instance, A
may offer to install the antenna at no cost to B. Notice that if both users
act according to their self-interest the negotiations arising from coordina-
tion lead to the installation of the antenna, and the establishment of the
new earth station--the economically (and technically) efficient solution
will be achieved without regulatory intervention.
The efficient solution also will be chosen if A is the existing user of
the spectrum, and B the newcomer. In this case, however, B will choose to
-10-
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build his system from the first with the super-directive antenna, since pay-
ing the extra cost of $100 is less expensive than paying A at least $200 to
relocate his earth station.lu
Coordination when Spectrum Use is Growing
Coordination also can achieve efficient use where business growth or
new technology lead to growing spectrum use. Assume that initially the
frequency allocation in the area is unused. Coordination is trivial for the
first user to establish a station. Indeed, it will probably be easy to
accommodate many early users in thin relatively uncongested environment.
Transactions such as the antenna upgrading 'iscussed above will rarely be
needed, because each newcomer will probably be able to locate his facilities
so as to avoid interference with any existing user.
However, as the available frequencies and sites are filled with users,
coordination will require adjustments to someone's system more and more
often. These adjustments will be of the kind reviewed above--antenna
upgrades, changes in transmitter or receiver design, and so forth. In each
case, users who follow their self-interest will adopt economically efficient
solutions to their electromagnetic compatibility problems. The cumulative
effect of the individual decisions will be to substitute technological
sophistication for spectrum use in a least-cost manner.
If growth conti:.ues long enough, the intensity of spectrum use will be
as great as can be accommodated by the state-of-the-art. Specifically, no
technical alternatives will exist that are worth installing. New systems
can enter only if existing systems cease to operate.
-11-
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As far as we know. this state of affairs has nut been reached.
rllthouyh manv urban areas are highl y congested, the stead y advance of
communications technology has kept spectrum use from being completely
constrained. Nut, even if saturation occurs, coordination would still
promote efficiency. In this cave. the new s ystem's operator would have to
he willing to pay enough to persuade the operator of some existing system to
cease operation. This might he feasible, for example, if an alternative to
radio transmission such as coaxial cables or optical fibers were available
to some users at a cost below what the new operator was willing to pay.
Thus. coordination encourages economic substitution between technologies
that use spectrum and other information transmission media.
Effect of the First-Come. First-Served principle
This discussion shows that the use of spectrum will be economically
efficient, provided negotiations are possible at relativel y low cost. How-
ever, the final distribution of wealth between the operators of the differ-
ent systems is dttferent depending on who is the existing user and who is
the newcomer. In the example, R's fixed station is the earlier user, and A
must lwy N at least ;100 to effect a coordination. If A's earth station is
earlier. N would pay $100. In short, the first-came first-served principle
transfers wealth from newcom.rs to established spectrum users.
The fact that the first--come first-served principle imposes the cost of
any adjustments on newcomers is a eentral issue in the on-4oin ►, interna-
tional debate over "planning" orbit-spectrum use in the Broadcasting
Satellite service in ITV Region 2, which includes the United States. The
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above argument suggests that frequency coordination (an alternative to plan-
ning) would lead to efficient use of the available orbit-spectrum. However,
the developing countries argue that this principle may impose an unfair
hardship on them, since they are almost certainly going to be using the
resource later than the developed countries. While this paper is not the
place for a discussion of the debate over planning international orbit-
spectrum, its seems to us that efficient use and wealth-transfer ought to be
regarded as separate issues, amenable to separate solutions. In particular,
if coordination is used to promote efficient use, some arrangement that
reallocates some of the costs from newcomers to earlier users may be
required in order to achieve equity.
Is There an Incentive to Prematurely Use Spectrum?
The first-come first-served rule may provide an incentive for claiming
"rights" by building ane coordinating a system before its use is otherwise
justifiable. Obviously, an early entrant is entitled to be compensated by
latecomers, and avoids the need to make such compensation. However, the
size of the distorting incentive to premature use depends on the presenL
value of the cost of expected future modifications (and associated compensa-
tion) to the early entrant system, since these costs are avoided by early
entry. These costs avoided by early entry, however, do not seem to have
been very large in satellite systems to date.
The argument is as follows. A potential early entrant has two
choices. Early entry means that at some future time engineering changes
will be required to his system. However, the costs of these changes will be
-13-
borne by latecomers. On the other hand, if construction of the system is
delayed these changes may have to be incorporated from the start. However,
the operator will have saved any capital and operating costs associated with
the system during the time prior to its eventual use. The difference
between the test of these two alternatives measures the strength of the
incentive to be an early entrant.
This cost difference will only be significant if (1) upgrades to an
existing system are substantially less costly than changes to a proposed
system, but (2) they are nevertheless very costly in comparison to the
system's other costs. Our investigation ([8], Chapter V) indicates that
neither condition holds very often. Upgrades are seldom substantially
cheaper than design changes because continuing technological advances reduce
costs. And, most cases of coordination involve incremental, relatively
inexpensive changes such as antenna improvements. Therefore, it seems to us
that the incentive to prematurely claim spectrum through coordination,
although a theoretical possibility, is not practically important in systems
built to date.
SOME PROBLEMS WITH COORDINATION
This is not to say, however, that coordination is without problems. It
has them, although some can be ameliorated by changes in the existing rules.
Coordination over Time
One issue that needs to be addressed is the extent to which coordina-
tion leads to optimal decisions over time when there are so-called
-14-
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"irreversible" investments. We illustrate this problem using the example
introduced above, involving users A and B. Suppose that the first system
introduced is B's fixed system. Since _t is the only system, it suffers
from no interference. If B designs the system to be more resistant to
interference than is initially required (e.g., using a super-directive
antenna), the cost of this additional protection may not be very great.
However, retrofitting the system at a later date to give equivalent protec-
tion is more expensive because unanticipated changes must be made. Now, let
A's earth station be the newcomer, with a $200 cost saving if it uses its
most preferred site, which will cause harmful interference to B's system
unless it is protected.
As discussed in [S], coordination may not choose the economically
efficient outcome in this case. Whether it does so or not depends on:
1. How much more expensive retrofitting is compared to
designing the protection into the system from the
start,
2. The time lag between the start of B's operation and
the entry of A, and
3. The interest rate applicable to B's investment.
Basically, examples can be constructed where the least costly alternative
overall is for B to install protection from the beginnir:g. However, B may
have no incentive to do so. Obviously, a mechanism is needed which gives B
an incentive to install extra protection at a time when his system does not
need it.
There are several ways to provide this incentive. The FCC rule allow-
ing fixed service operators to assert protection for systems up to five
-15-
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years in advance of their operation is one way to address this problem. For
example, if A's earth station were allowed five-year advance protection (and
if it were actually optimal to install it in less than five years), A would
be willing to compensate B to build in protection ab initio. Alternatively,
if A's earth station were granted protection before B's was, B would build
in the extra protection in 3rder to operate.
Limitations on Trading
Another problem with the present rules for coordination is that it
sometimes is diffic , ilt to transfer the implicit "rights." The problem,
related to one t .c arises in water rights law ([151, Ch. 1), is as follows.
Suppose an operator A has established rights through coordination. As
noted above, these rights are to interference-free use of a particular
communications channel. Whether or not A can transfer this right to another
party B depends on how B will use them. If A's and B's uses of spectrum
were identical (and if B's use were in fact the more valued of the two), B
could "buy" A's permission to operate, and A would cease operation. The
problem arises when B's use is not identical to A's. If B plans to create
less interference than A, he may not want all of A's implicit rights. The
problem is that A cannot always retain whatever portion of his rights B
doesn't acquire. For instance, A's right; lapse if he ceases operation at
the old location--hence, he cannot be compensated for them. As a result,
eamples can be constructed where A and B are not able to reach an agreement
18).
-16-
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Of course, other users in the area presumably suffer less interference
when B replace& A. If transactions costs were truly zero, it would be
possible for all the other users of spectrum to band together and buy those
rights that B doesn't want. The coalition of other users benefits by the
reduced interference, and A is compensated for his rights in this case. But
transactions costs are not aero, and the formation of such coalitions may
violate the antitrust laws. As a result, negotiation solely between A and B
may fail to produce an efficient solution.
An attractive solution to this problem is similar to one proposed for
water rights ([151, p. 35). Under it, A's rights could be transferred in
their entirety to B, even though B didn't use all of them. B could coor-
dinate his system in the future as if it were A's. This solution allows A
and B to complete their transaction, and gives B an asset (the rights he
isn't using) to dispose of during future coordinations. This possibility is
not allo:+ed by the existing rules.
How Much Protection is Reasonable?
A third problem is a technical one: the fact that there have been few,
if any, proven cases of interference between operating satellite earth
stations and fixed terrestrial stations (8] suggests that the interference
criteria and/or propagation models used in coordination may be overprotec-
tive. The implication is that much greater use could be made of these
frequencies with only a small increase in the likelihood of interference.
An analogy from another field may be helpful in illustrating this
point: a criterion employed by bridge players is, "if you make every slam
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criteria employed to date have resulted in substantially no interference
they probably are too restrictive. The increased use which could be made of
the spectrum through relaxed criteria could be so much more productive, and
profitable, that it would outweigh the occasional instances of interference
that might result. The solution to such interference is insurance: a Lax
imposed on, or a trust-fund established by, all "interference-marginal"
newcomers (that is, applicants who do not meet the present interference
criteria) could compensate existing users for the occasional cases of inter-
ference that might result. (A fund established by all such users would be
needed, since it is often difficult, or impossible, to ascertain the source
of uninte^ligible interference received for very small percentages of time.)
EXTENDING COORDINATION TO OTHER SERVICES
We have already noted that coordination's costs are relatively small:
for example, independent coordination companies charge as little as $1500
for coordinating a simple receive-only early station [8j. But the prolif-
eration of small earth stations, and their attendent low cost, has made
coordination relatively expensive for some systems.
The FCC has responded to the proliferation of receive-only stations by
allowing such stations to operate without a license. However, unlicensed
stations receive no protection against harmful interference by newcomers.
We feel that it would be better to extend the principle of coordination to
receive-only stations by licensing them, and recording the characteristics
of the station, without requiring coordination. OFerators of receive-only
systems would thus be afforde(^ protection from later applicants for licenses
-18-
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to operate a transmitter. Since their operation cannot interfere with any
prior system, coordination calculations are unnecessary in any event.
The effect of such a rule on the current TVRO (television, receive-
only) stations would be to give them the same incentives and opportunities
available to other systems. For instance, they could not be arbitrarily
interfered with by newcomers. Instead, newcomers would have to take the use
of spectrum by receive-only stations into account, deferring to this when-
ever and wherever this is economically justified.
The incentives for efficient use provided by frequency coordination
make it attractive in other services. For instance, there are a number of
"one-to-many" services, such as the Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS)
and the broadcasting services, where one transmitter sends to a large number
of receivers. What is needed here is some way to give the operator of a
transmitter protection from harmful interference in some service area around
each transmitter. Such areas are sometimes called "protected service areas"
by spectrum mangers (e.g., [11]). Methods of calculation exist (e.g., Close
[17]) which allow realistic contours defining such areas to be drawn.
We believe that the rules for defining protected service areas should
also do two things:
1. Require newcomers to demonstrate to existing users that their
proposed operation will not generate interference that encroaches
on the existing users' protection areas.,
2. Permit existing users to allow a newcover who may encroach on a
protection area to operate, i.e., permit voluntary modification of
an existing user's protection area.
-19-
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Such rules are a part of the FCC's technical proposals for MDS in
Docket 80-113 [11]. In [8] we discuss a similar set of rules for FM broad-
casting. Both [8] and [17] present calculations showing that substantial
gains in the number of people served are possible if realistic protection
areas are used and if technical trade-offs which alter these areas are made
between existing users and newcomers.
CONCLUSION
The preceding sections have pointed out how frequency coordination
defines a system of property rights, and thereby promotes spectrum
efficiency. Despite the far from crippling problems just discussed,
coordination in practice works reasonably well. As noted above, there are
no known instances of interference in the United States, and as far as we
know there has never been a case where the FCC has had to decide on a
license application in which all coordination conflicts had not been
resolved. In our earlier study [8] we summarized discussions with a number
of members of the user community; none expressed a willingness to replace
coordination with direct regulation by a government agency such as the FCC.
Coordination provides a lesson in how to promote efficient spectrum use
that should be considered by other spectrum users. Basically, all that is
required is a workable mechanism for determining which receivers and trans-
mitters are likely to suffer from and cause harmful interference, combined
with a clear statement as to which party is responsible for correcting any
interference problem. Good information about the location and technical
characteristics of stations also needs to be provided to users, but in most
-20-
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cases, such information is available from radio license applications, or
from domestic or international records on radio assignments.
We feel that frequency coordination has a role to play in efficient
spectrum management that is too little recognized. If its key features are
adopted more widely, we believe that all users of spectrum can benefit from
the flexibility and efficiency that coordination provides.
-21-
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FOOTNOTES
1 A number of articles in a recent special issue of the IEEE Transactions on
Electromagnetic Compatibility [1] discuss this point.
2 For a discussion of technical vs. economic efficiency, see [8],
Chapter II.
3 Typically a terrestrial station will operate in either `he 6 or 6 GHz
bands. On the other hand, a transmit/receive satellite earth station must
use both bands and will therefore need to coordinate, and be licensed for
operation in both 4 and 6 GHz.
4 While CCIR Recommendations 356 and 357 recommend an aggregate limit for
this interference, they provide no guidance as to the allowable contribution
to overall interference by a single system.
5 The FCC allows operators of receive-only earth stations in the
Fixed-satellite service to elect to operate without coordination. However,
any stations operated in this way do not receive protection from
interference.
6 No specific procedures are stipulated in the Iadio Regulations (or the FCC
Rules for that matter) and administrations (i.e., governments) are thus free
to use any mutually agreed method for resolving the conflict.
-24-
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7 In addition to the alternatives cited, electronic sidelobe interference
cancellers may become practical in the future.
8 Interestingly, research on the economic theory of property rights has had
a considerable rebirth in the last 20 years, due in no small part to Ronald
Coase's study of spectrum management. His paper "The Problem of Social
Cost [12] appeared only a year after his study of the FCC [9] which pro-
posed a market in spectrum as an alternative to regulation. Coase's work on
property rights stimulated others. In particular, there are Demsetz [13],
Mishan [14], and Posner [15], whose chapter on the property law provides
probably the clearest summary of the economic issues.
9 [i6l pp. 6-11 discuss this kind of right in greater detail.
10 It can also be shown that coordination achieves the economically effi-
cient solution if the numbers are reversed (i.e., if the antenna cost is
$200 and the cost saving associated with the earth station's location is
only $100). In this case the economically efficient solution is for the
earth station not to operate at its most preferred location. Under coordi-
nation, the earth station operator (A) is willing to pay only $100, but the
fixed system's operator (B) demands at least $200 to modify his system.
Clearly, no transaction will take place, and the earth station will be
located elsewhere in order to minimize costs. If B is the newcomer, on the
other hand, he will be able to pay at least $100 to relocate A's earth
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At present, the Federal Communications Commission assigns radio
licenses after making a determination of the public interest. Whenever
mutually conflicting license applications are filed, the Commission holds
a comparative hearing. This assignment mechanism has been criticized as
cumbersome and unreliable, and several alternative machanisms have been
proposed. This paper analyzes three of these: (1) increasing the avail -
able spectrus, and (2) an auction or (3) lottery of radio licenses. Th*
analysis deals specifically with the Multipoint Distribution Service
(MDS). Although MDS is a relatively minor radio service, many other
services use the same assignment mechanism. The way in which the initial
batch of MDS licenses was assigned provides a unique opportunity for
empirical work on the economics of the licensing process.
The analysis suggests that the present system is indeed a costly way
to select applicants. Increasing the spectrum allocation by an amount
sufficient to eliminate hearings will create more assignments than will be
demanded by MDS in many areas of the country, which is wasteful if other
uses are foreclosed. Rough calculations suggest that suctions offer a
more efficient selection mechanism. Lotteries with resale of the license
are also somewhat better than hearings, but not as good as suctions.
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At prescat, the Federal Communications Commission assigns radio
licenses after making P determination of the public interest. Whenever
mutually conflicting license applications are filed, the Commission holds
a comparative hearing. This assignment mechanism has been criticized as
cumbersome and unreliable, and several alternative mechanisms have been
proposed. This paper analyzes tnree of these: (1) increasing the avail-
able spectrum, and (2) an auction or (3) lottery of radio licenses. The
analysis deals specifically with the Multipoint Distribution Service
(MDS). Although MDS is a relatively minor radio service, many other
services use the same assignment mechanism. The way in which the initial
batch of MDS licenses was assigned provides a unique opportunity for
empirical work on the economics of the licensing process.
The analysis suggests that the present system is indeed a costly way
to select applicants. Increasing the spectrum allocation by an amount
sufficient to eliminate hearings will create more assignments than will be
demanded by MDS in many areas of the country, which is wasteful if other
uses are foreclosed. Rough calculations suggest that auctions offer a
more efficient selection mechanism. Lotteries with resale of the license
are also somewhat better than hearings, but not as good as auctions.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
When government controls a scarce resource, and licenses private
individuals to use it, it must decide how to assign the license. This
paper presents an economic analysis of the method used in the United
States to assign one such resource: the radio frequency spectrum. The
current procedure is to license individuals to use a particular frequency
assignment following a comparative hearing to determine which of several
competing applicants will best be able to serve the "public interest."
Two alternative assignment mechanisms, recently under discussion, also are
analyzed: auctions and lotteries of licenses. A third alternative
—
avoiding the problems of the present system by allocating enough spectrum .
to eliminate competing applications--also is considered.
The debate over these alternatives began several years ago when
the FCC proposed changes in the Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS)91
Because of this, and also because there is some data available from the
period 1975-76 relevant to the demand for MDS licenses, this paper
analyzes the assignment alternatives as they might be applied to MOS.
Although MDS is a relatively minor service, the problems associated with
the present assignment system occur in other new services. In particular,
at the time of writing, the assignment of licenses for many mobile radio
services (including cellular), low power television and digital electronic
message service are being delayed by the requirement for comparative
hearings.
Studying how these alternatives would work in MDS is relevant to
these other services because the analysis suggests that auctions would
promote efficiency better than the existing system. Lotteries, with
resale of licenses permitted, also appear superior to the existing system,
-1-
542	 VOLUME II, PART III.A.3
but are nct as good as auctions. The reason auctions promote efficiency
is that existing system encourages applicants to compete for the economic
rents associated with a license, and this competition wastes resoures.
There is much less of this kind of competition in an auction because the
winner must pay what is bid. Rough calculations presented below suggest
that the present system is three or four times as expensive as the
auction, with no offsetting benefits. Since similar competitive incen-
tives operate in other radio services, it seems likely that auctions would
be superior there as well.
The alternative of increasing the spectrum allocated to a service
like IDS cannot be compared easily to the other alternatives, because
there is no data that allows us to measure the cost of denying some other
service access to the additional spectrum to be made available to IDS.
However, for IDS at least this alternative appears unattactive. We pre-
sent evidence that the demand for assignments (at a zero price) is very
large in a few places, and fairly small elsewhere. if, as is currently
proposed, the spectrum would be allocated uniformly throughout the
country, it turns out that even the largest reallocation proposed wou!A be
inadequate to satisfy the demand for assignments (at zero price) in a few
of the largest cities. However, such a reallocation would leave most of
the assignments idle over most of the rest of the USA. Unless the cost of
restricting the use of this idle spectrum by other services is very low,
uniform reallocation appears to be a wasteful solution.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents back-
ground on MDS, summarizes the historical development of the service, and
discusses the use of comparative hearings to award radio licenses. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the proposed alternatives to comparative hearings in
-2-
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IDS. In order to compare these alternative policies one needs to know the
value to society of the assignment. However, there is no market to pro-
vide a price for MDS assignments. Hence, Section 4 addresses the question
of whether or not the value of an assignment can be inferred from other
data. Specifically, the first part of this section presents a theoretical
analysis of the hearing as a competitive process. This analysis suggests
that the number of applicants will be proportional to the value of an
assignment. A simple econometric model presented in the second half of
Section 4 supports the theory by showing that the independent variables
that should affect a license's value affect the number of applicants
similarly. Section 5 then presents a comparison of the hearing, lottery
and auction alternativef along with an independent analysis showing
(along the lines discussed above) that increasing the spectrum allocation
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2. AN OVERVIEW OF MDS
Multipoint distribution service is a relatively new common carrier
service used for broadcasting of miltiply-addressed material to different
fixed receivers. 2 In the top fifty television markets, MDS has been
allocated two 6-MHz channels in the frequency band 2150-2162 MHz. (A
6-MHz bandwidth is the standard one for a television signal.) In other
markets s single 6-MHz channel is allocated, along with a 4-MHz channel.
2.1 History
The rules for the present MDS service were established in 1972 with
one 6-MHz channel (channel 1), and in 1974 the second 6-MHz channel
(channel 2) was allocated in the top 50 television markets. 3 The Commis-
sion's decision in the 1974 case fixed MDS in its present fors:, and
initiated its growth period. Table 1 shows the number of licenses and
construction permits for channels 1 and 2 issued Since that time. The
compound annual growth rate for licenses shown in the table is about 41
percent.
MDS was initially used to distribute pay television programs to cable
television systems, hotels, apartment complexe3 and the like. Conse-
quently, the 4-MHz channel, which cannot carry a standard television
signai, has tr -n very little used. The growth shown in the table is
entirely in the 6-MHz assignments. More recently, MDS has been used to
distribute information services to businesses and households.
Immediately following t1ie FCC's 1974 decision on MDS, a large number
of license applications were filed. Because the number of licenses avail-
able was so restricted, many of these applications conflicted. That is,
licensing one applicant necessarily prevented the Commission from
-4-
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Table 1














* Excludes two users of the 4-,MHz Channel 2A
Sourze: Television Factbook, for the years noted
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licensing other applicants. Table 2 shows the multiple application situa-
tion in late 1975, about a year after the FCC's decision. The table shows
the frequency with which different numbers of competing applications were
filed for the same assignment. Under the rules then in effect (see
below), a comparative hearing was required whenever there were two or more
conflicting applications. As discussed in Section 4, the behavior of
applicants in these competitive situations reveals information about the
demand for licenses. By September 1975 the Television Factbook indicated
a need for 127 hearings, 100 of which are for assignments in the top fifty
television markets. That is, mutually exclusive applications were filed
for every available assignment in the largest markets.
The multiple application situation was stable between 1976 and 1978--
settlements among contending applicants roughly equaled new conflicting
applications so that the backlog of unresolved conflicts was constant.
Beginning in June 1978, a large number of new conflicting applications for
channel 1 assignments were filed. 4 By mid-1980, the FCC reported that
only 2 licenses had been authorized for channel 2, with 185 applications
p-nding. All these applications were mutually exclusive, as were 131 of
the channel 1 applications.
2.2 Legal Background on Assignment by Comparative Hearing
Sec „n 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 requires the Commis-
sion to award a license if it determines that the public interest, conve-
nience and necessity will be served by so-doing. Section 309(e) of the
Act states that if the Commission cannot make such a finding the applicant
is entitled to a hearing.
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In 1945 the Supreme Court decided a case involving mutually exclusive
applications for a broadcast license. In Ashbacker Radio Co. v FCC, 326
U.S. 327 (1945), the court held that when there are mutually exclusive
applications, granting one without hearings on all deprives the losing
applicant of its opportunity for a hearing. T.e Court ruled that it was
not sufficient to set a hearing on the losing applicant's application
after awarding the license, because this would place on the loser the
additional burden of showing that the competitor's license should be
denied, as well as showing that it is in the public interest to grant the
loser's own application (326 U.S. 331).
The Commission's reaction to AS`',-.-ker has been to hold a simultan-
eous hearing on all competing applications whenever they are mutually
exclusive. 5 In the case of IDS, the Initial case (Peabody Answering
Telephone Service, 55 FCC 2d 626 (1975)) established five factors on which
evidence was to be taken. The applicants were awarded "preferences" based
on evidence on each of these factors, with the overall award made on the
basis of these preferences.
While no general conclusions are possible from the few cases which
have been decided, the Commission has indicated that there is often no
difference between the applicants- 6 That is, many applicants often are
technically and financially capable of providing the service, and can
demonstrate to the Commission that providing the service would promote the
public interest, convenience or necessity. Thus, the Commission probably
could find in favor of mere than one of the applicants if there were no
conflict.
-8-
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3. ALTERNATIVES TO COMPARATIVE HEARINGS
In 1980 the FCC began to consider alternatives to hearings in MDS,
opening three dockets on various questions, two of which are relevant to
the hearing problem. At the time of writing, both these dockets remain
open.
General Docket 80-112 proposes a reallocation of spectrum which would
combine the existing MDS allocation with the allocations for the Private
Operational Fixed (Microwave) Service (POFS) and the Instructional Televi-
sion Fixed Service (ITFS). The reallocation would create a total of 33
television bandwidth channels for the three services. MDS aoutd have a
total of twelve channels as its "primary" allocation (i.e., MDS applica-
tions would have priority in these channels). IFTS and POFS would have
primary allocations of eleven and ten channels respectively. If all
primary channels in a given service area are occupied but one of the other
21 channels is available, an MDS station could be licensed to use one of
the latter channels.
If adopted, this proposal will provide at least six times as many
channels to MDS than now are available. (Because of adjacent channel
interference, all the new channels may not be usable in a given service
area. Hence, the exact size of the increase varies from one location to
another.) Multiple application cases could be settled by assigning
additional unused channels in the primary allocations of either ITFS or
POFS.
The second proceeding is Common Carrier Docket 80-116, a notice of
inquiry end prt posed rulemaking into methods for awarding licenses. The
Commission, noting that "our recent experience reveals a trend toward
fewer and fewer differences ... (between applicants)," and that "in the
-9-
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near .`_uture we may find ourselves in a position where no differences exist
at all or where such differences cannot be rationally measured against a
public interest standard ..." 7 requested comments on the use of a lottery
or an auction to select a licensee.
Under the lottery, a random drawing would take place among all
"qualified" applicants--that is, applicants meeting some prespecified
criteria. The present rules for MDS essentially require qualification on
financial, technical and legal grounds. The basic lottery proposal
analyzed in this paper assumes that a qualified applicant in a multiple
application situation would be anyone whose application would have been
granted in the absence of a mutually conflicting application.
In 1982, Congress amended the Communications Act to permit the FCC to
use a lottery to award licenses, and the Commission has proposed a similar
set of rules in other radio services. $ In general the proposed rules do
not require applicants to meet higher standards when there is a conflict
that when there is not. However, the rules provide for a "preference" in
the lottery for minority ownership or diversity in the television services
affected. We assume below that all applicants have an equal chance in an
KIDS lottery.
Both the present and proposed rules would restrict the resale of
licenses awarded by lottery. The so-called "anti-trafficking" provisions
require an init-1-1 licensee to wait at least one year before transferring
the license. The potential importance of a resale market is discussed in
Section 5.
The auction proposal is an outgrowth of a plan suggested by Robinson
(1978). The plan discussed by the Commission provides for would auction
assignments to applicants, subject again to qualification standards which
we assume to be the same as those for the lottery.
-10-
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The actual auction could be conducted in several ways. From the
viewpoint of economic efficiency, the so-called "English" or second price
auction has much to recommend it. Under the sealed-bid version of this
scheme the highest bidder wins, but pays the second highest price bid.
Vickery (1961) and others9 have analyzed this arrangement, and have shown
that it has several valuable properties. For example, it causes every
bidder to state his estimate of the true value of the object of the
auction, given that he wins. (Stated formally, bidding the true estimate
is a dominant equilibrium strategy for each participant in the auction.)
As a consequence, the second-price auction should award the object to the
bidder who values it the most. Also, it is relatively easy to determine
one's bidding strategy, so that the costs of deciding how to bid are
minimized. The auction system has the additional, not inconsequential,
advantage of revealing the value of particular spectrum, through the
bidding mechanism. This information can be used to make decisions about
how much additional spectrum ought to be allocated to a particular
servi
The analysis in this paper assumes that a secotJ price auction is
used. Under either the lottery or auction, licenses would be issued on
the same technical grounds currently specified in the FCC's rules,
eliminating the need to resolve interference. The license could run for
the statutory term, and would be reauctioned at its expiration. (To
facilitate reallocation of spectrum, all licenses in a given region should
expire together.) The license's price would be a lump sum paid to the
FCC. Transfer of the license would be allowed to any other party meeting
the qualifications of a license holder, subject to the anti-trafficking
rules mentioned above.
-11-
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4. THE APPLICATION DECISION AND COMPARATIVE HEARINGS
In Section 2 we saw that after the FCC's 1974 decision multiple
applications were received for all 100 assignments in the top 50 televi-
sion markets, and for many of the single assignments available elsewhere.
Because these applications were filed more or less simultaneously, they
provide information on the demand for licenses under the present system.
The data on these applications is important because of the simultaneity
(which is not present later in the history of MDS) and because it is
difficult to obtain similar data for newer services. On the other hand,
licenses in services such as radio and television broadcasting are bought
and sold aft« they are issued. Levin (1 1964, 1971, 198G), Crandall
(1977), Noll, Peck and McGowan (1972), and others have used this data to
analyze the economic behavior of these license markets, and the analysis
here follows the econometric specifications used in these studies.
There are two crucial points about the present system of assignment
that explain the Ewztern of multiple applications. First, the license
awarded to the winning applicant provides a limited, legal monopoly from
which the licensee can obtain an economic rent. The value of this rent
depends on several factors, including:
1. The amount of competition from substitute services,
2. The competition from other MDS licensees with overlapping
assignments.
3. Characteristics of the area being served, such as the number of
households in the service area.
The second point is that the hearing is a competi tive process with
both uncertain and significant participation costs. Moreover, applicants
	
appear to believe that their chances of success are improved by extensive 	 --
participation.
-12-
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This section presents a model of this competitive equilibrium,
supported with empirical evidence. The model is based on the idea that,
if the applicants in any market are more or less evenly matched, the
effort they devote to participating in a hearing (and the associated cost)
will be proportional to the value of the rents associated with the assign-
ment and inversely proportional to the number of comp-ling applicants. It
will follow that in an equilibrium with free entry the number of appli-
cants will be proportional to the value of the license.
4.1 Model Structure
Since we are interested in the relationship beween the value of a
licence and the number of competitors, the model described below concen-
trates on symmetric equilibria reached by identical license applicants.
Obviously, this focus on symmetry is a simplification; there may be non-
symmetric equilibria even if the applicants are identical, and in any case
the applicants are not identical in practice. However, the symmetric case
is convenient to work with and captures the essential features of the
comparative hearing "game." More elaborate modeling is rather pointlers
in this case, because the data used in Section 4.2 do not allow us to say
much about observable differecces among applicants.
Specifically, we consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium, with expendi-
tures taken as the strategic variable selected by each applicant. This
equilibrium concept was chosen to capture the non-cooperative nature of
the hearing process. While the Nash equilibrium may not be entirely
realistic, it captures the nature of the competition among the applicants
better than other possibilities. Moreover, given the form used here
(essentially, a "local" equilibrium found by weans of calculus), the
solution is easy to calculate.
-13-
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Consider a particular MDS market, and let V denote the value of the
assignment when it is awarded to one of the applicants. V can be thought
of as the certain equivalent of the present value of the future stream of
profits derived by exploiting the assignment. (By the symmetry assump-
tion, all the potential applicants have identical assessments of V.)
Under the present rules, each of the applicants i - 1,...,n will
compete in a hearing for the license, provided n is at least two. We
will assume that each participant assigns a probability it (xl,...,xi,
... 
' xn) - xi(xi'x-i) to winning the license, where xi is the i-th
applicant's expenditure on representation and A-i is a vector of the
other applicants' expenditures. We have more to say about the form of
n i below.
Each applicant attempts to maximize the expected net value of the
assignment:
Si - n 
i 
V - xi	(4.1)
by choosing a level of expenditure xi - x:A . We consider each applicant
to know the other applicants' expenditures and seek a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in the XV8,10
The function n i , embodies an applicant's model of the hearing
process. We will assume that each participant adopts the same "random
utility" model of the selection process. Specifically, we assume that
every participant thinks that the hearing officer associates a "utility"
with an applicant's case of:
U, - f (xi ) + e 	 (4.2)
-14-
n - 1
2	 V f' (x*) = 1
n
(4.4)
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where xi is expenditure on participation, f(xi ) is a function giving
the contribution of expenditure to utility and the random variable a 
is identically and independer_tly distributed according to the extreme
value or Weibull distribution representing intrinsic differences between
the applicants. As shown by McFadden ( 1973), if the hearing officer
selects the applicant with the highest Ui , the probability that the




McFadden ( 1976) applied this choice model to the decision of a regulatory
body.
With this specification for 
xi a symmetric equilibrium can be
found by maximizing Equation (4.1) with respect to xi . It can be
shown that the equilibrium expenditure x* satisfies:
Since all applicants have the same x*, Equation (4.3) implies xi
1/n for all i . Consequently, the expected value of each applicant's
rent is S* = V/n - x*. If entry occurs until this expected value is




Equations (4,5) provides the desired link between an observed quan-
tity, the n1imber of applicants, and the unobservable value -f the
assignment V. It form i
 the basis of our empirical work, which seeks to
explain how variations In n* (i.e., variations in V ) are affected by
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Since Equation (4.5) is derived from a model of symmetric equilibria,
how robust is the proportionality between n* and V when the model's
assumptions are relaxed? Rogerson (1982) shows, using a specialized ver-
sion of the random utility model, that if there are differences in the
abilities of firms to compete for a license, then the firms with an advan-
tage in the competition earn positive expected profits. However, even in
this model the aggregate expected profits of all the competitors are
proportional to the rents associated with the assignment (see Rogerson,
Zq. 27).
Ccomon sense suggests, however, that the proportionality relationship
will not hold exactly--i.e., n* "measures" V with error. These
measurement errors can be systematic or random. Systematic differences of
this type can be accommodated in a regression equation. Random errors
contribute to the regression error, and reduce the ability of the regres-
sion to account for all the variance in the dependent variable. Further
discussion of possible systematic and random errors is presented below.
4.2 Data 11;ed to Estimate the Mod"1
The Television Factbook tabulates MDS licenses, construction permits
and application activities since 1975, and so can be used to find the
number of applicants n* . In addition, one systematic difference that
may affect applicants' assessments of V is the previous award of a
license for one %MS channel in a market. Such an award sb:.u l d convey
information to the applicants for the second l.cenae about their pros
pects. This suggests that for channel 2 applications, one of the
independent variables affecting V w^uld b- whether or not a channel 1
—16—
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application had already been awarded, or whether it was still t , : be
awarded. This variable was also derived from the Factbook.
Equation (4.5) predicts that variations in V will be reflected in
changes in the number of applicants n* . However, because V is an
economic rent, the availability of a competing assignment will affect the
license's value. If N is the number of available assignments, we expect
V to be a decreasing function of N. (Econometrically, N can be
treated as exogenous since it is fixed by regulation for the period when
licenses are being awarded.) Data on N also can be obtained from the
Television Factbook.
The studies of broadcasting services cited above suggest that V
also will be affected by the size of the market served by the station. In
general, larger markets should be more valuable than smaller ones. The
market size variable used in this study is the Arbitron figure for ADI
(area of dominant influence) television households for the television mar-
ket that contains the proposed service area. This variable has several
unsatisfactory features. First, it is available only for large markets.
Consequently, the regression equation below may not hold for small
markets. Second, pDI households measures the potential audience in a
larger geographic area than an YIDS station can serve. Data on a more
detailed geographic basis could not be obtained.
Systematic factors affecting the equilibrium in Equation (4.5) must
now be considered. In particular, several large multiple system operators
(MSO's) participated in certain hearings but not others. It might be
argued that if one or more of these MS0 1 9 participated, other applicants
would be inhibited from entry. We can rest for this possibility by intro-
:ucing indicator variables when an MSO participated.11
-17-
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It also should be pointed out that there are two forms of truncation
error involved with the data obtained in the Factbook. First, the model
treats n* as if it were a real number, whereas in practice it is an
integer. Second, the Factbook never contains information on towns where
there are no applications, so a form of selection bias is present. Both
these problems could, in principle, be addressed by additional modeling of
the selection factors, coupled with the use of maximum Likelihood estima-
tion in place of ordinary lease squares.12
4.3 Regression Results
Table 3 shows the results of ordinary least squares estimates of the
relation for n* . Overall, they support the equilibrium model developed
in Section 4.1. The left-most equation is estimated for the 106 cases in
which there were at least two applications. The specification is the same
form as that used by Levin (1964, 1971), in which the value of an assign-
went was known from market data. As can be seen, the market size variable
(log of ALAI households) and the presence of an already licensed channel 1
are both highly significant. The number of assignments variable (N) has
the expected sign, but has a T-value of only -1.8. Since this variable
takes on only two values (one or two) there is probably not enough varia-
tion to give a significant result.
Basically, this regression equation (and the other two that are
discussed below) represent the demand for an IDS assignment at zero
price. Since a license is an input to the licensee's production of a
service, the equation is a factor demand function, and the market size
variable is a proxy for the output of the service to be provided by the
-18-	 C

























Largest MSO was an -0.0264
Applicant? (0.363)
Other three top MSO's 0.675
were applicants? (0.317)






	 106 115	 115
* Standard Errors in parentheses.
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licensee. The number of assignments variable reflects the effect on
demand of the availability of a substitute input while, as noted above,
the indicator variable for channel 1 licenses may reflect a perceived
difference between MDS markets with a channel 1 operating and markets
where one is not yet operating.
The two right-hand columns show the effect of introducing additional
variables, with the nine single-applicant stations included. The middle
column simply shows results when these stations are included, along with
an indicator variable for single applicant cases. This variable was
significant, but the other regression coefficients were little changed.
The right-most column contains two additional indicator variables for the
presence of the largest MSO, or the second through fourth largest MSO, in
a hearing. (Two variables were included because the largest ALSO, accord-
ing to industry sources, planned to operate a business communications net-
work. Consequently, its actions in applying for licenses in different
markets might have been motivated by networking considerations.) As can be
seen, one of the two coefficients is significant but positive while the
other is not significantly different from zero. The hypothesis that both
coefficients are zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level (F2,107
1.97), and none of the other coefficients are changed very much. The
incorrect sign, and the lack of significance, suggest that this form of
asymmetry, was not important in determining the number of applicants.
Rejecting thiP specification has led us to use the center column in Table
3 for the work described in the next section.
-20-
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5. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
We now turn to a comparison of the hearing with an auction or
lottery. The model of Section 4.1 showed us why the private value of the
assignment and the number of applicants should be proportional to each
other. It will be argued here that the private value approximately
measures the value of the assignment to society. This allows us to make
statements about the social costs and benefits of alternative policies
using the model, and certain other information introduced below.
By social value we mean the sum of the (appropriately discounted)
consumers' and producers' surplus associated with having an MDS station in
operation, compared to the sum associated with the next best alterna-
tive. 13 However,the value of the assignment ( V , in the terminology of
Section 4) is an economic rent, i.e., the total (discounted) producers'
surplus, associated with operating an MDS station as opposed to not
operating one. In what sense does the latter of these quantities help us
measure the former?
As noted in Section 4, the MDS operator's license awards a monopoly,
or half of a duopoly. The operator's profits will thus include as pro-
ducer's surplus a part, possibly a considerable part, of the consumers'
surplus. In broadcasting, these profits are observable when a station is
sold, and a number of studies (e.g., Levin 1964, 1971; Crandall 1978; and
Webbink 1977) indicate that the market value of a station is many times
its physical replacement cost.
While MDS is not a broadcast service, it does provide a one-to-many
service. Indeed, since the operator may offer a multi-part tariff there
are possibilities for discriminatory pricing not present in broadcasting.
-21-
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This suggests that an IDS operator is able to extract a significant part
of the consumers' surplus associated with the service.
Moreover, operating an IBS station during the period to which the
data in Section 4 applies was essentially an all or nothing proposition,
so that the operator had no incentive to restrict output, resulting in a
welfare loss. This is because, during this period, ADS was primarily a
transmission service for pay television service during prime time. There
was essentially no demand for service outside of pr-'-me time. Faced with
what was in effect a sharply kinked demand curve, and having negligible
marginal costs, a profit maximizing MDS operator operated during prime
time and shut down otherwise. This is basically the efficient strategy.
So far we have given reasons why the economic rent might be close to
but lower than the social value. However, the rent is determined by the
FCC's rules, which do not allow any other use for the frequency assignment
if it is not used by an MDS station. This policy is not necessarily
socially optimal, because the FCC's rules prohibit alternative uses (e.g.,
transmission of instructional programming during daytime hours) that might
have a social value in excess of their transmission costs. Thus, the
value of an assignment may overstate the social value. l`'
The argument above may be summarized as follows. Ignoring issues
such as discounting, the social value of the present policy would be






) where CS stands for
for consumers' surplus and PS for producer's surplus, and the subscripts
MDS and NBU stand for the present situation and "next best use." The
value of the assignment is V - PS MDS - PSC , where PSD represents the
-22-
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producer's surplus in some other activity, with the MDS assignment idle.
The arguments that the licensee can appropriate much of the consumers'
surplus imply that CSMDS is small compared to V . The FCC's restric-
tions mean that PSNBU > PS O . Consequently, W < (CS NDS - CSNBU ) + V ,
where the first term may be either positive or negative depending on the
demand for the alternative service and the monopoly power of that ser-
vice's provider, which determine CSNBU . In what follows we take W
to be approximately equal to V, recognizing that in doing so we may
overstate or understate the result. We now turn to estimating V as best
we can.
5.1 The Value of an IDS License
If we had external observations on average spending on hearings x*,
we could use one of the regression relationships and the fact that
V w n*x* to estimate the value of the license. Unfortunately, only
anecdotal evidence is available. Robinson (1976) estimated the costs of
presenting an IDS case at 15,000 to 35,000 dollars per participant, based
on "rather sparse" information. Discussions with industry sources indi-
cate that this value was approximately correct at the time of writing,
when inflation is adjusted for.
This estimate of hearing expense implies that the typical comparative
hearing in 1975, with 3 applicants (see Table 2), involved a license
valued at between $45,000 and $105,000 (3 x 15,000 - 45,000, and
3 x 35,000 - 105,000). This estimate of the implied value of an IBS
license in 1975 obviously is only approximate, and therefore we may think
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5.2 The Costs of the Present System
Equation (4.5) suggests that private costs typically will equal the
license's value of about $75,000. However, much of this cost is a
transfer because it is paid by potential licensees to their lawyers,
consultants and other experts on matters of interest to the FCC.16
However, these costs can also represent real costs to society if they
divert resources from other valuable uses. Moreover, we will see that
they can be significantly altered under the other alternatives.
In addition to the private costs there are two additional categories
of cost:
1. The administrative costs of the hearing to the spectrum manager
(i.e., the FCC), and
2. The opportunity cost of the spectrum, incurred because the delay
in the hearing process leaves the allocation lying idle or
underused.
Robinson (1978) estimated that at least two months of FCC staff time
were required, plus $1,900 in recording costs at the hearing itself.
Using $60,000 as the cost of a year of staff time in 1975, including an
allowance for overhead, this estimate implies a cost of about $12,000 per
hearing.
However, Robinson reports that many of the conflicts are settled
before a hearing. Of the first group, only 4 out of 74 had a hearing. If
we assume that half of the staff time is needed in any case, and use the
data given above, we find that the average administrative cost is about
$5,400 (the average of four cases requiring a hearing and 70 others that
do not).
-24-
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The opportunity cost of an idle assignment depends on the value of
the assignment, the value of the spectrum in its next best use, the delay
needed to make the assignment, and the discount rate used. Robinson
reports that the typical time required to resolve a set of mutually
conflicting applications by a hearing is 3 years. The opportunity cost is
therefore 3 years of the rental value of the license. Using a 10 percent
interest rate as the social rate of discount, 3 years of lost use of the
assignment amounts to about 25 percent of the value of the license.17
Since many cases are settled short of a full hearing, this fraction over-
states the lose. In the event of a settlement prior to a hearing, we will
take the administrative delay to be one year, resulting in a loss of 9
percent in the license's value. The average loss is therefore 10 percent
of the license's value ((0.09 x 70 + 0.25 x 4)/74). With these figures
the costs of the present system of assignment for a license involving
three competing applicants, each paying $25,000 for representation,
include $75,000 of participation costs, about $7,500 of opportunity costs,
and $5,400 of administrative costs, or about $87,900 overall. As can be
seen, the administrative costs (as Robinson suspected), are relatively
unimportant. The private costs of participation dominate, and the overall
costs about equal the assignment's value.
However, the social costs will be lower than this because of the fact
that most of the private costs are a transfer. The same is true of the
FCC's administrative costs, since the people processing MDS applications
presumably could be employed in some other work. For instance, if we
assume that the social losses associated with the private and administra-
tive costs are only 20% of the total, then the social costs are about
$24,000 per license (i.e., ($75,000 + $5,400)/5 + $7,500).
-25-
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One issue not so far discussed is that the hearing does not guarantee
a Pareto efficient outcome. Of course, if the successful applicant is
allowed to resell the license costlessly and im►isdiately, the availability
of this market ensures a Pareto efficient outcome. However, the anti-
trafficking rules forbid resale for one year, and the resale market is
unlikely to operate without transactions costs. The calculations in the
next section, however, take all these coats to be zero for the hearing.
This is a conservative assumption, and biases our comparison in favor of
the hearing.
5.3 Implications of Auctions and Lotteries18
As with the hearing, the costs of an assignment policy depend on
several factors:
•	 The number of competing applicants and the implied value of :he
assignment,
•	 The cost of participating 'n the selection process,
•	 The administrative costs of the selection process, and
•	 The time required to complete the selection process.
Instead of presenting results for one or a few "typical" valueo of
these parameters, a simple Monte Carlo model was used to generate at
random 1,000 alternative combinations of these factors. The costs of the
three alternatives (hearing, lottery, and auction) were then calculated.
This approach allows an exploration of the parameter space, testing
the sensitivity of any conclusions to different combinations of parameter
values. Therefore, parameter values were selected independently, and
except in one instance the probability densities used were uniform.
-26-
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(The empirical. distribution in Table 2 was used to generate the cumber of
applicants.) These distributional assumptions help to maximize the
chances that the simulated cases include a wide range of possibilities,
and consequently reveal whether one alternative is generally superior to
the others. Table 4 gives the parameter values used. The first seven
items in Table 4 were discussed in the preceding subsection. The follow-
ing paragraphs briefly discuss the reasons why the other values were
chosen.
We have assumed that 3 to 9 months are required to conduct either an
auction or lottery. This time estimate is longer than the three months
said by one source (CATJ) to be the time required to process uncontested
applications. But, additional time will undoubtedly be needed to allow
applicants to prepare for the auction or lottery.
In both the lottery and the hearing, the costs of participation
determine the number who participate. In the lottery, as in the compara-
tive gearing, rational individuals will be attracted by the chance of
winning a valuable price- If an unlimited number of risk neutral Individ-
uals can qualify to operate a station, additional applications will be
received until the expected excess profits are reduced to zero. For
instance, if a license is worth $75,000 and it costs $1,000 to apply,
there would be 75 applicants. Lotteries of Federal oil leases are
reported to have attracted thousands of individuals, each paying a nominal
fee for a small chance at a large prize ( Wall Street Journal, 1980).
Because assuming free entry by risk neutral participants is consistent
with the model of Section 4, it is our base case. However, risk aversion
or some limit on the number of qualified applicants might reduce the
-27-
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Table 4
RANGES OF PARAMETERS USED IN SIMULATION
Lower Licit Upper Limit
Number of applicants* 1 8
Representation cost $ 15,000 $ 35,000
per applicant
Cost per year of $ 40,000 $ 80,000
FCC staff time
FCC staff time 1 month 3 months
required for hearing
Fraction of cases 0 8/74
requiring a hearing
Time delay if NO 4 months 21 months
hearing
Time delay if hearin.j 1 year 5 years
Time delay for auction 3 months 9 months
or lottery
Participation cost $ 500 $ 1,500
in a lottery
Participation cost $ 2,500 $ 7,500
in an auction
FCC staff time 2 weeks 2 months
required for either
lottery or auction
Ratio of social to 0.05 0.50
private costs
* Number of applicants is distributed according to the empirical
distribution in Table 2.
-28-
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number who, participate. Therefore, we also simulated a rase where it was
assumed that no more than 20 individuals would be found eligible. Based
on discussions with FCC personnel, we took the participation cost to be
between $500 and $1,500. (This may be high. Or* can enter an oil lease
lottery for about $25).
Now consider the auction. The table shows the cost of participation
to be $5,000, representing the costs of preparing the application, and of
planning and bid pteparation. As in the other two assignment methods,
potential bidders must neigh this cost against their @xpected profits.
But, it can be shown that the potential profits of a bidder at an auction
decline at a rate proportional to 1/n2 instead of 1/n , where n
is the number of participants in the auction. 19 Consequently, if the
license is worth $15,000 and the costs of participation are about $5,000,
the number of bidders will be about 3 15 - 4 . (This calculation assumes
that the bidderr are risk neutral. As in the lottery, bidders' risk aver-
sion might lead to a smaller number of applicants.)
If auctions or lotteries are used, our econometric work in Section 4
suggests that the number of licenses available in a market will affect the
license's value, and hence the amounts bid in an auction and the behavior
of lottery participants. Therefore, in this subsection we will assume
that the spectrum allocation is not increased. This provides a clee.-
contrast to the alternative of increasing the spectrum allocation pre-
sented in the followiag subsection.
Table 5 shows the results of 1000 simulated cases. The table shows
that the auction is significantly less costly than the other two alterna-
tives. In terms of social costs, it is between one-third and one-fourth
-29-
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Table 5
COMPARISON OF ASSIGNMENT COSTS1
Comparative
Hearing Lottery Auction
Costs of Administration $	 5,320 $	 2,870 $	 2,870(58) (30) (30)
Costs to Applicants 77,300 77,300 16,000(1520) (1520) (197)
Opportunity Cost of 7,910 3,700 3,700
idle assignment2 (195) (81) (81)
Total Cost93 $ 90,500 $ 83,900 $ 22,500(1611) (1588) (270)
Social Costs 3 , 4 30,800 25,900 8,940(696) (614) (151)
1.	 Means of 1000 simulated cases. Standard errors of means areNOTES:
reported in parentheses. Values are rounded to not more than
three significant fig-res.
2.	 Discounted at 10%.
3.	 Detail may not add to total due to rounding.
4.	 Equals opportunity costs plus a portion of all other costs.
See text.
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as expensive as the hearing. In fact, the auction was the lowest cost
alternative in all 1000 cases simulated. (Notice that, because the oppor-
tunity costs of the auction are less than for the hearing, the qualitative
conclusion that the auction is superior is not sensitive to the ratio of
social to private costs.)
Because the values reported are averages of independent and identi-
cally distributed cases, the central limit theorem implies that the means
of the simulation are normally distributed with the mean and standard
deviations shown. Moreover, the partial sums of the costs will be approx-
imately normal also. We can therefore test the hypothesis that, under the
assumptions of Table 4, the average social cost of one alternative is less
than the average social cost of another using a paired-t test. This was
done, using partial sums of 25 cases. The auction is significantly less
costly than both the hearing (t - 6.35, df - 39) and the lottery
(t - 5.64) using this test. The lottery also is significantly less
costly than the hearing, however (t - 5.79).
The auction is superior because the costs to applicants are much
lower than for the lottery or the hearing. This is because comparatively
few individuals find it worthwhile to bid in an auction, whereas in both
the hearing and the lottery individuals enter the competition until the
sum of their participation costs equal the license's value.
Therefore, it may appear that if the total participation costs in the
lottery can be limited, it may be superior to the auction. For instance,
suppose that the FCC, by "pre-qualifying" lottery -,anticipants, limits the
number who can participate. Re. -run-ling the simulation with the additional
restriction that the number of participants in the lottery can never
-31-
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exceed 20 makes the lottery the lowest cost option in 326 out of the 1000
cases.
However, " ke the haring, the lottery does not automatically main-
Lain the guprantee, provided by the auction, that the outcome will be
Pareto efficient. To ensure this, it is necessary to allow a resale
market--i.e., in a privately organized auction. Uuder the anti-
trafficking rules this tq not allowed for one year. Moreover, unless the
transactions costs, and the costs of any additional delay in using the
assignment, are negligible, the cost of the lottery plus its after-market
may ex;:eed the costs of the auction.
For example, suppose we take the transactions costs of the resale
market to be zero, and consider only the opportunity costs due to delay.
Yor a lottery with N participants, the probability that a resale will
occur is at least (N - 1)/N, i.e., almost one. In the worst case, when
the assignment is entirely idle for the additional year, the additional
opportunity cost is one more year's rent on the assignment. Re-running
the simulation with this extra cost and the restriction N < 20, we find
that the auction is once again the least costly alternative in all 1000
cases. For an intermediate case, assuming only half as large an oppor-
tunity cost on average, the lottery is superior in only 6 out of the 1000
cases. These results suggest that the lottery is unlikely to be less
costly than the auction, even with restricted participation, if the addi-
tional costs and delays of the resale market are allowed for.
-32-
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5.4 Implications of an Increased Spectrum Allocation
The third alternative policy is to increase the spectrum available to
MDS. This policy could also eliminate the delays and costs associated
fith hearings by shaking enough assignments available to accommodate all
applicants without hearings. The proposed expansion of the allocation for
IDS, coupled with sharing between MDS, ITFS, and operational fixed
services, is an example of this policy.
The regression model estimated in Section 4 can be used to assess
this alternative in several ways. First, one can look at the number of
assignments that would have to be made available to eliminate multiple
hearings. To do this, set the left hand side of the regression equation
equal to 1 (i.e., set the expected number of applicants to 1), and solve
for the number of assignments N 	 (Also, the two dummy variables are set
to 1, which is consistent with n 1 and N > 1). Using the method of
Tin (1965), because the coefficient on N is a random variable, gives an
approximate estimate of the mean required N and its standard error,
namely 6.67 + 3.83. For comparison, the sample mean number of applicants
in 1975 was 3. Thus, in 1975 something like 7 + 4 assignments would have
been necessary in an average market to satisfy demand without resorting to
hearings.
Repeating this calculation for 44 individual cities shows that the
mean is iiisleading. 20 The largest five cities would require an average of
13.8 assignments. The largest (New York), is estimated to have a demand
(at zero price) of 16.8 + 9.1.
The disproportionate demand in the larger cities is even more
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applications for a license when N assignments are available. This
calculation requires an assumption about the distribution of the error
term. In view of the many other approximations made up to now there is no
clear choice. Here, we assume the errors are normal, and calculate the
probability in each market using two different assumptions about the
number of assignments that would be allocated to MDS. First, we assume
that each market had a total of twelve assignments available (ten of these
newly allocated, plus the two originally available). Second, a tabulation
of "unencumbered" channels in FCC Docket 80-112 was used to give the total
number of available channels in each market.
From these calculations, it turns out that there are only four cities
in which the probability that more than twelve assignments are needed
exceeds 0.20 (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadel phia). However,
in 14 out of the 44 cities, there are already fever than 12 channels
available; not coincidentally, these tend to be the largest cities where
the demand for !DS assignments, and for spectrum for use by other radio
services, already is high.
When the availability of unencumbered assignments is considered,
there is a probability of 0.80 or more that there will still be conflicts
in the seven largest cities, while the probability of a conflict is under
0.10 in 28 others.
These results tell us something about the likely effect of the
changes proposed in Docket 80-112. On the one hand, in all but the
largest markets the proposed allocation of additional spectrum will
probably eliminate the need for comparative hearings because the demand
for assignments will be less than the supply. On the other hand, hearings
-34-
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will atilt he needed in the largest markets. for the most valuable
iaa:Knmenta.
°tore generally, the results for MPS illustrate a paint about so-
called *%pectrum scarcity." This phrase to usuall y used to describe A
situation wieere there the demand for spectrum (at a zero price) exceeds
the supply. However, there is likely to be substantial variation in the
value attached to the spectrum. Hone*. a *votes that allocates spectrum
uniformly nationwide almost inevitably causes sp*ctrcaa to be idle or
undeerused in some area*, while keeping it "*care*" in other places.
The cost* of this method of avoiding comparative hearings are diffi-
cult to Asses. if we ignore the opportunity costs associated with allow-
ing MOS rather than some other service to u&;v spectrum, the apparent costs
of eontinueed hearings fall dramatically beeause hearings have barn 	 Oltm-
tnatod in most markets. However, there are alternatives to Ml)S, and denv-
ing them spectrum does have costs. For example, the "unencumbered"
channels would also be available for instructional televiatan (ITTS) and
private microwave svotems. Hut. there is no information on their value
(their ltcenses were not even awarded in comparativv hearings). to it is
not possthlee to make* a cost estimate for this Alternative.
-35-
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6. CONCLUSION
The present system of assigning licenses using an administrative
process is, as shown above, costly and economically inefficient. In the
comparatively small IDS service, the costs of assignment appear to be a
substantial fraction of the value of the license. The costs of assignment
associated with more important services (e.g., television broadcasting or
domestic satellite) sharing the economic characteristics of MDS may bear a
comparable relationship to the much larger value of the licenses.
The traditional response to situations where the demand for spectrum
exceeds its supply has been to allocate more spectrum. This policy's
costs cannot be estimated without a knowledge of the value lost when other
services are displaced. However, our analysis suggests that a uniform
increase in an allocation may have to be very large if those areas of the
country with the most intense demands are to be satisfied. Such increases
are likely to leave much of the increased allocation idle or underused
elsewhere.
In contrast, auctions appear to have lower social costs than compara-
tive hearings. Not only are delay and administrative costs less, but the
auction mechanism prevents wasteful competition among the applicants for
the rents associated with the assignment. Lotteries (with costless,
unlimited resale) also are less costly because of reduced delays and
administrative costs. However, the simple lottery mechanism does not
eliminate the losses from rent-seeking. Moreover, if a policy restricting
the number of lottery participants is used to reduce these losses, resale
of licenses won in the lottery must be allowed in order to gain the
auction's guarantee of an economically efficient allocation. 	 Such a
-36-
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resale market involves additional transactions costs, administrative costs
and delays. When these are included, the full cost of the lottery prob-
ably exceed the cost of an auction, even though the cost of the lottery
portion alone may be less.
-37-
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FOOTNOTES
*	 Research for this paper was supported by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's contract NASW-3204. Some of the work is based
on a previous study supported by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration at Mathtech, Inc. Don Ewing, Dale
Hatfield, Dean Olmstead, John Robinson and Douglas Webbink provided
valuable help during the time the original work on this paper was
done. An anonymous reviewer's comments prompted the Monte Carlo
simulation reported in Cection 5. The author is solely responsible
for any opinions or remaining errors.
1. FCC Common Carrier Docket 80-116, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, issued March 19, 1980.
2. The rules governing MDS are contained in Part 21, Subpart K of the
FCC's Rules and Regulations (47 CFR 21), hereafter cited as FCC
Rules.
3. Report and Order, Docket 19493, 35 FCC 2nd 154 (1972) and 45 FCC 2nd
616 (1974), reconsideration denied 57 FCC 2nd 301 (1975).
4. FCC Docket 80-116, p. 4.
5. Prior to Ashbacher, the FCC apparently set some conflicting applica-
tions for a hearing, but issued a license without a hearing (presum-
ably after a public interest finding) in other cases.
326 U.S. 338, n. 1.
6. See Docket 80-116. For instance, technical factors often seem to be
similar for each applicant. Indeed, one instance is reported in
which the hearing process apparently induced applicants to make their
applications more uniform (Docket 80-116, pp. 7-10). In several
-38-
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early cases, the winning applicant was awarded preference for quality
and reliability of service because it proposed to offer a "hot
standby" transmitter. This decision apparently induced a flurry of
amendments to pending applications adding a hot standby transmitter.
7. Docket 80-116, p. 28.
8. The amendments are contained in Public Law 97-259, Section 115. The
second notice of proposed rulemaking in General Docket 81-768
contains the proposed lottery rules for the low power television and
television translator service, the public mobile common carrier radio
service (except cellular radio), and certain private radio services.
9. E.g., Butters (1975). See Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) for a survey of
this and other auction mechanisms, and Agnew, et al (1979) Chapter
VIII for a discussion of auctions as they are related to spectrum
management.
10. This can be found by assuming that all other applicants j s i have
chosen xj - x*, and finding the optimal xi - xi . The value of
xi which also equals x* is the desired Nash equilibrium.
11. The inclusion of such variables on the right hand side of a regres-
sion equation explaining n* introduces a simultaneity problem,
because these variables reflect some of the applicant's decisions.
Ideally, the solution to this simultaneity problem would be the
specification of additional equations corresponding to a nonsymmetric
equilibrium. This specification might suggest appropriate instrument
variables. However, no such model exists nor does the data available
suggest any obvious instrumental variables. Thus, the possibility of
simultaneous equations bias must be kept in mind.
12. For examples of the techniques that could be used, see Hausman and
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13. Although this criterion is standard in applied welfare economics, its
use is not uncontroversial. Whether some more elaborate criterion
should be used here, however, is beside the point in view of the
limited data that we have on demand.
14. The rules are as they are because spectrum management is administered
hierarchically. First, "services" are "allocated" a band of frequen-
cies. Then, individuals are "assigned" to a particular frequency
within the band for their service. This paper is concerned with the
assignment issue, while the imposition of restrictions on service is
an allocation issue. Relaxing these restrictions within the IDS
service raises thorny spectrum management issues going beyond IDS.
As noted above, one of the proposed FCC actions would allow sharing
of spectrum between MDS and ITFS and OFS. If we use private value as
a measure of social value, we may understate the social value by at
least the value of this change.
15. This value is strikingly less than the value of a commercial televi-
sion broadcasting license. Estimates of the value of a "typical" VHF
television station, for example, based on capitalization calcula-
tions, are around $2 million (Crandall, 1978). VHF stations owned
and operated by one of the three major networks, all of which are in
the top television markets, may be worth almost $60 million dollars
each (Webbink, 1978). One possible reason for this disparity is that
MDS channels cover a smaller market area than television stations.
16. This is, of course, the classic rent-seeking argument of Posner
(1975) and Kreuger (1974).
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17. This fraction is based on the amortized value of the license, and is
given by 1 - (1 + r)-T --where r is the discount rate and T
is the length of the delay. For r - 0.10 and T - 3 this factor
is 0.25.
18. There is growing literature about the theory of auctions (e.g.,
Englebrecht-Wiggans, 1980). Unfortunately, most of this theory is
inappropriate for our problem. There are two reasons for this.
First, the essential feature of the auction models is that bidders'
estimates of the value of an object differ from each other. However,
the available data only reveals variations in the value of different
licenses, and the distribution of one tells us nothing about the
distribution of the other (see Agnew, et al., 1979, pp. VIII-35
ff.). Second, although auction models of increasing generality are
available (e.g., Hilgrom and Weber, 1980), these models are still not
general enough to describe real auctions for resources such as radio
licenses. For example, license auctions involve the sale of multiple
objects whose values may not be independent (because of network
interactions), and these sales occur at different times. A more
complete anlysis of this area must await more complete models as well
as data on individual variations in value estimates.
19. See Wilson (1977).
20. The calculation was done for 44 of the top 50 cities listed in FCC
Docket 80-112. That list includes six ADI's that are not included in
the 1975 data on which the regression equation is based.
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ABSTRACT
There are several indications that the demand for satel-
lite communications services in the domestic market will soon
exceed the capacity of the satellites currently in place.
Two approaches to increasing system capacity are the expan-
sion of service into frequencies presently allocated but not
used for satellite communications, and the development of
technologies that provide a greater level of service within
the currently-used frequency bands. This paper is directed
towards the development of economic models and analytic
techniques for evaluating capacity expansion alternatives
such as these.
The first part of Vie raper provides a brief overview
of the satellite orbit-,, ec .'um problem, and also outlines
some suitable analytic approaches. This is followed by an
illustrative analysis of domestic communications satellite
technology options for providing increased levels of service.
The analysis illustrates the use of probabilities and decision
trees in analyzing alternatives, and provides insight into the
important aspects of the orbit-spectrum problem that would
warrant inclusion in a larger-scale analysis. Finally, the
application of such analytic methodologies to the examination
of satellite R&D decisions such as those faced by NASA is
discussed.
iii
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Section I
OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
1. Introduction
This paper begins the development of economic models
and analytic techniques for evaluating NASA communications-
satellite R&D decisions. First, a brief overview of the
communications satellite orbit-spectrum problem is provided.
This overview describes the need for structural economic
models that characterize both the systems demand for
satellite communications services as well as the supply of
such services under a wide range of tec'.aology and policy
options. The overview also describes the need for methodol-
ogy to analyze NASA communications satellite R&D alternatives,
taking account of considerable market and technology
uncertainty.
The second part of the paper provides an illustrative
analysis of U.S. domestic communications satellite technol-
ogy options for providing increased levels of domestic com-
munications services within the constraints of orbit geom-
etry and present frequency spectrum allocation to domestic
communications satellites. The analysis illustrates the
use of probabilities and decision trees in analyzing tech-
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aspects of the orbit spectrum problem that must be dealt
with in a full-scale analysis.
The final section of the report outlines how analyses
of the type described in the preceding section can be used
to examine satellite R&D decisions such as those faced by
NASA.
2. Background
The allocation of geosychronous orbit positions and
frequency spectrum to communications satellite use is a
complex technical, economic and political problem. The U.S.
domestic market will be considered in this discussion as an
illustration of these problems.
There are presently three frequency bands allocated to
U.S. satellite communications: 4/6 GHz (C band), 12/14 GHz
(Ku band), and 20/30 GHz (Ka band). Interference considera-
tions limit the use of the geosynchronous arc, and projec-
tions of demand growth indicate that the orbit-spectrum
capacity in the C band and Ku band will be fully utilized
within a few years. The Ka band is not yet utilized for
satellite communications and presents some technical and cost
disadvantages relative to the C and Ku bands. One option for
expanding domestic satellite communication services is to
pursue development of Ka band capability.
In addition to increasing the amount of orbit-spectrum
allocated to communications satellites, there are many
2
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technical alternatives for providing greater services within
a fired orbit-spectrum. These technical alternatives include
changes in satellite and earth station design involving signal
processing, antenna design including polarization, demand
assignment among a pool of satellites, use of spat and inter-
satellite beams and changes in interference design parameters.
'these technical alternatives offer the possibility of a
several-fold increase in communications services for a fixed
amount of orbit-:spectrum resource.
The demand for domestic communications satellite services
has expanded rapidly. In some cases communications satellites
have diverted voice and data communications from possible new,
more costly terrestrial communications capacity. In other
cases, the increasing economic advantage of communications
satellites has reduced the costs of lone-distance communica-
tions, particularly video, and has resulted in the development
of new communications services that would otherwise have been
uneconomic.
It is very difficult at this time to foresee what
balance or imbalance will result between the technical alter-
natives for expandinU orbit-spectrum capacity and the demands
for communications services. Moreover, the demand depends on
the costs of satellite communications services in relation to
the costs of terrestrial communications and the benefits of
additional communications. in addition the balance is sensi-
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policy decisions to (nange the allocation or price of
the orbit-spectrum.
3. NASA's Role
NASA's role in developing new satellite communications
technology is articulated in recent testimony of Associate
Administrator Anthony L. Calio before the House Subcommittee
on Space Science and Applications. l
 NASA plans to meet the
need for improved effectiveness and efficiency in the use of
the limited resources of the radio spectrum and geosynchron-
ous orbit prsitions by:
1) new technologies to expend the capacities
of existing bands, and
2) capabilities for functioning in the
unused Ka band.
In the first category fall "frequency re-use" methods involv-
ing contourable-beam space antennas, onboard switching, siq-
nal modulation, and polarization techniques. NASA proposes
to take a leadership role in developing these technologies
for the Ka band:
We propose to develope an understanding of Ka-band usage
within a multibeam antenna research effort. We believe
that a unified R&D effort built around these new technol-
ogies and techniques will best advance U.S. leadership
in satellite communications and support industry's efforts
to increase the capacity of the two lower-frequency commer-
cial bands (C-band and Ku-band). Simultaneously, this ac-
tivity will provide new information and confidence in
equipment for Ka-band use for private commercial purposes.
We have widespread, enthusiastic acceptance from the
industry on these plans.
A. J. Calio, Testimony of
February 20, 1979, p. -13
4
VOLUME II, PART III.B.1
	 593
In addition to its role in R&D, NASA provides technical
advice to the FCC on spectrum allocation and equipment tech-
nical specifications. This role places NASA in a position
to participate in a wide range of potential policy decisions
on the mechanisms by which frequency usage will be regulated.
Finally, although NASA's role in the regulation of orbit-
spectrum usage is limited to technical advice, it is necessary
for NASA to take account of the effect o. future regulatory
policy on the need for new capacity and technology. For ex-
ample, government policy mandating or encouraging frequency
re-use or conservation measures could have a major impact on
the need for NASA's R&D on Ka band technology.
4. A Framework for Analysis
Decisions such as those associated with NASA's role in
,satellite communications are very difficult. While consider-
able information on the technology and market is available,
not all of it is relevant or reliable. Many technology and
policy alternatives are possible, but it is very difficult
to comprehend the important interactions among the alterna-
tives. And, even if one could project with certainty the
outcomes of alternatives, there is still the problem of
determining what we want or who is to pay the costs and
share in the benefits.
At the beginning we must recognize that no forecasting
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decisions or replace the need for difficult value judgments.
Rather, analysis and models are useful in the decision pro-
cess if they facilitate the decision process in structuring
available information and value judgments or preferences in
a way that provides insights into the choices among alter-
nat=.ves.
The objective, therefore, is to work towards the devel-
opment of a process of analysis that is supportive of the
NASA decision processes and makes appropriate use of models
and analysis.
5. Decision Analysis
Many aspects of communication satellite orbit-spectrum
decisions can be captured using readily understood techniques
of decision analysis. 2 In particular, the supply and demand
for satellite communications services are highly uncertain,
as are the technical outcomes of R&D. Early resolution of
technical uncertainty through R&D can have an immediate bene-
ficial effect on the market by facilitating good decisions on
the design and development of new satellites and the use of the
orbit-spectrum resource. The techniques of decision analysis
provide a way to put a dollar value on the benefits of resolv-
ing uncertainty through R&D, thus allowing the costs of R&D
to be rationally compared with the benefits.
Decision analysis is more than an analytical technique
for characterizing uncertainty in a decision problem. It is
also a process of analysis for bringing policy and technology
6
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decisions into a logical relation with the available infor-
mation, alternatives and preferences.
Typically a decision analysis is carried out with the
close involvement of many technical specialists and the
responsible executive officials. Through an iterative pro-
cess of information structuring and alternative generation,
a sequence of analyses is performed. The end product is not
the analysis but is the insight and communication that is
achieved by the participants in the analyses. This process
has been successfully demonstrated in many public and private
decision settings involving R&D, public regulatory policy,
corporate new product decisions, environmental planning and
facility capacity expansion.
As a first step towards such an application of decision
analysis to communications satellite R&D and policy decisions
of interest to NASA, we have developed the illustrative
example in Section II of this paper.
6. Structural Modeling
One of the aspects of the decision analysis approach that
deserves special attention in the case of satellite communica-
tions planning is the complexity of the interactions among the
competing satellite and terrestrial communications systems
and the demands for communications services. For example, as
the cost of communications is reduced by technological advances,
new demands for communications services appear. These demands
cause the capacity of existing systems to be fully utilized
7
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and create a need for new systems that compete for scarce
spectrum and orbital positions with existing systems.
Attempts to use simplified models of the communica-
tions market are generally not very satisfying. A typical
approach is to forecast the magnitude of future communica-
tions demand categorized by type of communication, video,
data, voice. But in a world where the distinctions between
different communication techniques are becoming fuzzy and where
the costs of communication, including travel and mail, are
changing rapidly, forecasts that extrapolate from past demand
data are not very accurate or useful.
A modeling approach that has been applied successfully
in many industries is a structural modeling approach. In
this approach, the demands for communications are characterized
in terms of basic end-use services such as person-to-person
and broadcast communications and in terms of the time urgency
and content of information to be communicated. Specific end
use market segments,such as residential, large business, and
small business might be distinguished.
The alternative communications modes, such as voice,
video, data, mail, and travel, available to each end-use would
be identified and the demands for each derived from the basic
end-use data and the prices charged for each service. These
prices would be computed with bases of information character-
ized in the supply side of the model.
8
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Communications services can be provided by a large
number of alternative technologies. Each of these technol-
ogies has its own unique resource requirements in terms of
spectrum resources, capital resources, reliability, and
types of communications that can be carried out. The prices
of these services are generally determined in part by eco-
nomic forces and in part by a regulatory policy that allo-
cates scarce public resources and controls prices of some
services. These prices and the regulatory policies deter-
mine which technologies are developed and utilized to meet
demand. The prices charged for the communications services
in turn influence demand as described earlier.
In a structural model of the communications market, each
generic communications technology would be identified, and
the direct capital operating and other costs associated with
each unit deployed would be characterized as inputs to the
model and would be adjusted within the model to account for
inflation and technological learning effects. In addition,
the technical information required to compute the amount of
spectrum and orbit resources required for a given mix of
communications services would be provided.
The model would utilize this and other information to
simulate the expansion and operation of an entire communica-
tions system including all major forms of communications over
a period of twenty or more years. The model calculations
9
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would be carried out iteratively because of the simultaneous
natua of the interaction between supply, demand and prices.
A structural model of this type would allow investiga-
tion of the penetration of different technologies under a
variety of assumptions regarding the outcomes of R&D and
public communications regulatory policy. Such a model would
also be a useful tool for investigating alternative communi-
cations satellite regulatory policies.
In this paper we have not attempted any significant
structural modeling of the communications market and have
instead relied on existing forecasts as a basis for the
illustrative decision analysis. This lack of emphasis on a
structural model of the communications market should not,
however, be taken as an indication of the lack of a need for
such modeling. The illustrative example as developed in this
paper makes clear the need for better models of the communi-
cations market as an aid to communications satellite R&D
planning.
10





This section of the paper describes an illustrative
application of decision analysis to technology decisions
affecting domestic communications satellites. First we
examine the likelihood of satellite services demand exceed-
ing the system capacity in the future. Having shown the
uncertain need for additional capacity, two options fcr
increasing orbit-spectrum capacity are discussed and com-
pared: the development of conservation and re-use technol-
ogies for the frequency bands currently in use, and the
introduction of service at a higher frequency band (the Ka
or 20 to 30 gigahertz band).
Background information for the analysis is provided by
four contractor reports, supplied by NASA. The contractors
are Western Union and ITT, whose studies concentrate on the
demand for Ka band satellite services, and Hughes and Ford
Aerospace, who provided "systems studies" of the technical
and cost details of alternative Ka systems.
The first part of the analysis develops a simplified
demand model, based largely on the ITT analysis. .T.TT's
forecasts are presented and discussed. Then a probabilistic
version of the ITT forecast is developed, based on a set of
illustrative estimates by the authors. The next section of
11
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the paper examines system capacity. Again the determi-
nistic data from the ITT analysis are used as a base on
which to build a probabilistic forecast. The probabilis-
tic forecasts for demand and capacity allow us to examine
the question of system saturation in a decision analysis
framework.
The next section of the paper considers system expan-
sion through the use of a Ka band service or frequency re-
use. A series of scenarios demonstrate how the technologies
might be used to meet demand. The comparison of technologi-
cal alternatives through the use of cost information is dis-
cussed and an illustrative cost comparison of Ka service to
re-use is presented.
2. Demand
A forecast of the future demand for satellite services
is essential to any evaluation of alternative satellite
sybtems. Ideally, the deman:' model would build a forecast
by aggregating over the various types of service. In keeping
with a decision analysis approach, the explicit consideration
of uncertainty would be desirable.
Below we develop a simple model of demand. We first
develop a framework for a general satellite demand model.
The model is derived largely from the ITT analysis. ITT's
data and results are briefly discussed. In the latter part
12
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of the section we develop a probabilistic forecast, using
a set of illustrative probability distributions.
The data developed in the Western Union report is in
a different form from that used by ITT, and is not used
in our demand model. The Western Union data is presented
and compared to the ITT data in Appendix A.
outline of a General Satellite Demand Model. A frame-
work for a satellite demand model is shown in Figure 1. The
model estimates satellite traffic in equivalent transponders
for a given service (voice, data, or video) in a given year.
We would expect the demand model to be driven by price,
which in turn will depend to some degree on the cost of both
terrestrial and satellite technologies. The model then de-
termines the total annual demand for long-haul telecommunica-
tions traffic. However, of greater interest is the peak level
of telecommunications traffic. This will depend on total
traffic load, and also on peak hour pricing strategies. The
peak demand will determine the capacity equirements.
The next step is to determine the satellite share from
the total peak demand. We can think in terms of a "satellite
capture ratio," or market share, that determines the percent-
age of the total demand that: goes to satellites. This ratio
will vary for different types of service. The major factor
in determining this ratio for a given type of service are
the relative costs of terrestrial and satellite technologies
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capacity of transponders in use will determine the
demand for transponders.
A More Limited Demand Model. The ITT analysis does
not explicitly consider price as a factor in demand. Pre-
sumably the assumption is that demand is simply not price
sensitive, or that price can be determined directly from
satellite systems cost estimates and from projections of
terrestrial tariffs. This leads us to a simpler demand
model, which is shown within the dotted lines in Figure 1.
Price and cost characteristics of terrestrial and satellite
technologies are considered implicit to the resulting model.
Below we discuss the components of the modified model,
and present the relevant data from tie ITT report.
a) Yearly Long-Haul Demand. ITT's forecast of yearly
demand for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 is shown
in Table 1. It is broken down into three services
types: voice, data, and video. Note a common unit,
terabits per year, is used for each type of service.
The share of the traffic attributed to each type of
service is also shown for each year.
b) Peak Demand. Peak demand determines the overall
capacity required. Peak demand will depend on the
overall traffic level, patterns of usage, and peak
period pricing policies.
Table 2 shows ITT's forecast for peak demand, in
millions of bits per second. The available
15
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Table 1: ITT - Forecast of Yearly Demand, in Terabits/yr.
1980 1990 2000
Voice	 559,000 (74%) 1,402,000 (76%) 2,891,000 (77%)
Data	 112,000 (15%) 281,000 (15%) 437,000 (12%)
Video	 82,500_(11%) 170,700 (9%) 417,300 (11%)
Total	 753,500 (100%) 1,853,700 (100%) 3,745,300 (100)
Table 2: ITT - Forecast of Peak Hour Demand (millions of
bits per second)
1986 1990 2000
Voice 43,800 (65%) 108,100 (63%) 204,700 (64%)
Data 20,667 (31%) 50,869 (30%) 78,853 (25%)
Video 2,891 (4$) 13,252 (7%) 37,980 (11%)
Total 67,358 (100%) 172,221 (100%) 321,533 (100%)
Table 3:	 ITT - Ratio of Pea;: Hour to Average Demand (Derived)
1980 1990 2000
Voice 2.5 2.4 2.2
Data 5.8 5.7 5.7
Video 1.1 2.4 2.9
16
VOLUME II, PART III.B.1	 605
information gives no indication of the methodology
used to determine peak traffic. For information
purposes, the ratio of peak demand to average
demand for each of the services is shown in Table 3.
c) Satellite Capture Ratio. The satellite capture ratio
refers to the percentage of long-haul traffic (defined
by ITT as traffic transmitted more than 200 miles)
that is handled by satellite. This will be different
for different types of service.
ITT's capture ratios are presented in Table 4. The
report does not state how the ratios were determined.
One way of determining capture ratios is presented in
the Westeni Union report. They consider the relative
costs of satellite and terrestrial service to split
the demand up. They develop a set of terrestrial/
satellite crossover curves that determine the relative
costs for various distances of transmission. However,
the approach may still be simplistic. The ratio can
also be different between sets of city pairs the same
distance apart, depending on factors including traffic
density, geography, etc.
d) Satellite Traffic. Satellite traffic is an intermed-
iate result. It is computed as the product of peak
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Table 4:	 ITT - Satellite Capture Ratio, in percent
1980 1990 2000
Voice 2 15 25
Data 1 50 60
Video 50 60 60





Table 6:	 ITT - Demand for Transponders (in 36 MHz equivalent
transponders)
1980 1990 2000
Voice 21 (34%) 225 (33%) 474	 (42%)
Data 5 (8%) 335 (51%) 436	 (39%)
Video 35 (58%) 110 (16%) 211	 (19%)
Total 61 (100%) 690 (100%) 1121	 (100%)
18
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e) Unit Transponder Capacity without Re-use Technologies.
ITT estimates that transponder capacity (in terms of
bits received per time period) will increase as time
goes on, as shown in Table 5. Becaua p re-use technolo-
gies are not explicitly considered in the ITT analysis,
we have assumed the capacity increases stem from factors
other than the re-use technologies considered later in
this report. Thus the data given in Table 5 are taken
as base capacities, which can be increased by various
re-use technologies.
f) Transponders Required. The resulting number of trans-
ponders required can be calculated as the quotient of
satellite traffic and transponder ca pacity. ITT's
forecast is shown in Table 6.
Probabilistic Analysis. Below we use the simple model
outlined in Figure 1 and a set of illustrative probability
distributions on the model components to demonstrate the :on-
struction of a probabilistic forecast. The output will be a
probability distribution on total transponder demand for a
given year.
The equation below determines the demand for a given type
of service in a given year:
19
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PKD.DT.. _ _ 1]	 SCR..
TCj	 13
where:	 i - type of service: voice, data, or video
j - year
DT = number of transponders required
PKD = peak long-haul demand, in MBPS
TC = unit transponder capacity, in MBPS
SCR = satellite capture ratio
Below we will drop the subscript j 	 Just one year, 1990,
will be considered.
The procedure to be used here will be to assign a
probability distribution to each of the state variables.
These can be transformed, through the use of equation (1)
into a distribution on the number of transponders required
for each type of service for 1990. This can further be con-
verted into a distribution on the total number of trans-
ponders required.
Probability Distributions on Model Parameters. In general,
a continuous or a discrete probability distribution can be
assessed by one or more "experts" for each of the state vari-
ables. Techniques for the elicitation of distributions are
well-established. 3 The distributions we have used here are
purely illustrative. In each case a discrete distribution
with three branches is used. The value from the ITT report is
(1)
20
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used as the "nominal" case and is assigned a probability of
.5 . "Low" and "high" values, each with a probability of
.25 are also assigned. The values assigned are shown in
Table 7.
It can be expected that there is probabilistic depen-
dence between certain sets of variables. In the first part
of the analysis, where we produce distributions on demand
for each of the three types of service, we assume there is
no dependence between the peak demand PKD i , the capture
radio SCRi , and the transponder capacity TC . It would
in general be possible to include the dependencies by
assessing conditional distributions, or by restructuring
the model to include additional variables that explicitly
deal with the dependencies, allowing unconditional assess-
ments to be made.
Distribution on Transponders Required for Each Service
Type. A probability tree, such as the one shown in Figure 2
for voice, can be constructed for each service. From the
tree we ca. generate a probability distribution on the number
of transponders required. The distribution has 27 branches.
Because the distributions for voice, data and video traffic
are intermediate results in terms of this analysis, they
are not presented here; they are shown in Appendix B.
Distribution on Total Number of Transponders Required.
It is also possible to use the assigned distributions to
produce a distribution on total demand. This requires
21
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Table 7: Probability Distributions for Demand Model for 1990
Low
( prob = .25)
PKD (Peak Demand)
- Voice (mbps)	 86,480
- Data	 (mbps)	 25,434
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Fig. 2: Probability Tree for Voice Demand
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further consideration of the dependencies between the
types of service. Two possible approaches for the purposes
of the demonstration are: 1) to assume independence between
the peak demand for each service and between the capture
ratio for each service; or, 2) assume complete dependence
between the three peak demand variables, and complete depen-
dence between the three capture ratio variables. The latter
approach is used here. This i,eans that if the voice peak
demand variable takes on its low value, the data peak demand
variable and the video peak demand variable also take on
their loco values. The same applies to the capture ratio
variables. The assumption of complete dependence can be
partially justified as follows. There are several common
underlying factors that will influence peak demand for all
the types of service. These factors include new developments
in satellite technology, and general satellite service pricing
policies. With respect to capture ratios, the most important
underlying factor is the relative costs of satellite and ter-
restrial technologies; this should affect each of the three
service types in a similar way. The fact that these underly-
ing factors will influence the variables in a similar way for
each type of service indicates that some dependence between
demand for the three service types does exist.
The probability tree is shown in generic form in Figure
3, and the resulting cumulative distribution on total demand
is shown in Figure 4. The point estimates from the ITT and













































Fig. 3: Probability Tree for Total Demand
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3. System Capacity Without Re-Use
In this section we determine the capacity of the
domestic orbital arc, in terms of the number of domestic
satellites and the resulting number of transponders thtLt
can be placed in orbit. The ability of each of the three
frequency bands to handle communications traffic is
limited by three factors:
— the intersatellite distance required to keep
interference to acceptable limits--this determines
the number of satellites that can be used;
— the number of transponders per satellite; and
— the fraction of the domestic orbital arc designated
for use by the U.S.
The ITT report provides data on the first factor, and
presents an estimate of available .,apicity. We first sum-
marize that data. We then proceed in a menner analogous to
that used in the demand section. We present a simple model
that determines capacity from information on the three
limiting factors listed above. We use the ITT data as a base
from which to generate illustrative probability distributions
on each of the factors. From these distributions we derive
a probability distribution on capacity.
ITT Data
ITT presents three orbital spacing scenarios for the
C and Ku bands. They are shown in Table 8. Although it is not
explicitly stated, they appear to take 30
 as the most likely
Ka band spacing.
27
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Table 8: ITT - Satellite Spacing Scenarios
Scenario	 C band	 Ku band
Minimum Capacity	 4.5°	 4.5°
Most Probable	 4°	 3°
Maximum Capacity	 3°	 3°
Table 9: ITT - Resulting System Capacities (in Transponders)








Maximum Capacity	 384	 768
28
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The ITT estimates of C and Ku band capacities (in
transponders) are shown in Table 9. They present 3 esti-
mates, corresponding to the three spacing scenarios. The
method by which the estimates were derived is not currently
available. In comparison with our estimates of capacity
presented below, the results seem rather high.
Probabilistic Analysis. The following equations can
be used to determine maximum capacity, in terms of trans-
ponders:




tc + Sk	 tk )
b) combined capacity of C , Ku , and Ka band:
CAP	 CAP
=	 CAPck + 3 2 	 to	 pa
where:
Sc =	 satellite spacing in	 C	 band, in degrees
S =	 satellite spacing in	 Ku hand, in degrees
S =	 satellite spacing in	 Ka band, in decrees
tc =	 average number of transponders per satellite, C	 band
t  -	 average number of transponders per satellite, Ku band
to =	 average number of transponders per satellite, Ka band
72 =	 the size of the domestic orbital arc, in degrees
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A probability distribution on capacity can be
produced by assigning probability distributions to the
variables in the above model. Again we have assigned
illustrative distributions, which are shown in Table 10.
The data on spacing is based on the scenarios in the ITT
report. It will be assumed there is complete probabilistic
dependence between Sc	S  , and S  . That is, if Sc
takes on its low value, S  and S  do also. The three
variables relating to satellite transponder capacity, t 
t  , and to
 , have been taken as certain for this analysis.
From these distributions, cumulative distributions on
capacity without and with the Ka band were derived; the
results are shown in Figures 5 and 6. Again, it is pointed
out these results assume no re-use technologies are applied.
The impact of re-use on capacit will be examined in
later sections.
4. The Probability of Saturation
In this section we determine the likelihood of system
saturation by 1990 if re-use technologies are not employed.
To do this, we compare our probability distribution on total
demand, from Figure 4, to the distributions on capacity with-
out and with the Ka band, shown in Figures 5 and 6 respec-
tively. We assume probabilistic independence between the
sets of variables making up the demand and the capacity
models.
30
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Table 10: Probability Distribution for the Capacity Model
low value nomimal value high value
Variable (Prob.	 =	 .25) (prob. _ .5) (prob.	 =	 .25)
S 4.50 40 30
c
S 4.50 30 30
S 4.50 30 20
a
t - 24 -
c
t 12 -
t	 -	 24	 -
a











































0 0	 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
TRANSPONDERS




VOLUME II, PART III.B.1
We first examine the "most likely" values of the
distributions. The median value of demand is 690 trans-
ponders; the median capacity without Ka is 360 trans-
ponders, and with Ka is 648 transponders. Using the most
likely demand and capacity values, we can calculate that
without Ka the system can meet only 52% of demand in 1990,
while with the Ka band the system can meet 94% of the demand.
Moving away from the "most likely" case, we can use the
complete distributions to calculate the overall probability
of saturation; i.e., the probability that demand exceeds
capacity. The equation used is:
Probability of Saturation =
1Q Prob 1 DT > q I CAP = q 1	 Prob (CAP = q 1qe
where Q is the set of a l l values in the capacity distribu-
tion, and DT is the demand for transponders. We have assumed
probabilistic independence between demand and capacity.
Therefore:
Probably of Saturation =
E Prob (DT > q)	 Prob (CAP = q)
qEQ
The result of these calculations are:
— without Ka band: .86 probability of saturation
— with Ka band: .54 probability of saturation
34
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Thus without the Ka band and without re-use it is very
likely that saturation will occur. Even with the Ka band, the
probability of saturation is still greater than .5. This
suggests re-use technologies will probably be needed if demand
is to be met. In the next section we examine alternative ways
of expanding system capacity.
5. Capacity Expansion Alternatives
If demand in 1990 exceeds the capacity of the C and Ku
bands (as it appears likely it will), capacity expansion will be
required. In this section we discuss how re-use and/or Ka band
service might be used to provide additional capacity.
We will avoid consideration of the details of the techno-
logical alternatives employed. For example, there are many
possible re-use technologies that are or will be available;
some of these are coding and modulation techniques, dual polar-
ization, antenna sidelobe suppression, satellite-to-satellite
links, ind the multiple beam antenna with on-board switching.
In the remainder of the paper we assume that one aggregate re-
use technology is available. The aggregate technology could
include one or more of the above technologies. Presumably the
technologies with the lowest marginal costs of use would be
selected for use first. The exact configurations of a system
would be determined by systems engineering studies. For Ka
band service, we ignore attenuation and reliability problems,
and assume the service provided is indistinguishable from C
and Ku band service.
35
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Analysis of Some Expansion Scenarios. The degree to
which expansion will be required depends on the demand level
in 1990. From the probability distribution on demand from
figure 5 we select three demand scenarios:
— "low"	 : demand is 415 transponders
— "nominal":	 If 	 It
— "high"	 It 	 to
In order to keep the analysis simple, we will not use
the probability distributions on capacity from Figures 5
and 6. Instead we will take capacity to be certain, and
assign the "most likely" values:
C band: capacity is 216 transponders
Ku band:	 It 	 of
Ka band:	 to 288	 it
Finally, we will consider three technological alterna-
tives, and compare them in terms of their ability to meet
demand. They are:
A. Neither Ka band or re-use are available.
B. Ka band is available; re-use is not.
C. Ka band is not available; both the C and Ku
bands can be re-used several (3 to 20) u,.-
times, using an aggregate "package" of technologies.
The alternatives presented are just examples; the list is in
no way comprehensive.
The alternatives and the demand scenarios are laid out in
tree form in Figure 7. On the right side of the tree the
ability of the alternatives to meet each of the three demand
levels is described.
36
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Saturation - 87% of demand met
Saturation - 52% of demand met
Saturation - great undercapacity -
only 33% of demand met
Capacity exceeds demand
only 19% of Ka band needed
Capacity slightly short of demand -
94% of demand met
Saturation - only 59% of demand met
Only 15% of C and Ku bands need to
be re-used
Re-use 92% of C and Ku bands - need to
approximately double capacit}
A large level of re-use is necessary -
about 3 times the C and Ku
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In Section 4, comparing the full distribution on total
demand to the distribution on total capacity led to the conclu-
sion that there is a probability of .86 that demand will exceed
capacity if neither re-use or Ka band are available. In the
cruder analysis here, we see that in no case can demand be met
by just the C and Ku bands without re-use. At the "low"
demand level, either a small amount of re-use or a small
portion of the Ka band are required to meet demand.
At the ncminal demand level, the Ka band on its own
falls just short of meeting demand. Under Alternative C,
it is necessary to re-use the C and Ku bands so that capacity
is approximately doubled. It appears that given a moderate
level of success in developing either technology, this level
of demand can be met. If a large number of -:e-use technolo-
gies were to become available between now and 1990, there is
the potential for a large amount of overcapacity.
At the high demand level, the addition of the Ka band
demand. Under Alterna-
be expanded to triple
demand. Therefore
zessfully developed by
supply could r.^sult if
alone does not come close to meeting
tive C, the C and Ku bands vast each
their base capacity in order to meet
unless Ka band and/or re-use are suc
1990, a large gap between demand and
the demand level is high.
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Combining Ka Band and Re-use Technologies. In general,
there are many combinations of C band re-use, Ku band re-use,
and Ka service that can be used to meet demand. Examples of
combinations that could be used to meet the nominal demand
level of 690 transponders are shown in Figure 8. The graph
on the left of Figure 8 shows possible combinations if the
Ka band is not available; the graph on the right assumes Ka
band is available (but cannot be re-used). A vertical line
drawn at any point on a graph showa how demand is met: the
amount that C nand is expanded over its capacity without re-
use, the amcun^ that Ku band is expanded over its capacity,
and whether or not the Ka band is used.
If the demand for satellite services is taken as insen-
sitive to price, then the optimal choice of satellite tech-
nologies corresponds to the problem of finding the system
configuration that meets demand at least cost. In the next
section we introduce cost data into the analysis.
6. Analysis of the Comparative Costs of Alternatives
By quantifying the uncertainties relating to cost, we
can expand the decision analysis framework of the earlier
sections of the paper. Unfortunately, the cost data avail-
able so far, from the contractor reports and from other
sources, is sketchy. 3elow we present a general outline of
how the analysis should proceed. We then present an example

























a) without Ka band	 b) with Ka ban
Fig. 8: Possible Combinations of C band Re
-use, Ku band Re-use,
and Ka band to Meet a Demand of 690 Transponders
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The General Framework. Figure 9 shows a decision tree,
in generic form, that determines the expected cost of meeting
demand for a given technological alternative. For example,
an alternative might be the use of the Ka band, or the intro-
duction of some combination of re-use technologies. There
are four state variables represented in the tree. The first
two variables are total demand, and system capacity without
re-use for each band. Comparison of the values taken on by
these variables determines to what extent frequency expansion
is needed. The last two variables are the technical perfor-
mance of the alternative at the level of service required to
meet demand (e.g., amount of re-use attainable), and the
resulting cost. In some cases the value of one or both of
t'Aese variables may be relatively certain. The last two
variables provide a general representation; they would appear
in different forms for specific analyses. The values at the
right side of the tree determine the cost of meeting the
resulting demand level. In some cases it may not be possible
to meet some high levels of demand with the given technologi-
cal alternative. "Rolling back" the tree determines the
expected cost of using the alternatives.
The cost of terrestrial technologies in direct competi-
tion with satellites will also determine the desirability of
using the various satellite technologies. The effect of com-
petition from terrestrial service will show up in the satel-
lite capture ratio in tla demand model. Since we have even
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costs, we will assume the contractors' estimates of satellite
capture ratios included the possibility of new or improved
terrestrial technologies. As noted in Section I, it would be
desirable in the future to formulate a structural model that
approached the question of terrestrial/satellite tradeoffs
in a more comprehensive manner. Pricing policies should
certainly be included, as should latent demand--demand not
currently observable, but which might appear if the costs
were reduced substantially.
An Illustrative Cost Comparison of Ka Service; to C Band
Re-use in 1990. The following analysis uses illustrative
cost data. Its purpose is to show how uncertainty about cost
enters into the analysis. A full description of an expanded
form of the example appears in Appendix C.
We compare two technological alternatives. The alterna-
tives are simply examples; many other possibilities exist.
The alternatives are:
1. C-band re-use. The C band spectrum is re-used
through a variety of technologies. The Ku band is
used before re-use is employed on the C band. The
Ka band cannot be used. For the sake of compu-
tational ease, we assume no re-use technologies are
used for the Ku band.4
2. Ka band. The Ka band can be used. No re-use is
possible for the C band or the Ku band. In perform-
ing the analysis it was found that the capacity
43
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available from the use of all three bands often
fell short of meeting demand. Therefore re-use
of the Ka band only is allowed, say through the
use of spot beams with on-board switching.5
The decision tree for the analysis is shown in Figure
10. There are four state variables: total demand, system
capacity, cost of C-hand re-use, and Ka system cost.
The total demand distribution from Figure 4 was approxi-
mated by a three-branch distribution. In order to reduce the
amount of analytic effort required, we again use determinis-
tic values for system capacity. The values used are:
C band: CAPc
 = 216
;:u bsnd : CAP 	 = 1 1
Ka band: CAP	 = 288
a
Uncertainty on system capacity could be added to the analysis
with no change in the methodology used.
The basic unit of cost used is dollars per transponder.
We are interested only in relative costs. It is assumed the
costs for the C and Ku bands are certain, while Ka band cost
is uncertain. The following data are_usda:
Qc = cost/transponder in
Qk = cost/transponder in
Qa = cost/transponder in
by the distribution
Prob (Qa = $1.50
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A simple model of re-use cost is employed for C band
re-use (and for Ka band re-use when required). It is assumed
re-use technologies are added one at a time until demand is
met. Each technology allows the entire spectrum capacity to
be re-used; i.e., it doubles capacity. Cost increases for
each re-use, as follows:
CRU (n)	 = QM 	 (2)
where:
CRU(n)	 = marginal cost per equivalent trans-
ponder when the spectrum is being used for the
nth time
Q = cost per transponder without re-use
m = a multiplier (m > 1)
n = number of times the spectrum is
being re-used
This model is u
does seem plausible.
would allow this and
data and compared in
For Alternative
sed for illustrative purposes. Its form
The acquisition of data on re-use costs
alternative model forms to be tested with
terms of suitability.
1, C-band re-use, the multiplier is me
and is uncertain:
Prob C me = 1.2	 ) _	 .5
Prob t me = 2 _	 .5
For cases where re-use is required for the Ka band, the
multiplier ma is taken to have the value of 1.2.
46
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Figure 11 shows the fuel decision tree, with the
deterministic capacity variable removed. At the right
side of each final node in the tree is the resulting
minimum cost for meeting demand. The cost calculations
are described in Appendix C.
The tree can be rolled back to yield an expected cost
of meeting demand for each alternative. The results are:
Alternative 1, (C-band re-use):
Expected cost = $1621
Alternative 2, (Ka band):
Expected cost = $1802
Because the data used here is illustrative, no defini-
tive statements can be made from the results. However, we
can see how the data could be used for decision-making pur-
poses. If Research Programs 1 and 2 were available that led
respectively to Alternatives 1 and 2 being available in 1990,
then it appears that Program 1 leads to a savings of $181
compared to Program 2. The steps involved in extending the
analysis to give explicit consideration to R&D alternatives
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Fig. 11: Decision Tree for Cost Comparison
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ATIPLICATION OF THE APPROACH TO COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE R&D DECISIONS
NASA faces a range of decisions in the area of
communications satellite policy. The analysis presented
here is focused primarily on the choice between Ka band
technologies and re-use and conservation alternatives.
The discussion here illustrated how a decision analysis
approach can be used to address that question.
The analysis, however, intentionally leaves out many
issues in order to illustrate analytical techniques. The
full approach as outlined in Section I requires considera-
tion of many other issues and much more attention to data,
involvement of knowledgeable experts and decision makers,
and structural modeling of satellite supply and demand.
In addition, to be useful to NASA R&D planning, the focus
of an analysis would have to be on the R&D allocation
decisions that precede the technology deployment decisions.
Figure 12 illustrates the structure of an R&D
d3cision analysis. This figure shows a two-stage decision
tree for the R&D decision problem. In the first stage, R&D
allocation decisions and R&D outcomes are represented. In
the second stage the deployment decisions and outcomes are
represented. The analysis of the second deployment stage
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The analysis of the R&D stage would use the same
decision analysis techniques as illustrated in the preced-
ing section. The additional information requirements would
include information on the cost of each R&D alternative and
the probabilitites of various outcomes of the R&D.
Within this structure alternative NASA R&D programs
can be represented as alternatives. The value of an R&D
program would be characterized in terms of the change in
information produced by the program including delineation
of new technical alternatives. Numerical values for this
information could be imputed from the resulting changes
in deployment decisions and reduced costs or increased
level of communications services.
We have not carried out the detailed R&D analysis in
this paper. Such an analysis should properly be carried out
with the close involvement of the relevant technical special-
ists and NASA officials. This two-stage R&D decision analysis
structure when combined with appropriate structural models of
communications markets would provide significant insights to
NASA R&D planning and could serve as a basis for a rational
allocation of NASA communications satellite R&D funds.
51
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Notes
1. Calio, Anthony J. Statement before the Subcommittee
on Space Sciences and Applications, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,
Feb. 20, 1979.
2. For a general introduction to decision analysis, see:
Howard, R. A., "Decision Analysis: Applied Decision
Theory,"
North, D. W., "A Tutorial Introduction to Decision
Analysis,"
Howard, R.A., "The Foundations of Decision Analysis,"
all reprinted in Readings in Decision Analysis,
SRI International, znd e	 .
3. See: Spetzler, C. S., and C. S. Stael von Holstein,
"Probability Encoding in Decision Analysis," reprinted
in Readings in Decision Analysis, SRI International,
2nd ed., 1977.
4. It may in fact be easier to re-use Ku band than C band,
suggesting the alternative of re-using Ku but not C
might be more realistic than the one presented here.
5. Re-use of the Ka band will likely use Ku band re-use
technology, and therefore should be feasible.
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APPEND?X A. Western Union Demand Data and
Comparison to t e ITT Data
Below we summarize the demand data from the Western
Union (WU) report and, where possible, compare it to the
ITT data. Western Union's demand model appears to be com-
prehensive, and fairly complex. It builds up a forecast
by aggregating data on a large number of telecommunications
services.
Table A-1 shows Western Union's forecast of net long
haul traffic for voice, data and video services for 1980,
1990, and 2000. A terrestrial/satellite cost model is then
used to split out satellite traffic from the total long haul
traffic. The estimate of satellite traffic appears in
T&ble A-2.
The data for the three types of services in the above
tables are each stated in different units. This makes com-
parisons between service types and with the ITT data difficult.
The data is eventually all converted into a common unit, equiv-
alent transponders. The process used to make the conversions
is not known at this point. There is some indication it is
a relatively complex process, and includes consideration of
peak hour demand, among other factors.
Western Union's resulting estimates of total long haul
traffic and satellite traffic in transponders are shown in
Tables A-3 and A-4. In each case we have shown the demand
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Table A-1:	 WU - Forecast of Annual Long Haul Traffic
1980 1990	 2000
Voice (1/2 circuits) 2,100,000 5,300,000	 13,700,000
Data (terabits/year) 1,100 7,000	 27,600
Video (widebond channels) 170 290	 450




voice (1/2 circuits)	 345,000	 892,000
Data (terabits/year) 	 464	 3,215
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Table A-3: WU - Total Long Haul Traffic in Transponders
1980 1990 2000
Voice 2100 (92%) 3407 (91%) 8828 (93%)
Data 13 (1%) 75 (2%) 320 (3%)
Video 176 (7%) 253 (7%) 357 (4$)
Total 2289 (100%) 3735 (1001) 9505 (100%)
Table A-4: WU - Satellite Demand in Transponders
1980 1990 2000
Voice 346 (80%) 360 (76%) 1862 (80%)
Data 61 (1%) 42 (5%) 201 (9%)
Video 80 (19%) 157 (19%) 258 (11%)
Total 432 (100%) 829 (100%) 2321 (100%)
Table A-5: WU - Satellite Capture Ratio (derived) in percent
1980 1990 2000
Voice	 16 18 21
Data	 46 56 63
Video	 "5 62 72
55
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we are able to derive a satellite capture ratio, which is
shown in Table A-5.
It is interesting to compare data from the latter
three tables to the ITT data presented in Section 2. In
order to facilitate comparison, the relevant pieces of data
will be reproduced side-by-side.
Table A-6 compares the contractors' estimates of the
way total long haul traffic is split between the three types
of service. There is a major discrepancy over the importance
of data traffic. Although the difference could be attribut-
able to differing perceptions of what c joing to happen
with respect to the vario ,:s technologies, it is also possible
the discrepancy stems from the use of different accounting
conventions. The fact that the results are so different for
1980, essentially the present, supports the latter view. The
discrepancy will hopefully be resolved when the full reports
become available.
In Table A-7 the estimates of satellite capture ratio
are presented. The results are again very different in 1980,
but concur to a large degree in 1990 and 2000.
The estimates of satellite demand in transponders is
presented in Table A-8. The forecasts presented in Table A-8
are the product of the full analysis of each e•. the contractors,
and are therefore the most interesting data for comparison.
As can be observed, the forecasts are so different that one
questions whether they are based on the same set of basic
56
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Table A-6: ITT and WU - Comparison of Split of Total
Long Haul Traffic Between Service Types - in percent
Format: (ITT data, WU data)
	
1980	 1990	 2000
Voice	 (74, 92)	 (76, 91)	 (77, 93)
Data	 (15, 1)	 (15, 2)	 (12, 3)
Video	 (11, 7)	 (9, 7)	 (11, 4)
Table A-7:	 ITT and WU - Satellite Capture Ratio - in percent
Format:	 (ITT data, WU data)
1580 1990 2000
Voice (2, 16) (15,	 18) (25,	 21)
Data (1, 46; (50,	 56) 1%60,	 63)
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assumptions and definitions. Although it is a major task
to critique either of the analyses and to improve them, one
apparent assumption of the WU analysis is that transponder
capacity remains constant at 50 MSPS. If the WU results
are recalculated with the increasing transponder capacities
used by ITT, the forecast for the total number of transponders,
as shown in Table A-9, is much closer to ITT's. This does
not mean one analysis is correct and the other is not, but at
least it offers one explanation for the discrepancies. we
note that there is still a major divergence in terms of the
split between voice, data and video traffic.
58
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Table A-8:	 ITT and WU - Demand for Tr,insponders
Format:	 (ITT data, WU data)
1980 1990 2000
Voice (21, 346) (225, 630) (474,	 1862)
Data (5, 6) (345, 42) (436,	 201)
Video (35, 80) (110, 157) (211,	 258)
Total (61, 432) (690, 829) (1121,	 2321)
Table A-9: WU - Demand for Transponders, modified to include
increasing transponder capacity (in 36 MHz
equivalent transponders)
1980 1990 2000
Voice 412 438 862
Data 7 29 93
Video 95 109 119
Total 514 576 1074
59
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)IX B. The Probability Distributions for Demand
for Voice, Data, and Video Services













	 200	 400	 600
TRANSPONDERS




` 0	 200 400 600 800 1000
TRANSPONDERS
Fig. 8-2: Cumulative Distribution on Data Demand for Transponders
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APPENDIX C. Expanded Version of the Illustrative
Cost Comparison
In Section 6 we presented an illustrative analysis
of the costs of Ka band service and C band re-use. This
appendix is an expanded version of that analysis: a third
technological alternative has been added. A full descrip-
tion of the cost calculations is also presented.
We compare three technological alternatives.
1. C-band re-use. The C band spectrum is re-used
through a variety of technologies. The Ku band
is used before re-use is employed on the C band.
No re-use technologies are available for Ku band.
The Ka band cannot be used.
2. Ka band. The Ka band can be used. No re-use is
possible for the C band or the Ku band. In per-
forming the analysis it was found that the
capacity available from the use of all three
bands often fell short of meeting demand. There-
fore re-use of the Ka band only is allowed, say
through the use of spot beams with on-board
switching.
3. Combination. Both of the above are available. The
minimum cost combination for each demand level
will be used.
The decision tree for the analysis is shown in Figure
C-1. There are four state variables: total demand, system
capacity, cost of C-band re-use, and Ka system cost.
The total demand distribution from Figure 4 was approxi-
mated by three-branch distribution. In order to reduce the
amount of analytic effort required, we again use determinis-
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C band: CAP  = 216
Ku band: CAP  = 144
Ka band: CAP  = 288
Uncertainty on system capacity could be added to the analysis
with no change in the methodology used.
The basic unit of cost used is dollars per transponder.
We are interested only in relative costs. It is assumed the
costs for the C and Ku bands are certain, while Ka band cost
is uncertain. The following data is used:
Qc
 = cost/transponder in C-band = $1
Qk
 = cost/transponder in Ku-band = $1.50
Qa
 = cost/transponder in Ka-band is described
by the distribution:
Prob Ga  = $ 1.50 _ . 5
Prob ( Qa = $5.00
 / _ . 5
A simple model of re-use cost is employed for C band re-use
(and-for Ka band re-use when required). It is assumed re-use
technologies are added one at a time until demand is met.
Each technology allows the entire spectrum capacity to be
re-used; i.e. it doubles capacity. Cost increases for
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me 	Qa
resulting node




cost	 band meeting (for use in
demand parameter	 cost demand Table C-1)
Alternative
me = 1. 2 498 1
415
-- ----





C band Pr 2 —_^_—^-- 1322 4
re-use 1568 5
1100
Pr = 1/3 2 4942 6_ _
Q	 5 514 7
415
+---'--	 Q	 5 706 8
942 9
Alternative 2 690
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Fig. C-2: Full Decision Tree
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CRU(n) - Qmn	 t2)
where:
CRU(n) - marginal cost per equivalent trans-
ponder when the spectrum is being used for the
nth time
Q - cost per transponder without re-use
m - a multiplier (m > 1)
n - number of times the spectrum is being
re-used
For Alternative 1, C-band re-use, the multiplier is
me and is uncertain:
Prob t me = 1.2 ,	 .5
Prob me =	 2 1 - . 5
For cases where re-use is required for the Ka band, the
multiplier ma is taken to have the value 1.2 .
Figure C-2 shows the full decision tree, with the
deterministic capacity variable removed. At the right side
of each final node in the tree is a resulting minimum
cost for meeting demand. The cost calculations are out-
lined below.
Cost Calculations - Alternative 1
Demand is met by first using C band, then the Ku band,
and then by re-using the C-band as many times (or fraction
of a time) as requ:Lred. For tha range .:f demand values
encountered here, the following equation can be used.
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Let:	 DT-CAP
R = CAP 
k	
where DT is demand
c
INT = largest integer less than R
f = R - INT





The amount of re-use required to meet de:
each demand level is described in Table C-1.
costs are shown on the right side of the tree




Cost Calculation - Alternative 2
Demand is met by first using the C , then the Ku, and
then the Ka band, and then by re-using the Ka band if
necessary. For the range of demand values encountered here,
we use the following to calculate cost.
Let:
R = DT-CAP 
c 
-CAPk	
where DT is demand
CAP
a
INT = largest integer less than R












7 Re-use 25% of C band
8 Re-use 25% of C band
9 Re-use C band,then re-use 53% of it
10 Re-use C band,then re-use 53% of it
11 Re-use C band three times,then re-use
43% of it






Use 19% of Ka band
Use 19% of Ka band
Use Ka band,then re-use 15% of it
Use Ka band,then re-use 15% of it
Use Ka band,then re-use it once,
then re-use 57% of it
Use Ka band,then re-use it once,
then re-use 57% of it
13 Re-use 25% of C band
14 Re-use 25% of C band
15 Use 19% of Ka band
16 Re-use 25% of C band
17 Re-use C band, then re-use 53% of it
18 Re-use C band, then re-use 53% of it
19 Use Ka band, then re-use 15% of it
20 Re-use C band, then re-use 53% of it
21 Re-use C band twice, then use Ka,
then re-use 9 % of C
22 Re-use C three times, then re-use
43% of it
23 Use Ka, re-use Ka, re-use 76% of
C band
24 Re-use C twice, use Ka, re-use 7% of
Ka
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Table C-1: How Demand is Met





COST = CAPa	mk + fmintk
i = o
+ Qc
 CAPc + Q  • CAP 
The amount of Ka band uce required to meet demand for
each demand level is shown in Table C-1. The resulting
cost values appear in Figure C-2.
Cost Calculations - Alternative 3
Under Alternative 3, it is assumed demand is first met
by using the C and Ku bands once. Additional capacity
is added through re-use of the C-band and/or through the use
and subsequent re-use of the Ka band. Capacity is added
in increasing order of its marginal cost. This generates
a supply curve for capacity. Table C-2a shows the increase
in marginal cost as the C band is re-used, and as the Ka
band is used and subsequently re-used. When the appropriate
cost parameters are "plugged in," the supply curve is derived
by combining the lists for the two technologies and selecting
alternatives in order of increasing marginal cost. Since
there are two possible values of Ka system cost and two
possible values of C band re-use cost, a total of 4 supply
curves were needed in order to calculate the costs at the
end of the tree. The development of the supply curve for
one set of parameters is shown in Table C-2b the resulting
supply curve appears in Figure C-3. For a given demand
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Table C-2a: Marginal Cost of Increased Capacity
C Band Re-use:
Increased Capacity 	 Marginal Cost
in Transponders	 per Transponder
first 216	 me QC
next 216	 m c 2 QC
next 216	 m c 3 QC
next 216	 m c 4 Qc
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Table C-2b: Development of the Supply Curve for
One Set of Cost Parameters
Parameters: me = 1.2 , Q  = 1.5 , ma = 1.2
C Band:
Increased Capacity	 Marginal Cost

















Increased Capacity Cumulative Marginal Cost
in Transponders Capacity Increase Per Transponder
first 216 216 1.20
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the demand value. Table C-1 shows how demand was met for
each of the branches of the decision tree pertaining to
Alternative 3.
Because the data used here is illustrative, no defini-
tive statements can be made from the results. However, it
is interesting to analyze the tree in Figure C-2 both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
The tree can be rolled back to yield an expected cost
of meeting demand for each alternative. The results are:
Alternative 1, (C-band re-use): Expected cost = $1621
Alternative 2, (Ka band): Expected Cost = $1802
Alternative 3, (Combination): Expected Cost = $1171
If Research Programs 1, 2, and 3 were available that
led respectively to Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 being available
in 1990, then it appears that Program 3 leads to a savings
of $450 compared to Program 1, and a savings of $631 compared
to Program 2. If the costs of the research program were
available, the net savings generated could be compared.
In SectionII, comparing the full distribution on
total demand to the distribution on total capacity led to
the conclusion that there is a probability of .86 that
demand will exceed capacity if neither re-use or Ka ban
are available. In the cruder analysis here, we see from
664	 VOLUME II, PART III.B.1
Table C-1 that in no case can demand be met by just the C
and Ku bands without re-use. In the case of the lowest
demand value, 415 transponders, demand is met either by
using 19% of the Ka band or by re-using 25% of the C band.
For the higher demand levels of 690 and 1100 transponders,
the introduction of the Ka band without re-use is not
sufficient to meet demand. It appears likely that re-use
will be required by 1990. At the highest demand level,
extensive re-use is necessary. We also note that the
lowest cost "solutions" involve mixing re-use of the C and
Ka bands.
76
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The purpose of this paper is to describe the boundaries of rcket
areas which favor various reams for distributing cormuaicatione satellite
tvaffic. the distribution asthods considered &rot (1) central earth
station with cable access, (1) rooftop earth stations, (3) earth station
with radio access, and (4) various combinations of these methods.
The method of comparison is to determine the least cost system for a
hypothetical region described by number of users end the average cable
access mileage. The region is also charac--rised by a function which
expresses the distribution of users.
The results indicate that the least cost distribution technology is a
central earth station with cable access for medium to high density areas
of a region, combined with rooftop earth stations or (for higher volusues)
radio access for counts users.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to describe the
boundaries of market areas which favor various means
for distributing communications satellite traffic.
The distribution iaethods considered are: control
earth station with cable access, rooftop earth sta-
tions, earth station with radio access, and various
combinations of these methods.
The method of comparison is to determine the
least cost system for a hypothetical region described
by number of users and the average cable access mile-
age. The region is also characterized by a function
which expresses the distribution of users.
The results indicate that the least cost distribu-
tion is central earth station with cable access for
medium to high density areas of a region, combined with
rooftop earth stations or (for higher volumes) radio
access for remote users.
iii




Technological improvements increasing satellite capacity
and lowering costs are likely to continue, implying that the
long haul portion of telecommunications costs will steadily
assume less importance. This paper focuses on least cost con-
figurations for local distribution of satellite traffic, which
is likely to account for an ever increasing portion of tele-
communications cost.
The local distribution problem is non-trivial because of
the different approaches and technical alternatives for meeting
demand that are available. In general, existing common carriers
favor use of large earth stations and local distribution provided
by existing facilities. Current plans call for only five
Western Union earth stations and only seven joint AT&T/GTE earth
stations. New entrants, on the other hand, prefer to avoid
distribution over existing facilities, instead relying on smaller
units which can be placed on customer premises. The latter
approach is exemplified by the Satellite Business Systems (SBS)
proposal for small rooftop earth stations. In the SLS case,
the local distribution cost is insensitive to distance. An
alternative approach, the Xerox Telecommunications Network MEN).
employs an MDS (radio) system for local distribution. The XTE17
system's distribution c yst is basically independent of distance,
although reception is limited to points within about forty
miles of the transmitter.
1
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The presence of the three technical alternatives poses
gjestions about how local distribution should be accomplished.
Demographic characteristics of the region served will. usually
determine which system has the least cost. However, the best
means of local distribution could be a combination of the com-
peting technical arrangements.
Cost Characteristics for an Example Service
For the purposes of this discussion, an example service
*
is taken from a teleconferencing study. The service provides
four channels for one-way video and two-way audio communications.
The study, which reached the now familiar conclusion that satel-
lite systems are often the most ccst-affentive way to provide
long distance communications, provides cost estimates for earth
stations, cable distribution, and an MDS-type system. Cost
equations extracted from this report are used (with simplifi-
cation) in this paper to provide order of magnitude estimates.
The cost structure for a region with n users is:
earth station with cable access (C)
c = c  + c2rn
rooftop earth stations (ES)
C = c 3 n
earth station with MDS system (MDS)
c = c  + c4 + c5n
* Teleconferencing: Cost Optimization for Satellite and Ground
Systems for Continuing Professional Education and Medical-ge'rvices,
D. Dunn, B. Lusignan, E. Parker, Stanford University, May 1972.
2
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where:
c  = cost of earth station equipped for redistribution ( 11,500)
c 2 = cost per mile per user for cable distribution (6,000)
c 3 = rooftop earth station cost ( 9,200)
c4 = cost of MDS transmitter ( 86,000)
c 5 = cost of user MDS receiver (8,600)
r = average mileage for cable distribution per user.
Figures in parentheses are approximate dollar costs for installed
equipment and maintenance. Note that different types of
systems may have different space segment designs for minimum
cost operation.
C vs ES vs MDS
The minimum cost arrangements for regions described by the
variables r and n are now examined. If only one technical
arrangement can be used for a region, the transitions oc;:ur at:
ES-MDS tradeoff





r = 5 + 4 n = 1.43 + ln' 3 (miles)^ c
2	 2
C-ES tradeoff
r = c3 - cl n - 1.53 - 1 .n1 6 (u ►i,ies)
2	 2
The boundaries of `hese areas are plotted in Exhibits 1-A, B, C.
Exhibit 1-D displays the composite of these boundaries. The
C-MDS, C-ES, and ES-MDS boundaries intersect at a common point.
3

















	 100	 200	 n
Exhibit 1
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Using the above cost estimates, this intersection point is at
r = 1.522 and n = 162.5.
The conclusion in this case is fairly straightforward. If
the demand is highly concentrated, a central earth station ac-
cessed by cable is the lowest cost alternative, regardless of
the number of users in the region. If the demand is low density
(geographically dispersed), then either an MDS system or rooftop
earth stations dominate in terms of cost. The choice between
these latter two depends only on the number of users, provided
users are not so widely dispersed as to be outside the range of
the MDS transmitter. Higher demand favors the MDS system, since
the incremental cost of an MDS receiver is slightly less than
the cost of an individual earth station (an MDS distribution
system has a fixed cost as well). However, if earth station
costs become low enough, the MDS system will not be a least
cost alternative in any region.
C vs C and ES
It is sometimes possible, when the space segment allows
compatible designs of two local distribution technologies, to
assume that more than one technology will be used in the same
system. For example, consider the joint use of cable and roof-
top earth stations. Civen the cost characteristics of these
systems, it seems that distribution cost would be minimized
by employing cable for the nearby users and rooftop earth
stations for the more remote users.
Unfortunately, the boundary separating near and remote areas
is not well defined by r and n alone. More information about
5
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the demography of the region is required. Specificall y-, we need
to know the number of users n within a given radius r of the
cable relay station. This information, which can be represented
by a function of radius n(r), is sufficient for us to obtain a
second function, r(n), which tells how average cable mileage
changes as additional users are served.
For regions of interest, we will assume that all users can
be ordered so that s(n), the increment in cable-miles required
to serve the n th user, is non-decreasing. This is a useful concept
since it enables an evaluation of the incremental cost of serving
the n th user by alternative arrangements. If served by cable,_
the incremental cost is c 2s(n). If served by rooftop earth
station, the incremental cost is c 4 . This allows a division of
users by the distribution technique serving them:
Let	 n = max In is (n) < c3/c2}
then use:
C for users	 1, 2, ....n
ES for users	 n + 1, n + 2, ....n
Note that if s(n) is not non-decreasing, a more complicated analysis
is required. Furthermore, this analysis could indicate that a
second central earth station accessed by cable is required to
minimize distribution cost--a result that is precluded when s(n)
is non-decreasing.
It can be shown that s(n) and r(n) are related:
s (n) = r (n) + nr I (n) *
* The total number of cable-miles is nr(n), the number of users
multiplied by their average distance from the transmitter. The
increment in cable-miles s(n) is just the rate of change with
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This relation can be used to plot ah appropriate boundary for
"C only" and "C and MDS" in our r - n space diagrams for various
assumed "demographies" s(n). For example, suppose that regions of
interest have users distributed such that s(n) is linear:
s(n) = an	 for some constant a,
so that r(n) = 2 and s(n) = 2r(n).
s(n) reaches the criterion c3/c2 at r = c3 and n = c3 .
T—C 2	 ac 2
Note that for this special case, r does not depend on n. This
example is depicted in Exhibit 2-A. As shown, for any linear
demography, there is a threshold value above which both cable
and rooftop earth stations are used jointly. This threshold
is one-half the value of the threshold (in the limit) in Exhibit
1-C.
To show that the boundary is not always flat, consider a
logarithmic demography defined by:
s(n) = all + log n) for some constant a
so that r(n) = a log n.
c	 c
s(n) reaches the criterion c	 1 +3/c2	
a	








This example is depicted in Exhibit 2-B.
It is important in the examples above to note that the
boundary of the areas "C only" and "C and ES" is not invariant to
the demographic "class" of the regimen. Even in the limit for a
7
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Of POOR QUALITY
large number of users, the threshold for introduction of user
earth stations depends on the type of demography assumed. For
most regions of interest, the boundary is expected to be fairly
flat as shown in the examples.
C vs C and MDS
Now consider the joint use of cable and an MDS system. This
analysis proceeds parallel to the above analysis, except that it
is slightly complicated by the presence of a fixed cost for the
MDS transmitter. Otherwise, the MDS system has cost characteris-
tics similar to rooftop earth stations. In the previous case, the
behavior of s(n) after it reaches the cost criterion was irrelevant
as long as it was non-decreasing; in this case, it matters.
If the systems are used jointly, cable access will be em-
ployed for nearby users and MDS receivers for remote users. The
users may be divided by the criterion:
let n* = max (nl s (n) < c5!c2}
then use
	




n* + 1, n* + 2, ..n .
The system will be used jointly only if:
Cost (C only) ` Cost (C and MDS)
or
	
cl + c2rn	 cl + c,r	 (n*) n* + c 4 + c 5 (n-n*)
or
n	 c4 + (c 2 r (n*)
	
c5) n*
c 2 r - c5
9
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Consider again the linear demography s(n) - an and r(n) = anT .
nc 5 	c5
Transition occurs at n* _ -2—
rc 2 r* _ f-c 2 . The condition on n
requires:
cl + c 2rn > c l + c2 2c 2 2r cZ + c 4 + c5 (n-n^2)
or
c4
n > c2 
r	 c5for r >
(r - 2c ) 2	
c2
2
Exhibit 3-A displays the boundary for the linear demography.
Note that this curve is always below the curve in Exhibit 1-B,
which assumed that the systems could not be used jointly.
C vs C and ES vs C and MDS
Now let's consider the case where cable is used and either
MDS or user earth stations can be used in addition. The linear
demography s(n) = an, r(n) 2 is assumed again. To determine
the boundary, note that:
Cost (C and ES)	 > Cost (C and MDS)
cl + c2 r (n) n + c 3 (n-n) > c  + c 2r (n*)n* + c 4 + c 5 (n-n*)
c nc	 nc	 c nc	 nc
—> c2 2c 2 2rc2 + c 3 (n- 2rc 2) > c 4 + c2 IF2 2rc2 + c5(n-^2)
4rc c
n >	 ^- 2 + 4rc 2 Cc3-c5)
c5 - c3
In the limit on r,	 n = c4	 = 143
c3-c5
10
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Note that the fixed cost for a central earth station does not
enter in the boundary relation since both systems require it.
This result is depicted in Exhibit 3-B, and represents the
composite boundaries for the linear demography. Compare this
figure to Exhibit 1-D, where it was assumed that only one system
could be used in a region.
Remarks
In this paper, a technique has been described that can be
used to determine the demographic characteristics of regions which
favor different technical arrangements for local distribution of
satellite traffic. The example used finds the least cost arrange-
ment to be a central earth station with cable access for medium to
high density areas of a region, combined with rooftop earth
stations or MDS for more remote users in the region. The rooftop
earth station--MDS tradeoff is decided principally by volume,
with the latter arrangement preferred for high volumes. More
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This paper reports a study of the investment oust of serving a rural
telephone subscriber in the Wited States. In particular, this morkisg
paper presents estimates of the incremental investment cost per rural
subscriber. There have bean a number of previous studies of the woo of
telephone service, =at of them based on snfinsering data and a for wing
econometric techniques. A second purpose of this working papa is to
survey sow of the more recent of these studies.
Our analysis shojis several thinp about rural equipmees cents.
Perhaps the cost, siSnificaat is that out econometric equation, as well as
the majority of the engineering studies cour4lted, indicate that adding a
rural subscriber costs about $510 in constant 1973 dollars. TbLs is less
than the conventional estimates of about $1000 per main station, often
heard in the industry, and is also less than the average increase in book
value for REA borrowers, $940 in 1972 dollars.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOTE MWEj .
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1.	 INTRODUCTION
This working paper reports a study of the investment cost of serving a
rural telephone subscriber in the United States. It is part of a larger
study concerned with the prospects and costs of new technologies and ser-
vices for rural telecommunications. In particular, this working paper
estimates a simple cost function that provides an estimate of the incre-
mental investment cost per rural subscriber.
There have been a number of previous studies of the cosrR of telephone
service, most of them based on engineering data and a fsw using econometric
techniques. A second purpose of this working paper is to survey some of the
more recent of these studies.
This is probably a good time to examine the cost of rural service.
Although other studies have addressed the prospects for introducing new
technology providing both narrow band (e.g., voice bandwidth) and broad band
(e.g., tele-ision bandwidth) services to rural areas, no such new technol-
ogieb have yet been implemented in the U.S except experimentally. However,
forces are now at work which seem likely to favor this new technology. This
is because, at present, the local telephone company is the principal
provider of telecommunications services to rural areas, and the pattern of
telephone regulation has been such that the pricing of service has not been
based on cost. The Rural Electrification administration (RBA) has sub-
sidized the construction of rural telephone systems for many years
through loans and loan guarantees with interest rates as low as two percent
1 For example: Office of Technology Assessment (1976), Alleman et al.,
(1977a), and BNR Inc. (1978).
	 —
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per year. Perhaps more importantly, the telephone separations and settle-
ments process appears to have caused long, distance and urban services to
subsidize local rural service, especially residencial service.
This subsidization of rural service may have suppressed innovation in
rural telephony. innovation will he suppressed if the cost of rural service
per additional main station using a new technology is below the cost per
main station using existing technology, while the price of the service to
rural subscribers is below its economic cost by at least as large an
amount. To determine whether or not this is the case, one obviously needs
reliable estimates of the economic cost per new mail, telephone, which this
paper is intended to provide.
Such an estimate is also ueeful because any subsidization of local
rural telephone service is likely to be reduced by the deregulation of other
parts of the telephone industry. Factors such as introduction of competi-
tion in the markets for customer premises equipment (CPE) and private line
service, and the reselling of message toll service, will tend to eliminate
the financial resources providing the subsidy. Thus, it seems likely that
the revenues from local service will have to become more closely connected
to the cost of the service, possibly favoring the introduction of econom-
ically beneficial new technologies. If, as a matter of national policy, it
is determined that some new form of subsidy is appropriate, the estimates
provided here will give some idea of the size of Lite subsidy.
Our analysis shows several thing~ about rural equipment costs. Perhaps
the most significant is that our ecrnometrte equation, as well as the
majority of the engineering studies consulted, indicate that adding a rural
690
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subscriber costs about $500 in constant 1972 dollars. This cost includes
the equipment on the subscribers premises, the local loop and the incre-
mental costs of local switching. It does not include any additional costs
associated with the subscriber's use of the long distance telephone network.
The value of $500 per subscriber is less than the conventional estimate
of about $1000 per main station often heard in the industry, and is also
less than the average increase in book value for REA borrowers, $940 in 1972
dollars. That is, our econometric equation indicates a "fixed" or
"constant" cost component, equal to about $160 thousand in 1972, per REA
borrower. This component is not associated with several factors which could
influence costs, namely:
1. Increases in the number of central offices,
2. Decreases in the average length of haul for subscriber loops, or
3. Changes from multi-party to one-party service during the period
from which the data used in this study are drawn.
Although the lack of association is not water-tight because we had only
twenty years or so of data available, it appears that some of a typical REA
borrower's capital costs are incurred independently of increases in the
number of subscribers. One explanation for this may be that these costs are
somehow associated with network components not included in our $500
estimate, particularly the costs of toll connecting trunks used to link the
local central office to the toll network. To the extent that this explana-
tion is valid the long run cost of an additional subscriber will be closer
to $1000 than to $500. However, since the technologies proposed for as
substitutes for wire conventional telephones do not always affect the costs
of long distance service, the lower figure is still uscful as a benchmark.
-3-
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Finally, as noted in Section 2, several factors may cause a rural
company to build an excessively capital-intensive plant. These factors all
distort prices faced by a rural company from the market prices at which
judgments of social costs should be made. Consequently the cost estimates
reported here are not appropriate for assessag the social cost of rural
telephone service. However, to the extent that these factors (which are
primarily due to regulation) persist, the estimates can be used as
benchmarks. Moreover, if deregulation eliminates these distortions the
capital costs for rural companies will rise, and our estimates will be too
low. Hence any new technology that appears favorable using the estimates
presented here will seem even more attractive in a de-regulated environment.
-4-
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2. DEFINITION OF LOCAL RURAL SERVICE
This section outlines the components of local telephone service, and
discusses the nature of the problem of estimating the costs of providing
such service. Figure 1 shows schematically the elements of equipment that
go towards providing local telephone service. Some terminology used in this
paper is also illustrated in the figure.
Although there are many ways to divide the costs of the elements shown
in Figure 1, we have used the following four-way breakdown:2
1. Station equipment, including inside wiring, station
protectors and connectors.
2. The "local loop," including the house drop and the distribu-
tion cables connecting the subscriber's premises with the
central office.
3. Central office line and switching equipment.
4. Toll and/or tandem connecting trunks, and other equipment
needed to connect the local (Class 5) central office with the
long-distance telephone network.
The first three items, taken together, represent essentially all the costs
of the local exchange network, connecting subscribers to one another by
means of a central switch. Although some newer technologies can be used to
2 For other taxonomies, see ITU (1972) and Hall (1975).
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Figure 1. Local Telephone Network Elements
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move some of these switching; functions to concentrator devices (thereby
reducing; the number of very costly long loops), the general layout of the
local network is a "star" configuration in which all subscribers are
electrically connected to the central office. The fourth item is
essentially the cost of connecting this star network to the national toll
telephone network, carrying lung] haul traffic.'
2.1 Characteristics of Local Exchange Areas
There have been a number of studies of the characteristics of different
exchange areas; some of them are summarized in Alleman (1977b). Table 1 is
taken from a Bell System reference (Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1977) that
describes the basic parameters of wire centers in the public telephone net-
work. The most striking difference between the urban, suburban and rural
exchanges is the density of subscribers. Rural subscriber densities, with
which we :ire concerned with here, are about 5 working lines per square
mile."
However, the Bell System values shown in Table 1 may overestimate the
density of rural areas, since the Bell System provides local service mostly
to urban and :suburban areas. For example, Table 2 shows the typical dis-
tance from a central office to the main station for the Ball System, General
Telephone (GTh), .sod REA burrowers. As can he seen, Bell and GTE
z In an urban setting; it would be necessary to consider the role of tandem
switching machines. These are not very important in a rural setting.
" Alaska is, of course, still more :sparely populated. For information oil
the costs of service in Alaska see Hills and Morgan (14111).
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* Hundred call seconds per main station
Source: Bell Telephone Laboratories (1977).
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statistics do not differ greatly, but the REA borrowers have substantially
longer loops, particularly the few very long loops.
Table 2
TYPICAL ROUTE DISTANCE FROM CENTRAL OFFICE TO MAIN STATION (MILES)
Ninetieth
Organization	 Mean	 Median	 Percentile
Bell System	 2.0	 1.5	 3.5
GTE	 2.2	 1.5	 4.5
REA borrowers	 3.4	 1.9	 8.5
Sources: Lally and Hitt (1966)
Davis and Lally (1971).
These few long loops have a significant cost impact. The most
startling statistics come from a 1964 survey of Bell System loops, which
showed that 1.5 million, or 3.25 percent of all Bell System customers, were
served by loops exceeding 30 kilofeet in length. These 3.25 percent of
customers used only 1.7 percent of the working Bell System loops (due to
multi-party lines), but accounted for 11.2% of total outside plant invest-
ment in the Bell Systemi (Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1977)
2.2 Cost Trends in Rural Telephone Plant
The initial evidence we examine on rural subscriber costs is provided
by data published by its REA Annual Statistical Report. Figure 2 shows the
-9-
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trend in plant co-ts per subscriber in two different ways. The solid line is
the gross value of telephone plant-in-service for all REA borrowers, divided
by the number of subscribers. The dashed line shows the annual first differ-
ence of the plant-in-service account divided by the first difference of the
number of subscribers. 5 This quantity is an indication of the incremental
cost of plant per added subscriber.
Neither of these figures has been been adjusted for inflation. Figure 3
presents some of this data with an inflation adjustment, based on the plant-
and-equipment component of the GNP deflator (Council of Economic Advisors,
1981). The solid line in this figure is the deflated value of the dashed
line in Figure 2. That is, it is the deflated difference in gross plant
divided by the difference in subscribers. The dashed line in Figure 2 is
based on the net plant-in-service, i.e., telephone plant-in-service less the
associated depreciation reserve. As can be seen in Figure 3, there has been
no discernable trend in the real incremental cost per subscriber for REA
borrowers. Table 3 shows the averages these two time series.
Table 3




Annual Change in Gross Plant-in-Service
per Added Subscriber	 $ 940
Annual Change in Net Plant-in-Service
per Added Subscriber	 697
5 See Appendix A for these data, and other series referred to below.
-11-
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2.3 Significance of Book Costs
As noted in the introduction, rural companies receive several subsi-
dies. Because these subsidies distort the prices faced by rural companies,
it can be shown that the companies have incentives to build and operate
telephone systems which are not least cost when evaluated at the prevailing
market prices. Consequently, the cost estimates based on book costs are not
necessarily unbiased estimates of the social costs of serving a rural
subscriber.
Three sources of bias can be identified for rural companies who are REA
borrowers.
1. The low interest rates on RKA loans and loan guarantees,
2. TF.a general effect of rate-of-return regulation, and
3. The effect of toll settlements.
The first two factors (the REA interest rate subsidy and the so-called
Averch-Johnson effect of rate of return regulation) should bias the typical
REA borrower in favor of building a system which is too capital inteva ive.
This is because both these factors make ctipital expenditures appear less
costly to the firm than expenditures on opei r ing cost items-6
The toll settlements process also produces a capital-intensive bias.
To see why this is so, consider the following simplified model of the sepa-
rations procedure. (See Gabel (1967) for a description of the procedure.)
6 Another and more subtle reason for a capital intensive bias may be the
process by which REA sets the standards its borrowers must meet.
Representatives of rural telephone companies and telephone equipment
manufacturers play a role on the technical committees which affect how the
standards are written. Both groups have an interest in making it possible
to build plant which is too capital intensive.
-13-
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A local company which is unaffiliated with a company providing toll service
may be thought of as offering subscribers two different services: (a) local
calling, and (b) access to the long distance network. However, these
services are provided usii ►g the same equipment. The local company charges
its subscribers for access to the network itself, and for local calling
activity, although in most cases the price of local calling is set at zero.
In addition, the local company acts as a collection agent for the "partner-
ship" of companies which together provide end-to-end long distance service.
(On any one call, there will be at least two local companies and a long
distance company involved.)
The local company's share of the revenue of each toll call is not, how-
ever, fixed. Instead, it is determined through the separations and settle-
ments algorithm, which is designed to recover a provortion of the local
company's investment in whatever plant provides both local and long distance
service. (Any costs directly attributable to long distance also are
recovered.) The share of joint costs recovered from long distance charges
depends on the relative use of local and long distance calling according to
a complicated formula. As a result, either an increase in l.ng distance
caling or an increase the book value of jointly used plant increases the
revenues of the local company.
Put differently, building excessively costly plant increases the
revenue requirement, but some of this requirement will be returned through
settlements more or less automatically. (If the additional investment
increases the use of long distance service, so much the better.)
-14-
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Thus, we see that the separations and settlements process probably also
provides a capital-intensive bias in our estimates. As noted, this means
that the estimates such as those presented in Section 4 below may understate
the social costs of connecting a subscriber. This means that any new tech-
nology that appears favorable using the estimate presented below will be
even more attractive if deregulation eliminates the intentives just
discussed.
-15-
VOLUMt 1 t . ."ART l l 1.h.A
	
'it_i
PRIOR g'NUl gg OF LOCAL gEttVl4G L'UgTS
AS uoted iu the lutroductiou. there have boon A uumbor of provious
studied of local excitaugo coot:.. The early studios Are durvovod by Alloman
1191 h). Aud will nut bo ro-survoyed her*. Allomau also discusses the
so-cAlled "cost of service" studied mado by the Noll aystem during; it%o
1 14,0's And early la'U'o. accordiug, to various cost Study mothodologios such
Ad "tully didtributod" cast, or "embedded direct codt." Moot of those
studies wore used for rato makiug purposed. dud were oevorol y criticidod for
their .iota, Assumptions. And overAll approach. All tended to dhow redideu-
tlAl service to be Heavily dubsidized by long distAtice and vertieAl set
vices. but they did nut do4l Specitically with rural telephone service.
Those studtoo we will deal with ma y be divided into tWI cladoos:
"bottom--up" Aud "top-dowti." 'rile tottota-up studied repraoeut attempts to
detormine the cult of one or more of the. .:omponeuto of local tolophono
p1AU[. As .let ined is Sec tiou : Above. lu gouerAl, this is doue by analyt-
lug the componouts of tile. tolephono network. and applyillA standard cast
tdctors to the ditterent cotupououts. This approach .•AU tide existing; tacil-
ities. %Ir uow And hypothotteAl service Aread.
rile top-down Studies Attempt to tide Agg;rrg;ato cost Aud usAse: JAtA to
determine costa or coat tutictioud without pertorming a dotailod Aualysls.
MAUy of thr.Se y tudieo use StatisticAl techniques. Although there is Au




VOLUME II, PART III.R.3
literature has to date scarcely been applied to local ervice-' The
studies we deal with are essentially attempts to relate costs to output
measures such as the number of subscribers and the traffic they generate.
Also included in the top-down category are studies which use data generated
by engineering cost models and fit a statistical function to them.
3.1 BottorUp Cost Studies: Random Samples of Loop Plant
We first consider the three studies of the Loop plant on which Table 2
was based. These studies were, in one senxc, carefully designed and carried
out. They begin with the Bell System's ,t..udy (Hinderliter, 1963), and
continuing with REA in 1966 (Lally a.id ::.t , 1966) and GTE in 1968 (Davis
and Lally, 1971). In each study a &tratified random sample of loops was
drawn, and each loop examined in detail. The applicable standard costs
(e.g. REA's for the Lally and Hitt study) were estimated for each component
of the loop, and assumptions were made to allow for the partial fill of some
cables containing sample loops. Table 6 summarizes the cost results for GTE
and REA (AT&T's published repurt does not contain cost data). Table 7,
below, shows some cost functions estimated using the sample data.
Unfortunately, these st,:dies are flawed--they do not produce an econom-
ically meaningful estimate of the incremental cost of a loop. Instead, each
study produces, in effect, a detailed estimate of the average reproduction
` A number of recent studies such as Mantell (1975), Vinod (1972), Denny,
Fuss, and Everson (1980), and Nadiri and Schankerman (1950), and
Christensen, Cummings, and Schoech (1980), have applied this methodology to
data for long-haul telephony.
-17-




SOME ENGINEERING ESTIMATES OF SUBSCRIBER CASTS
	Source Date	 Scope
	 Cost ($)
REA	 1964	 Median cost per loop 	 335
GTE	 1968	 Average cost per loop 	 657
ITU	 1968	 Cost for "local network	 490
and telephones," to add
a main line, excluding
"switching equipment"




Hall	 1975	 "Average" loop	 239
Hall	 1975	 Loop at 23 kft	 739
BNR	 1980	 First cost per channel, 	 200
new applications, 24
channels and 10 kf t
BNR	 1980	 First cost per channel, 	 430
new applications, 24
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cost of the plant in place at the time when the study was made. However,
each report notes that much of the plant in place did not conform to the
technical standards in existence at the time of the study. That is, had the
sample of loops been built at the time of the study different, and presum-
ably more stringent and costly, standards would have been applied. Conse-
quently, the cost estimates shown in Table 4, and also the cost functions
shown below in Table 7, underestimate the incremental cost of a loop.
3.2 Engineering Cost Estimates for New Loops
In contrast, a report by BNR, Inc. (1978), commissioned by REA, con-
siders future costs. BNR's approach was to estimate the cost of designing
narrow band paired-cable systems under a variety of assumptions about (1)
loop lengths, (2) the number of channels provided simultaneously, and (3)
whether these channels were provided as a new application or to existing
pairs. Table 5 summarizes a much larger body of data contained in the BNR
report. For comparison with other studies, Table 4 also gives BNR's results
for 24-pair cable (the most common choice, according to the BNR report), at
distances of 10 kilofeet and 20 kilofeet. (Ten kilofeet is approximately
the average distance for GTE and Bell System loops, and 20 kilofeet is
slightly more than the average distance for REA loops.) As can be seen in
Table 4, BNR's estimates of the first cost per channel for a new application
at 20 kilofeet ($430) exceeds REA's estimate of median cost per loop
($335). How much of this difference is due to inflation and how much
to the above-mentioned bias in the REA sample's survey methodology is
VOLUME II, PART III.8.3
Table 5
COST PER VOICE CHANNEL USING A PAIRED EXCHANGE CABLE
First Cost at a Distance
of 10 kf t
New	 Existing
Application	 Pairs
First Cost at a Distance




3.3 Bottom-Up Cost Studies: The ITU Survey
Another source of information on incremental costs is a survey sent by
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to member Administrations
(i.e. member nations) in 1968. Ten Administrations responded to the survey,
which asked for information on their telephone systems including the cost of
adding a long-distance circuit and the cost of adding a main line "in the
last three-five years." This cost per added main line is further broken
down into three categories:
1. Local network and telephones
2. Switching equipment
3. Long distance equipment
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The category local network and telephone9 corresponds to the first two
categories in our taxonomy. The average cost for the 10 countries is
reported as $490 per main telephone (shown in Table y ). For the first two
111-1 categories the combined average is $d30. However, the IIU estimate
includes the switching equipment coats associated with long distance
service.
The ITU published an analysis of their data which addresses the ques-
tion of whether there are economies of scale in the cost of providing local
service. $
 In particular, they examined the cost of local network and
subscriber's equipment as a function of the main line density. They suggest
a "realistic" cost range of $300-$500 per main line, for densities between
U.S and 45 main lines per square kilometer (see Table y ). However, inspec-
tion of a plot of density against cost per main station suggests that there
may he slight economies of scale at the lower end of this density range,
since the ITU's "realistic" range excludes two outliers (out of ten sample
points). both with higher costs. located at 0.3 and 5.5 main lines per
square kilometer. (The Bell Sy stem "rural" exchanges depicted in Table 1
above has a main line density per square kilometer of about two.)
Also relevant from the ITU study are the data summarised in Table b,
showing ten country averages of the share of costs per added main line,
aged ,across 10 countries. As can be seen the local area network and
Tiber equipment represents about 45 percent of total costs. This
Leman (1977b), also discusses this question. Briefly, older studies
-d diseconomies of scale, but newer ones show constant or increasing
-tas to scale.
-,I-
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percentage is relatively constant over the 10 countries; the lowest reported
share ie 37.4 percent while the highest is 56 percent.
Table 6
AVERAGE SHARES OF COST FOR AN ADDED MAIN LINE
Cost Share per
Added Main Line
Local area network and subscribers'
equipment	 45.4
Switching network, both local and
long distance	 31.5
Long-distance network 	 23.1
Total	 100.0
Source: ITU (1968).
3.4 Top-Down Cost Studies
Two studies by economists develop cost functions using a top-down
approach: Littlechild (1970) and Alleman (1977b). The first of these is a
study of peak load pricing of telephone calls, and the second is concerned
with the usage sensitive pricing of local service. Both studies therefore
focus more on the demand side than on the cost side, and the cost functions
are provided as incidental to the main investigation.
Littlechild's study includes the cost function for local central
offices shown in Table 7. As can be seen it involves a substantial fixed
cost, plus a small cost per subscriber for switching equipment and an
additional cost associated with traffic generated by a subscriber. This
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Littlechild's study. The $23 per subscriber figure is consistent with Mall
(1975) who gives a cost for central office switching of $25-$40 per
subscriber.
Littlechild's function can be used to estimate a full cost per sub-
scriber if we assume that all subscribers generate equal amounts of
traffic. Since Littlechild's central office had about 25,000 lines, it is
appropriate to use the value of 3.1 CCS per main station given in Table 1.
The implied incremental cost is $107.00 on this basis (3.1 x $27 + $23).
For comparison, the ITU study cited above gives a ten-country average cost
for both local and long-distance switching equipment of $340, three times
Littlechild's value.
Alleman's 1977 study is a pseudo-data regression 9 of data from a
series of local exchanges designed by a model developed by SAI, Inc.
(1976). This model included all costs in the first three items in our
typology except the cost of the subscriber's station equipment. Alleman
reports making a series of runs at comparatively high subscriber densities
(over 2500 subscribers per square mile) and then fitting the linear function
shown in Table 7 to the cost estimates produced by the model. Once again
this function shows a substantial estimated "fixed" cost which is presumably
associated with the land, buildings, and other facilities needed to support
subscribers. Also shown are costs per subscriber and per Erlang. Using
Alleman's value for average traffic per subscriber (0.417 Erlangs), and for
a telephone instrument (equivalent to $59) gives an incremental cost per
subscriber of $242 (181 + 59 + 4.04 x .417).
9 This "pseudo-data regression" technique has been popular in energy
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4. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF LOCAL TELEPHONE COSTS
This section presents a purely econometric model of local rural tele-
phone costs. We specify a simple cost model of rural telephone service, and
we estimate it us'ng data from REA borrowers. The data used are presented
in Appendix A. Briefly, they represent the annual aggregate of the account-
ing data on the books of REA borrowers. The next section presents the
model, and subsequent sections discuss the econometric results and present a
sensitivity analysis of them.
4.1 Model Description
In this section we will use capital letters to denote industry aggre-
gate values and lower case letters to denote the values for a representative
firm, to which our cost function will refer. Let:
kit - Gross Telephone Plant-in-Service, at the start of
period t , for borrower i .
git - Gross investment in telephone plant during period t for
borrower i.
q it - Number of subscribers added during period t, for
borrower i .
zi t - Other variables affecting cost
cit - mt (g it •z it ) - First cost of servicing qit
new subscribers, equal to net investment.
The function 0 is the first cost of providing subscribers with service.
Unfortunately, ci t is not directly observed unless economic depreciation
-25-
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is zoco. 1U To allow us to proceed we assume that economic depreciation is
geometrically determined. This gives us the following two difference equa-
tions involving cit, kit, and Sit.
kit - k i,z-1 0 cit
	 (4.1)
kit 0 (1 - 6)ki,t-1 + sit
	 (4.2)
Equation 4.1 is simply the definition of ci t , and Equation 4.2 is the
definition of sit , assuming geometric depreciation, where 6 is the
depreciation rate. Combining these equations to eliminate kit gives:
cit - (1 - 6)c it-1
s it	 git-1	 (4.3)
To avoid a solution for ci t which involves an infinite series, we
use the following approximation for small values of 6:11
10 Economic depreciation is the rate at which the value of the services
provided by a capital asset is exhausted. It need not bear any relationship
to accounting depreciation, especially for electrical equipment which, if
properly maintained, has an essentially infinite life.
11 The most direct derivation of this approximation uses the lag operator,
which has the property that Lxt - xt- 1 . From Equation 4.3, the transfer




11 -(1 6)L 1 + 6L I(1-LT
1 - 16L 
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where the last line follows after expanding the geometric series. Hence:




following equation for the "representative" borrower:
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t-1
it	 mt
( g it , z it ) + 61 1	 in + 0(62 )	 (4.4)
a--•
Ignoring terms of second-order and higher in 6 Equat ion 4.4 says
that the gross investment in plant equals the cost of new plant plus 6
times the book value of the plant. Thl-; approximation will be exact when
6 - 0 , but when 6 $ 0 we can estimate 6 , thereby validating the
approximation.
Equation 4.4 applies to an individual firm. The data we have used,
however, is aggregated. Let:
Nt - The number of REA borrowers reporting in year t.
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where r;,, ! error term c t includes any error associated with 0 , the
Approximation error 0(S 2) , and another error due to the fact that St
is computed only from time t - 1 instead of time t - - M .
It remains to select a functional form for 0 and to choose the zit
variables. We ultimately selected the simplest functional form possible,
namely one linear in q it and t only, and with & - 0. This choice is
presented first, but the sensitivity analyses presented later, which use
other functional forms and variables, support this selection. It is prob-
ably true that a more complex functional form would be appropriate, as
might the use of additional variables. Those variables that were available
did not produce sensible results when added to the specification, probably
because we had about 20 years of data to work with--a very smal, data iet.
4.2 Basic Regression Results
Table 8 12 shows a summary of the four equations that were estimated at
first, assuming 5 - 0 . Two of these involve the logarithms of the varia-
bles, two involve the absolute values. The specific variables used are
defined as follows:
AGRINV - First difference of gross telephone plant-in-service for all REA
borrowers, deflated by the equipment component for GNP deflator,
and divided by the number of borrowers reporting in the year t
APHONES - First difference of the total number of subscribers reported for
all REA borrowers divided by the number of reporting borrowers.
YR - The year of the report, 1900 - 0.
All logarithms are natural iogaritlims.
12 In the tables reporting regression results, the figures in parenthesis
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Table 8
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS
ln(AGRINV) - 0.0125 + 0.575 ln(APHONES) + 0.0337 YR 	 R2 - 0.970
(0.2395) (0.0596)	 (0.00390)	 n - 21
ln(AGRINV) - -8.75 + 3.60 ln(APHONES) - 0.264(log (APHONES) 2 R2 - 0.980
(3.05) (1.05)
	 (0.0916)	 n - 21
SE - 0.0640
+ 0.0354 YR	 DW - 1.66
(0-00345)






AGRINV - -616.0 + 1.047(APHONES) - 6.648x10-4(APHONES)2 	 R2 - 0.981
(61.5)	 (.173)
	
(2.105x10-4)	 n - 21
SE - 18.61
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On inspection of Table 8, one might conclude that adding a quadratic
term to either the absolute or logarithmic specification significantly
improves the fit. However, Figures 4 and 5 show the implied cost functions,
plotting costs as a function of the number of telephones for larger numbers
of subscribers than appear in the sample. 13 As can be seen, both quadratic
forms give absurd results outside the sample region. (The average number of
new telephones per borrower per year is about 300). Both quadratic equa-
tions indicate a maximum in total cost and, eventually, additional tele-
phones come for zero or negative costs. These absurd results lead us to
reject both the higher order models.
The choice between the linear and the log-linear models on the basis of
their total cost predictions is at first less clear. In view of the fact
that least squares used a different metric in the two cases, one function or
the other fits the available data slightly better depending upon hcw it is
plotted. We have selected the linear specification over the log-linear
specification because (1) it is the same form as used by others such as
'1W
	
Littlechild and Alleman, and (2) it implies a positive, constant marginal
cost per subscriber. As seen in Table 8, a point estimate of this cost is
$517 per subscriber. In contrast, the log-linear specification implies both
average and marginal costs fall to zero. This implication is shown in
Figure 6 which plots the two average cost functions, as well as the average
costs implied by the data.
We now inquire whether the economic depreciation rati, 6, omitted
from the equations shown in Table 8, is important. This question is
13 In plotting Figures 4, 5 and 6 the time variable is at its average








VOLUME 11,  P4
OF POOR QUALITY
O U u v O
O O O O O

































































O	 000000 O O O0	 000000 O O O
0	 OCn CON CO Ln ^ (n	 N
N	 ^


























































OO O O O O O OO O O O O. O OO	 co N CO	 Lo
SJ12TTOO EZ5T '^SOJ abQJOAV
-33-
VOLUME II, PART III.9.3	 721
addressed in Table 9. The linear model with 6 - 0 is shown in the first
column as Equation 4.5. Equation 4.6 adds the depreciation term using the
approximation developed in Equation 4.4. As can be seen, the estimated
value of 6 is approximately 0.57% + 2.0%. Thus, the value of 6 is not
significantly different from zero, and in any case is estimated to be quite
small. The incremental cost per borrower shown in Equation 4.6 is essen-
tially the same as in Equation 4.5, given the estimated standard errors for
both functions. Equation 4.6 implies that Equation 4.5 is in fact the more
parsimonious specification, and we take it to be the base case from now on.
The other two equations in Table 9, Equation 4.7 and Equation 4.8, test
the hypothesis that the cost is given by a distributed lag over several
years. This test is performed by adding a lagged value for APHONES. In
Equation 4.7, this value is added with the time trend included, in 4.8 it is
added with the time trend deleted. In both cases, the coefficient is not
significantly different from zero and is quite small in comparison to the
coefficient on APHONES.
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
This is probably the place to address the Durbin-Watson statistics,
tabulated in Tables 8 and 9. 14 The Durbin-Watson is suspiciously low in
all four equations. However, for 20 observations and 2 regressors (the case
in Equation 4.5) the upper and lower 5% critical values of the Durbin-Watson
14 Strictly speaking the Durbin-Watson should not be tabulated for Eqs. 4.6
through 4.8 because the lagged value of real plant-in-service is, in effect,
a lagged endodgenous variable. However, when the coefficient of the lag
variable is small, the "correct" test, involving Durbin's "h" statistic, is
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Table 9
RESULTS OF DISTRIBUTED LAG TESTS





(4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8)
-550.1 -498.0 -639.3 67.6
X70.86) (300.2) (459.8) (16.0)
0.517 0.489 0.481 0.474




Lagged New Phones/Borrower (Qt-1)
Real Plant-in-Service/Borrower (S t- 1 ) 0.00566 -0.00481 0.0442
(0.0196) (0.0325) (0.00710)
Year (YR) 9.85 9.03 11.25
(1.18) (4.84) (7.31)
R2 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.966
n 21 20 20 20
DW 1.:4 1.09 1.16 0.911
-35-
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statistic are 1.10 and 1.54. 1 '' A test for first order autocorrelation is
thus inconclusive. An inspection of the residuals did not reveal any
obvious problems, however the possibility that an omitted variable was the
cause of the low Durbin-Watson could not be ignored.
on the other hand, in view of the small number of data points, the
number of additional specifications which could be explored is quite
limited. Table 10 shows two attempts to add plausible additional variables
to the cost function. In Equation 4.9 the number of added central offices
per REA borrower was included as an explanatory variable. Its coefficient
was not significant, and did not much perturb the other coefficients. In
Equation 4.10 examined the possibility that the marginal cost per subscriber
depended on the average distance from subscriber to central office. The
coefficient was wade to vary linearily with the number of added miles per
borrower per new telephone. This coefficient also was not significant,
although it was slightly positive as expected from the engineering studies.
In neither case was there any improvement in the explanatory power of the
equation and the Durbin-Watson was essentially unchanged. We conclude that
if the basic relationship (Equation 4.5) was misspecified the problem is not
easily repaired
The next item to be examined involves the time trend, which has been
significant in the regressions so far. The coefficient indicates that the
constant term is increasing by about $9000 to $10,000 annually. Some of the
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Table 10
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION INVOLVING CENTRAL OFFICES AND LENGTH OF HAUL




Intercept -550.1 -739.6 -604.8
(70.86) (224.5) (124.4)
New Phones/Borrower 0.517 0.437 0.488
(0.0524) (0.102) (0.0765)
Added Central Offices 96.98
(139.3)
Average Length of Haul 0.0101
X (Phones/Borrower) (0.534)
Years 9.85 12.71 10.75
(1.18) (3.38) (1.98)
,&2 0.971 0.971 0.970
n 21 19 19
DW 1.14 1.12 1.07
-37-
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runs in Table 11 were made to explore alternative time trend specifica-
tions. Equation 4.11 allows the time trend to affect the marginal costs per
subscriber, but not the constant term, while Equation 4.12 allows both to be
affected. Finally, Equation 4.13 allows marginal costs to depend both on
the number of subscribers and time. At first all three specifications
appear plausible, and Equation 4.13 improves the Durbin-Watson. Once again,
however, these equations must be rejected because of their unreasonable
implications. For example, the slope estimated in Equation 4.11 implies
that the cost of service to an additional subscriber was zero in 1956, and
negative in previous years. Similarly, Equation 4.12 contains the
optimistic implication that marginal cost will fall to zero in the year
2003. Equation 4.13 has the same difficulty as the earlier quadratic
equation, predicting negative marginal costs for large numbers of
subscribers.
To summarize, nothing in the equations constituting the sensitivity
analysis justifies more than a simple linear equation with 6 - 0. That
regression, Equation 4.5, indicates that quasi-fixed charges are growing
with time but that the marginal cost of adding a subscriber has been in
constant with time. The full function for the year 1972, including the
standard errors for that year, is:
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Table 11
ALTERNATIVE LINEAR-QUADRATIC SPECIFICATIONS
Dependent Variable is Gross Real Investment per Borrower
(4.5
repeated) 4.11) 4.12) 4.13)
-550.1 132.6 -931.2 -21.47
(70.86) (27.75) (206.3) (30.58)
0.517 -1.323 1.824 -0.623







0.971 0.938 0.976 0.980
21 21 21 21














The econometric equation suggests that tit* incremental cost per sub-
scriber for a typical REA borrower is approximately $520 in 1972 terms.
Average costs in 1972, at the sample mean of 315.1 new subscribers per
borrower, are $1,023 + $75 per subscriber.
How does this estimate agree with other studies? The engineering cost
estimates examined in Section 3 can provide some additional information.
REA loop costs are approximately $335, in 1964 dollars (Table 4). Applying
our deflator to convert to 1972 dollars gives $418 for the loop cost; apply-
ing the ITU cost share from Table 6 (45.4% divided by 45.4% + 31.5%) gives
an estimated cost of $5'-' dollars for the incremental costs of the local
area network, subscriber equipment, and switching. Alternatively, adding
the $107 per subscriber derived for Littlechild's equation for local switch-
ing gives $525. Notice that all these figures disregard the additional
costs associated with long distance, which are unlikely to be incurred by
the local rural company. Including the long distance cost share give $921
per subscriber as an estimate of overall incremental costs to all companies.
In addition to these costs we recall the estimate by Alleman (for an
urban/suburban exchange area) that was equivalent to $243 for an incremental
subscriber, and the estimate from Hall (1975) for a local area network
(including a 23 kft loop), subscriber equipment, Pad local switching of
$764-$779. Finally BNR gives a per channel cost of $430 for a 20 kft
circuit. All these estimates are summarized in Table 12.
Several things are apparent. First, when our attention is restricted
to subscriber equipment, loop and local exchange plant, the bottom-up
-40-
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Table 12
POINT ESTIMATES OF THE. INCREMENTAL
COST PER SUBSCRIBEk
Source Scopt Value
Alleman (.977b) 1-3 $ 242
BUR (1980), 20 kft 2 430
ITU 1968:	 Cost of local network 1-2 490
and subscriber equipment
Equation 4.5 1-3 517+52
REA loop plant survey + Littlechild 1-3 525
switching cost equation
REA 1964 Survey + ITU, excluding
long distance investment, 1-3` 543
1972 dollars
Hall (1975) 1-3 764-779
ITU 1968 Survey excluding long
distance investment (196b) 1-32 830
REA 1964 Survey + ITU , including
long distance investment, 1-4 921
1972 dollars
Average Annual Change in Telephone
Plant-in--Service per Added 1-3 ? 940
Subscriber, 1958-79, 1972 dollars
Notes:
1	 Numbers re:-, r to the four-part taxonomy introduced in
Section 2.
2	 Includes costs of added long distance switching
associated with an added subscriber.
11
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The econometric equation suggests that the incremental cost per sub-
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Average costs in 1972, at the sample mean of 315.1 new subscribers per
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#• 1timates examined in Section 3 can provide some additional information.
REA loop costs are approximately $335, in 1964 dollars (Table 4). Applying
our deflator to convert to 1972 dollars gives $418 for the loop cost; apply-
ing the ITU cost share from Table 6 (45.4% divided by 45.4% + 31.5%) gives
an estimated cost of $543 dollars for the incremental costs of the local
area network, subscriber equipment, and switching. Alternatively, adding
the $107 per subscriber derived for Littlechild's equation for local switch-
ing gives $525. Notice that all these figures disregard the additional
costs associated with long distance, which are unlikely to be incurred by
the local rural company. Including the long distance cost share gives $921
per subscriber as an estimate of overall incremental costs to all companies.
In addition to these costs we recall the estimate by Allemen (for an
urban/suburban exchange area) that was equivalent to $243 for an incremental
subscriber, and the estimate from Hall (1975) for a local area network
(including a 23 kft loop), subscriber equipment, and local switching of
$764-$779. Finally BNR gives a per channel cost of $430 for a 20 kft
circuit. All these estimates are summarized in Table 12.
Several things are apparent. First, when our attentiou is restricted
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estimates do not differ greatly from the top down estimnates. Although the
range is from about $240 to $775, most of the estimates cluster around $500.
The second point is that our econometric estimates, along with the
studies of Littlechild and Alleman, suggest that there are substantial
investment costs that are not associated with additional subscribers. In
1972, our econometric study estimates these costs to be $159 thousand
(+ $20 thousand) per REA borrower, and implies that they were increasing at
$9,900 + $1,200 annually after adjusting for inflation. The other two
studies show fixed costs per exchange to be $1 million and $15.68 million
respectively. (However, the exchanges involved in these cases are much
larger than the typical rural exchange, so these magnitudes cannot be used
as standards for comparison.)
In fact, it is not certain that the intercept term found in the regres-
sions necessarily represents fixed costs, i.e., the costs of identifiable
equipment whose provision does not depend on the number of subscribers
served. Looking at Table 10, we see that when the number of central offices
is included as an explanatory variable the intercept $175.5 thousand in
1972. But the central office equipment, and the associated land and build-
ings, are likely to be the major source of costs. This variable should
enter positively into the regression, while reducing the size of the inter-
cept. It did not do so.
Another possible explanation for the intercept is a change in the
quality of service. In fact, the period from 1957 to 1979 saw a major
improvement in service as single party service replaced multi-party. How-
ever, this change does not seem to be the reason for the intercept, because
-43-
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inspection of the subscriber series published by REA indicates that vir-
tually all additional subscribers received one-party service. Thus, Equa-
tion (4.5) really pertains to a new one-party subscriber, and the intercept
should not be due to some change in the mix of one- and multi-party sub-
scribers.
One possible explanation for the positive constant term, of course, is
that the independent variable (APHONES) is measured with error. In general,
this will result in inconsistent estimates of the regression coefficients
when least squares is used. Indeed, in the simple regression model, it can
be shown that if the errors in measuring the dependent and independent vari-
ables are independent the slope will be underestimated asymptotically
(Malinvaud, 1970). The intercept will be overestimated as a consequence.
Something like this may be happening in Equation 4.5, but we cannot be
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APPENDIX A
The data used in this study is taken from the REA's Annual Statistical
Reports for the years 1963-1979 and covers the period 1956-1979. In addi-
tion, the deflator used was taken from the Economic Report of the President.
-	 Gross telephe-ie pl"nt la servi<-e,
-	 Accumulated depreciation on telephone plant
-	 Total subscribers served,
-	 Miles of lines,
-	 Central offices, and
-	 Number of borrowers (used to weight the data).
Table A.1 shows the raw data, Table A.2 shows the data used in the regres-
sions on plant, derived from Table A.1.
The data on the change in telephone plant have not been adjusted for
retirements because REA does not report retirements separately. These seen
likely to be small, however, so that the change in investment reported in
Table A.2 is unlikely to be much affected.
-45-
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Table A.2
Data Used in Regressions
Change	 in Telephone
Plant-in-Service Change in Change in
per	 Borrower, Change in Miles of Central
Thousands of Telephones Lines of Offices
1972 Dollars per Borrower Borrower per Borrower




1959 205.924 313.977 0.17545
1960 204.884 313.232 0.15753
1961 195.364 245.628 28.657 0.07746
1962 193.857 213.537 37.356 0.11833
1963 161.830 176.587 38.992 0.06265
1964 161.833 171.219 21.398 0.04302
1965 158.745 178.985 35.130 0.09049
1966 177.417 183.526 26.860 0.12802
1967 197.657 214.312 21.176 0.19198
1968 229.024 237.166 42.392 0.14550
1969 220.931 239.695 25.597 0.15242
1970 288.204 289.444 -8.492 0.10610
1971 265.659 206.201 25.406 -0.01446
1972 321.064 324.554 19.308 0.05245
1973 394.952 349.078 23.857 -0.01540
1974 414.502 436.813 27.991 -0.02295
1975 369.301 315.911 29.605 0.01949
1976 469.823 503.403 35.119 0.10816
1977 530.151 661.056 47.623 -0.00352
1978 488.965 595.775 24.490 0.07243
1979 477.399 445.976 25.669 -0.04071
-47-
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This report reviews recent legislative, judicial and regulatory.
changes in telecommunications, and discusses the reliance of these changes
to NASA. The report reviews the history of legislative attempts to
rewrite the Communications Act of 1934, the settlement of the U.S. Depart -
ment of Justice's Antitrust suit against AT&T, and changes in the PCC's
role as regulator of the telecommunications industry in general and AT&T
in particular.
These changes mean that the regulatory environment in the future will
be characterised by increased competition in the marketplace and in regu -
latory and legislative arenas. A number of changes in rates, services and
technologies are expected to occur. Consequently, the report recommends
that NASA devote increased attention to these changes, specifically by the
creation of a position in the agency charged with monitoring events in
telecommunications.
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ABSTRACT
This is the final report on the regulatory investigation component of
a long-range telecommunications planning effort initiated by NASA Head-
quarter's Communic&tions and Data Systems Division. Through extensive
interviews with telecommunications policymakers, research on the history
of telecommunications regulatory changes and experiments which allowed
observation of NASA's response to changes, we have developed a set of
recommendations which will enable NASA to improve its effectiveness.
Briefly, accelerating change in the telecommunications environment points
to the need for increased long-range plamx±ng by NASA, an improved manage-
ment decision support system and a more acti ►e role for NASA in the
development of domestic telecommunications policy. In order to implement
these recommendations effectively, the responsibilities must be assigned
to a single individual, so we recommend the creation of a new position and
we provide an initial description of that position's responsibilities.
-i-
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CHAPTER ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. Background
The Office of Space Tracaing arA Data Systems (OSTDS) is responsi-
ble for managing all communications within NASA. Within OSTDS, the
Director of the Communicatiors and Data Systems Div = ..ion has recognized
that changes in the telecommunications environment mandate a more con-
certed and active role for the Division in long-range strategic planning.
An overall effort has been initiated in response to this need. This study
comprises one element of the overall effort. It investigates: (1) rele-
vant current and pending regulations and legislation pertaining to tele-
communications, (2) the implications of such to NASA, and (3) the possi-




The babic objective of the overall effort is the same as that of all
NASA network management functions: minimizing NASA's telecommunications
costs without sacrificing requirements. However, a different perspective
sets thij effort, and this study, apart from ordinary studies of network
operation and planning. The methodology of a typical planning stuuv is to
inventory the system, determine areas for improvement and develop a m'.gra-
tion strategy for impl,^.tentatin„ the changes. Instead, tha method igy of
the overall study is to identify trends in regulations and technology,
determine NASA's potential future requirements, and develop conceptual
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intended to provide: (1) specific recommendations for improvements in
network management methods, (2) a well defined set of long-range goals,
(3) a long-range conceptual plan for the networks, and (4) an improved
understanding of the importance of participating in telecommunications
regulatory activities.
2. Regulatory Investigation Component
This report is concerned with the regulatory investigation component
of the overall effort. It is intended to provide information on the
direction of pending regulatory/ legislative actions in order to: (1)
improve NASA's understanding of possible opportunities • nd constraints and
(2) help NASA protect current and future interests. ::.trefore, this study
has two main objectives. The first is to examine both the telecommunica-
tions regulatory environment and NASA's existing mechanisms for dealing
with change in that environment. The second is to provide specific
recommendations for improving NASA's effectiveness on a continuing basis.
	
C.	 Study Methodclngy
This study was performed by one outside consultant and one intern
working for the Director of the Communications and Data Systems Division.
The work was done on a part-time basis over a 9--month period comprising a
total of two man-months of effort. Interviews were held with prominent
polinymakers in the telecommunications arena in order to gain a more com-
plete understanding of existing policies and to determine the general
direction of future policy efforts. Research was conducted on: (1) the
history of significant paet changes in the environment including previous
-2-
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legislative initiatives and (2) the role of technology in increasing
competition.
Because of the rapidly changing nature of the telecommunications
environment, several new policies which potentially affected NASA were
proposed during the course of this study. These provided excellent oppor-
tunities for observing NASA's influence on policy development and NASA's
mechanisms for reacting to such proposed policy changes. Several NASA
actions were initiated during the study (see Appendix D), thus allowing
first-hand observations to be made on the effectiveness of the process.
D. Summary and Conclusions
For many years the telecommunications industry could be characterized
by stability and extensive regulation. During this time the common
carriers provided virtually all telenommunication services, owned the
entire complement of equipment and maintained close business ties with the
equipment manufacturers. This monopolistic structure was supported by the
policymakers because they believed that the stability of a single inte-
grated systeL provided the most efficient service possible. In the past
few decades, the pace of technological change ir. the telecommunications
industry has accelerated. Many of these technological developments have
eroded the justification of a monopoly industry structure. The need for
	
some form of change
	
industry structure has been recognized by the
Congress, the Department of Justice and the FCC, and all three are
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Congress began its recent attempts to rewrite major portions of the
1934 Communications Act during 1976. In each succeeding session legisla-
tive initiatives were introduced, but major legislation has failed to
pass. Congress has taken an active interest in the AT&T antitrust
settlement and it appears that Congress will continue its efforts to pass
major legislation.
The Department of Justice settled its long-standing antitrust suit
against AT&T on January 8, 1982. The traditional monopoly structure of
the industry was perceived by the Department of Justice to be no longer
adequate in light of emerging competition in many sectors of the
industry. In order to change AT&T'4 incentives to cross-subsidize
unregulated activities out of regulated activities, forestalling
competition, it was deemed necessary to separate AT&T's regulated and
nonregulated activites. To do this, the settlement contains a divestiture
plan whereby AT&T will spin-off its 22 local operating companies which
will remain regulated monopolies. AT&T will be allowed to compete in
nonregulated markets after divestiture.
The Federal Communications Commission has been taking steps towards
increasing competition in the telecommunications industry since the latter
part of the 1950's. Although the development of new technologies has
prompted these decisions by the FCC, it appears that the FCC's decisions
have in turn spurred the development of new technologies. It is this
accelerating cycle which creates the dynamic nature of today's
telecommunications industry.
As discussed in Chapter 6, this dy , ..ic environment has several
significant implications for NASA. As competition in the industry
-4-
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increases and technology advances, NASA's managers will find available
services and equipment more diverse, and the number of off-rers will
increase. In order to prevent unnecessary inefficiencies, longer term
planning to guide procurements will become necessary. For similar
reasons, improved and accessible information on services, tariffs, equip-
ment and contractors will become increasingly important to efficient
decision making. A final implication is that NASA's interaction with the
telecommunications environment will become increasingly valuable. This
interaction is necessary not only for influencing the environment, which
is possible and could be very beneficial to NASA, but also for improving
NASA's ability to react to changes and seize neu, ipportunities.
We have developed a set of recommendations (c retained in Chapter 7)
which will enable NASA to improve its effectiveness. Briefly, accelerat-
ing change in the telecommunications environment points to the need for
increased long-range planning by NASA, an improved management decision
support system and a more active role for NASA in the development of
domestic telecommunications policy. In order to implement these recom-
mendations effectively, the responsibilities must be assigned to a single
individual, so we recommend the creation of a new position and we provide
an initial description of that position's responsibilities.
-5-
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CHAPTER TWO: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. The Years of Stability
For many years, until roughly the 1950s, the telecommunications
industry could be characterized by stability and extensive regulation.
The recent changes resulting from a decrease in both of these characteris-
tics can best be examined by looking at (1) the services rendered, (2) the
facilities from which those services were derived, and (3) the relation-
ship between the providers of the services (the common carriers) and the
manufacturers of the equipment.
In terms of services, the carriers held to the "universal service"
concept whereby they provided telephone, telegraph, private line, video,
data and facsimile. This same concept was applied in terms of facilities
as the carriers provided the entire range of equipment including the
customer premises equipment (terminals), the local distribution facil-
ities, the central office exchanges and the long distance trunks. The
local distribution lines and the attached terminal equipment were seen as
indivisible, and the carriers owned all equipment and leased it to users.
Duplicate or alternative long-haul and local distribution facilities were
viewed as wasteful and contrary to the "public interest." Consequently,
many new technologies were defined as complementary rather than competi-
tive and hence within the purview of the existing monopoly (AT&T).
Finally, the service providers and the equipment manufacturers were ver-
tically integrated. That is, the carriers held ownership in their equip-
ment suppliers (e.g., AT&T ownership ^f Western Electric). Thus, the
possibilities for potentially competitive firms to enter the telecommuni-
cation services or equipment markets were minimal.
-6-
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Such a noncompetitive industry structure was supported by the policy-
makers as being in the public's best interest. Many believed that the
stability provided by a single integrated system not subject to competi-
tion was necessary in order to maintain an efficient, universal service.
The widely popular natural monopoly thesis held that the existing monopo-
listic structure provided for lower charges than would otherwise have been
required. And, given a Government sanctioned monopoly, regulation was of
course necessary.
B. The Effects of Technological Change
Although technological change in the telecommunications industry was
apparent throughout the first half of the century, the past few decades
have been different owing to an increased pace in the introduction of
substitutes generated by new technology. These technological developments
have altered precisely those characteristics of the industry which were
used to justify a government regulated monopoly. For over two decades,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been moving towards an
increasingly competitive industry by recognizing substitute technologies
as properly competitive, and allowing firms other than the traditional
carriers to market both new and substitute services and equipment. How-
ever, the FCC has found that .imply allowing competition is not sufficient
to attain a competitive industry. The integration or interconnection of
new equipment and services with those already existing must be required,
and structural changes in the industry must be mandated.
The concept of a sole provider of all services was largely abolished
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industry, and subsequent decisions have continued to open services to
competition. In 1968, the .traditional carriers' control of terminal
equipment was dealt a death blow with the Carterphone decision which
opened the way for any firm to manufacture and market terminal equipment.
This decision required that the carriers allow such equipment to be inter-
connected with the existing network.
Diverse transmission and distribution facilities, which were viewed
as uneconomic and wasteful when provided by copper wire and coaxial cable,
can now be provided efficiently by many new technologies. Figure 1 shows
where these alternative technologies fit into the system. For instance,
multipoint distribution service and cable television provide broadband
alternatives for local distribution, and cellular radio provides a narrow-
band substitute. Satellites provide a substitute for the microwave and
coaxial cable systems used for long distance transmission. And the com-
puter industry is producing hardware both for central office and remote
switches, as well as offering many data processing and software services.
In short, the carriers
	
losing their once almost absolute control over
services., terminal equipment and switching facilities as well as local
distribution and long-haul transmission facilities (see Appendix A for the
diversity in the industry today).
Once the decision to promote competition in the telecommunications
industry was acted on, the challenges to the traditional industry struc-
ture began snowballing. Today the FCC is undertaking several major inves-
tigations related to competition (see Chapter 5), the Department of
Justice (DOJ) has settled an antitrust suit against AT&T that will reshape
the industry (see Chapter 4) and Congress is attempting to rewrite the
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CHAPTER THREE: LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES
154
A. Background
Congress began its recent attempts to rewrite major portions of the
1934 Communications Act (the legislative document governing the telecom-
munications industry) in 1976. In each succeeding session many legisla-
tive initiatives were introduced but only a few narrowly focused bills
passed into law, leaving the act essentially unchanged. Even though the
FCC began promoting limited competitive policies several years earlier,
the first series of legislative initiatives favored retention of a regu-
lated monopoly structure in the telecommunications industry. It was not
until two sessions later, in 1978, that Congress considered major legisla-
tion favoring competition over monopoly in most sectors of the telecom-
munications industry. In each of the next four sessions, through 1982,
Congress tried unsuccessfully to rewrite the Communications Act and move
away from the need for a regulated monopoly. With the entering of the
AT&T/ DOJ antitrust settlement, competition is likely to increase even
withc •it the assistance of legislation. However, with this increased
competition, the changes in the role of the FCC and the new structure for
the telecommunications industry, Congress is likely to try once again to
set policy through revision of the 1934 Communications Act.
B. •^ t±.ons in the 94th and 95th Congresses
Attempts to make major revisions in the 1934 Communications Act began
in the 94th Congress with the introduction of H.R.12323 and S.3192 both
known as the "Consumer Communications Reform Act of 1976." This
-1U-
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initiative was introduced in a variety of forms and was reintroduced in
the 95th Congress as H.R.8 and S.530. In all forms, it gave a presump-
tion in favor of a monopoly communications network, declaring that an
integrated interstate and foreign common carrier service maintains reason-
able charges that are "lower than would otherwise be .required" and results
in an efficient, high quality, universal service. The proposed act
favored a single integrated system free from marketplace competition,
finding that ouch competition resulted in inefficiencies and was "contrary
to the public interest."
It was not until the second session of the 95 th Congress that major
legislation favoring competition in the marketplace was submitted. H.R.
13015, the "Communications Act of 1978" attempted to revise all major
aspects of the Communications Act of 1914. Among the key common carrier
provisions were: (a) the reliance on competition to control rates; (b)
the required divestiture of the manufacturing arms of both AT&T (Western
Electric) and GTE, and (c) the lifting of restrictions barring AT&T and
other carriers from offering related communications services. None of
these initiatives were passed into law.
C. Actions in the 96th Congress
In the 96th Congress members of both the House and the Senate
introduced broad scope legislation (H.R.3333; S.611; S.622). All three
bills contained extensive proposals dealing with the deregulation of the
common carrier and tha broadcast industries. H.R.3333 was later replaced
by more limited lel13lation (H.R.6121) solely addressing common carrier
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to include broadcast and cable communications as well as common carrier
issues (S.2827). All actions included deregulation of some markets and
services while retaining regulation over basic telephone services and
"dominant" carriers (e.g., AT&T). The Senate legislation differed from
that of the House in its expanded list of "dominant" carriers and its
retention of the FCC's power to make structural changes in AT&T. But, as
before, several factors prevented the passage of legislation.
D. Actions in the 97th Congress
Unlike most actions taken by previous Congresses to amend the Com-
munications Act of 1934 through omnibus initiatives, the members of the
97th Congress have taken a different approach to communications reform
by introducing a series of separate measures dealing with more specific
aspects. Although legislation affecting most facets of the communications
industry has been introduced and limited broadcasting and international
carrier measures were enacted, the most far-reaching communications
measures to be introduced in the 97 th Congress are S.898, the "Telecom-
munications Competition an4 Deregulation Act of 1981," and H.R. 5158, the
"Telecommunications Act of 1982." Both bills sought to restructure major
segments of the celecommunications industry as well as AT&T.
Once again the attempts at major revision did not result in new law.
This time the lack of success was in a large part due to the AT&T settle-
ment of January 1982. The nectlement led to a $2 million AT&T lobbying
campaign against H.R.5158. This resistance was aided by opposition to
specific provisions expressed by other. groups. The far-reaching impact ^°
-12-
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such legislative reform, and the lack of a consensus a 2ong communication
specialists regarding the best legislative approach, added to the contro-
versy.
There is a consensus, however, that the incorporation of competition
into the telecommunications industry as well as the elimination of boun-
daries between information and communications due to technological
advances have necessitated the revision of the 1934 Communications Act.
It is the rs:nner in which this should be accomplished which continues to
be a subject of debate. The complexity of the issues, as well as the
simultaneous actions by the courts (and DOJ), the FCC, and the Congress
have created the current environment of uncertainty.
E. Summary
Even though the Congress has failed to pass broad scope legislation,
this does not mean that it lacks any influence in the policymaking
process. Just the reverse is true. Congress often signals its policy
guidelines to regulatory agencies such as the FCC throagh proposed legis-
lation. Consequently, NASA should never underestimate the effect that
proposed legislation may have on the Executive Branch--or even the
Judicial Branch for that matter.
A good example of the influence of Congress on the Judicial Branch is
a letter written by Congressman Tim Wirth, D-CO., Chairman of the Rouse
Telecommunications Subcommittee, to Judge Harold Greene, who is presiding
5ver the AT&T antitrust case, following Wirth's "withdrawal" of H.R.^158
in late July. Wirth--and several of his colleagues---made a number of
suggestions regarding modifications of the antitrust settlement between
-13-
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AT&T and the Justice Department. Judge Greene, in his proposed modifica-
tions announced on August 11, 1982, included several of Wirth • s sugges-
tions in his order which have now been included in the final judgement.
The Chairmen of the Senate d the House Telecommunications Subcom-
mittees have both expressed a "wait and see" attitude towards the AT&T
settlement. However, given the changing technology and the consensus that
Congress needs to provide telecommunications policy guidance, it is almost
certain that future Congresses will continue to grapple with revisions of
the 1934 Communications Act.
-14- t
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Congress Years) Bill Number Comments
94th 1978 H.R.12323 All of these initiatives gave a
S.3192 presumption in favor of maintaining
a monopoly controlled industry,
95th 1977 H.R.8 finding that competition led to
S.530 inefficiencies.
1978 H.R.13015 This was the first major submission
favoring competition in the
industry.
96th 1979 H.R.3333 All of these actions included
S.611 deregulation of some markets and
5.622 services while retaining regulation
over basic telephone service and
1980 H.R.6121 dominant carriers.
S.2827
97th 1981 S.898 Both initiatives favored competition
1982 H.R.5158 but were different from previous
actions in that their provisions
were such more specific, seeking to
restructure major segments of the
telecommunications industry as well
as AT&T.
Figure 2
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SETTLEMENT
A. Introduction to the Settlement
August 24, 1982, marked the beginning of a iew age in the telecom-
munications-information industry. On that date the Justice Departmnt's
historic antitrust suit against AT&T was finally settled when Judge Greene
signed the Modified Final Judgement. The settlement will have a major
impact on industry structure, the degree of competition, the services
offered, and the Federal/State regulatory policy relationship.
The suit, brought in November 1974, when the Federal Communications
Commission was promoting limited competitive policies in the telecommuni-
cations industry, was settled at a time when the Congress, via two bills,
was attempting to prevent AT&T from offering servicea iu parts of the
newly emerging and potentially lucrative information sector, i.e., elec-
tronic publishing and broadband communications. In addition, prior to the
settlement, AT&T would only have been able to enter competitive areas of
the telecommunications-information industry via separate subsidiaries
under close scrutiny by the FCC.
Clearly, the settlement demonstrates that AT&T will go to great
lengths to avoid having its business opportunities limited by the Congress
or the FCC.
B. Theory of the Settlement
Within the telephone industry, three virtual monopolies have
developed: local exchange service; toll, or "long distance" service; and
equipment manufacturing. The theory of vertical foreclosure is used to
-16-
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explain AT&T's activity in all three of these markets. Put simply, the
theory holds that AT&T is subject to rate-of-return regulation and rate-
of-return regulation limits profits. Therefore, AT&T has an incentive to
increase profits by shifting them out of the regulated activities into
nonregulated activities. The primary way profits are shifted is by
cross-subsidizing competitive services.
To help alleviate perceived detrimental effects of AT&T's activities
in these three markets, the Department of Justice has supported the prin-
ciple of open entry. But, by itself, open entry is not sufficient to
ensure competition since distorted incentives still exist. It was the
desire to change the incentives that led the Department of Justice to the .
divestiture approach with the original intent of achieving total separa-
tion of regulated and nonregulated activities.
The divestiture plan that led to the settlement incorporated compro-
mises to the "ideal" divestiture as envisioned by the Department of
Justice. Judge Green's subsequent modifications resulted in further
compromises, and further adjustments are sure to arise in the implementa-
tion process. There is little doubt that AT&T's incentives will be
greatly altered, but Whether or not the Department of Justice's objectives
will be realized depends on several unresolved issues such as the rela-
tionship between the FCC and the state regulatory agencies, the effective
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C. Presettlement Structure of AT&T
AT&T is the dominant player in the domestic telecommunications-
information industry. The company has roughly $140 billion invested in
plant and equipment, employs about one million people, has 2.9 million
shareholders, and is responsible for 8 percent of all plant and equipment
investment in the U.S. Last year, the company grossed about $60 billion
in revenues and made an after tax profit of over $7 billion. This year it
plans to invest about $23 billion in new plant and equipment. In addition
to the 22 Bell Operating Companies (i.e., New York Bell, New England Bell,
Illinois Bell, etc.) AT&T owned Long Lines, Western Electric (its manufac-
turing arm), and Bell Labs, along with other miscellaneous companies, as
can be seen in Figure 3.
Western Electric, by itself, is the 22nd largest U.S. industrial
corporation ranked by annual sales, and sells between $12 and $13 billion
in equipment, mostly to Long Lines and the Bell Operating Companies.
Bell Labs is one of the world's largest industrial research and
development labs with an annual budget in excess of $1 billion. Bell Labs
has over 9,000 employees, 2,700 of whom are PhDs.
D. The Settlement
Settlement talks had been going on in earnest for only 6 weeks when
AT&T went to the Justice Department and suggested a "simple" resolution.
This became the basis of the 14-page settlement, which Judge Greene sub-
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(1) The Settlement's Elements
a. AT&T must divest itself of the local telephone service provided the
22 dell Operating Companies--the 6t1Cs.
Local service is the most costly to provide, and is expected to
experience relatively slow growth in the next few pears. Local
service is said to receive cross-subsidies from revenues earned
by AT&T Long Lines, and it is the service whose price is most
rigorously regulated. Under the settlement, local service will
probably continue to be regulated by the States, but it is
important to note that such of the service currently provided by
the 11OCs is not considered i.>,al telephone service in the
settlement. For example, most intrastate toll service, and the
facilities used to provide that service, will be transferred
from the SACS to their former parent.
b. Western Electric dell Laboratories, and AT&T Long Lines will be
retained by AT&T.
As noted, most intrastate toll services currently handled by the
Bell Operating Companies will be turned over to AT&T Long
Lines. Consequently, AT&T will remain a near total monopolist
in the provision of inter- and intrastate services, and will be
in a position to provide many other telecommunications-
information services. Western Electric will remain intact as
the Nation's--and perhaps the world's--dominant telecommunica-
tions equipment manufacturer. dell Labs will also remain as an
integral part of the AT&T system, providing research support to
Western Electric, Long Lines, and other AT&T enterprises that
are beginning to emerge, such as the consumer products subsid-
iary, American Bell.
	
C.	 The substantive provisions of the 1956 Consent Decree will be
vacated.
AT&T will no longer be barred from offering unregulated non-
telephone services. This opens the way for the new AT&T to
enter such areas as computer and date-processing communications
(though electronic publishing will remain prohibited for 7
years).
-20-
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d. The Bell Operating Companies—those divested over the next 2 years by
AT&T--will be required to provide access to their facilities for all
long distance telephone companies on a nondiscriminatory basis.
e. Local telephone companies will be barred from discriminating against
AT&T/Western Electric competitors in buying equipment and planning
new facilities.
f. AT&T shareholders will retain stock in AT&T, and will be issued
proportionate values of shares in the local exchange companies, which
they can—at their choice--sell at any time.
g. The Justice Department will have visiting and inspection rights at
the local operating companies to interview employees and review the
books. This may be supplemented by state regulatory supervision.
The following elements are due to Judge Green 's modifications as outlined
in a 178-page document released on August 11, 1982:
h. The reorganization of the Bell System—and in particular the terms of
the divestiture of the operating companies—can only be carried out
with Judge Green 's participation and oversight.
The Judge said that he wants to review and approve each step of
the divestiture to make sure that the local operating
companies--once divested—remain financially viable.
i. Other parties involved in the divestiture and in the antitrust suit
generally can file for "intervenor" status.
This means that they, too, can make their comments known to the
Judge and the court during the divestiture and restructuring
-21-
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process. These "intervenors," the Judge suggested, should
include the Chief Operating Officers of the divested operating
companies.
J. There will be limits placed on the amount of debt that the divested
phone companies will inherit from AT&T.
k. AT&T will be restricted from engaging in electronic publishing over
its own transmission facilities.
The Judge defined electronic publishing as "the provision of any
information that AT&T or its affiliates has, or has caused to
be, originated, authored, compiled, collected or edited or in
which it has a direct or indirect financial or proprietary
interest and which is disseminated to an unaffiliated person
through some electronic means." Upon a filing by AT&T, this
restriction "shall be removed" after 7 years from the date of
entry of the decree, unless "the court finds that competitive
conditions clearly require its extension."
1. The local telephone companies (BOCs) will be allowed to market,
though not manufacture, terminal equipment such as telephones and
switchboards, and other sophisticated devices.
Terminal equipment is a highly lucrative and--of late--rapidly
expanding business area. (It was originally stimulated by FCC
interconnect dec1sions of the late 1960s.) Under the original
proposed settlement, the BOCs could not sell terminal equipment,
which was to be an exclusive AT&T activity. Now Western Elec-
tric, AT&T's manufacturing arm, will have to supply the BOCs
with equipment in competition with other equipment manufac-
turers. AT&T will also compete with the BOCs in the sale of
equipment.
Me The BOCs can publish the Yellow Pages.
This is another profitable area that had--under the original
agreement--been reserved for the parent AT&T. It will be worth
$3 billion a year in revenues to the BOCs.
-22-
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no The BOCs can venture into other unregulated business areas as long as
they can show that they will not use their monopoly power to hinder
competition.
This will pave the way for "unlimited" competitive options by
the BOCs, such as date processing and many types of enhanced
tale comuni cations services that the original settlement
proposal would have barred. Indeed, AT&T wanted its divested
operating companies to offer only regulated—and monopoly—local
telephone service.
o. If equal access to long-distance competitors of AT&T is not given by
a BOC, the rates charged by that company to long distance competitors
such as MCI, SPCC, etc., should reflect the difference.
In other words, less than equal access will result in less than .
equal payment.
p. If a BOC includes any charges on a customer's bill for services
rendered by !UT, the following statement must be included in the
bill -.
"This portion of your bill is provided as a service to AT&T.
There is no connection between this company and AT&T. You may
choose another company for your long distance telephone calls
while still receiving your local telephone service from this
company."
(2) Why AT&T Settled
An understanding of AT&T's motivations for settling provides an
insight to their future direction. Few believed that the company would be
required by the Justice Department to divest any—let alone all—of its 22
operating companies. So why did AT&T settle? Why did the world's largest
company decide to split itself into several different pieces, choosing to
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rather than the safe, regulated, but monopolistic local telephone carvice
with a guaranteed profit?
a. AT&T decided to abandon local telephone service in favor of the
newer, competitive, partially deregulated services because it is
certain that it can win--and win big.
It will have the ability to establish new monopoly power in
areas that are dynamic, highly profitable, with low operating
costs, and where demand is growing geometrically. Demand for
voice service is growing at a so-so 8 percent per annum and is
threatening to taper off, especially with the introduction of
so-called measured use or usage sensitive pricing. AT&T Long
Lines, which dominates long distance services, will no longer
have to "subsidize" local exchange rates.
b. Local telephone service is going to cost significantly more over the
next decade.
This will result in a greater degree of interest —and
harassment--on the part of the state regulatory authorities.
(This cost increase was happening irrespective of the
settlement.)
C. Recent legislative activity on Capitol Hill threatened to limit
AT&T's ability to compete effectively in the newly emerging
competitive markets.
Most bills required the establishment of one or more separate
subsidiaries to compete in new service areas, and fairly
stringent regulation of noncompetitive services. In addition,
legislation would keep AT&T out of specific business activities,
i.e., mass media services, electronic advertising and
publishing, etc. AT&T is extremely interested in broadband
communications and electronic publishing, and also in the
provision of a wide variety of entertainment, information, and
business services.
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d. AT&T was uncertain as to future FCC regulation.
Although FCC Chairman Mark Fowler is an avowed "unr?gulator,"
there are certain decisions and potential decisions that AT&T
began to believe might impose undue competitive restrictions on
the company as it exists today.
e. AT&T began to see that it was "on the ropes" in the antitrust trial
in Wa.hington, D.C.
Judge Harold Greene, who in the summer of 1981 refused to
dismiss the case, was clearly backing the Justice Department.
AT&T, if found guilty by Judge Greene, could not have avoided a
finding of liability which in turn would expose the company to
enormous damage claim from a wide variety of its competitors--
and even perhaps some of its customers.
f. Possible court delays were beginning to frighten the Fxople who
govern AT&T.
Computer II and other cases involving AT&T were threatening to
go all the way to the Supreme Court. These, plus further
regulatory and legislative delays, forced AT&T to settle with
Justice, restructure, and go aggressively for the new markets.
D. Changea in AT&T's Structure over the Next Two Years
Two important dates will affect the future structure of the telecom-
munication-information industry and earmark the beginning of a new con-
petitive era:
e	 The Federal Communications Commission's Computer II decision was
implemented on January 1, 1983.
At that time ownership of all installe.. Customer Premises Equip-
ment (CPE) passed to AT&T—due to a corporate decision by AT&T
and not the FCC. Also on that date, AT&T's Baby Bell, now known
as American Bell Incorporated (ABI), opened for business. The
1 Relating, for instance, to Computer II, Cellular Radio, Competitive
Common Carriers, the Uniform Sytem of Accounts, Bell System Purchases from
the General Trade Suppliers, Telco-Cable Cross Ownership, and the
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Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) will not be able to handle new
customer premises equipment (CPR) in 1983, although they can
install and maintain it under contract to American Bell for at
least 18 months, thanks to a waiver by the FCC.
•	 Under the terms of the Modified Final Judgment in the AT&T anti-
trust case, AT&T and the BOCs must be separated from each t-:her
by February 24, 1984.
But the internal target date of AT&T and the BOCs for planning,
tax year, and accounting purposes is January 1, 1984--assuming
Federal District Court Judge Herold Greene approves. From that
date, there will no longer be any organizational ties between
the BOCs and AT&T. Also by that date, the BOCs, at their own
discretion, can move back into the marketing of CFE, but cannot
manufacture it.
In addition to local exchange functions, the BOCs can
operate AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone Service), Yellow Pages, and
other competitive/deregulated business interests so long as
their monopoly local exchange revenues are not used for the
purpose of cross-subsidizing their competitive offerings. The
BOCs will not be able to offer intrastate interexchange toll
services. Also, because all CPE installed through 1982 is now
owned by AT&T, the BOC's will not be permitted to service it.
In 1984, AT&T Long Lines will become known as AT&T Inter-
Exchange (AT&T IX) and will offer interstate, intrastate, and
international toll telecommunications traffic.
1. AT&T in 1983
In 1983, AT&T's corporate structure will include Bell Laboratories,
Western Electric, Long Lines, AT&T International (ATTI), Advanced Mobile
Phone Service (AMPS) and American Bell (ABI). It will also continue to
control the destiny of the Bell Operating Companies during this imports.,t
transitional period. The transitional AT&T structure is outlined in
Figure 4.
During 1983, AMPS will be a division of AT&T and will be able to
offer cellular radio services in those markets in which it has been
granted FCC permission to operate. AMPS will also sell and manufacture
-26-
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equipment (perhaps via Western Electric), and offer technical and service
assistance.
American Bell will begin operations with three important divisions:
Advanced Information Systems; Enhanced Services and Data; and Consumer
Products. Its equipment will be purchased from Western Electric and also
from other suppliers. It plans to sell equipment via its own telephone
stores and also under an agreement with Sears.
The other divisions of the company--Bell Labs, Western Electric, Long
Lines, AT&T International and the BOCs—will operate as they did in 1982,
except that the BOCs will begin to plan their restructuring into seven
regional operating companies and will lose the ability to sell new
customer ,premise equipment (unless there is some last minute change in
AT&T's CPE plans). AT&T Long Lines will also be going through some
organizational changes as it looks toward taking over all interexchange
traffic following the divestiture of the BOCs.
2. AT&T in 1984
By 1984, the AT&T reorganization will have been completed. AT&T will
have spun off the seven regional BOCs and will be left with: Bell Labs
and Western Electric, which will be very closely linked; AT&T
Inter-Exchange (AT&T IX); the Embedded Base Organization; a dramatically
reduced Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) organization; AT&T
International (ATTI); and American Bell (ABI). The reorganized AT&T
structure is outlined in Figure 5.
The Embedded Base Organization will be a totally new division of AT&T
in 1984, and its future is currently uncertain. It will probably be
limited to marketing and sales.
-28-
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Figure S
AUT's Structure in 1984
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SSPPD tthe hell System product procurement Division), the centralised
purchasing entity for the hell System. to already being phased out of
existence and will cease to exist in 1984. Some of its peoplo will be
moved tt. Awerican Bell (some have already been transferred), while others
will go to the regional staff* and the central staff of the DOCs.
ATT 1X will take on greatly expanded business reeponsibiLitt** in
1984 as the company begins to offer intrastate int*rexchange services in
addition to the intertutte and international off*rings that it currently
handles. AT&T IX will be vertically integrated with Western glectric,
hell labs, siai American gall. AT&T International and Mwrtcau hell will
remain unchanged.
3.	 The Now Western Electric
Western hloctric and hell Labs will continue to be closely related.
Western will after s full range of equipment. at least for the ties
being. There may be some production changes dtnrn the road. Its range of
equipment offerings may be narrowed %iue to competition from other equip-
ment suppliers. but the future is too uncertain at this *tag* to wake Any
definite predictions as to its future equipment manufacturing rang*.




	 he ll Labs and AT&T 1X: Western will provide the vast majority
of AT&T X's equipment needs.
e
	
	 AT&T International: Western will vigorously pursue interns--
tional sales And international joint vonturom. under the
umbrolla of AT&T International.
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The seven r*gional ib 11 Oporating 62spanies and the companies
that ask* up those regional kXs: Western wants to maintain its
close ties with the divested operating companies.
•	 American Bell, Inc_.: Western wants to be the major provider of
equipment to its sister division, ASI, and will attempt to move
closer to this division. There say be problem in this rela-
tionship, however, since AdI my want to sake its own decisions
and choose to remain independent of Western.
•	 The end user for customer promise *quipment t Since Western has
a good name in the equipment manufacturing business, but hoe
hitherto lacked national marketing expertise, it my face
problem here. Nonetheless, it is planning a major national
advertising campaign and AT&T's marketing venture with Bears
will help it remain class to the residential user. Western
plans to beef up its contacts with the business user, especially
the Fortune 500 companies.
•	 The Indoeendent Telephone Companies: United Telecommunications,
Continental, CENTEL, and Hid-Continent are all potential cus-
tomers, On the other hand, Western expects to sell very little
equipment to GTE, which is vertically integrated end manufac-
tures most of its own equipment.
The independent manufacturers of equipmont--those belonging to the
general trades suppliers--say have little contact with Western Lloctrie.
post -divestiture, and will have no contact whatsoever with 8*11 Labs.
The independent equipment manufacturers will therefore find themselves
competing even more vigorously with Western, and will have to establish
new and closer business contacts with the WXs, American Bell, AT&T
International, and the and user (both business and residential).
4.	 The 60Cs in 1984
In 1984, the 80Cs will become **von different units, and their
organisational structure will look significantly different from pr*settle-
went days when the 1k)Cs were closely integrated into the overall vertic-
A11y integrated AT&T corporato structure. The reorganized BX structure
is outlined in F'.guro 0.
•
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Figure 6
Bell Operating Companies in 1984
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A Central Staff Organization will be created by the seven BOCs. It
will be responsible for network engineering. This staff will not serve as
a central purchasing organization for the seven companies. If it does,
the general trades suppliers will probably take the seven BOCs to court on
antitrust grounds. The seven companies, since they are large organiza-
tions in their own right, are expected to do their own purchasing. There
will also be significant unilateral action permitted on the part of the
separate members of the regional BOCa--Illinois Bell, Michigan Bell,
etc.--to allow thrum some flexibility in equipment purchases.
The Regional Staff for each of the seven regional BOCs will have the
capability of performing technical and economic evaluations. The staff
will establish purchasing and distribution capabilities, but--as mentioned
above--so can the individual companies that make up the regional com-
panies. There will be some degree of independence between the companies
that make up a regional BOC.
The seven regional companies--according to the terms of the Modified
Final judgment--will not be dependent upon any given equipment supplier,
and in particular Western Electric. Western Electric will be just a.-other
supplier, although it will be the major one--at least for a few years.
Under the terms of the antitrust settlement, the seven BOCs will be
able to return to the CPE business in 1986. They will be able to market--
though not manufacture—CPE at their own discretion. There is an expecta-
tion that some BOCs will decide to return to the CPE business and some
won't: some BOCs will offer a wider range of equipment than others.
-33-
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Whatever happens, the BOCs will not have an established CPS base
because that stays with AT&T. Also, because of the antitrust settlement,
it is not clear whether or not the BOCs will have to establish a separate
subsidiary to handle new CPE, as they were originally required to do under
the terms of the Computer II decision. Computer II was decided by the FCC
before the Bell System was split up, so the separate subsidiary concept
might be abandoned.
AMPS will be handled by the BOCs in 1984. The regional companies,
which are only just beginning to be organized, have not decided how they
will handle cellular radio, but decisions on cellular radio's future will
be made over the next 12 months.
5.	 Summary:
•	 The structure of the telecommunications-information industry
will change dramatically over the next 12-24 months.
•	 The markets for telecommunications services and equipment are
also changing because of the AT&T antitrust suit settlement and
also because of the FCC's Computer II Decision.
•	 American Bell began operations on January 1, 1983. It is going
to be the primary AT&T marketer of CPE and the sole AT&T
marketer of "enhanced" communications services.
•	 AT&T Long Lines is being significantly restructured and enlarged
to become AT&T IX--Inter-Exchange. It will be vertically
integrated in the new AT&T structure and will have close ties to
Western Electric and Bell Labs, and perhaps even American Bell.
-34-
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e	 The points of contact for Bell System customers and suppliers
will be changing over the next 12-24 months.
e	 The seven regional Bell Operating Companies--once divested--will
gain some new responsibilities, e.g., cellular radio and perhaps
some competitive business activities--but will lose others,
e.g., intrastate toll and CPE (CPE for only a year if they so
choose).
e	 Western Electric will vigorously attempt to protect, and even
enlarge, its markets. It will have close ties to Bell Labs,
AT&T IX, American Bell, the BOC's, and others.
e	 All of this activity may result in massive confusion over the
next couple of years--for users, for equipment vendors, and for
telecommunications service providers.
E. Remaining Issues Relevant to NASA
Although the Judge approved the settlement, with his modifications
included, there are still a number of critical issues that will remain
unresolved for some time, especially since it will take AT&T at least 2
years to reorganize. Clearly, the turmoil is not over. Many decisions
are yet to be made which will determine the future structure of the
industry. In the longer-term, these industry structure changes will lead
to price and technology changes. And these changes will in turn impact
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1. The FCC's activities in the interim as AT&T attempts to reorganize
may dramatically influence the shape of future competition. It seem
clear that the Commission will continue to play an important role.
Plans already exist to launch a major inquiry that will examine the
implications of the settlement. The Commission will do this under
Section 214 of the Communications Act which gives it authority to
certify the transfer of assets. The indications are that the FCC
will plan one comprehensive proceeding dealing with a miscellany of
AT&T settlement problems and issues.
2. What does the U.S. Congress plan to do this session? There will
certainly be a series of hearings relating to the settlement--and
also to other telecommunications-information industry structure and
policy issues. But there may also be a series of bills relating to
certain aspects of the settlement, although Senator Bob Packwood,
R-OR, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, and Congressman
Wirth have both stated intentions to wait on major legislation until
the settlement is implemented and any remaining problem become
clear.
3. The types of restraints the State Regulatory Commissions are likely
to place on the BOCs' competitive activities are unknown, as is the
FCC's part in the process of allowing the BOCs to get into competi-
tive areas.
4. The so-called access problems remain in spite of Judge Green 's
attempts to mollify those who will compete with AT&T Long Lines. The
rates charged for access--and less than equal access--will be debated
"in perpetuity," according to some experts. Again the FCC, and
perhaps the Congress, will be involved in the process.
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5. Confusion remains over whether AT&T and the divested BOCs will be
allowed to move into cable television or other interactive services
via broadband facilities. Where the BOCs are concerned, FCC rules—
at least for the time being--prevent them from entering cable,
although Judge Greene obviously wants the BOCs to compete in other
areas and did not specifically bar them from cable. Nonetheless, the
FCC, as authorized by the Communications Act of 1934, has primary
jurisdiction over telecommunications policymaking. Where AT&T is
concerned, it appears that the cable business is open to it, along
with other "local distribution" options, although some policy experts
believe that Judge Greene's "broad definition" of electronic publish
ing may keep AT&T out of the business for 7 years.
6. There is growing uncertainty about what exactly constitutes elec-
tronic publishing, and many policy experts believe that this uncer-
tainty can only be resolved either by the FCC or the Congress. A new
Computer II type inquiry may be necessary except that this time the
argument will be about what is, and what is not, electronic publish-
ing. A leading question here is: Can electronic publishing be
separated from the new data services such as teleprocessing? This
may develop into a serious problem for AT&T.
-37-
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE FCC AND NTIA
A. FCC Activities
Throughout all of the deliberations concerning the AT&T settlement,
the FCC will remain the dominant policymaking body, not only regarding the
future of AT&T but also in a host of other matters.
The Commissioners and senior staff at the FCC have been preoccupied
with the post-AT&T settlement problems that they fear they will be called
upon to resolve. But because of severe budgetary constraints imposed upon
it by the Reagan Administration, the FCC may be losing its ability to
regulate as effectively as it has in the past. In addition, the FCC has
scaled down the size of its policy planning capability. The Commission is
now apparently ill-equipped either to regulate effectively or to conduct
meaningful policy planning in new policy areas. The result, apparently,
will be a progressively heavier reliance on the marketplace.
1. Regulatory Surveillance and Rate-Setting
The FCC has changed the thrust of its regulatory approach. Emphasis
has shifted from detailed cost surveillance, particularly of cost alloca-
tion on a service-by-service basis, to broader review processes which are
to complement the FCC's basic reliance on "market forces" as a means of
keeping prices just and reasonable. Thus, those unhappy with the treat-
ment they are getting from the FCC must look to the market, and, if this
does not work, to the Courts and Congress as a means of advancing their
interests. Clearly, the Specialized Common Carriers and many of the users
will have to take this route.
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The FCC is backing away from the vigorous service-by-service fully
distributed costing standard that it established in 1976, known as Fully
Distributed Cost Method 7.
The Commission is also deemphasizing its goal of carrier accountabil-
ity. For example, in April 1980, in a proceeding involving determination
of access charges for exchange network facilities, the Commission decided
it could regulate charges by considering cost allocations for only four
broad interstate service categories.
Also, in June 1980, in a decision involving the Fully Distributed
Cost manual, the FCC found that only an overall (e.g., private line)
service category must earn the Commission's prescribed rate of return,
rather than each private lice service. In short, rates for individual
services would not be closely scrutinized.
The FCC is relying increasingly on current-relative-use or
separations-based allocations for any surveillance activities that
remain. This is a significant step away from the forecast-based alloca-
tions mandated by the FCC in 1976. It is recognized that in order to
implement the necessary changes, revisions to the Uniform System of
Accounts are essential, but these have been put on the back burner with no
meaningful result expected until 1985.
The Commission has therefore substantiall y veversed its prior
policies, which were designed to closely monitor the costs of competitive
services offered by AT&T in order to make sure that there was no cross-
subsidization or predatory pricing. Fully Distributed Cost Method 7 has
been abandoned, and separations categories and principles underlie the
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manual, adopted in December 1980, and its development of access charges in
an earlier proceeding, both rely on cost allocations and earnings devel-
oped for broad service classes, not for individual service offerings. In
Phase I of the Competitive Common Carrier Docket, decided in August 1980,
the Commission indicated that nondominant carriers' tariff proposals, may
no longer require service cost support materials. The final phase of this
docket may be decided in early 1983.
All of this means that AT&T has been given such greater ratemaking
discretion. It can set prices and distribute costs for particular sar-
vices within an overall service category according to its own marketing
strategy. When and if these plans break down, the Commission will resort
to the negotiations process—in the sane way that it fostered interstate
access charges. Recent Joint Boards also illustrate this more informal
approach.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not this additional
discretion will have an adverse impact. If the theory of the settlement
is correct (see Chapter 4 above), the divestiture of competitive/
unregulated businesses from AT&T has largely eliminated the incentive to
cross-subsidise. Unless it turns out that some of the businesses retained
by AT&T are not workably competitive, market forces can be expected to
control prices effectively. The FCC's shift in cost standards can there-
fore be regarded as allowing a test of whether or not the market will
work.
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler essentially had no choice but to curtail
rigid regulatory oversight, largely because of budgetary constraints, but
also because of the loss of key personnel (partially due to burgeoning
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opportunities in the private sector) and the Reagan Administration's
regulatory (or unregulatory) philosophy. In financial and accorntfag
areas, therefore, a higher earnings level and new higher depreciation rate
prescriptions are permitting earlier recovery of capital and hig::er rates
for AT&T. As a result, AT&T is garnering higher cash flows with which to
pursue substantial investments in competitive enhanced services, terminal
equipment, and network construction.
2. Common Carrier Issues
The FCC will press ahead--regardless of the settlement of the AT&T
suit--with attempts to allow marketplace forces to restructure the
telecommunications-information industry as opposed to regulatory
restraints. Computer II implementation, now that the decision has been
upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, is being given top priority,
not only within the Commission, but.also between the ".omission and the
State Regulatory Commissions. The so-called nondominant carriers will be
freed from much regulation when the Competitive Common Carrier Docket
comes up for final consideration; a new private line rate structure will
be devised; and attempts to revise the 46-year-old Uniform System of
Accounts will continue. The so-called Interim Cost Allocations Manual
will attempt to determine what each group of telecommunication services
offered by AT&T really costs; changes will be instituted in the separa-
tions and settlements procedures in order to protect the small and rural
telephone companies; and significant progress is expected regarding the
development of local access charges. In addition, there will be further
work in establishing proper depreciation procedures for all carriers, an
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inquiry into domestic satellite spacing, and an inquiry into the proposed
deregulation of domestic satellites. The Commission may begin a ruiamak-
ing into telephone -cable cross ownership, will continue to implement the
Cellular Radio =^cision by awarding licenses to operate, give the go-ahead
to Digital Termination Service (local distribution), and establish policy
regarding videotex-viewdata.
On the international side, the Senate's recent deliberations on
5.2496, the "International Telecommunicat--Lons Deregulation" bill, have
influenced the FCC's actions. Tie Commission has abandoned its so-called
Authorized User Decision, which mans that users ( including NASA) will be
allowed to obtain some services directly from COMSAT rather than going
through AT&T or the International Record Carriers ( IRCa). In addition,
regional satellite policies are also being encouraged, including a recent
transborder accord reached with Canada. This coincides with the imple-
mentation of more competition in the international telecommunications
service arena as Western Union is allowed to compete internationally with
AT&T and the International Record Carriers (IRCa), while the IRCs will be
allowed to compete domestically with Western Union. Also, the FCC will
look into international trade reciprocity in the area of telecommunica-
tions equipment purchases, although such "sectoral" reciprocity is
unlikely to be implemented. Nonetheless, telecommunications trade policy
issues will certainly be on the congressional agenda.
B. NTIA Activities
Current budgetary constraints which have reduced the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration ' s appropriations are part of
a several years old trend toward reducing the government's role concerning
-42-
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the planning process in the telecommunications industry. NTIA's planning
and policy activities are being greatly reduced and its Boulder group
(where most of this work was done) has been eliminated. Furthermore, it
will no longer be involved in the planning and procurement of federal
agency telecommunication systems. NTIA will focus its efforts on the
international policy area, spectrum management and networks research and
analysis.
In the short-run, industry may notice little change, but NTIA has
been a rich source of advice for the FCC and with the FCC's own budget-
strained, long-range planning expertise is sure to suffer. With recent
efforts towards deregulating portions of the industry, the nfed for exten-
sive detailed oversight is diminishing, but in such a complex and dynamic
industry as telecommunications, constant vigilance is required to ensure
the proper functioning of the marketplace and its relationship with those
sectors still regulated.
The rapidly changing telecommunications environment and the concur-
rent de-emphasis on long-range planning at NTIA and the FCC make it neces-
sary for each agency to assume a greater share of the responsibility for
assuring that such policies are adopted as will provide for the availabil-
ity of reliable cost-effective communications. This means that NASA's
communications personnel will need to make every effort to keep abreast of
the technological changes in the industry, the regulatory decisions
impacting the telecommunications environment, and the long-range implica-
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CHAPTER SIX: IMPLICATIONS FOR NASA
Implication #1: Conceptual planning for the telecommunication networks
is becoming increasingly important.
As competition in the telecommunications industry increases and tech-
nology advances, the network managers will find that available services
and equipment will become more diverse, and along with the various rates,
are likely to change more frequently. Also, the number of offerers will
increase, since there are likely to be more "piece-part" suppliers emerg-
ing to capture market niches and more "end-to-end" vendors emerging to tie
the many new offerings together into communications packages transparent
to the user. Within this rapidly changing environment there will be a
greater tendency for the network planners to optimize their piece of the
network "locally" (as each new requirement or uffering comes into exist-
ence) rather than "globally" (i.e., for all of NASA, in the longer-term).
This tendency will lead to unnecessary inefficiencies if decisions to make
or forego procurements are not made within the guidelines of a long-term,
conceptual plan for the networks. It is easy to conceive of procurements
which appear to be cost-effective today, but which limit the neworks'
options and flexibility and force less cost--effective procurements in the
future. Most of this potential problem can be avoided if a formal
description of where the networks are headed is developed and if communi-
cation amongst the various network planners (and between the planners and
the user community) is improved.
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Implication #2. Comprehensive, up- to-data information on available
equipment, services and rates are becowing increasinaby
ii oa^rtant6
As was mentioned in Implication g l, the pace of introduction of new
equipment and service offerings appears to be accelerating. And. as AT&T
enters new unregulated markets and cou"tition increases, the nuabor and
frequency of rate changes will increase. hates will also be in flux due
to the divestiture and the (unrelated) move towards cost based pricing,
which will result in reduced lung distance rates and increased local
rates. Many of these changes could lead to reduced costs, but in order
for NASA to take advantage of these sk+ried opportunities, the network
managers must have comprehensive. up-to-date information. An advanced
decision-support information system. which can provide comprehensive
information on opportunities as well as information on NASA's current and
future requirements. can keep management sensitive to the changing
environment atki can help management make the most efficient decisions
possible.
Imputation 03s Interaction with the telecommunications environment in
which it must operate is bocoming increasingly ipMrtant
to NASA.
Therea are. and will continue to be, mony changes in telecommunica-
tions policy which will impact NASA. But NASA can influence the direction
of such changes and, if properly prepared, can benefit from (or at least
minimise the offsets of) those changes. Technologically. NASA hae had a
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which it currently relies. It has, however, chosen to remain virtually
inactive in the development of telecommunications policy domestically.
This reactive role in policy development is not the only available option,
as evidenced by NASA's success in the development of telecommunications
policy and standards within the international arena. This success is, in
a large part, due to the fact that many NASA employees hold national and
international posts within international organizations. As a result, NASA
is able to be intimately involved in the policymaking (or standards
setting) process. Although there is little chance that this level of
success could be achieved in the domestic process, the current environment
is creating possibilities. The increasingly competitive industry, a
dynamic regulatory environment, the increasing importance of data distri-
bution to the performance of NASA's missions, and the declining role of
NTIA and the FCC in the formulation of telecommunications policy, all
interact to create a situation in which NASA will benefit from choosing a
more positive, active position.
-46-
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS
The implications presented in the previous chapter pointed to the
importance of: 1) long-range conceptual planning for telecommunications
networks, 2) comprehensive up-to-date information on new offerings in the
telecommunications industry, and 3) efforts to interact with time telecom-
munications regulatory environment. Provided below is a set of recommud-
ations which parallel these three implications, as well as a fourth recom-
mendation which, if enacted, will enable NASA most effectively to imple-
ment the three other recommendations.
We recommend that a position be created within the Office of Space
Tracking and Data Systems (OSTDS), the responsibilities of which are
listed in Recommendation #4. Our observations of OSTDS activities
throughout the 9-month duration of this study led to the conclusion that
the activities detailed in Recommendations 1, 2 and 3 are not properly
provided for within the existing organization because of their secondary
or "extra detail" status. In the existing and future telecommunications
environment, NASA will benefit greatly if these activities are pulled
together at a single point, creating a new position with responsibility
for both long-range planning and telecommunications policy analysis.
Given the subtlety of political trends and the many minute but significant
details in proposed regulatory change, only an individual familiar with
the preferred options for satisfying NASA's long-range telecommunications
requirements can recognize all the potential future options foreclosed by
the decisions made today. Likewise, only an individual acquainted with
both political and technological trends deduced from informal industry
-47-
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contacts and comprehensive up-to-date data can properly maintain a long-
range conceptual plan for the totality of NASA's information requirements.
Recommendation P1: Planning Activities
IA. Develop and maintain a long-range conceptual plan for all of
NASA's information requirements. To assist in this task, a
working group should be formed consisting of both Headquarters
and Center personnel with expertise in data aye :- p , telecom-
munication network capabilities, and future prog -7s. require-
ments. The conceptual plan should be based on the projected
regulatory and technological environment rather than that exist-
ing at the time, and on possible and probable information
requirements rather than just approved and funded requirements
as currently stipulated in NMI 2520.1C (which guides the activi-
ties of the Communications Planning and Analysis Branch of the
NASCOM Network Directorate at GSFC). The Space Tracking and
Data Systems Division is currently considering procuring the
services of an outside consulting firm to develop just such a
conceptual plan. If this is done, the working group should have
the responsibility of maintaining the plan.
1B. Push for the completion of NSDP Section II, the 5-year develop-
ment plan for the NASCOM system. A similar development plan
should be completed and maintained for the Program Support
Communications system. It is important to recognize that these
are intermediate range plans and are not a substitute for the
longer-term conceptual plan.
-48-
VOLUME II, PART III.0
	
793
1C. Improve the incentives for communication amongst the network
planners. Participation in the process of maintaining an over-
all conceptual plan will encourage this exchange of ideas and
expertise.
ID. Encourage, and expand where possible, the ongoing planning-type
activities, such as the Data Systems "I4 study and the 10-Year
Frequency Requirements study.
Recommendation f2: Decision Support System
It
	
	 Develop and maintain the following data bases, integrated to comprise
a useful management decision support system.
2A. Management level data on new service and equipment offerings.
2B. Current regulatory issues, the possible impacts of such on NASA,
the NASA position on each issue and an account of any responses
made (or in progress).
2C. An official mission model projecting information requirements at
least 10 years into the future.
2D. A communications and data systems user community profile.
2E. A complete set of documents relevant to the telecommunications
environment in which NASA must operate (e.g., legislation,
dockets, NMI's, OMB Circulars, industry reports, etc.).
794 VOLUME II, PART III.0
Recommendation Y3: Interacting with the Environment
3. NASA should move towards a more active role in the development of
telecommunications policy domestically.
3A. Continue to familiarize itself with the telecommunications
polic)Mking process and with the leading policymakers them-
selves. It should meet at all levels with the FCC, NTIA, OMB,
GSA, the White House and the Departments of Defense, Justice and
State. Contacts should be established and areas of mutual
interest explored. Also, contacts should be established with
the pertinent State Regulatory Commissions.
3B. Make itself available to the appropriate committees of Congress
as an expert in the telecommunications technology field. As
well as playing an active role in legislative hearings pertinent
to telecommunications technology and policymaking, NASA should
offer its expertise informally to key politicians and staffers.
Likewise, NASA should more frequently offer its expertise to the
FCC as it deliberates on numerous proceedings of consequence to
NASA and NASA's contractors.
3C. Improve the existing mechanisms for reviewing and responding to
FCC Dockets and Congressional Inquiries and other materials
related to telecommunication policy. Several NASA responses
were initiated by the authors during the course of this study,
allowing first-hand exposure to the process (see Appendix D).
We found the existing response mechanisms to be virtually use-
less from the standpoint of influencing telecommunications
legislation or rulemakings. The Office of Legislative Affairs
-50-
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(Code C) is oriented towards the budgetary process and is ill-
equipped to recognize the importance or relevance to NASA of
subtle technological issues. Nor do they maintain active con-
tacts with the telecom uinications subcommittees. As a result,
too sany items of potential significance fall through the
cracks. When and if the information does get to the Communica-
tions and Data Systems Division there is little that can be done
with it. Time lines are too short, the clearance process for
responses is too long, managers do not have the time and are not
trained to be sensitive to the political subtleties, and the
informal contacts with the policymakers are almost nonexistent
(outside of Code C and its budgetary activities). A set of
f
	 issues and response guidelines, updated periodically to reflect
contemporary requirements, would help reduce the reply time (see
Recommendation 2B) and, perhaps most importantly, the establish-
ment of informal contacts between the Office of Space Tracking
and Data Systems and the policymakers would improve the informa-
tion flow (see Recommendation 4A). Currently, NASA is "concur-
ring," through silence, to testimony on both sides of important
issues, allowing others (e.g., DOD) to "carry the ball."
Recommendation #4: Planner/Policy Advisor Position
4. A long-range conceptual planner/telecommunications policy advisor
position should be established within the Office of Space Tracking
and Data S)-stems. Representative responsibilities for such a posi-
tion are given below.
-51-
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4A. Communication systems long-range conceptual planning.
4.A1 Develop and maintain a long-range conceptual plan as
described in Recommendation 1A.
4.A2 Initiate and chair a NASA-wide working group which will
assist in the maintenance of the plan.
4.A3 Provide guidance and oversight for the planning officers of
each network, develop incentives for improving planning
dialogue amongst NASA offices, and encourage and coordinate
planning efforts by NASA's frequency, network and data
systems managers.
4.A4 Initiate and improve efforts to identify long-range com-
munication systems requirements as inputs to the planning
process (see Recommendation 1D).
4.A5 Stay apprised of new service offerings, tariffs and equip-
ment and their potential usefulness to NASA in the long
term (see Recommendation 2).
4B. Telecommunications Policy Advising.
4.B1 Provide a single NASA point of contact for all telecommuni-
cations regulatory and policy issues.
4.B2 Provide impact analyses of new and pending telecommunica-
tions policies.
4.B3 Develop policy positions on issues relevant to NASA's
communications interests.
4.B4 Provide telecommunications policy advice to the Associate
Administrator of the Office of Space Tracking and Data
Systems.
-52-
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4.B5 Develop congressional testimony on the implications for
NASA's communication systems of changing technologies and
policies (see Recommendation 3B).
4.B6 Respond in the telecommunications regulatory/legislative
fora according to the requirements of NASA's long-range
plan (see Recommendation 1).
4.B7 Keep apprised of relevant activities of the FCC, NTIA, GSA,
OMB, the White House and the Departments of Defense,
Justice and State.
4.B8 Keep apprised of the relevant activities of the State
Utility Regulatory Commissions (they will be increasingly
important).
4.B9 Collect and distribute relevant materials including Bills,
Dockets, congressional testimony, NASA NHI's, OMB
Circulars, industry reports, etc. (see Recommendation 2F).
4.B10 Develop productive contacts in the telecommunications
policy field outside NASA.
Note: There are of course many other planning and policy analysis
responsibilities which would necessarily fall under the purview of this
position, but which the authors of this report are not qualified to
detail. Also, it is recognized that there exist several alternatives for
implementing the above recommendations other than the creation of a new
position. However, it is necessary that NASA recognize the importance of
improving its planning efforts, enlarging its information base and
actively participating in the telecommunications environment in which it
must operate.
-53-
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APPENDIX A
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Others in Western Europe, Japan
and S.E. Asia
A. Radio Common Carriers ( RCC's): Approximately 1,000.
B. Wireline Carriers: AT&T and the other telcos.
2.	 Private
Aviation and Marine; Public Safety; Land Transportation;
Industrial; Personal: Thousands






















(c) 1982, Alan Pearce
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Tom Campbell, Associate Executive Director, FCC.
Cristopher Coursen, Counsel, Senate Telecommunications Subcommittee.
Gary Epstein, Chief, Comm Carrier Bureau, FCC.
Jerry Fritz, Legal Assistant to FCC Chairman Mark Fowler.
Janes Graf, Legal Assistant to FCC Commissioner Joe Fogarty.
Bert Halprin, Division Chief, FCC Common Carrier Bureau.
Larry Harris, Chief, Broadcast Bureau, FCC.
Dale Hatfield, Consultant, formerly Associate Administrator, NTIA.
Leon Kastenbaum, Deputy Chief, FCC Common Carrier Bureau.
Dr. Dan Kelley, Office of Plans and Policy, FCC.
Dr. Jerry Lucas, President, TeleStrategies.
Dr. Kent Nilsson, Legal Assistant to FCC Commissioner Henry Rivera.
Scott Rafferty, Counsel, house Telecommunications Subcommittee.
John Rowe, MCI.
Commissioner Stephen Sharp, FCC.
Dr. Christopher Scerling, Special Assistant to FCC Commissioner Anne Jones.
Dr. Richard Thayer, AT&T, Corporate staff.
Phillip Verveer, Partner, Pierson, Bell and Dowd, formerly head of the
Justice Department's Trial Staff in the AT&T antitrust case and
formerly Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC.
Paul Wickrie, Uninet, United Telephone.
Richard E. Wiley, Manging Partner, Kirkland and Ellis, former Chairman,
FCC.
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APPENDIX C
MEETINGS ATTENDED FOR THE STUDY
•	 TeleStrategies, Conference on the AT&T Settlement
•	 Department of Commerce, Conference on Information Policy
•	 Congressional Hearings on such topics as the 1934 Communications Act,
International Telecommunications Deregulation, the AT&T/DOJ Antitrust
Settlement, High Definition Television, and Advanced Satellite
Communications Technology
0	 George Washington University, Course on Telecommunications Policy
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NASA RESPONSES INITIATED BY AUTHORS DURING THE STUDY
•	 Response to Congressional inquiry on HR3158, "The Telecommunications
Deregulation Act of 1982."
•	 Systematics General Corporation study of the impacts of several
legislative initiatives on the TDRSS program.
•	 Comments on the Depa°taint of Defense's analysis of S.2469, "The
International Telecommunications Deregulation Act."
•	 Comments to the FCC or Common Carrier Docket 81-704, "2° Spacing of
Communications Satellite-3."
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When two or more information sources ( "experts") provide a decision
maker with information on two or more random variables, the decision maker
using Bayes' rule has an opportunity to (1) update a prior about the random
variables, and (2) calibrate the experts. (Calibration is the process of
adjusting the decision maker ' s likelihood about the experts' assessments.)
This paper presents a model for this two-way process, and specializes to the
case where the experts' assessment errors have a multivariate normal den-
sity. In general, we find that variables which the decision maker and the
experts regard as independent a rp iori will be dependent a posteriori
because of dependence in the assessment errors. Formulas for posterior den-
sities are given for the normal model. In this model the posterior density
of the random variables depends on only a weighted average of the expert's
means, with weights that depend on the experts' assessments of previously
known quantities. We also present a special case of the model for which the
mean of the posterior density is correctly given by a simple (unweighted)
average of assessments.
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ABSTRACT
When two or more information sources ("experts") provide a decision
maker with information on two or more random variables, the decision maker
using Bayes' rule has an opportunity to (1) update a prior about the random
variables, and (2) calibrate the experts. (Calibration is the process of
adjusting the decision maker's likelihood about the experts' assessments.)
This paper presents a model for this two-way process, and specializes to the
case where the experts' assessment errors have a multivariate normal den-
sity. In general, we find that variables which the decision maker and the
experts regard as independent a priori will be dependent a posteriori
because of dependence in the assessment errors. Formulas for posterior den-
sities are given for the normal model. In this model the posterior density
of the random variables depends on only a weighted average of the expert's
means, with weights that depend on the experts' assessments o f previously
known quantities. We also present a special case of the model for which the
mean of the posterior density is correctly given by a simple (unweighted)
average of assessments.




A recent paper by Winkler [5] introduced a consensus model for combin-
ing probability assessments from dependent sources of information, which we,
like Winkler, will call "experts." Winkler's model is closely related to
Morris' [3] Bayesian framework and to the "internal approach" for reconcil-
ing probability assessments proposed by Lindley, Tversky and Brown [1]. As
with these other models, Winkler's approach requires two probability assess-
ments from the decision maker who is reconciling the experts' distribu-
tions. First, the decision maker supplies a prior distribution for the
uncertain event. (Since the consensus model deals with random variables,
the prior is a density function for a random variable 9.) Second, the deci-
sion maker assesses the likelihood of each expert's assessment given the
unknown.
Winkler's paper on the consensus model presents the case where a number
of experts provide assessments about a single random variable, and both the
prior and likelihood are provided by the decision maker. l This paper con-
siders the case where the experts provide assessments about several random
variables simultaneously. This extension makes it possible to use the
experts' assessments both to update the decision maker's prior on the random
variables and to calibrate the experts. Calibration, as the term is used
here, is the process of adjusting the decision maker's likelihood function
for the experts' assessments.
To illustrate how calibration can be accomplished, we use results for
the multivariate normal model presented in Section 3.1. There are K
experts providing information about M random variables 
01'	 0M'
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We assume that the decision maker regards these variables as independent a
priori (possibly, some of them have been so constructed as to be independ-
ent). The decision maker also believes that the experts' assessments are
unbiased but correlated estimates of these variables, with normally distrib-
uted errors. Consequently, the likelihood function of the assessments is a
multivariate normal density for the assessment errors, with zero mean and a
covariance matrix containing K(K+1)/2 parameters. Since there are MK
assessments and M + K(K+1)/2 unknowns, if M is large enough it can be
shown that information about the covariance matrix can be extracted from the
experts' assessments, in addition to information about the Ai's.
Introducing the possibility of joint updating and calibration by using
several assessments per expert is the essence of Morris' calibration proce-
dure [3]. However, Aorris deals with the limiting case where the number of
assessments approaches infinity. In the model presented here the number of
assessments need not be infinite before some information can be extracted.
Another consequence of the theory presented below is the following.
Suppose the decision maker believes the random variables being assessed to
be independent arp iori. However, after consulting the experts the decision
maker will in general have a posterior density in which the random variables
are dependent. This phenomenon, pointed out in the single-expert case by
Harrison [2], arises because a change in one of the expert's assessments may
affect the posterior distribution of all the G i 's. Hence the decision
maker learns something about A i , say, from an assessment of ej
because the assessments are dependent.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section (52)
introduces Winkler's consensus model and presents the case where the deci -
sion maker's prior and likelihood are general density functions. Section 3
thrn ape:-Ia .izes to the normal error model. In addition to illustrating the
general pcints made, this section provides fairly straightforward formulas
for the moments of posterior densities. The results in this section,
particularly Proposition 3.4, are perhaps the most practically important
ones in the paper. Section 4 contains some concluding comments.
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2.	 The Consensus Model with Multiple Assessments
In the consensus model, generalized to multiple assessments, a vector
9	 (91)...,9M) of real-valued, unbounded random variables is of interest
to the decision maker. 2 Each of K experts, i - 1,...,K, has a probabil-
ity density g 1(9) on these uncertain quantities. The consensus model
makes the crucial simplification that the decision maker believes the
experts will make only certain kinds of "errors" in assessing these densi-
ties. This simplification puts restrictions on the likelihood function that
the decision maker must assess, making formulas for calibration easier to
implement.
Specifically the consensus model assumes that experts' assessments
differ from 9 according to an "additive noise" model. Lett^ be
a vector of means of the i th expert's probability density on 9. The
assessment error for the i th expert's is defined to be u  - µ,i
 - Q.
The decision maker's likelihood function involves only the error vectors.
This assumption that only the errors matter implies that the decision
maker thinks that experts' assessments differ by a consistent location
shift. Knowledge of 9 would not change the decision maker's likelihood.3
However, the likelihood function may incorporate dependence among the
experts' errors. In particular, the likelihood function is written
f(m 1 , . —Y-0 q), where Z - (a ......  ap ) is an additional vector of the
parameters in the likelihood function which encode the decision maker's
beliefs about the experts.
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The parameters a represent an addition to the consensus model of
[5]. They summarize the decision maker's Judgement of the accuracy of the
expe rts' probability assessments. In the next section, for example, a is
a matrix of the variances and covariances of the experts' assessment
errors. More generally, these parameters could represent biases in assess-
ments, or structural relationships between the errors such as might be
produced by a model that the decision maker is consulting.
The decision maker uses the experts' assessments to make inferences
about both A and a. He combines a prior p(A,a) with the likelihood
function to obtain the posterior density:4
PQ, dg 11 ... 1 9K ) a f( l - 9,...,LiK - A la) p Q,Z)	 (2.1)
Equation (2.1) is the most general statement of the solution to the
problem of multiple assessments. A number of additional assumptions can, if
appropriate, simplify the equation and help one to understand its implica-
tions. In particular, decision maker may regard A and a as independent
a rp iori. Such might be the case, for example, if the A represent foot-
ball point spreads and the a the reliabilities of bookmakers consulte.: by
the decision maker. Unless the bookmakers can influence the outcomes of the
games, A and a will be independent a rp iori. (The same remarks apply,
of course, to other situations such as the case were a encodes the reli-
ability of actuaries' assessments of risk or stock market analysts' assess-
ments of earnings per share or the prices of stocks.) However, as can be
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seen in this equation, even the a pr.(ori independence of 8 (or q for
that matter) does not imply a posteriori independence.
Simplifying assumptions also can be made about the decision maker's
likelihood function. Perhaps the two most important ones are when the
decision maker regards the experts' errors uij to be independent with
respect to one of the two subscripts. If each expert's assessment errors







= Rf (u	 ^a)	 (2.2)j=1 j ^(j)
where u (j) _ (u1j,...,uKj). In this case the decision maker regards the
experts as dependent, due for instance to their common knowledge of public
information. However, the dependence has the same probabilistic form for
each e i , i = 1,...,M.
The assumption of independence among the A l may seem unlikely in
realistic situations. However, cne may be able to arrange for it to hold by
asking the experts for additional assessments of variables which the deci-
sion maker selects tc be independent a rp iori. The assessments of these
variables are used to calibrate the experts. Such a procedure is used in
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Morris' calibration procedure, and in what Lindley, Tversky and Brown call
"extending the conversation" with the expert.5
In some cases the additional assessments may not be of intrinsic
interest to the decision maker. Alternatively, the assessments themselves
may be of interest, but haN_^ been selected by the decision maker to give the
independence property. For example, the decision maker may regard the price
of a security in successive periods as dependent, but the successive first
differences of prices may be variables which are considered independent.
The other important case arises when the i th expert's errors for
e j end Ok are dependent, but the i th and l th experts them-







This case was not considered by Winkler, but could atise in several situa-
tions. One of these occurs if the experts possess a great deal of independ-
ent, private information about A . For example, geologists working for a
petroleum exp.oration company may be asked to assess the values of adjacent
tracts for the purposes of bidding for a lease. Each geologist will have
some common in formation available, of course. But, there may also be
proprietary data which is so much more detailed that the decision maker
believes it dominates the public information. On the other hand, because
the tracts are adjacent (and hence likely to share common geologic strut- 	 f
Cures), the values of tracts j and k may be correlated.
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Another situation where this assumption may be ,justified is when the
decision maker believes that certain experts tend to be optimistir or pessi-
mistic in their assessments. Thus, a knowledge of u ij (say) woul^ lead
the decision maker to revise his density on uik, but not on u ki or
ue k . The commonplace identification of some securities analysts as
"bullish" or "bearish" is an example of this case, since the degree of
optimism or pessimism is associated with the individual expert rather than
the variables being assessed.





3.	 A Model with Normally Distributed Errors
This section specializes the model of the preceding section to the ca
where the experts' errors are normally distributed. In this case the
parameters a are elements of covariance matrices of appropriate dimen-
sion. To save space, and because most of the derivations are based on sta
dard sources, (e.g., Press [4] or Zellner [6]), the main results are pre-
sented as propositions. Some details are provided in an Appendix to this
paper. Also, because the details can be found in the sources just cited and
add little to the interpretation of our results, we will consider only the
case where the decision maker has a diffuse prior on the variables 8 .
In order to deal easily with the two special cases introduced in the
last section it will be helpful to it ►troduce some additional notation.
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We will also wish to write the errors and assessments as (KM x 1)





3.1 Dependent experts, independent random variables
We will first consider the case where experts' errors are dependent,
but the decision maker believes that the experts' assessments are independ-
ently and identically normally distributed across variables.
Letting k be the K x K covariance matrix of the experts' errors,
the likelihood function for this case is:
f(*KI ) = f(MIA, 1^
1 M/2	 M
a I
LK I	 eXp [ -(1/2 ) ,7 u (J)	 1 "(J)^	
(3.1)
=l	 k
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This likelihood function can be rewritten in terms of a K x K "sum of
squares" matrix S(S):
f(MI A, Z;l ) a 141 IM/2 exp [-(1/2) tr S( o - 1 1	 (3.2)
where:
M
s(^	 j^ l"(j) u(j)
e^)'(M-Ae^)	 (3.3)
and eK is a K x 1 vector of ones.
In this case we will use a Wishart conjugate prior density on r l .
1	 1 (v-K-1)/2	 1
P^	 Iv'S0^ 
a I*-K I	 eXP^-(1/2) tr^vs,o,^ ^^ (3.4)
where So is a positive definite K x K matrix and v> 0 is a "degrees^
of freedom" parameter. The case	 = 0 represents an improper diffuse
prior on
Combining the likelihood and the prior gives the following posterior
density on A and 7;1:
P( '-4 	 V'S )a 1 41 I	 exp{-(1/2) tr [vSro + S( 8)	 } (3.5)
This density is a non-central Wishart distribution function. Viewed as a
joint density its properties are very complicated, although some analytic
results are known (e.g., (41). Fortunately, we can often work with marginal
or conditional densities, as summarized in the following propositions.
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To make the following propositions more tangible, consider the simple
example whose data are given in Table 1. A decision maker is interested in
two variables S and e , and consults two experts, A and B. Initially
the decision maker considers the experts to be independent, and assesses a
prior with v - 2, and S,o - I ') , a two-bv-two identity matrix. When the
decision maker consults the experts he or she supplements the conditional
means for the two variables of interest with values for three other
variables, s, 6 and y, whose correct values are known to the decision
maker.
Proposition 3.1: Given 0 , the posterior density on qCl is a
Wishart density of the form given in Equation (3.5), with M + v
"degrees of freedom," and weighting matrix v S10 + S( 	 The density is
proper only if M + v > K and the matrix v S^ + S( ) is positive
definite ([41, p. 101). The posterior mean precision matrix is:
E( r- 1 IM, v,3S ) - (M + v) [v So + S( 0) ]-1	 (3.6)
This proposition is the 'basic result for pure calibration of the
experts. It says that if we are able to compare the experts' assessments
with the true values of 0, the posterior mean precision is a weighted sum
precision S	 (if any) and the cross product matrix S Q) evaluated at the
of prior true values of 0.
3	




has the Wishart density in Equation ( 3.5) it can be shown that
Ek has an inverted Wishart density with M + v + K + 1 "degrees of
"freedom." The properties of this density are summarized in [4] and [6).
If M + v > K + i the mean of this density exists and is given by:
	
E(41 !l I,v'S0)	 [ v SS,o + S(6)]/(M + v - K - 1)	 (3.7)
In terms of the example introduced above, we have M = 3 and the
matrix v So + SQ) is:





The posterior correlation derived from this matrix is 0.46, suggesting that
the experts are dependent.
Proposition 3.Z: If 
^l 
is known 6 the conditional density on 6 is
a multivariate normal with mean 8* and covariance matrix o*2IM
where:
	
eKWe'Kl eK 1	 (3.8)
7* 2
	1/(eK S 1K eK ^	 (3.9)
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This proposition is a restatement of Winkler's analysis [5] when 0 is a
vector. The posterior mean	 0* is a weighted sum of the experts'
assessments, with the weights determined by the precision matrix Fl.
Also, the elements of 0 are mutually independent a posteriori. This
illustrates that the dependence among the 0 arises solely from :he
dependence among the experts, a point confirmed in the next proposition.
In the example we have been following, the data were actually generated
from a bivariate normal density function with both variances equal to 1.0
and a correlation coefficient of 0.7 (before rounding off). In this case it
is easily shown tht the optimal weights are 0* = (0.5,0.5)', and that
a* - 0.922. Hence the posterior means of 6 and E given knowledge of
Zk; i.e., complete calibration, would be 7.75 + 0.92 and 8.65 + 0.92. In
fact, the data were generated so that the true means where 7.0 and 9.0.
Proposition 3.3: The posterior marginal density on 0 is a matrix-t
density function:
pQk , v,S o) a	 1 + (0 - 9 )' A-1 0 - 0„0) I (M+v)/2	 (3.10)
where:
so
	M So l eK/(? So l ?^ 	 (3.11)
ao = v/eK S o l a	 (3.12)
Ao - a2 [I + (M - 9 e')(v S o ) -l (M - 0 e')' ^ 	 (3.13)
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In order for Equation ( 3.10) to be a proper density function we must
have v > 0. If v > 1 the posterior mean of 0 is ,0^, and if
v > 2 the covariance matrix of 0 isAro/(v-2).
This proposition considers the case where 
7;1 
is unknown. The
posterior mode 0  of 0 is calculated using the same weighted -sum formula
as when ZV
	 is known, except that the prior "sum of squares" matrix v S0
provides the weights instead of S(0). However, the covariance matrix of
the 0 (proportional to A0) is no longer diagonal; in addition to the term
CT IM there is a term involving the deviations of the assessments from 02	 0.
Notice also in this case that the decis ' -n maker mu st provide some
prior information (i.e., v > 0 ) if the posterior density is to integrate
to one. The posterior thus represents a real mixture of the experts'
assessments with the decision maker ' s beliefs about the experts assessment
abilities.
In the example here, only the decision maker's prior information would
be used, i.e., v - 2 and 
S
o - I2 . In this case the weights are again
equal, and a0 - 1.0. However, the number of "degrees of freedom" are
one too few for the second moments of the posterior on b and c to
exist. If this were not so, the A 	 matrix would show a slight degree of
correlation between the variables.
Propositions 3.1 _ind 3.3 can be used to derive the predictive density
for a new set of variables ( say an M2 x 1 vector 0 ) given a new set of
assessments ( say a matrix M 2 ), and the results of a prior calibration step
in which both the assessment matrix M and the "true" values of 0 were
obtained. By Proposition 3.1 the precision matrix 	 I has a Wishart
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To find the predictive density of S2 given M,,	 M and 0 we replace 8
by 0
	 M by M2 , and so on. The case where the original prior is diffuse
(v = 0) and M2 - 1 will give the "data based" prior used in the
football point spread example in [5]. In the general case v > 0 we have:
Proposition 3.4: When S(0) is known from a previous calibration
step, the predictive density for the new assessments is given by
Equations (3.13)-(3.16):
P(A2IM2'S ),v, So	 a I1 + ( 02- A20 )' A 2 1 ( 02- 020 )I 	 2	 (3.14)
there
020 - {M2 [vS. + S(.e)] -1?xE/^e'[vS0 + S(A)] -le^	 (3.15)
s 2	 1/ {ems' [ vSr^  + S(0)] -1 eK }	 (3.16)
42 - s2 1I 2 + (M2 	820 ek	 x0 + S( 0)] -1 (12 - 820 eej)' f (3.17)
In the example, this proposition tells us how to combine the decision
maker's prior with the extra assessments made by the experts. Calculation
shows that the weights the decision maker uses on the experts' assessments
of the mean are now (0.595, 0.405)', so that slightly more weight is given
to Expert A than to Expert B. This occurs because Expert A's assessments of
a, 0 and _r happened to be closer to the actual values than Expert B's
assessments. ( Given t 'ze way the data were generated, it is evident that if
there were many more questions the weights would gradually swing back towrds
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equality, which is optimal if Ek 1 is known.) The posterior density on b




The implied correlation coefficient is about 0.01, so that in this cae at
least the dependence of the experts has not made much difference in the
decision maker's posterior density.
Table 2 shows the relevant statistics for the three cases discussed
above. The fourth case shown is what would have happened with a diffuse
prior on T^ 1 , i.e., if v - 0. Ironically, in this case the posterior
means are actually closer to the actual values in this case than in any
other, despite the fact that the weights used in this case are far from
correct, namely (1.45, -0.45).
3.2 Independence among the experts but dependence
among the random variables
We turn now to the second special case introduced in Section 2, where
the decision maker believes that the experts' assessments on any particular
variable are independent, but that the assessments will be dependent when
considered across the variables being assessed. Moreover, the decision
maker views the experts as making identically distributed errors.7
In this case the error vectors u 	 and u 	 are independent and
identically normally distributed, with zero mean and M X M positivz
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definite covariance matrix ZM . Hence the likelihood function can be
written:
_ 	 K	 _




exp{- ( 1/2)tr V + K(0 - 0)(0 - A ' 	 1M I	 [	 ]	 }	 (3.18)
where
K
8	 R	 ^i	 (3.19)i=1
K
V = i Y (k - e) (^_Ii - 9 )	 (3.20)
Thus ^ is the simple average of the experts' assessments, and V is the
associated M x M cross-product matrix.
As in the preceding subsection we assume a diffuse prior on 0 and a
Wishart prior or the precisiou matrix ;; . Specifically:
p(8 ^1 ) " Ir
	
11(v-M-I)/2-(1/2) tr(v Yo ;4 1 )]	 (3.21)
where Y. is a positive definite M x M matrix and v > 0. The resulting
posterior density is:
1	 1 (K+v-M-1)/2
X exp{ -(1/2) tr[v VO +V+K( 9-A)( 0-0)' ]£M (3.22)
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This posterior density leads immediately to the following propositions:





density with K + v "degrees of freedom" and weighting matrix
vV0 + V. Hence the conditional mean precision is:
E(Z; 1 11 ,v,VO )	 (K + v)(v Yo + X) -1 	(3.23)
In this case the unknowns A do not have to be revealed to obtain the
density of 
41 
in a useful form. However, it should be noted that the
density of the precision matrix does not condense as the number of
assessments M increases, when the number of experts K is held fixed.
Intuitively, this is because increasing the number of variables also
increases the number of unknowns.
Proposition 3.6: The posterior marginal density of 9 is a matrix-t
density function:
p(2+1t,v,V4 ) a I1 + Q - e)' B 1 (A - 9)I-(K+v)/2	 (3.24)
where B - ( W + WK. This density is proper provided K + v > M,
and has mean 6 provided K + v > M + 1. If K + v > M + 2 the
covariance of 8 is ( K + v)B/(K + v - M - 2).
This prop sition says that when the experts' assesSMI-T)ts are regarded
as independent the posterior mean of 0 is a simple average of the
828
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assessments--no weighting by covariance matrices is needed. The elements of
9 are dependent a posteriori because the variables themselves are
dependent, with covariance matrix proportional to v Yo + V.
The appearance of a 8 is interesting because so many informal
techniques for achieving a "consensus" of experts' forecasts use a simple
average. If we are willing to accept the posterior mean (or mode) of the
density in Equation (3.22) as an estimator, the above model gives a case
where the simple averaging of assessments is the correct way to proceed.
Informally, the pi— position says if the experts' private information
dominates the public information, no attempt should be made to weight the
assessments for "reliability."
3.3 The Case of General Dependence
In the general case, the error vector u_ has a multivariate normal
distribution with mean X k and positive definite covariance matrix 2 ,
where X is an MK x M matrix of ones and zeros. Since we assume that
each expert assesses all the random variables we can write X in a
particularly simple form:
X - 4 9 ek 	 (3.25)
where IM is a M x M identity matrix and t. is an K x 1 vector of
ones. (B denotes the direct or Kroneker product of two matr i ces.) The
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likelihood function in this case is:
f(J^.I^,^,) a, ,xp[- (1/ 2 )(1^^ - X	 1( ►^ ^ - x 8^} (3.26)
Since there are MK assessments provided by the experts, and the
likelihood function contains M + MK(MK + 1)/2 parameters, the posterior
density function on A and 0, cannot be expected to be a proper density
unless some additional information, either in the form of a prior density on
A and 2, or in the form of restrictions applied to some of the param-
eters, is supplied. If prior information is supplied we are dealing with a
case like Winkler's. For example, suppose the decision maker can supply the
matrix 2 . In this case the conditional density of 9 given Q is the
product of ti-e likelihood function given above and the prior density on 9.
The treatment is essentially the same as in Proposition 3.2, except that the
conditional mean is 8* 	 (X'	 1 }C) -1 X 1 2 1 ^, with covariance matrix
The other alternative is to place restrictions on parameters. The
possibilities here are almost limitless. Indeed the special cases





respectively. Other possibilities include
making Q,'EC or	 functions of a smaller number of parameters.
(Winkler's equicorrelated case is an example of this.) The particular
choices will undoubtedly depend on the decision maker's particular assess-
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4.	 Conclud1n8 Remarks
This paper assumes that all K experts assess the M unknown varia-
bles. However, there are many practical circumstances where this will not
be the case. F + ther some assessments will be unavailable by chance, or the
decision maker will consciously restrict their n•imber in order to reduce the
assessment burden placed on the experts. Indeed, the introduction of multi-
ple assessments introduces an experimental design issue not present when
there is only one unknown. Although the details are beyond the scope of
this paper it should be clear that various sorts of block design, entirely
analogous to those studied in classical statistics, can be used to reduce
the experts' workload.
Anotier point to be made about the procedure discussed in this paper is
that an expert need not be human to provide an assessment. A model, or even
actual data will do ,just as well. For example, one could use the price of a
security in a previous period to predict a future price. Indeed, one could
mix the assessments of models with ,judgmental forecasts in a straightforward
manner.
Finally, the model discussed here opens several areas for further
work. The first of these is the derailed investigation of the incomplete
experimental designs discussed above. A second area of interest would be to
allow the experts' errors to have non-zero mean-, (i.e., to be consistently
"biased" in one direction or another). For the normal model, the addition
of bias leads us from a model resembling a one-wa y analysis of variance to
one that resembles a two-wav analysis of vari.nce. (However, the :-onven-
tional anal ysis of variance mode. (foes not assume general covariance
matrices.)
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A third area which has not been fully explored here is the relationship
between the calibration results, particularly for the normal model, and the
use of exchangeability by Morris to calibrate experts. There are two
related issues here. First, if the decision maker considers the A to be
exchangeable, but not independent, how can general dependence among the
experts be handled? Second, what is the consequence of assuming that the
experts' errors are exchangeable, instead of being dependent in a general
way? Specifically, does such an assumption help to simplify the calcula -
tions of posterior densities when either K or M or both are large?a
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains some details of the derivation of the
propositions presented in Section 3. We begin by deriving Equation (3.2)
from Equation (3.1):
G1 P-(J) Z M(J) = tr{ I u(J)u(	 lJ) I F^}J	 J 1
M
tr {[JI ( Z(j) - e^ ^)(-u(^) - 8^!K
= tr S(D FF
where the next-to-last line follows from the fact that the (i,k) element
M
of the matrix in brackets is
	 u^iujk = ui uk . Hence the sum of squares
j=1
matrix S(8) = U'U = (M - B e')'(M - 8 ems'). Proposition 3.1 is immediate
from this calculation and the assumed form of the prior density.
To obtain Proposition 3.2 we use:
tr S(S) 1; 1 = trQ - A e')	 l (M - A ems)'
= tr[(M - A*ems) K l (M - A*eK)' + (8 - 6*)(A - 8*)'/0*2
since	 (M - A*ems) FK l e^(8 - O*) = 0(A - A*) = 0 , where 6* and c* are
defined in Equations (3.8) and (3.9). Only the second term involves 9
and this is clearly the exponent of an independent normal density.
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Proposition 3.3 is obtained by almost similar steps, except that the
posterior density involves	 tr vS^ + S O]	 so that integrating outl	 	 (	 ( ) 
the precision matrix F^1 as described in Press [4] or Zellner [6] gives:
p(OIM,v,SQ ) a IvSD + S ( A)l- (v+M)/2
a ivb
0
 + (M - Oe')'(M - Oe')l-(^)/2
a JIK + (M - Oe')'(M -	 )(vSO)-ll-(v+M)/2
a 
J 
M + (M- OeK)(vS4 ) --1 (M - ei)'l -(v+M)/2
a IIM + (M - 00e^)(vSo )-1 (M - ^^)'
2 1-(v+M) /2
a lao + Q - e0 )(8 - Oo)' l - (v+M)/2
Cc
	 + (O - O)'A l(9 - go)l-(v+M)/2o o 
where Oo, a  and A  are defined in Equations (3.11)-(3.13).
Proposition 3.4 is merely a restatement of Proposition 3.3, using the
fact established in Proposition 3.1 that the conditional posterior density
of ,; 1 given A is of the Wishart form.
Finally, Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 are simply special cases of the
general multivariate model, and the derivations can be found in Press [4],
Chapter 7.
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1 Winkler provides an example in which the likelihood function is "data
based," i.e., is estimated from past observations. This paper shows now
this approach is related to a calibration of experts using past data.
2 All vectors are column vectors. A prime superscript indicates a
transpose.
3 Winkler's paper [5] discusses this assumption in more detail, and also
suggests ways to rescale random variables so that the transformed variables
satisfy the assumption, even when the untransformed variables do not.
4 Notice that f(LLl - A,...,k - 21 2) is the conditional density of
1 ,...,	 given 8 and a .
5 However, Morris' procedure requires only exchangeability among the events
assessed.
6	 1Since we assume	 to be known, the prior on
C l is superfluous.
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7 The latter assumption is admittedly restrictive. It can probably be
justified as an approximation whenever the number of experts K becomes
moderately large. Otherwise each expert would have a covariance matrix (say
^1	 for i =1,...,K), and the decision maker would have to provide K
prior densities.
8 Research supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's
contract NASW 3204. The author thanks Donald Dunn, Shmuel u; ,mr end Robert
Winkler for helpful comments.
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Table 1 — Experts' Assessments and Known
Values for Example
Expert A's Expert B's Known
Variable Mean Mean Value
a 0.9 0.3 1.0
0 4.2 4.4 3.0
y 4.5 4.7 5.0
S 7.4 8.1 ?
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Table 2 — Moments of Decision Makers' Posterior
Density on 6 and e
Variable 6	 Variable E
Based on perfect information 	 7.i5	 8.65
about ;c (Proposition 3.2)	 (0.92)	 (0.92)
Based on prior only	 7.75	 8.65
(Proposition 3.3)	 (*)	 (*)
Based on prior and assessments	 7.68	 8.66
of a, 0 and y (Proposition 3.4)	 (1.05)	 (1.00)
Based on assessments of a, 	 7.08	 8.75
and y only	 (1.83)	 (1.28)
Correct value	 7.0	 9.0
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. * means that the moment does
not exist.
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The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recently
headed an interagency task force to	 the technical parameters and
institutional arrangements for a U.S. operational earth resource sensing
system. One of the most important and least understood inputs confronting
the task force was the market for Landsat products and ground processing
equipment. While the U.S. government represents somewhat over half of the
1979 market (about 52X), the foreign segment of the market is substantial
(about 36X), and is expected to grow rapidly.* In particular, the
developing nations of the world represent a large potential Larket for
Landsat data and products. This paper is an effort to understand the
Landsat market in developing countries, and the constraints on the growth
of that market which stem from the development process itself and from a
country's technical, political and institutional attributes.
* Private Sector Involvement in Civil Space Remote Sensing, NASA
Headquarters, June, 1979, see also Planning for a Civil Operatio
Remote Sensing Satellite System: A Discussion of Issues and Opt
Headquarters. June 1980.
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1. OVERVIEW
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAH)
recently headed an interagency task force to determine the
technical parameters and institutional arrangements for a
U.S. operational earth resource sensing system. One of the
most important and least understood inputs confronting the
task force was the market for Landsat products and ground
processing equipment. While the U.S. government represents
somewhat over half of the 1979 market (about 52%), the for-
eign segment of the market is substantial (about 36%), and
is expected to grow rapidly.' In particular, the developing
nations of the world represent a large potential market for
Landsat data and products. This paper is an effort to
understand the Landsat market in developing countries, and
the constraints on the growth of that market which stem from
the development process itself and from a country's techni-
cal, political and institutional attributes.
Private Sector Involvement jLn Civil Space Remote Sensing,
NASA Headquarters, June, 1979, 	 (cited hereafte: as the
PSIS study),	 see also Planning For a Civil Operational
Land Rem>te Sensing Satellite System: a Discussion ,off
Issues and Ontions, NOAA Headquarters, Jury 1980, (cited
hereafter as Issues and Options).
- 1 -
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2. INTRODUCTION
Four competing factors guide the development of policy
regarding an operational land remote sensing system, and it
is important to outline them at the outset, for they provide
the broad societal context for the analysis in'this paper:
1) there is a need to boost U.S. exports in areas where the
U.S. holds a technological lead;
	
2)	 the need to develop
user applications in developing countries on their terms
coincides with a foreign policy imperative to maintain good
relations with third world nations; 3) developing countries
desire to take control of their own development and the
types of technology and indu; - which they adopt; 2 and 4)
the U.S.
	 government wants to enlist the participation of
major companies in the manageme;it, operation ar.d ownership
of the operational System.
	 Such participation requires a
substantial world-wide market.
	 A more in-depth look at
these four factors follows.
First, declining U S. productivity and the decline of U.S.
technological superiority in many international markets
impels the U.S. to take advantage of any technological lead
which it holds.
	 There is, as well, an economic imperative
Z Lately there has been a shift in rhetoric from an emphasis
on GNP growth and the "trickle down" theory of development
to the meeting of basic human needs. While this is of
course not universally true, the principle of the theo-
retic shift has been accepted by the World Bank and other
international institutions.
	 See Baum, Warren, "The World
Bank Project Cycle", in Finance and Development, 12/78.
2
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in capitalist systems which calls for exploitation of a
technological monopoly when it exists. Earth resource sens-
ing satellites represent an area where the U.S. holds an
edge over its nearest competitors. The French and the Japa-
nese will not be launching experimental systems until the
mid-1980'x. 3
 By that time the U.S. 	 should have an interim-
operational system based on the Landsat D spacecraft and
sensor system in the air.' However, recent Congressional
testimony suggests that foreign systems may, by leapfrogging
primitive U.S. systems, catch up to or move ahead of U.S.
systems technologically. 5
 Foreign countries also may be tai-
loring their systems to the needs of the developing coun-
tries, thereby, cutting into the U.S. market share. Hence,
one factor guiding U.S decision-makers is that of support-
ing U.S. industry in a highly competitive world.
Second, in contrast to the strictly domestic economic needs
of +re country, the health of the international economic
community demands the development of third world countries
in an effort to stabilize a seemingly chaotic world situa-
tion.	 The recent Afghanistan crisis should not blind us to
3 PSIS and Issues and Options op. cit.
" Ibid.
S See Statement by Mr. David Johnson, Director National
Environmental Satellite Service, National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce,
Before the Committee on Communication, Science and Trans-
;
	
	 portation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space,
June 26, 1960.
- 3 -
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the fact that the East -West cleavage in international rela-
tions has been fading in place of a growing north -south con-
flict over the call for a new international economic order.
Even in the context of a renewed cold war, the U . S. will no
longer be able to ignore the demands of the developing world
if it hopes to maintain a viable foreign policy.
Third, there is a growing demand by third world nations to
control their own development. 	 As such, the profit motives
cf U.S.	 companies may run headlong into a host country's
desire to develop its resources and population in a stable
manner. For instance, even if Landsat data is the most
cost-effective and most efficient way to obtain resources
information, and we in the developed world would immediately
adopt it it may not make any sense for a developing country
with a huge labor surplus that could employ many people
do?.ng ground surveys. If the U.S. wants to develop markets
in third worle nations, it may have to do so on terms set to
some extent by those nations.
Fourth, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is
in the process of transferring the operational earth
resources sensing program to the Department of Commerce's
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).	 As
a part of that tra^,,er NOAA must initiate private sector
involvement,	 and dsal with international participation.
- 4 -
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Work done thus far  on private sector and foreign involve-
ment has focused on efforts to determine how to entice com-
panies into owning and operating the operational system.
Following the example of the communications satellite indus-
try, one might conjecture, the government would continue to
pursue long-term RED, while the private sector would pursue
applied RCE and market development. However, unlike the
communications industry, a multi-billion dollar market does
not already exist. To find a company of sufficient size to
be interested in making the investment required would demand
that a market for resource yer? .? products be fairly appar-
ent. Showing that market nay b• a difficult task as many
U.S. government agencies have said that a market price would
sorely limit the adoption of Landsat technology by federal,
state and local government users. ? Therefore, a fourth fac-
tor that guides the policy process is the need to demon-
strate t:iat a sufficient market can be developed to support
corporate investment in the space segment of an operational
earth resource sensing system.
--------------------
6 In private discussions with NASA personnel, I was told of
the studies presently being undertaken as a part of the
transition plan effort.
7 see State and Local Government Perspectives gar a Landsat
Information System, prepared by the Natural Resource and
Environmental Task Force on the Intergovernmental Science,
Engineering, and Technolo gy Advisory Panel, June 1978, pg.
36, hereafter cited as the ISETAP report.
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This paper is an attempt to illuminate the constraints on
the Landsat market in developing countries. These const-
raints play an important role in potential market projec-
tions, and will therefore be important to understand as
policy regarding the system characteristics and govern-
ment/industry interface is made.
d
I intend to place the discussion of the potential Landsat
market in developing countries in the context of resource
information for development planning.	 The reason fo- this
is simple:	 resource information is essential to successful
development planning (in all countries, not just developing
countries). Landsat technology and products are one way
amongst several for acquiring that data, and Landsat may or
may not be the most effective and cost-efficient method
available.	 Hence,
	
the real market which private sector
firms in this country must deal with is the market for
development planning,
	
of which resource information is a
vital part. Therefore, building a viable Landsat market in
developing countries will depend on its use in development
planning, and such planning rests inevitably on the particu-
lar characteristics of the country involved.
This study is divided into four parts. 	 Chapter 3 of this
study reviews V e technology of Landsat, including the space
and ground segments. 	 In much of the literature on remete
- 6 -
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sensing, there has been an unfortunate overemphasis on Land-
sats' technology and potential. Chapter 4 of this study
concentrates on the user segment, and in particular, on the
constraints inherent in the development process which limit
the market for Landsat data. It will generally point out
that there is a "user need" for Landsat type data but that
the development of that need into a viable market is con-
strained by present technology and indigenous factors.
Chapter 5 focuses on the institutional and political const-
raints impacting the adoption of Landsat technology in
developing countries.
Finally, Chapter 6 will take a tentative look at the trade-
offs confronting U.S. policy makers as they formulate Land-
sat po-icy in the context of the four guiding factors dis-
cussed on preceding pages. At that point, preliminary
suggestions for future study will be discussed.
- 7 -
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3. THE TECHNOLOGY OF LANDSAT
In simplest terms, Landsat consists of three critical seg-
ments-- the space segment, the ground segment and the user
segment. The space segment consists of the satellite, the
sensors, the ground based satellite control equipment and
software.	 The ground system consists of data reception
facilities,
	
data processing facilities and information
extractioniimage interpretation.	 A third critical segment
is the user community.	 This segment is treated in Chapters
4 and S.
3.1 THE SPACE SEQMENT
The Landsat satellite is a 950 kilogram spacecraft which
orbits the earth at an altitude of about 560 miles. It
orbits the earth 14 times a day and returns to the same
orbit once every eighteen days.	 The 14 strips of the
earth's surface covered each day by Landsat are each about
185 kilometers wide (115 miles).	 Each day the satellite
passes over a strip 170 kilometers west of a strip surveyed
on the previous day, and senses it. 	 This provides a 15 km
overla;, which can be important if there is a problem with
- 8 -
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cloud cover or other atmospheric interference on any given
day. 8
There are two sensor systems on all of the Landsat's which
have been launched to date. Landsat's 1 and'2 each had
return beam vidicon (RBV) system and a multi-spectral scan-
ner (MSS). The REV system consists of three television like
cameras aimed to view the same 185 by 185 km ground area
simultaneously. These cameras have a nominal ground resolu-
tion of 80 meters and the spectral bands designated bands
1,2,and 3 on Landsat cover the following parts of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum:
band 1 (green) .46 to .60 um
band 2 (red) .57 to .68 um
band 3 (near infrared) .66 to .82 um.9
However, on Landsats 1 and 2 the RBV systems were used rela-
tively little; they will be more thoroughly tested on Land-
sat 3. 10 The MSS records information in both the visable and
in parts of the electromagnetic spectrum which are invisible
8 Femote Sensing From Space, Prospects For Developing C.oun-
tries, National Academy of Sciences. 4ashington D.C.,
1977, pg. 39,40. hereafter cited as the NAS study. see
also Lillesand and Kiefer Remote Sensing and ImageInter-
pretation, New Yank, John Wiley and Sons, 1977.
9 NAS study, op. cit., pg 45.
10 Ibid, pg. 43.
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to the human eye and to the camera systems. The MSS take
four readings for each 1.1 acre area on the ground--one fo
the intensity of green light reflected, one for the inten-
sity of red light reflected, and two for the intensity of
infrared light reflected. The four bands of the MSS overlap
some with the bands of the RBV, but are designated as bands
4, 5, 6 and 7.	 They cover the electromagnetic spectrum as
follows;
85E
band 4 ( green) . 5 to .6 um
band 5 (red) . 6 to .7 um
band 6 (infrared) .7 to .8 um
band 7 Cnear infrared) .8 to 1.1 um
Landsat 3, launched in 1978, contained two major changes
from the previous Landsa^s. First a thermal channel (10.4
to 12.6 um) was added to the MSS, and second, the spatial
resolution of the RBV system was improved to 30 m. However,
shortly after launch the thermal channel developed operating
problems, hence the MSS on -board the spacecraft is operating
in essentially the same mode as the previous Landsats. "
While the effective resolution of Landsat images is about
79m on the MSS images, and about 30m on the RBV images,
depending on the interpretation technique being used, narrow
linear objects with distinct spectral characteristics can
t ^ Lillesand and Keifer, op. cit. , pg. 540.
- 10 -
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often be detected. On the other hand objects much larger
than 79m across may go undetected if they blend with their
surroundings so that features are not spectrally distinct.12
The space system also includes two wideband video recorders
which collect and store the data acquired in areas beyond
the range of the receiving stations. This data is held
until the receiving station comes back into view of the sat-
ellite and is then dumped to the station. Each recorder can
handle either RBV or MSS data. On Landsat's one and two,
only one of the four recorders worked regularly, making it
difficult to receive data from areas not in sight of the
satellite when it passed near a receiving station.13
The MSS has the following characteristics which make it dif-
ferent and sometimes better than conventional purposes for
remote sensing:
1. data is available it digital form making large
amounts of data rapidly processible by computer;
2. the original data, in digital foam, can easily and
rapidly be transferred to other receiving stations,
unlike a film original;
12 Ibid, pg 544.
NAS Study, op. cit., pg 46.
- 11 -
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3. they can acquire data in the infrared region which is
beyond the capability of regular cameras.
However, the high resolution camera is still superior in
some cases for disclosing the identity, shape, and appear-
ance of many small objects or
	 features.14
3.2 THE GROUND SEGMENT
The ground segment involves three activities:
	 data recep-
tion, data processing and data interpretation.
Data recevtior.:
There are presently ten ground stations capable of receiving
Landsat data--of which three are located in the United
States, tKo are in Canada, and one each in Italy, Brazil,
Ar,entina, Japan and Sweden. The operators outside the U.S.
simply tell NASA when they wish to have the MSS turned on
over their station. The station can receive Landsat data
while the satellite is within their "line of sight"--a
radius of &!-out 3000 km. This allows each station to
receive a total of about 28 million km sq. duri p3 one Land-
sat pass. (This is the total footprint of the Landsat as it
passes within the stations line of sight.)15





	 VOLUME II, PART IV.A.1
Data uro ss . _q:
There are three primary products which can he made out of
the Landsat data.	 black and white imagery is produced at
the earth resources observations (EROS) 	 data center in
several forms: first, there are 55.8 by 55.8 cm. negative
and positive transparancies at a scale of 1:3,369,000, and
18.5 by 18.5 cm film and print enlargements at 1:1,000,000;
second, there are print enlargements 37 cm by 37 cm at a
scale of 1:500,000 or 74 cm by 74 cm at 1:250,000. 16 The
second Landsat products are color composites. 	 These take
advantage of the !act that the hu_man eye can distinguish
many hundreds of color variations. Hence, by applying dif-
ferent variations of colors to the variations of grey in the
negative, a color composite can be produced.
The third product developed from Landsat data are computer
compatible tapes (CCT'S). These ta.a"s preserve all the
intensity levels of the MSS (a total of 64) in digital form.
The CCT's can then be fed into a computer for digital analy-
sis of the spectral properties in order to prod urs desired
information in tabular form.	 The	 can	 be used to
11 Issues and Options, op.cit.
16 Ibid,	 pg.	 55.	 A scale of 1:250,000 = 1 in/4 mi;
1:500,000 = 1 in/0 mi; 1:1,00'"0,000 = 1 in/16 mi.
- 13 -
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produce thematic maps emphasizing one or another selected
ground features.17
In performing digital analysis of Landsat data, 	 there are
three types of computer based procedures that can be usei:19
1. image restoration: these operations act to "restore"
distorted image data to a more "faithful" representa-
tion of the original scene;
2. image enhancement: prior to displaying image data for
visual analysis, enhancement techniques can be
applied to accentuate the apparent contrast between
features in the scene. In many applications this
greatly increases the amount of information that can
be visually interpreted from the image data;
3. image classification: quantitative techniques can be
applied to automatically interpret digital image
data. In this process, each pixel observation is
evaluated and assigned to an information category,
thus replacing the image data file with a matrix of
category types.
Ibid, pg. 56.
Lillesand and Kiefer, Op. Cit., pg. 557.
- 14 -
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Data interpretation usually begins with the datection and
identification of important objects. 	 The objects are then
measured manually or with the aid of appropriate instru-
ments.	 This measurement is then considered in light of the
interpreter's particular expertise. Then the interpreter
must be able to communicate both his perception of and the
significance of the object identified. 19 Various methods or
extracting information from remotely sensed data can be
used.	 In sequence from least to most expensive and sophis-
ticated they are:
1. manual interpretation of standard photographic prod-
ucts using very simple, inexpensive instruments;
2. manual interpretation aided by photographic enhance-
ment and employing more costly optical equipment;
3. manual interpretation of special digitally enhanced
photographic products using the equipment as
described in step 2;
4. digital analysis of the computer compatible tapes in
a process of man-machine interactions to produce the
desired computer output, which is in turn subjected
to further human interpretation and analysis.20
---------- ---------
19 Estes, John, "A Perspective on the State of the Art of
Photographic Interpretation", in International Symposium
on Remote SensincT of the Environment, vol 11, ERIM, 1977,
pg 161-176.
2° NAS, Op. Cit. , pg 55-56.
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Finally, image interpretation and particularly information
extraction may be aided by the "multi-concept" of data
interpretation. This includes multi-station (Landsat,
aerial, and ground surveys used together), multi-temporal
sampling (different time periods using the same sensing
unit), multi-stage sampling (which means simply acquiring
data at different scales) and multi-band sampling (simply
using different bands to look at the same scene).
Landsat • s technology, from the space and ground segment pro-
vides at least five advantages over traditional surveying
techniques. First, it views the earth synoptically; sec-
ond, its repetitive coverage allows it to maintain up to
date information; third, its computer compatibility allows
its data to be merged with other information about popula-
tion and terrain in order to produce more complete land-use
and resource planning maps; fourth, its uniformity over time
allows it to take comparative pi^tures which enhances the
ability of planners to detect change. and fifth, its multi-
spectral scanner allows it to observe different aspects of
the same object, or to distinguish between two objects that
might otherwise be missed. 	 These advantages provide excit-
ing potential.	 However, one must look to the user segment
to determine if that potential will be realized.
- 16 -
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4. THE USER SEGMENT, CONSTRAINTS ON MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
4.1 RESOURCE INFORMATION NEEDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The ultimate objectives of collecting natural resource
information are
1. to aid countries in the evaluation of investment pro-
spects;
2. to provide information to be used for improving cur-
rent management of natural resources;
3. to aid in the performace of certain governmental
activities (particularly the administration of land
taxes and the like).21
I am primarily interested in the first two objectives, and
later on I will explore them in the context of a development
project. However, a central question is: what kinds of
objectives and resource information needs drive developing
country investment and management decisions? The following
examples suggest the types of development objectives out of
which the need for resource information is generated.
Z ' Herfindel, Orris, Natural Resource Information for Eco-
nomic Development Resources for The Future, Washington
D.C., Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1969, pgs 20-21.
- 17
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Tanzania
Much of Tanzania's economic development effort is
directed toward agriculture and animal husbandry.
Principal resource data requirements in Tanzania
tied to immediate needs include:
1. land use and land capability (distribution
of soils and vegetation types) information
to determine suitability for farming or
range;
2. structural geology and groundwater informa-
tion. as linked to soils, vegetation, and
topographic data, to help locate additional
water sources, to increase the efficiency
of well digging and water impoundment
schemes. and to help in the siting of new
villages; and
3. monitoring of land and range stress due to
drought or overgrazing to permit rehabili-
tation of these resources.z"
Venezuela
Venezuela's development plans call for continued
industrialization. further exploration• of mineral
and petrolewn deposits, improved land use and
quality of life in urbanized areas, colonization
of frontier area, greater emphasis on investment
in agriculture, including expanded assistance to
the rural poor and placement of more land under
irrigation.	 To accomplish these objectives. Ven-
ezoula's data collection efforts ei„phasize:
1. land use and urban change;
Z. pollution assessment of beaches and coastal
area;
3. further mapping of geologic structures to
aid in mineral exploration and siting of
mine related construction projects;
NAS Study, Op. Cit., pg.29.
- 1e
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4. classification of soils and vegetation in
current and potential agricultural areas.
determination of crop acreage and changes
in crop and
5. monitoring of seasonal water coverage of
lands being considered for new settlement.
agricultural development and improvement.:'
Costa Rica
The use of land for agricultural purpose; has been
the backbone of Costa Rica's economy ^or several
centuries. As Costa Rica's industrial and eco-
nomic bases grows. increasing pressures are put
e.ipon agricultural and range land, and in turn upon
the forest lands of the nation. Thus, prime ngri-
cultur:al areas are being threatened by urban
expansion and areas predominantly suited to fores-
try are being converted to marginally productive
range and agricultural uses.
This conversion is not controlled or monitored.
Costa Rica's need for resource information in
order to control this type of urban spread is not
unique to developing countries. They require
information to monitor and update their land use
maps. in order to better manages their own domestic
growth and expansion.:`
:3 Ibid.. pg. 30.
Crnib. Ken. eat al.,	 "Application of Remote Sensing Tech-
niques to Forest %'o getation Surveys in Tropical Areas and
Urh.in Fringe Latid Uses Problems in Costa Rica".
	 in _111jor-
lt :_t ^'11^i^ k1'nLI2t^' t t ► ►11 ^^ FQm _,tL2 S;US..b1]_'1 ^?.L Fll1'..j T 'VLn5'11	 vol.
12. 1)(7 ;.081. 197 111.	 thereafter cited as ERIM symposiuln)
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In Sri Lanka, development planners in the mid
1970's began a program to develop new agricultural
land in order to reach self-sufficiency in agri-
cultural production and food consumption. Land-
use maps had last been updated in the early
1960's, and many smaller farms were not recorded.
The agricultural program has as its goals:
1. crop breeding;
2. multiple cropping;
3. soil conservation; and
4. improved management of agricultural lands.
An agricultural base-mapping program was required
to provide information on soils, present vegeta-
tion,	 land-use for siting of new agricultural
areas, and topography for assistance in irrigation
planning and watershed management.25
The importance of natural resources to economic development
is clear, particularly as a country strives for self-suffi-
ciency.	 While trade enables many nations to acquire
resources which it does not possess internally, natural
resources and information about those resources is essential
in planning and implementing development projects. 26 Appen-




"Agricultural Resource Inventory and Base Maping in Sri
Lanka, A Program Evaluation and Assessment", Resource
Development Associates, Los Altos, Ca., 11/76.
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In order to successfully design and complete a development
project, then, knowledge of the resource base is essential.
This is the context within which the market for resource
information products in developing countries exists. In
sum, according to a national Academy of Science study,
the process of economic development consists
largely of organizing the development and prod-
uctive exploitation of natural resources in the
interests of the whole community. To do so effec-
tively a nation needs to know what resources it
has and where they are, and it needs to have a
fairly detailed grasp of its overall physical
environment. For many developing countries, this
knowledge base is limited, fragmentary, dispersed,
and on the whole, less than adequate for the pur-
poses of sound national development. The capabil-
ity to acquire, store, analyze and use natural
resource information for broadly developmental
purposes still eludes many devel-3ping nations.
Most nations at present are seeking to acquire
better resource information.27
The above quotation stresses that the type of resource
information needed varies not only with the type of resource
to be monitored, but with the end-use of that information as
well. The surveys themselves do not represent the end-use
of the data collected. Rather, the way data is used to make
decisions about resource management in particular and devel-
opment planning in general, represent the actual end-use of
remotely sensed data.
21 NAS study, Op. Cit., pg 24: See Appendix B for a discus-
sion of Landsat applications in developing countries.
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4.2 THE DEVELOPIAENT PROJECT CYCLE: CONSTRAINU QN MARKET
QEVELOIENENT
Developmental decisions are usually related to specific
development projects. Such projects go through at least
four distinct phases, including project identification, pro-
ject planning, project implementation, and project evalua-
tion. 2 9
The identi ication phase must be "carried out first to
determine the human needs as well as the availability of
renewable and nonrenewable resources required to prepare a
development project. " 29 The planning phase takes information
on the nations infrastructure, existing capabilities, col-
lected resource information and the countries political,
social and financial status into account in designing an
appropriate project.	 This stage is followed by the imple-
mentation phase, which varies in length according to the
type of project and the sector to which it is related. 30 The
project gvnluation phase, sometimes called the project
appraisal phase.	 includes an on-going social, political.
economic,	 institutional and financial analysis of the
--------------------
20 Adrien. Pierre, and Alfonso Blandon. " Economic Overview
of Remote Sensing Applications in Development Projects",
in Proceedin.a 21 the Second Conference 2 Um Economics
ol Remote Sensing, Craib and Watkins (eds.), Resources
Development Associates, Los Altos, Ca., January 1978.
(cited hereafter as Second Conference)
29 Ibid., pg 21.
30 Ibid., pg 22.
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4.3 HJU NEED--* : T1S QE all--FLY-S
Using the above chart we can divide resource information
needs into three broad categories: reconnaissance surveys,
semi-detailed survevs, and detailed surveys.` For each type
--------------------
J4 Other authors have used different labels for the various
surveys. Throughout this paper I will use these, however
they correspond to other common labels as follows: pre-
investment = semi -detailed,	 inventories for operational
- 24 -
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of survey, mapping requires progressively larger scale maps.
(See Table Below.)
I	 I


















Detailed maps are used, for example, in the use and manage-
ment of soils. Semi-detailed maps are required for agricul-
tural development projects, irrigation development, drain-
age, land enhancement decisions, and for determining
investment potential in agricultural development areas.
Reconnaissance surveys are used for identifying areas for
potential development activity. 3s However, these general
guidelines vary from resource to resource -end country to
country.	 For instance, one study recent,► described agri-
cultural and forest information surveys as follows.J6
--------------------
management=detailed, and reconnaissance is usually just
called reconnaissance.
J5 From informal discussions with personnel at Resources
Development Associates. See also Herfindel, op. cit.
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Reconnaissance--spatial/area information and data Qbout the land
its natural condition, occurrence and acreage of
forest types, land use classes, crop types, etc.
(to be cited later as category A)
Semi -detailed-- -qualitative information about growing crop
species, tree species, species composition in
natural or cultivated stands of vegetation,
as well as about such stand quality aspects
as vigor •
 healthiness, timber quality, etc.
to be cited later as category P)
Detailed--------quantitative information and data about
cultivated stands of vegetation, or natural
but usable vegetation crops, timber volume
and age, plantation density, grazing capacity,
figures about the less of a resource after
a disaster, etc. (also to be cited later as
category P)
Ze same study then produced the following table which gen-
ralizes, with respect to agricultural and forestry applica-
Lons, the sources of various survey requirements.37
Hildebrandt, Gerd, "Application of Remote Sensing for
Policy Planning and Management in Forestry and Agricul-
ture", in Earth Observation Systems^X Resource Manage-
ment and Environmental Control, Clough and Morley ( eds.),
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Satellites	 aircraft	 aircraft field work
Reconnaissance:
very large areas, A	 A	 A A




large areas, A	 A	 A A





small areas, A A
detailed classes, P P
very many details.
Information Source Can Produce
A = Area napping/classification
P = Properties, quantitative
and qualitative.
Note that as one moves from reconnaissance to detailed sur-
veys, the information source and what it can deliver, shifts
from an emphasis on satellites to medium and to »! altitude
aircraft, and ground surveys. Hence, as one moves along '.n
the project cycle from identification to implementation,
satellites as an information source are likely to give way
to medium and low flying aircraft, and ground surveys. How-
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ever, for appraisal and evaluation purposes throughout the
project, satellites may prove to be very important."
In cutting into the resource information needs of developing
countries then, we can segment the potential market for
Landsat products by the type of survey required. With pres-
ent technology, Landsat is fully able to meet the reconais-
sance resource information needs of developing countries
(except where data is unobtainable), and to partially meet
their semi-detailed/pre-investment needs (this is a particu-
larly grey area, depending to a large extent on the particu-
lar country involved).
38 I shc.•': qualify this statement a bit, because depending
on the sophistication of the ground processing equipment
and the user, and depending on the country and resource
involved, this generalization may not hold.
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assumed in current government projections. 	 Instead it will
tako on the following demand growth curve. This curve
reflects "one-shot" users who will order Landsat data once
oz a very few times, then drop out of the market.
Time
As various technological requirements (mainly for finer res-
olution) for more detailed data are met. the amount of repe-
titive data utilized will increase (due to use of the data
throughout all phases of the development project cycle)--and
the demand growth curve will more fully approximate the
"linear growth" projected by government policy makers.40
with repetitive
coverage
Demand	 — — without repetitive
coverage
Time
40 Issues and Options piper and PSIS study, op.cit.
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4.4	 SUMMARY
While development information needs exist for all countries,
the needs of individual countries vary according to several
factors, including the size of the country, its type of
geography, its development strategies and objectives, the
type of resource information already available, the degree
of detail that is needed, the present capacity of a country
to use resource information, 	 and whether data will be
acquired once or repetitively. In sum, in determining the
resource sensing information environment in developing coun-
tries, and hence the potential market for Landsat data, one
must consider the following:
1. At what stage in the development cycle is a piciect?
Does that stage require reconnaissance surveys, or
more detailed resource information? In general one
can think about the project cycle, extending along a
continuum from project identification to project
planning, project implementation, and -:valuation.
Generally as you move from development planning to
project implementation the information needs become
more specialized,	 calling for a closer and closer
look.
Z. Repetitive Coverage--Some	 projects require	 only
infrequent resource surveys, 	 while others will
require them to be taken weekly, daily, or even more.
- 31 -
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For instance, crop yield prediction requires at least
bi-monthly overflight, while reconnaissance surveys
may only need to be done every five years. Monitor-
ing urban sprawl may require yearly pictures, while
estimating disaster damage may require hourly
response.
3. The type of resource to be monitored--some resources
are more easily discernable than others, and this
also will determine to some extent the timeliness
requirement of the data. One particularly important
determinant of the type of technology used for
resource surveys, for example, is the simple or com-
plex nature of the area to be observed. Appendix E
outlines the difference between simple and complex
areas in agricultural vegetation, range and forest
vegetation, and geology, hydrology and soils."'
Along with the constraints of the resource development proc-
ess and the type of resource to be monitored (and how
often), one must also examine institutional and technologi-
cal constraints when assessing the Landsat market. It is
these constraints, as well as political questions regarding
Landsat, to which I now turn.
o ' Colwell, op. cit., pg 200,201.
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5. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRY MARKET FOR LANDSAT PRODUCTS
Further constraints on the development of a market for
remote sensing products in developing countries take the
form of political concerns and institutional limit__tions.
5.1 DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
The operational use of Landsat remote sensing data is not
constrained so much by technical concerns as it is by man-
power, institutional and equipment factors. 	 It is in the
routine use of data, not its collection,
	
that the opera-
tional use of remote sensing data meets its toughest test.42
Therefore, there is a need to understand what internal insi-
tutional ind technological capabilities exist in a given
country, and what type of interpretation and analysis proce-
dures will best serve a developing country's needs. In
other words, one must understand the users present institu-
tional environment to successfully build a user market in
developing countries.	 A recent survey" (the Wallender
report) of technology transfer cases developed a useful typ-
42 NAS Study, op. cit., pg 117.
43 Wallender, Harvey, et. al., Technology Transfer and Man-
agement in Developing Countries, Ballinger Publishing
Co., Cambridge, Mass., see Ch. 3.
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ology of user environments in dovelopinq countries 	 this
typolo g y is summarized in Table 1,
TABLE 1
Development and Infrastructure
Stage? Of Tevchnological Ob3octives or Goals Witkin Each
Povolopment in Dovolopinq St.ago That Must Be Achieved





l.	 Orclanizeation	 Dove>lopnlent 1.	 Building	 an	 initial
institutional structure.
2.	 Building can internal 	 problem
solving and diagnostic
planning capability.




5.	 Tochnology Application and
use in decision making.
3.	 M:aI lit, onanco G.	 Maintaining and modifying
:and ModI f IC3 t  1011 tochnological and decision
makinq structures as now
tochnologios and problems
arise.
•1. fioso.are-h. Development and
1:11ca I not,r 1I1q 7. Pevolopment of internal
technological capabilities.
S.	 Spr y?adinq tocilnoloRy to
other sectors of the
country.
W11at tho Weallondor report suggests 1s that prior to building
n sol f support Intl 111:1rket	 for l•cantisat	 data 11 1 developinq
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countries, an institutional framework to support the use of
Landsat is essential. Transferring or selling technology to
end-users does little to help them achieve the objectives of
organization development (stage 1) or technology search and
acquisition (stage 2), and may in fact retard their movement
toward self-reliance in maintenance and modification of
technology and in RED (Stages 3 and 4). The point is that
many international technology transfer projects have overem-
phasized technology (useful in stages 3 or 4) and have
failed to build an infrastructure or internal organization
to support continued use of Landsat data. 44 The Wallender
study concluded that efforts to build the technical capabil-
ities associated with stages 3 and 4 will fail unless the
objectives of stages 1 and 2 have been realized. Hence
critical to the development of a self-supported Landsat mar-
ket in developing countries is the development of indigenous
institutional and technological capabilities.
5.2 INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
From the Wallander typology, we can see that prior even to
the development of the capability to identify problems and
to search for appropriate solutions is the need for organi-
zational development.	 This stage includes the building of
° Craib, Op. Cit. , 1973, pg. 290.
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an initial organizational structure, and the development of
an internal problem solving and diagnostic planning capabil-
ity. These two features of development may be thought of as
the major institutional and manpower constraints on techno-
logical development. In the development of a long term mar-
ket for Landsat products in developing countries, these two
constraints must be overcome and effective strategies for
overcoming them may rely little or not at all on applica-
tions of Landsat technology.
Because one Landsat scene can be used by many interested
parties, including hydrologists, geologists, soils scien-
tists, agricultural specialists, physical planners, geogra-
phers, there are economies of scale in promoting multiple
uses of Landsat data. According to the National Academy of
Sciences, "the more numerous and diversified the users of
remote sensing are, the more economically feasible it is for
a country to sustain a national analysis capability." as As
such, with the interdisciplinary nature of development plan-
ning coupled with the technology's demand for interdiscipli-
nary skills, the generation of organizational structures to
effectively house such activities is crucial. Also, with
limited manpower and budgetary resources, a focused resource
information effort is needed. There are many ways of
M5 NAS Study, op. cit., pg 125.
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coordinating such activity,	 depending	 on the country
involved, its needs, resources, and political situation.46
Hence for the development of a long term market, the devel-
opment of an organizational infrastructure is critical. As
with any technology transfer project in this or any other
country, the user must be trained to stand on his own once
the transfer agent has finished his job. 	 In this case the
transfer agent, be it the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID) or some private consulting firm, will not
succeed until the developing country has developed an inter-
nal organization that can decide on its own to use Landsat
products and Landsat technology.	 This is where a potential
market will be transformed into a viable market. In other
words, a market requires demand pull as well as technology
push. Foreign aid spent on transferring technology might be
better
	
spent in	 the	 development	 of an	 instituti-
naliorganizational infrastructure conducive to using remote
sensing data. Without successful technology transfer
efforts which start at stage 1 in the technology development
typology, market building is likely to fail.
46 See ERIM Symposium, Vol 12, for a review of many national
remote sensing programs. Appendix F reviews some of the
various methods used to coordinate national remote sens-
ing programs.
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5.3 M "FAMILIA=\	 WITH TECHNOLOGY" CONSTRAINT
Closely related to the development of an effective organiza-
tional context is the need to thoroughly familiarize the
users of the technology with the technology itself and its
value for helping them perform their work. This primarily
means training people and coordinating manpower and equip-
ment.	 Generally there are two types of training: 	 general
and in-depth.
General training includes a balanced exposure to scientists
and policy makers of what the technology is and what its
limitations and advantages are. This type of exposure is
essential to starting a country on a road toward the adop-
tion of the technology.	 It usually proceeds a more formal,
in-depth training stage.
In-depth training involves coupling the training of special-
ists in the fields to be explored (water resources. geology,
etc.) with training in the interpretation of remotely sensed
data. This process may be quite extensive and take several
years. Such training is currently available from the devel-
oped countries and one concern of the developing nations is
continued access to training programs and facilities.
In developing a long term market--in creating both the
1
organizational infrastructure and internal problem-solving
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capability--long -term, intensive training programs will have
to be implemented. If this area is treated in a haphazard
manner, the potential for developing Landsat users will be
severely hampered. In discussions with Dr. Charles Poulton,
former head of the remote sensing laboratory at Oregon
State, and consultant at various times to U.S. AID and NASA,
I was told of the importance of training programs which
were intensive, hands-on, and long term enough to allow the
individuals involved enough time to develop the confidence
to "stand-alone." In his opinion this was one of the most,
if not the most,	 critical step in building a market for
Landsat data products.
One particularly successful training program has been devel-
oped between the Laboratory for Applicatons of Remote Sens-
ing (LARS) at Purdue University and Bolivia." As a result
117 This program includes the following features:
1. Short Courses: A one week long course on the fun-
damentals of remote sensing.
2. Mini-courses: A series of modularized auto-tuto-
rial units containing a broad range of sensing
subjects that can be used in a variety of learning
situations by students with diverse backgrounds.
3. Remote Terminal Network: Direct access to the
LARS processirg system is also available through
remote termira .s. A seven unit educational pack-
age usable from remote terminals is available for
user training:
4. Visiting Scientists: A specialised course, vary-
ing from subject to subject, which offers in-depth
training in various applications or scientific
areas.
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of this program, Bolivia now has a trained set of scientists
who can perform their own analysis of Landsat data using
sophisticated U.S. data processing equipment in their home
country.•,
The conclusions of this section are straightforward. The
development of an effective market for Landsat products ana
tech n ology will rely on effective technology transfer that
encourages developing countries to adopt Landsat technology.
Such technology transfer wi:l be successful only if it
assists in the development of an effective organizational
context.49
10 Bartolucci and Brockman, Second Symposium, op. cit., pg.
-58.
49 One firm, Resources Development Associates (RDA), aa,ring
undertaken many projects in developing countries., has
developed a multi--stage technology transfer procesa which
includes
1. Identification of user information needs;
2. Demonstration projects which determine the most
of-Fective technological approach for obtaining the
required resource surveys;
3. A pilot project which develops an internal opera-
tional capability and the information base respon-
sive to the country's needs and its capabilities
to operate and maintain that information base;
4. Implementation--thc development of a national pro-
ject to conduct resource information surveys and
aid decision makers.
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However, the adoption of Landsat technology in developing
countries also depends on political factors. It is to these
factors that I now turn.
5.4 POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 0 IM = QE LANDSAT DAT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
There are three main areas of political and legal concern
that shape the development of a market in both developed and
developing countries. First, sovereignty issues: here there
are two foci, the question of whether a nation may engage in
remote sensing of the territory of another nation without
that nations consent; and the question of whether the sens-
ing nation has the right to transmit data generated from the
observation of the territory of one nation to a third nation
wit!-out the consent of the country sensed. Second, economic
issues:	 will resource information be used to the detriment
of the countries being sensed; i.e., 	 will multi-national
corporations be able to further exploit a country's
resources to the detriment of that country's development
goals? Third, dependence and accountability issues: devel-
See "An Assessment of Resource Inventory and Environmen-
tal Problem-- in Costa Rica", Craib, 3/77, and "Design of
s Natural Resource Inventory for Costa Rica, Pilot Pro-
ject Report, 6/79, and Agricultural Resource Inventory
and Base Mapping program in Sri Lanka: A Program Assess-
ment and Evaluation", Craib and Cain, 11/76, (Los Altos,
Ca., RDA).
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oiling countries are reluctant to have to rely nn a single
source for critical data. They are also concerned about who
will be accountable for the reliability and continuity of
the uata. Here. I believe, are the most important issues to
be encountered. How can developing countries avoid further
and deeper dependence relations with developed countries,
and at the same time assure themselves continued access to
re:iable and complete data?so
5.5 THE ISSUES OF SOVEIREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION
There are two primary sovereignty issues discussed through-
out the legal ail,± political debate in the United Nations
over the development of remote sensing regulations. First
is the desire of the developing countries to control the
Qensing of their territory. A set of draft principles which
Argentina and Brazil jointly submitted to the U.N. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the UN states "that
states shall refrain from sensing the natural resources of
--------------------
50 Before delving into these issues, one caveat is in order.
Th.:vughout this policy discussion, it is essential to
remember, that while much t-ilk goes on, the U.S. through
Landsat 3,	 continues to sense the entire world and to
make that data available to all countries. This should
b© kept in mind because many developing countries have
shown that the use of Landsat to gather resource informa-
tion, with all of its question marks and political haz-
ards, is better than no information at all. 	 By buying
the data at this point, they are undercutting their pri-
mary bargaining chip,	 which is the witholdinS of their
market from the U.S. companies.
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aanotlit:r state wt thout consent . " S I This issues is largely aca-
demic.	 l.andsa: tHChnolotly is not bounded by the the rela-
t ivoly rovont demaareaatlon of state boundrios drawn on the
Earth. and to dovolop a sensor that could conform to such a
damaand would be prohibitively expensive. 	 In any case. this
move► has boon droppod.
`ocond. many countries desires control over the dissemination
of &at.a obtainod about their country from remote sensing.
This issuo is they nexus of the argument in the UN debate:
and a prohibition against open dissemination without consent
is eontaintid in the Argeaatinailiraazil draft. and also in the
F'ronch 'l:us!: ,
 an sot of draft principles regarding control of
romoto %onsing from spaces. `=
Concern over dissominaation stems from V.o fact that "nations
seam to feear the economic imperialism of the technologically
doi°talopod countries. particularly with regard to exploita-
taon of 1. ntisaat discovered and hitherto hidden rosourct
the	 of which might be unlcnawn to a developing
coi+niry. "" viis fear is quost:ionad oil
	 grounds:
` i Stio 11. S.	 Working Vapor. 	 "12omoto `:ansinh of the Natural
Envirnomont cif the Earth from Outer Space". UN Document
A• A C . 10!, C.:?/L. 103 t 1`3731 .
soo ON Document A.'AC. 1, 1047 (Oct 15. 1974). Articlo IX of
L.oatin
	
Amt+ricaa Uraaft	 Tronty.	 Wit 110)
	 pr►-;itions on
	 this
issue+ linvo shiftt+d. it is still a mayor point for dahavo.
' j . J.
	 Hahn.	 Toward a lZogimo For Control of
l:t+mote ►
 Sons i iig from Outer Space".	 in L'AmrI13l Q1 laitt' ixi-
43
VOI UMt
	 I I . 1'-1KI	 IV.A.I	 '1;1`)
First •	
%I 
o VO 1011 111q countries are, onterinq into
mataro. tllittltally tionotlrlal TOS011rcul ONpltoltatloll
rolationshups with lovot41il Intclosts. without tt,r_
swoarltlg thou rights to silrh ultImato saitcttons
as 
 tlatl vs nraliltion ►and 'or proprlatio.l. Socond.
tho plll'slcal control of I-w ourcos and t,t Accos% to
rosourt-o %I to on art/ tho t rtttnp cards. not possession
of	 t till tatIvo and t tit voratIv,d data.	 Tit ird.	 as
dove IopInq votintrIos. acgltlre t Ito lr own rtom,,to
.oils 11141 uxpar t 1,:o .
	
who t for t nd i (jonous or procurod
from olitsido consultant-S. the mar41111 of informa-
t1on 0.11sadvantatlo can lt+so a good monstivo of Its
':111111 f irallret. ,
Tho posItIoil of countrlos dostrinq a rostrictod dissominta-
t loll pol Icy rums dl roc t ly c-ountor to the U. S. position.
which Is contorod around tlua dinsomination of rwmotea sonslnq
dicta to :all intorestod p:arttos "oil all ogxtxtable. timely and
non dt .crlminatory basis. " Tho t). S. further arques that
tho Iin tit's ttlon of disr:om11144t1011 limits would undormino twa
of tho most loll+ Irtant bonof i is of sate+l l i to remote sensing
-- the+ 11 ro .1 d synoptic view of mitt ti-naattonal ronourcos and
the dcavolopment of global InonItorInq Thea U.S.
be IIvvv% tll:at support of a restrlctod dissemination rt3glme-*
lleglovfs to Consider t11A "tremendous benotlts of remote
so11V%inq 'and the. fact that oXplol tat toll rnlillot really tal:o
tuial Law alid EQQII ,nxQn. no. 3. 1 4175. pq 4411.
NAS Study. op. c • 1 t . . pq 14'7 - 1411.
` c Hosoitball Spooc-It to ttte AmoI- ICn l3:al • Associ:ata con . 	 11,11 73.
In Hood. Kimball and Kay. A l• 1tA1 t11 Earth Qbzic'rvati<,n S y s-
tem E"r Earth	 and rrozivect*• tAmor1-
rail	 ov14 1 t.y of lntolit.%tlorlta1 Law. Wa5111 ►l(Itoil 1). C. 	 1'17:1.
tit)	 !1 1 .
NA`:. op. r it .. pq 14'7 .
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place wiLl ► OUt the knowledge and effective cooperation of the
country in which the resources lie. "S7
For some U.S. decision makers, however, concerns over disse-
mination impede the development of a global information sys-
tem. 59 These concerns also lay the base for international
pressures/demands on U.S. decision makers. This presents a
policy dilemma for U.S. decision makers. On the one hand,
in the U.S., the position is taken that the U.S. government
ought to take the lead in establishing remote sensing
resource information as an international public good--taking
the information out of the hands of large U.S. companies
that might utilize such data/information. 59 In fact, this
position may well be in accordance with U.S. domestic policy
which allows open access to the data--and an open interna-
tional dissemination system would simply extend the domestic
system. On the other hand, the private sector--if it is to
become involved in the ownership of the system--will likely
apply for some rights to the data, either through an exten-
sion of copyright laws or by making the data somehow pro-
prietary. in order to make the system profitable.	 While
this would not directly violate the open dissemination
57 Hosenball Speech, pg. 50.
Se These include, among others, Senator Stevenson of Illi-
nois, and Howard Kurtz. See next footnote.
59 Kurtz, "Remote Sensing of Environment. An Interdisc_pli-
nary Journal, Vol G, Number 2, Editorial.
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policy, it would make it harder and more expensive to use
Landsat.
Generally then,	 within the U.S.,	 policy makers are con-
fronted with competing goals; first, for a government run
global information system; and second, for a private sector
dissemination system which will increase prices and encour-
age the use of Landsat data for economic gain. These com-
peting goals interlock with the developing countries desire
for reliability and continuity of data, which are free from
political pressures. Here too, is a policy paradox. To
avoid economic exploitation the elites of developing coun-
tries and of the U.S. may want governments involved in regu-
lating the dissemination of information and its use; but to
avoid political exploitation of developing countries,
greater authority and control for the operation of the Land-
sat system should be located in the private sector, 60 or in
some international organization.
60 This is not to say, unfortunately, that the private sec-
tor wouldn't use Landsat to politically exploit develop-
ing countries, however the fear is that they will use the
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5.6 THE ISSUES OF DEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The issues of dependence and accountability will probably
gain importance and move to the center of the policy stage
as the Landsat technology and market matures. The issue of
dependence is clearly stated as follows:
Should remote sensing technology fulfill it prom-
ise, it will become indispensable for many coun-
tries.	 User nations will have made significant
investments in facilities of various kinds. They
will have geared their data gathering and decision
making processes, both in the public and private
sectors,	 to the peculiar characteristics and
assured availability of satellite imagery. Their
interest in the stability and continuity of the
service on which their domestic systems will have
come to rely will consequently be considerable.61
The impact that this issue has on the development of a
remote sensing market in developing countries is tied up
with the notion of international dependency. Most third
world nations do not want, for political and practical rea-
sons to become dependent on one source of resource informa-
tion vital to their national planning--particularly a source
over which they have no control. As dependence increases,
the demand for a voice in the planning of the system will
grow. While in the short run the U.S. is in a dominant pos-
ition, the development of competitors in Japan and France
could dilute the U.S. hold on the market for remotely sensed
data. If the U.S. doesn't consider the needs of developing
countries,	 and assure continuity and reliability of the
61 NAS Study, op. cit., pgs 149-150.
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data. then when alternative sources become available--the
likelihood of a decreased U.S. market share increases.
The question of accountability suggests to some policy mak-
ers that the U.S. should acknowledge its use of space to
obtain resource information as the use of a "public commons"
for the purpose of obtaining a "public good." The use of an
international commons is to avail oneself tt sa public good.
Here. the international community view is th>;. ^n the use of
such a commons. a nation should be accountable not only to
itself but to the interests of the larger world community.
This issuo of accountability. it seems to me, is much like
the dependence issue. If developing countries demand a par-
ticipatory role in the development of a remote sensing sys-
tem. then by that simple fact they will have taken part in
the collective exploitation of the international commons,
and the issue of accountability will be easier to confront.
Whiles at first blush this seems to be consistent with the
U.S. policy of developing space for the benefit of all man-
kind. it unfortunately runs into the problem of enticing the
U.S. private sector to participate in the development of an
oportional system. For if the research and development. and
the market development that an operational system demands
are dictated by international actors the ability to make a
profit could bolo impaired as the private sector is unlikely
- 40 -
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to want to be held accountable to the desires of interna-
tional actors. This position also overlooks the tremendous
money spent by the U.S. to make the exploitation of the com-
mons possible in the first place.
In general then, while the U.S.	 has a monopoly at present
over the technology of remote sensing from space, and only
naturally wants to exploit that monopoly, 	 the developing
countries (representing part of n viable market) wish some
say in the development of an operational system. 	 While the
monopolist, in general, 	 has to worry less than the small
competitor about user demands--in the case of Landsat this
may not hold.
	
First, the technological monopoly is likely
to be short-term: and second,
	
the market monopoly assumes
that a market exists to be monopolized. If the technology
does not meet the needs of the user, the user might not buy
what the technology has to offer, and the monopoly will have
nothing to monopolize.
The idea is the same as before: the U.S., in building a via-
ble market in developing countries, must take into consider-
ation, to some extent, the desires of the user--in this case
the developing world. To do this, the U.S. must try to
develop cooperative relationships, while at the same time
encouraging developing countries to adopt Landsat technol-
ogy.
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6. POLICY ISSUES AND TRADE OFFS
The primary issue facing American decision-makers throughout
the debate over an operational earth resource sensing system
is the type of government/industry relationship that will
come to own and operate that system. The market for Landsat
data and products is important to this issue because many of
the decisions on the pricing, timing and financial arrange-
ments for the operational system depend on that market.62
Unfortunately, a good market analysis has not yet been done.
The developing country market is an important potential mar-
ket, but is poorly understood. This final section under-
takes some tentative analysis of the impact of U.S. policy
decisions on the growth of that market.
In general, there are four goals guiding the development of
Landsat Policy. Two are international: the desire of some
U.S. policy makers to develop a global information system to
be used for peaceful purposes; and the desire of developing
countries to manage their own development. Two are domes-
tic: the need to revitalize the U.S. economy in an economi-
cally hostile world; and the desire to move the operational
Landsat system into the private sector.63
6z See PSIS and Issues and Options Paper.
63 see Introduction to this paper, pgs. 4-8.
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Three primary policy issues will be addressed from the
perspctive of these four goals; pricing, data ownership, and
system characteristics.
	 The issues are simply stated.
First, should the price of Landsat data be increased? If
so, how much and how fast? Second, who should own rights to
the data? The U.S. Government, the U.S. private sector, the
user, or some U.N. body?
	 Third, what type of system should
be flown? One with maximum technical sophistication and
highest cost, or a less sophisticated and cheaper system?
These three issues can now be analyzed in light of the four
policy goals just mentioned.
Policy I. Pricing: In general an increase in the price of
Landsat data and products will influence the international
factors negatively and the domestic factors positively (at
least in the short-term). (1) If a market price is charged
for Landsat data, fewer Landsat applications will be cost-
effective and this will dampen market growth. (2) An
increase in the price of data is essental to capitalizing on
the U.S. technological lead and encouraging private sector
participation in the operational system. Thus, while a
price increase is essential for private sector participation
it may dampen the market building process.
In the short-term the building of the user community may be
more important to the building of a long-term market than is
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capitalizing on a short-term market.	 Further, as competi-
tors come along,	 a high price might allow them to capture
some or all of the market.	 In general, in thinking about
the price of Landsat products, one ought to consider the
design of the system which will be extremely important in
determining which users are most likely to use the system,
and the sensitivity of those users to an increase in product
prices. Hence an understanding of the .aarkets sensitivity
to various system configurations and to price increases is
essential.
Policy II: Data Ownership: If data ownership is taken out
of the hands of the government and put into the hands of the
private sector, international objectives will be negatively
influenced and domestic objectives will be positively influ-
enced. (1) If the government gives the private sector data
ownership rights, the ideal of a global information system
will be unachievable. 	 Such a policy would make data pro-
prietary and not reproducible by and for everyone. While
proprietary rights are important if private sector partici-
pation, is to be encouraged, such rights discourage an open,
global system. (2) Generally, the building of a user market
would be hampered by making the data proprietary Rs the re-
use or reproduction of data might be made illegal (although
difficult to control).	 Developing countries who might be
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(although the government seems to regulate much interna-
tionst trade and technology transfer), may be wary of "eco-
nomic imperialism". (3) To bring the maximum return on
sales of Landsat data, ownership of the data and general
copyri1ht laws are seen (particularly by industry) as essen-
tial. A decision in this area should include an analysis of
whether a market exists that could support a private sector
enterprise (in the best of all possible worlds).	 If there
is a potentially viable market, then some form of data pro-
tection may be necessary.	 If no viable market exists. then
a redirection of the program toward the meeting of global
objectives might be in order. Finally, this question is
tied up with the pricing question, data ownership should not
be undertaken without raising the price of Landsat data.
Policy III:	 System Characteristics: 	 In general, the more
powerfu1 64 a system, the greater the positive impact on the
international objectives,	 and the more difficult it will
become (in the short run) to meet domestic objectives. (1)
The more powerful the sensing capabilties of the satellite,
the more useful it will be for global applications, and the
more important will become global coordination. (2) As
the satellite system becomes more powerful, it will meet
more and more user needs, thereby expanding the use of, and
14 Powerful referring to a system including maximum possible
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interest in the data. 	 By tailoring the system to user
needs, the users will be more likely to support the system.
(3)	 The cost of a powerful satellite becomes increasingly
expensive. As this occurs, the potential for recouping U.S.
investment, particulary in the next decade, becomes more
problematic. (4) An increase in the the systems power, and
hence in the systems cost, will make it harder to entice the
private sector into ownership of the system. In general a
powerful system is likely to generate a larger user commu-
nity and make it harder in the short-term to encourage pri-
vate sector participation. The U.S. should consider pursu-
ing a more ower*ul system for several reasons; first, if
they don't the French and :,apanese are likely to try and
take away whatever market exists in developing countries by
tailoring their systems to developing countries needs; sec-
ond, the U.S. is likely to fall technologically behind for-
eign competitors; and third, in the long run it is likely
that a more powerful satellite will be essential to the
building of a viable market, as it will be usable throughout
the development project cycle, and hence, for more repeti-
tive uses.
Further issues can also be analyzed from this perspective.
My general conclusion is that the building of a viable mar-
ket in the short run, coupled with a strong R&D effort to
maintain U.S. leadership in this area will insure a viable
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situation for private sector participation in the long run.
Short run factors pushing for "market now" strategies may
hinder U.S. efforts to build global relations and to build a
viable market. Policy makers must now get a firm hold on
the market and its sensitivities to these various issues.
In particular,
	
I suggest the following areas for market
study:
1. The extent to which the present market is supported
by U.S. aid programs;
2. The probability that a viable market can be sustained
through the continuation of such aid;
3. The determination of the real value of information
from Landsat;
4. Market sensitivity to a projected four-fold increase
in Landsat products;
5. Market sensitivity to the use of and cost of digital
processing and interpretation techniques;
6. Market sensitivity to effective or non-existent user
training programs;
7. Market sensitivity to different configurations for
the operational satellite system;
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B. The potential for aggregating a user market in devel-
oping countries which will be of sufficient size to
help entices the private sector to take over some or
all of the development and ownership of the system.
This paper has been an effort,
	
in part, to understand the
special problemo inherent in developing a market for Landsat
data and products in developing countries. 	 Because of the
great potential in developing countries, because of the
importance to policy makers of understanding that market,
and because it is so poorly understood--this should be an
important item on the list of needed analysis for policy
makers.	 Only when this and in fact the entire Landsat mar-
ket is better understood, will policy makers be able to
undertake to design the appropriate private/public sector
interface for an operational Landsat system.
- 56 -
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Appendix A
RESOURCE INFORMATION AREAS
Briefly, some of the areas where increased resource informa-
tion is needed are:
1. Agriculture--the need for accurate estimates of crop
acreage and yields is critical to national and inter-
national agriculural planning. Land-use capability
maps will prove useful in making decisions regarding
what crops tc plant and where, irrigation and drain-
age. As such, soils maps, hydrologic maps, and gen-
eral terrain maps will be important in constructing
lan -use capability maps for agricultural plarining.6s
As an aside, goals for global agricultural surveys
might include:
a) A global survey of cultivated areas, agricultural
systems and crops to provide the statistical base
for planning agricultural development and informa-
tion for specific development projects, and to
keep such information up to date.
65 NAS, op. cit., pg 38.
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b) A survey of tropical Africa and South-east Asia of
shifting cultivation and within thoso - tho aroas
candor cultivation and fallow. and as far ns possi-
blo the age► classos of then fallow as a quido to
longthoning excessively short fallow poriods and
then resultant reduction of yiold. data to incrons-
ing population prossuro.
c) A global and dosort locust belt survdy to monitor
conditions.	 mainly of wonthor and veagotation,
potentially favorablo for tho dovolopmont of crop
post oplde)mlcs in ordor to improves thoir control
2.	 I:cangoland Man:agefmont--l:angealands area important con-
tributors to world-wido protoin food supplion as t1ty-y
furnish grasslands for feodinq of bovino. shoop. and
goat populations.	 Botwoon 40 and t;0 por cont of tho
earth's land mass is covored with rangelands.
	 Thoy
roprosent tho largost re,sorvoir of land available for
convorsion to moro direct human use+. s•
Howovor, duo to rangolnnd chnrac-teristics.
	 informa-
tion is and has boon difficult to obtain. "1'raae-ti-
eaally no information has. bel on :available► on rangal:and
conditions in dovolopanq rogions. "^ 7 one) nocessary
et• U!;or Noods. op. cit.. pq. 1!-.
Ibid. .	 p(j.	 17.
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component, then, for improving rangeland management
is the acquisition of information on when, how much.
and how long forage will be available.
However, this information should be in the
hands of range managers within about 10
days after it is acquired. Like most plant
systems. rangeland vegetation exhibits
rapid changes in ondition at certain sea-
sons of the yeii and livetock movement can
take appreciable time. Hence a need asso-
ciated wit'A Vie °fathering of rangeland data
is for the establishment of an effective
system for rapid dissemination of rangeland
information."'
Better range ma .1gement information will enable
a) more accurate determination of germination and
drying periods for planning movement of grazing
animals to or from annual grassland ranges:
b) predictions of the remaining length of the green
feed period made early enough to plan more effi-
ciently for alternative sources of livestock feed:
c) comparison of conditions and relative forage prod-
uction between grazing areas within a season, and
comparison of conditions and productivity for a
given area between seasons;
d) determination of the time when dry forage creates
a fire hazard to better allocate man and equipm:nt
for fire suppresion.
--------------------
68 Ibid., pg 17.
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3. Forest Management--Information is needed in monitor-
ing clear cutting of forest by developing countries,
mapping burn areas, monitoring logging and detection
of pests and diseases. In several developing coun-
tries the extent of deforestation has reached levels
far exceeding the calculations of the countries
involved. Since forests are an important national
and international resource, information about them
becomes all the more important in the face of present
inadequate information sources.
Management activities require information
on quantitative standing timber values,
patterns of stand structure and conditions,
and dynamic response of the forest.
	 How-
ever, traditional data acquisition and
processing procedures have generally been
inadequate, slow, and too costly to produce
the necessary information to meet current
and projected needs of forest managers.69
Forest resource inventory information is
generally needed in 1 to 10 year cycles for
forecasting forest trends and in the devel-
opment of ong-term national programs. How-




i) detection of stresses in forest vegetation
to permit remedial action before major dam-
age occurs:
ii) monitoring of forest harvesting progress,
particularly in remote areas of developing
countries:
iii) determining forest response to silviculture
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4. Water Resources Management--Since water is required
by all humans for irrigation, sanitation, power gen-
eration, and industrial processing, and the demands
for water in all these application areas is increas-
ing in the face of growing world populations and
increased demands for quality of life improvements,
water resources information is essential. "Efficient
water management may require a varied set of meteoro-
logical and hydrological data: the volume of runoff
and the variability of streamflows; the geological,
soil, and vegetation characteristics of watersheds,
possibly including data on the extent and depth of
high mountain snow; the area watered by irrigation;
and the rate of agriclutural use of water. 70 Improved
water management capabilities require:
a) maps of surface water bodies as small as several
hectares to determine water reserves;
b) mapping major river systems to determine their
spatial variation and the reasonability of stream
flow;
c) surveying and monitoring of surface conditions in
large watersheds;
70 Ibid. pg 17.
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d) mnpping of the extent of snow and ice-covered
arenas for runoff estimation;
of mapping of the extent and duration of flooded
areas as a basis for flood protection and land
capability assessment;
f) survoyinq of estuary and coastal hydrologic fea-
4
tures to determine dynamic water circulation pat-
terns and water turbidity;
q) surveying of surface features as a guide to
ground-water assessmc?nt . 7 '
Such information will enable improved water resource manngn-
ment in theso respocts:
i) improved regulation of roservoirs for effi-
cient hydropower generation, flood control.
and water supply on the basis of bettc±r
snowmelt and runoff prdiction;
ii) improved planning of regional water distrib-
ution based on better monitoring of surface
water amount and soil moisture;
•' lbid. pq 10.
- b .' -
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iii) better decisions regarding irrigation man-
agement for crops through improved knowledge
of water consumption and supplies;
iv) mora efficient	 and economic	 siting of
wells.'.
5. Minerals--Many parts of the world remain geologically
unexplored. As developing nations (and all nations
for that matter) become increasingly aware of the
importance of minerals for development, and aware
that they do not possess the detailed minerals maps
and information that developed countries do-- and as
they seek to assert their rights and ownership over
the development of minerals in their country, mineral
resource information becomes essential. v90logical
mapping and terrain studies are a first step toward
mineral exploration, and provide a base for better
resource investment decisions."
6. Energy--In an effort to cope with high and rising
prices of energy, information on alternative energy
sources is becomming critical. For example, the
potential for hydrologlectric and geothermal energy
NAS. op. cit. , pg 73
Smith.	 Willim."Landsat Applications in Less Developed
A r ty i s".	 1 11	 j, , _,Ln o f	 p 1 J1 c1	 ^^^ j71 1 c: k t I tj a	 f or M ]_ n t- r n
ps?p_atis?il. Strousberg.	 Fenn.. John Wiley and Sons,
19'?li.	 Iu7.	 :?7n.
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is/will be based largely on geologic and hydrological
data and such data only becomes available through
resource surveys. However, the primary thrusts of
applied geology have come where the discipline is
mature, the exploration area is accessible and the
cost of exploration is moderate.7%
Because of these factors a disproportionate percent-
age of the known mineral deposits are found in the
temperate and arid regions of the world. However,
there is no geological reason why economic mineral
deposits should not be present in the tropical
regions in the same relative abundance as else-
where.75
7. Cartography-- There is a general need for basic maps
fo- purposes of national and regional resource plan-
ning. This includes information on urban sprawl,
agricultural land withdrawl, siting or transportation
and power systems, etc.	 General mapping needs are
widespread:
Generally every agency within a Government
utilizes maps in one form or another for
resource inventories, land use planning and
control, urban area planning, energy devel-
opment and conservation, coastal zone and
wetlands management, environmental protec-
tion, etc.	 This is because Governments
--------------------
74 Ibid, pg. 285.
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cannot effectively function without precise
knowledge of the boundaries or the area
under their jurisdiction, the physical
characteristics of the country, the posi-
tion and size of urban areas, the communi-
cation network, etc.76
76 Ibid, pg. 13.
- 65 -




THE MAPPING POTENTIAL OF LANDSAT
The application of Landsat data and image interpretation to
many fields has begun to be demonstrated in developing coun-
tries. The actual utilization of the data to help make bet-
ter or different decisions is less well demonstrated, and in
fact more difficult--this question is taken up in part 2 of
this study. Here, I am more concerned with what types of
Landsat data can be produced and what their potential appli-
cability is; what is Landsats potental for solving resource
information problems in developing countries?
In general Landsat data can be used to prepare photomaps at
scales of 1:250,000 and smaller, particularly with
state-of-the-art processing techniques. Generally for prod-
uction of basic maps at scales of 1:500,000 and smaller,
Landsats 1 and 2 (and Landsat 3 is) were quite acceptable.
With advanced digital processing techniques larger scale
maps can be produced (up to 1:24,000), 	 but the level of
detailed information which can be drawn more these maps may
make them unusable for some applications. 	 What my research
has shown, is that it is generally impooiible to say whether
- 66 -
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or not Landsat can do this or do that apriori to knowing
what the problem is. For example, in some countries needing
general reconaissance surveys Landsat may turn out to be
inapp opriate because of the cloud cover. In another area
where detailed information is needed, advance ground proc-
essing capabilities may make Landsat data quita useful, par-
ticularly in simply structured resource areas. What follows
are some examples of what has been done with Landsat in
developing countries to date. The examples are meant to be
illustrative of the rich, however problem oriented, poten-
tial of Landsat.
Bolivia
1. The Institute Geografico Militar has prepared photo-
maps at scale 1:500,000 from Landsat frames. In
addition, an uncontrolled mosaic covering the whole
territory of Bolivia at scale 1:500,000 was produced
using 65 Landsat frames.
2. Three different government institutions are involved
in geologic studies using Landsat. Complete regional
geologic maps covering one third of the country at
1:250,000 have been developed. Using Landsat images,
the government was able to select a number of poten-
tial areas for oil exploration.
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3. The government has also completed a map of the drain-
age system in Bolivia at scale 1:1,000,000. It is
currently combining this information with geomorphi-
cal data and geological data in order to identify
areas of potential ground water accumulation;
4. Landsat imagery has also been used to produce a for-
est map of the country at scale 1:2,500,000. For
further details maps at scales 1:250,000 are now
being produced.
5. The government has done reconaissance soils s: . Is
at scales 1:250,000.
6. A comprehensive preparatory effort has been made to
define land cover and land use types corresponding to
the country's conditions. The result has been a land
cover land use map at scale 1:4,000,000.77
Australia
1. Landsat colour composites are being used in the com-
pilation of land-use maps at a scale 1:5,000,000 for
the preparatiom of an Atlas of Australian resources:
UN, "Report on the UN/FAO Regional Training Seminar on
the Applications of Remote Sensing from Satellite", La
Paz, Bolivia, 1977, A/AC.105i210, pg. 5.
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2. A complete set of Landsat aerial photomnps at a scale
1:500,000 covering the whole of the state of South
Australia has recently been completed. These maps
are intended for use in an ecolc,gical survey of that
state;
3. The Division of National Ma piling has also completed
photomaps of the ..ustralian Antarctic Territory d at
scales of 1:500,000 and
	
1:250,000 from Landsat
imagery. These maps cover the main areas of topo-
graphical interest such as coastlines and features
free of ice and snow. 7 a
4. r comprehensive land-use mapping program is underway,
intially to cove. the South-Eastern part of Austra-
lia.	 Three "a3perate overlays showing land cover,
land tenure, and land use are being compiled. False
colour Landsat images of Bands 4,5 and 7 have been
found to provide the degrei3 of detail needed to dis-
tinguish the different land cover patterns in most
cases.	 Where finer detail is required conventional
aerial photographs are used. "79
70 J.F. Ryan, "Applications of Remote Sensing in Australia",
ERIM Symposium, Vol :'l, op. cit., pg 47.
79 Ryan, Op. cit., pg 69.
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Argentina A number of projects were carried out in the prov-
ince of Santa Cruz, using Landsat images for soils and
actual land use studies as well as for economic and social
studies of the area influenced by the construction of a big
dam. For soils and geomorphological studies, Landsat
imagery at scale 1:500,000 proved to be best suited under
the topographic conditions existing in the Santa Cruz prov-
ince. a
Chile
Visual analysis of Landsat imagery at scale
1:500,000 and 1:1,000,000 was used in 1975 for the
inventory of natural resources in the regions of
Tarapaca and Antofagasta covering an area of
212,000 square kilometers. The geological inter-
pretation of the imagery resulted in the identifi-
cation of 10 areas with linear structures that
justify a detailed prospecti onf on the ground.
Geomorphologists identified 21 land forms each
composed of 35 material components. For the first
time vegetal associations could be mapped in these
regions, discriminating seven formations and their
respective subgroups. The interpretation of the
Landsat imagery also allowed the delineation of
several climatic zones and the separation of 43
watersheds.	 Pedologists were able to differenti-
ate 56 soil associations.B1
80 UN, "Applications of Remote Sensing from Satellite", op.
ci.t. , pg 7.
8 ' Ibid. , jig. B.
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Malaysia Land use mapping at scales 1:100,000 and 1:500,000
has been carried out. Using band 5 "broad land use delinea-
tions were possible and rice, rubber, mangrove, forest and
mixed agriculture were easily discernable. Band 5 gives
greater tonal differences in vegetation cover than the other
bands. 1182
Brazil
Fiat areas with thin forest cover were considered
to best suited for a transition into range land or
agriculutral land with the excepton of very wet or
swampy areas that had to be seperated out. The
selection of potential areas for the envisaged
land use transition was made after studying the
drainage pattern, the humidity and the density of
forest cover in Landsat images of band 5 and 7. "93
8i Salleh, Melid, "Remote Sensing Activities in Malaysia", in
ERIM Sympos i -i, vol 12, op.cit., pg 135.
83 UN, "Applications of Remote Sensing From Space", op.
cit., pg 7.
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Geologic Survey and Mineral -4j& Petroleum Exploration
On the basis of a rock-type classification map
produced by digital computer processing of Landsat
data, 30 prospect sites were chosen in a Pakistan
area. Out of the 19 sites visited, 5 yielded evi-
dence of surface mineralization, indicating the
possibility of an enriched zone of copper.88
Land Use--Urban andRegional Planning
Comparative analysis of two sets of Landsat scenes
covering the state of Orissa in India has yielded
a substantial volume of land-use information of
direct value to state resource managers and agri-
cultural planners. The earlier imagery were stud-
ied primarily to locate areas of present and
potential two-crop rice production, but also to
identify as many land-use categories as possible.
Indian soil technicians, foresters, and geolo-
gists, trained by a world bank team in interpret-
ing satellite imagery by field survey methods•
succeeded in recognizing about half of the thirty
categories sought. The two sets of Landsat scenes
highlighted the differences between dry and wet
season agricultural patterns and identified prom-
ising areas for conversion to irrigated two-crop
production. The Landsat data also indicated areas
suitable for dams of barrages showed the extent of
forest cutting in the 	 highlands and coastal
regions, provided a new base for checking the
accuracy of crop acreage estimates done by conven-
tinal means, and showed the changing course of the
Mahanade River and its tributaries from the time
of the last topo graphic mapping two or three dec-
ades earlier. 99
--------------------
87 E. Van Es, H. Gomez and R Soetern, "An Inundaton Study of
the Lower Magdalena-Cauca Basin" in Houston Symposium,
op. cit., 2295-2297.
ea NAS Study, op. cit. pg 77.
99 NAS study, op. cit., pg 79.
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Observe the advancing waterline in croplands during disas-
trous floods. Observe the start r f locust flights in agri-
cultural areas.
10-20 hours
Map progress of crops as an aid to crop identification using
"crop calendars" and to estimating date to begin harvesting
operations.
10-20 months
Facilitate annual inspection of crop rotation and of compli-
ance with federal requirements for benefit payments.
10-20 years
Observe growth and mortality rates in orchards.
20-100 years
Observe shifting cultivation patterns.
For Timber Stands
10-20 minutes
Detect the start of forest fires during periods when there
is a high "Fire Danger Rating."
10-20 hours
Map perimeter of on-going forest fires.
10-20 days
Detect start of insect outbreaks in timber stands.
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Facilitate annual inspection of fire-breaks.
10-20 years
Observe growth and mortality rates in timber stands.
20-100 years
Observe plant succession trends in the forest.
For Rangeland Forage
10-20 minutes
Detect the start of rangeland fires during periods when
there is a high "Fire Danger Rating."
10-20 hours
Map perimeter of on-going rangeland fires.
10-20 days
Update information on "Range Readiness" for grazing.
10-20 months
Facilitate annual inspection of fire-breaks.
10-20 years
Observe signs of range deterioration and study the spread of
noxious weeds.
20-100 years
Observe plant succession trends on rangelands.
For Other Vegetation (mainly shrubs)
10-20 minutes
Detect the start of brushfield fires during periods when
there is a high "Fire Danger Rating."
10-20 hours
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10-20 days
Update information on times of flowering and pollen
production in relation to the bee industry and to hay fever
problems.
10 - 2 (1 M—O Lt-1a
Facilitate inspection of fire-breaks.
,LQ-?-. 0 years
Observe changes in "Edge Effect" of brushfields that affect
suitability as wildlife habitat.
20-100 yeas
Observe plant succession trends in brushfields.
- 77 -
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Appendix E
SIMPLE VS. COMPLEX RESOURCE AREAS
Characteristics of simply structured versus complexly
structured areas in relation to natural resources.
Simply St I jAc t ured Areas
Aaricultu al %'cnelation
1. Fields large. regularly shaped. usually homogeneous
with respect to crop condition.
2. Few computing crops and cultural practices.
3. Little in +.orspersion of cropland with noneropland.
4. All fields of a given crop planted on about the same
date and hence developing in essentially the same
seasonal pattern.
1. Blocks of rangeland and forestland are large and rel-
atively homogeneous.
2. Elevational range is low to moderate and hence vecne-
tation -^f a given type tends to develop with essen-
tially tl.e same seasonal pattern.
- 79 -
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3. Few vegetation types present, all adapted to the same
elevational and climatic range.
4. Topography flat to gently rolling so that few vegeta-
tional differences are the result of differences in
slope and aspect.
5. Cultural practices with respect to range and timber
resources are few and uniform.
Geology, Soils, and Hydrology
1. Geologic, soil, and hydrologic formations are rela-
tively large, simple, discrete, and homogeneous.
Complexly Structured Areas
A. Agricultural Vegetation
1. Fields small, irregularly shaped, frequently hetero-
geneous with respect to crop condition.
2. Many competing crops and cultural practices.
3. Much interspersion of cropland with noncropland.
4. Fields of a given crop planted on many different
dates and hence developing with many different sea-
sonal patterns.
- 79 -
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B. Range and Forest Vpctetation
1. Blocks of rangeland and forectland are small and rel-
atively heterogeneous.
2. Elevational range is high to very high and hence veg-
etation of a given type tends to develop with many
different seasonal patterns.
3. Many vegetation types present, each adapted to a par-
ticular elevational and climatic range.
4. Topography steep so that many vegetational differ-
ences are the result of differences in slope and
aspect.
S. Cultural practices with respect to range and timber
resources are many and varied.
C. Geology, Soils, and Hwdrology
1. Geologic, soil, and hydrologic formations are rela-
tively small, complex, intermingled, and heterogene-
ous.
- 80 -
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Appendix F
METHODS FOR ORGANIZING NATIONAL REMOTE SENSING PROGRAMS
A first method involves the development of remote sensing
programs within an existing technical agency concerned pri-
marily with a particular resource.
In Argentina, the primary interest of the first
Landsat investigation has been to test space sens-
ing capability to determine acreage and conditions
of crops, especially wheat. The Ministry of Agri-
culture amd Livestock has established a remote
sensing opertion with an associated data process-
ing center capable of both manual and computer
processing Program plans include work in range
management, agriculutal land use maps, and mapping
of drainage networks.90
Secondly, in many countries remote sens.,ng programs have
centered themselves in a lead agency that showed early
interest in using Landsat data.
Brazil's highly advanced and well-equiped program
is lodged in the Natinat Institute of Space
Research. It operates a ground station which
records more than 350 Landsat images a day, pro-
vides data on agriculture and forestry to the Min-
istry of Agriculture, on geology to Ministry of
Mines and Energy, and on a broad range of subjects
to the Ministry of the Interior , all of which
contrib-te to the Institute's budget for these
services. Other clients now include private firms
and neighboring countries. The Institute has ties
with educational institutions and runs its own
seminars, workshops, and courses on remote sens-
ing. 9 1
--------------------
91 NAS Study, op. cit. pg . 125,126.
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Third, some countries have organized coordinating committees
to organize users and technical capabilities prior to the
establishment of a full-blown program.
The National Committee on Mineral Exploration and
Survey Operations in the Philipines has served as
a coordinating agency for remote sensing activi-
ties. The coordinating body includes several
bureaus including some out of the repartments of
Agriculture and Natural Resources,	 The Coast and
Geodetic Survey, The Air Force, and The University
of the Philipines. Thus far. this committee has
dealt with Landsat programs in the areas of geol-
ogy, land use, hydrology, cartography and mineral
exploration.9z
Finally so.,,- countries have simply developed new agencies to
organize and take responsibility for remote sensing activi-
ties.
The Indian Government established the National
Remote Sensing Agency in the Department of Science
and Technology in 1975. It has plans to orbit an
earth survey satellite with a return beam vidicon
sensor at some point in the future. Its goals are
to guide remote sensing research, maintain data
banks, publish research results, organize training
programs, and conduct resource surveys for use by
the countries development planners.93
91 NAS Study, pg 126.
9: ERIM Symposium, Vol 12, See pg 128-138.
93 ERIM Symposium, Vol 12, see pg. 43-53.
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OF POOR QUALITY




The previous paper, "Understanding the Landsat Market in De doping
Countries" discussed the potential Landsat market in developing coun-
tries. The discussion addressed Landsat in the context of four political
and economic goals constraining U.S. policy makers. These four goals--(1)
global development, (2) effective U.S. foreign policy, (3) domestic
economic growth, and (4) private sector involvement in an operational
remote sensing system--stem frG,% a mix of domestic, foreign policy and
international concerns. As an extension to that earlier study this paper
undertakes a political systems analysis which explicitly recognizes and
takes into account those oftan-competing goals.
To accomplish this task, and to illuminate the policy trade-offs
facing U.S. decision makers, this paper proceeds through three stages.
The first .::age briefly discusses Landsat as global technology, as a
driver of global interdependence and a harbinger of the types of issues
which are likely to populate policy agenda in the future. The second
stage reviews the historical development of Landsat policy, both domestic-
ally and internationally. Finally, a policy analysis framework is applied
to the historical interpretation laid out in the second stage.
.^.	 ^	 _^	 T TAT 1l,fT.7^
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LANDSAT: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Overview
An earlier work, "Understanding the Landsat Market in Developing
Countries" (Program in Information Policy, Report No. 30, November 1980),
discussed the potential Landsat market ;n developing countries. That dis-
cussion addressed Landsat in the context of four political and economic
goals constraining U.S. policy makers. These four goals--(1) global
development, (2) effective U.S. foreign policy, (3) domestic economic growth
and (4) private sector involvement in an operational remote sensing
system--stem from a mix of domestic, foreign policy and international
concerns. As an extension to that earlier study this paper will undertake a
political systems analysis which explicitly recognizes and takes into
account those often-competing goals.
To accomplish this task, and to illuminate the policy trade-offs facing
U.S. decision makers, this paper will proceed through three stages. The
first stage will briefly discuss Landsat as global technology, as a driver
of global interdependence and a harbinger of the types of issues wtlich are
likely to populate policy agenda in the future. Second, I will review the
historical development of Landsat policy, both domestically and interna-
tionally. Finally, I will apply a policy analysis framework to the
historical interpretation 1-id out in Part II. This will serve to illus-
trate the type of policy analysis I think is necessary for understanding
global technologies in an era of international interdependence.
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This paper will serve the reader in two ways. First, Part II can be
read for its historical value and whatever it adds to the readers under-
standing of this important technology. More importantly, I hope, the reader
will be able to take the framework of analysis and think constructively
about Landsat and other issues from a slightly different perspecti ,.e. If
this paper accomplishes these things then it will add to policy debate
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Part I. INTKODUCTION'
in 191e, the National Aeronautics and Jpace AdMinistration (NAJA)
launched the first earth resources technology satellite (EKTJ); an unmanned
satellite to provide information about the earths resources and environment
on a global basis. The LKT-', system ;later renamed the Landsat system) holds
great potential for providing widespread human benefits in the areas of
resource planning and exploration and environmental monitoring.
Landsat is a global technology, a technology whose technical aspects
and socioeconomi(- effects have a major transnational component. but which
is developed largely from a national base. Leonaru Jaffe explained its
technical side to the United Nations this :gay:
First, satellite sensors are riot capable of disti nguishing nationa l
boundaries. No nations are clearly demarcated, except island nations,
by natural features around their• entire perimeters.
^econo, as a technological matter. we do riot know how practically to
disentangle images taken by a remote sensing satellite on the basis of
political boundaries ... we do riot forsee the time when
comparUientali.:ing data processing on the basis of national boundaries
would be either economically feasible or technologically acceptable.
References will be listed in parenthesis following the appropriate
sentence. The first symbol (i.e.. C- ) refers to the appropriate reference
found in the "Sources Consulted" section at the end of this paper. The
second symbol ti.e.. p. 1) refers to a particular page, where appropriate.
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Third, the wide scope of the area covered by the satellite will in most
instances unavoidably entail the sensing of at least parts of several
countries. Technically we cannot now or in the foreseeable future
limit or shape the reception capability so that data would conform to
political boundaries (C-50. p. 4).
Landsat's global basis is also reflected it the bide range of
participants it the policy process--more explicitly the many parties who
must he taken into account in the policy process. Other examples of global
techologies include communications satellites, weather satellites,
internationa, data networks. seabed mining technologies. and international
transportation technologies.
The politics of global technologies are complex. The interests are
many. and the problems to be dealt with in developing policy on both the
national and international levels enormous. In developing policy on a
future operational earth resource sensing satellite system, it is not
surprising that the following range of interests must be considered:
Technical Interests
-
	 Remote Sensing provides the opportunity to learn a great deal about the
physi-.al aspects of the earth on a global and regional basis. Current





VOLUME II, PART IV A.2
-	 Landsat provides the gluual and regional information which could become
central to solving national and international resource and
environmental problems;
The continued improvement of remote sensing technology will spin off
technological improvements in other areas, including information
processing, interpretation techniques and forecasting models.
Public Interests
-	 Earth resource information derived from Landsat images can make
significant contributions to the functions of many Federal agencies in
areas as widespread as crops, weather, climate, geography, geology, map
making, land use planning and monitoring, environmental protection,
etc. The potential is for Landsat informatiun to make the jobs done by
the Federal Government cheaper and more effective.
-	 The broader public interest needs of the U.S., including the use of
Landsat data by state, local ana regional governments, and by
Universities for resource monitoring and compliance with Federal
environmental and other regulation, are many. The use of Landsat to
meet those demands at reasonable cost, and in an efficient manner, is
possible.
Private Sector Interests
-	 The use of Landsat data can be used to the advantage of U.S. industry
in many areas, particularly in the field of oil and mineral
exploration.
-5-
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With the potential for commercialization of remote sensing technology
and products, the U.S. is in a position to utilize its competitive
advantage in space technology. It is clearly in the U.S. interests to
maintain a technological lead in space technology and particularly in
remote sensing technologies, where some believe an enormous market will
develop.
The potential of Landsat pictures for contributing to the economic
growth of both the developed and developing world th rough appropriate
use in development planning and resource exploration is large.
U.S. International Interests
The use of satellite remote sensing data by many countries in the world
suggests that Landsat may be a positive tool for use in supporting U.S.
foreign policy efforts. Promises have been made by U.S. presidents to make
remote sensing data available to the developing countries along with
technical aid.
-	 The U.S. has pioneered the use of satellites for gathering resource
information. It is important to the prestige of the U.S. and its
ability to lead the international community that it maintain leadership
in space activities, particularly in areas of such tremendous human
applications potential.
-	 Landsat presents the U.S. with a tremendous opportunity to enhance its
position with the developing countries. In particular, in regards to
technology transfer, Landsat presents an opportunity to carry through
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Space has provided an area of a great deal of international
cooperation. It is generally in the U.S. interest to maintain that
cooperation. Also, many developing countries and other developed
countries have made substantial investments in ground equipment to be
used with Landsat. It would be in the general interest of the U.S. to
see the program through and not see the investments of those foreign
countries go to waste.
The development of international institutions to deal with global
problems has a long history. The Landsat system presents another area
in which international cooperation is important. It provides an
opportunity to innovate institutionally--to try and find workable
international arrangements for dealing with international issues.
Foreign Interests
-	
Many foreign countries, particularly developing countries, are now
using Landsat operationally for mapping and as an input development
planning processes. These countries strongly desire availability and
continuity of high quality data, while minimizing dependence on the
U.S.
-	 These same countries are concerned about sovereignty over national
resources and data about those resources. A restricted data
dissemination regime-2
 has been discussed.
1 Such a regime would impose restrictions on the sending of data gathered by
one country, about another, to a third party.
-7-
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-	 There is a concern that data from remote sensing satellites will be
used to help the developed countries economically exploit the
developing countries.
-	 There is a concern that space exploration will become overly
competitive. As such, some countries are pushing for a cooperative
international regime.
-	 Foreign countries are developing their own highly competitive systems
for remote sensing and will provide data and services competitive with
those offered by the U.S. They may also be looking for economic gain
from resource sensing satellites.
It is this set of domestic, foreign, and international interests which
give rise to the competing goals and issues facing U.S. policy makers. In
this paper I intend to look at the policy tradeoffs amongst the interests
outlines above.
Summary - Part I
The politics of Landsat, and of global technologies in general, are
complex. The interests involved are many and the problems to be dealt with
in developing both national and international policy difficult and
interconnected. Now can the complex and interdependent politics of global
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Part I I . AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
What follows is an interpretive history of the development of Landsat
policy. It proceeds through various stages--in both the national and
international realm--in an effort to suggest the trends and patterns which
will highlight in the analysis/evaluation which follows.
Stage 1: The Bureaucracy in Action: The Emergence of Landsat
The United States Civil Space Remote Sensing Program began in 19bO when
the first remote measurements of the earth by satellite were mace by the
Television Infrared Observation Satellite (BIROS-1); a meteorological
satellite launched as a precursor to todays operational weather statellite
system (C-13,6). "Activity in the earth's resources area within NASA dates
back to at least 1964 when the manned spacecraft center at Houston commenced
a program of aircraft flights to define possible sensor systems for remote
sensing use" (C-35). In 1964, NASA also set up a photographic advisory team
which recommended the flying of a metric camera to do base mapping.
However, the Department of Defense (DOD) liked the idea so much that it
disappeared behind the classified door (C-32, 362). However, it seems that
restrictions on military technology caused few problems for the developing
earth resource program because military technology was not well suited to
studying earth resources (C-6, 4). In the early 1960s with the U.S.
emphasizing a civilian spaLce program, separate from the military, with the
success of the first weather and communications satellites, and due "to the
fact that spy satellites were neither suitable or available, much of the
-9-
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impetus for Earth Observations Satellites for civilian purposes came from
early NASA manned programs and weather satellites" (C-6,5). It was,
however, in conjunction with the military, that initial spatial resolution
limits were decided upon (C-6,5).
At their inception, earth resources satellites were without a natural
constituency in the government or in the general public. Therefore, NASA,
being strictly an experimental agency, reached out to tie its program to
other, user-oriented agencies. In that same year, 1964, NASA moved $100,000
to the Department of Interior to undertake preliminary studies of satellite
potential for earth resource surveys; in 1' 1.5 similar funding was supplied
to the Department of Agriculture and the Naval Oceanographic Office (C-6,6;
C-15; C-31,30) while the total for all these studies was only $4UU,000
($100,000 in 64, $300,000 in 65) the cat was out of the bag (C-41, 669).
The door was now open for bureaucra*ic pressures to work to move the
program. However, an initial agreement was not forthcoming as the Interior
Department was particularly interested in spatial resolution and base
mapping, while the Agricultural Department concern was with automatic
spectral recognition (C-34,34); the ability to determine crop varieties
depends not so much on fine-grained pictures as it does on the ability to
show different spectral signatures. While both user agencies wanted a
smaller, less sophisticaed, operational satellite, NASA was interested in
flying a large, highly experimental satellite--in line with the 'manned'
emphasis of its overall programs. NASA added that a mapping camera would be
an operational system, and not NASA's responsibility (C-32,363). Uuring
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satellite--a small, a medium and a large orbit;-.g g irth resources orbiting
satellite. NASA dropped the small version from its studies until 1966 when
it was put buck into the study program under pressure from the user agencies
(C-34,34).
In 1966 the program gained momentum. NASA asked the Interior
Department's United States Geological Survey (USGS) to expand its support of
NASA's Earth Resources Program. The USGS went to the National Academy of
Sciences, National Research Council (C-41, 66a) which undertook a study on
the "Useful Applications of Earth Oriented Satellites." This study later
suggested that the Earth Resources Satellite would "have a revolutionary
impact on land management and environmental planning" (C-47). In fact, the
NAS study recommended the same thing as a NASA team which had been working
concurrently on feasibility studies.
In late spring of 1966, a Geographic and Cartographic applications
program was established at the USGS, through NASA (C-31,30). Two NASA
people were assigned to work with the program at the USGS and they managed
to convince the Director of the USGS, William Pecora, of the merits of earth
resources satellites. They also convinced him that it would be a good
political move for Interior to take the initiative. Pecora then convinced
then Secretary Udall to "launch the issue" (C-6,9-10). On September 21,
1966, Secretary of the Interior Udall announced the Earth Resources
Observation Satellite (EROS) program. He made every effort to make it an
Interior initiative by stating "that the Interior Department should be the
prime decision-making agency on the goals and execution of the program" and
that "NASA should supply the needed expertise in sensor and space flight
-11-
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engineering" (C-41, 66a; C-31, 3U; C-1,3). NASA quickly and angrily
responded that "before a fully worked out program to use operational systems
can be approved, a long period of experimental work must take place" (C-15,
C-1,5). However, during this time NASA bowed in part to this pressure by
moving responsibility for its own program, the Earth Resources Technology
Satellite (ERTS) program, from the Office of Manned Space Flight to the
Office of Space Science and Applications (C-1,5). This shifted the program
to the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), an applications, as opposed to
manned flight, center. This seemingly small bureaucratic shuffle was
actually very important as it brought ERTS out from under the Apollo
program. While this initially might have been detrimental (as I will point
out shortly), in the long run it enabled the program to attract supporters
and move forward under its own auspices.
The Interior Department continued to push. On October 21, 1966 it sent
to NASA its performance specifications for the satellite. They wanted an
operational system by 1969. NASA argued for an unhurried appraisal
(C-6,12-13;C-1,5). While these initial specifications were put forward only
as a straw man, when ERTS-1 eventually flew it met most or all of them.
NASA, through the GSFC, undertook a set of feasibility studies
regarding the use of unmanned spacecraft for earth resources experiments
(C-31,30). They later reported that such a satellite was not only feasible
but could be put into orbit in 1970 (C-1,5). On the basis of this study,
the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) prepared a program plan
which included a mapping imager and a multispectral imager. This plan
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Multi-Spectral Scdnner (I-ISS) and the Interior Department which pushed for a
Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) mapper (C-6,14). A compromise was reached to
include both as each agency wanted its own, small economical satellite, and
NASA wanted to test numerous sensor systems (C-6a,8; C-6,14).
In October of 1961 NASA submitted a $11 million new start in the Earth
Resources area; the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) completely rejected it. They
cited the following reasons: First. "an earth resources satellite may
actually cost more than other methods of providing the same benefits;"
second, "past studies have not adequately focused on the specific actions by
which satellite acquired data would be used to create savings and benefits;"
and third, that, "studies and plans should cover the organization and
systems involved" (C-15). One could look beyond this official response to
note pressures for keeping the budget down; experience with new projects
which promised a lot but delivered little; and because CIA and military
people working in OMB thought such a program would draw attention to U.S.
spy satellites (C-6a,11). In addition, NASA could be faulted for pushing a
new start instead of attaching the ERTS program to one of its already
accepted applications programs, as new starts always attract heavy budget
scrutiny (C-15).
As a brief sidelight to this tale of bureaucratic machinations, it is
useful to point out that international involvement had already begun. In
1966, in a letter from NASA Deputy Administrator Services to the President
Special Assistant Rostow, NASA outlined a rationale for pre-EFTS pilot
projects including foreign countries. This rationale included the support
of U.S. international policy objectives and an effort to generate interest
-13-
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in the program in foreign countries (C-32). In December of 1967 the
President of Indonesia asked the Secretary General of the United Nations,
U. Thant, to help expedite the program (C-31,30). In 1968 initial, aircraft
remote sensing projects were started with Mexico and Brazil (C-8,10). These
activities would br i ng the State Department and the Agency for International
Development into the bureaucratic scramble. Already, prior to the approval
even of a test satellite, international relations had begun to be joined to
the bureaucratic political machinations.
In sum, the slow evolution of ERTS was not a technical problem.
Instead it steimned far more from "budgetory constraints and bureaucratic
infighting" (C-1,2). Why was there such a delay? NASA had the ball but
had no quarterback (C-1,3). They were dominated by manned spaceflight
programs and saw little benefit in ERTS; believing that the Interior and
Agriculture departments would probably get the credit (C-1,11). In fact,
it wasn't until the moon shots ended, under pressure to pro6uce
earth-oriented applications, that NASA became an ERTS proponent. Then NASA
ran smack into the Office of Management and Budget (C-1,1).
Following the BOR rejection, Congress--in order to keep the program
from stalling completely--got into the act. Following Congressional
hearings in March 1968 on Earth Resources Survey Program requirements, the
Congress urged vigorous pursuit of the program (C-15). They were, contrary
to the BOB, willing to go ahead win the development of a system without a
clear idea of the future domestic or internation l institutional
arrangements which would accompany ±'ie technology-- given that it realized
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technology and allowing the institutions to catch up--or moving them ahead
simultaneously.
In response to Congressional prodding, the Earth Resources Survey
Program Review committee (ERSPRC)--including NASA, Agriculture, Interior,
Commerce, and the Navy--was estblished for interagency coordinating purposes
in July 1968. In February 1969 this committee approved final design
specifications for ERTS-1 and in May 1969 sent requests for proposals to
industry for doing the design work--General Electric and TRW won the design
study contracts (C-6,23; C-31,31).
At the Congressional Hearings for FY 1969 on the ERTS program, the
'private sector' testified that the program was +,chnically feasible
and ought to go ahead (C-15). In fact, one coii,,,a„y suggested that "... ERTS
can be readily derived from an existing flight proven satellite, with a
minimum of modification. This is almost an off-the-shelf technological
opportunity" (C-28,504).
Congress put $5 million into the FY 1970 budget for EROS (and for
sensor development) but "the OMB impounded $3.9 million of the allocated
funds and as 3 result the project ran into financial difficulties (C-13,
17). This eventually burdened the Interiors ability to provide high quality
M	 data from ERTS-1 (C-6,22). The OMB had set NASA up for a Catch-22. "It had
	 ,
to conduct only an experimental scientific project, but could justify it
only on the grounds of its eventual practical uses" (C-6,12). By holding
^^ck EROS funds, the OMB had made it particularly difficult to run
successful projects and generate the high cost-benefit iaturn the OMB
required.
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Finally, on July 15, 1970--after six years of debate--GE was awarded
the contract to design and build ERTS-A. It flew on July 23, 1972.
As the program got underway, experiments were needed to test the
satellite's usefulness. At this stage, NASA chose to fund hundreds of small
experiments and provide data to any serious experimenters who would provide
their results to NASA. In doing so NASA ended up reaching out to state and
local governments, universities, foreign countries and other ultimate users
(C-6,27). In all, 98 principal invstigators in 37 countries were selected
(C-8a,10). These experiments provided a base for a growing and positive
interest in satellite remote sensing, throu ghout the U.S. and the world. It
is these experimentors, in part, who would later shape the development of
Remote Sensing policy.
In sum, ERTS-1 represented a set of compromises; between a conservative
approach to the state of the art in the late 1960s ... i.e., tight budgetary
limitations, a relatively unfocused user community ... and concern over
international reaction to the general availability of high quality earth
resource survey imagery (C-9c, 162) and between NASA and the user agencies
involved (C-35).
Into The International Arena
In '-969, President Nixon formally introduced ERTS to the international
community. In the traditional spirit of the U.S. space program, he stated
that the ERTS "program will be dedicated to produce information not only for
the U.S. but also for the world community ... such an adventure belongs not




VOLUME II, PART IV.A.2
the same spirit of fraternal cooperation that has long been the hallmark of
the international community of science" (C-48, 301). On December 10, 1969
the U.S. ambassador to the UN, William Buffum, further elaborated U.S.
policy:
1. The U.S was "happy to offer technical guidance to member states
who may wish to pursue aircraft based sensing programs;"
2. The U.S. provided copies of the detailed descriptions of the earth
resource survey program;
3. The U.S. wcu-d expand NASA's international fellowship programs to
incl6ue remote sensing training at the university level;
4. The U.S. would provide briefings and exhibitions of earth
resources surveying techniques;
5. The U.S. would convene an international workshop on earth resource
survey systems to provide interested agencies of other nations an
opportunity to acquire substantive information about remote
sensing equipment, techniques, and applications; and
6. Would "invite international users to work with the U.S. as we
explore the best ways of approaching such technically difficult
matters as data processing, interpretation and dissemination"
(C-49; C-5, 60-62).
On December 16, 1969 the UN recognized the development of remote
sensing technology (UN 1; C-14,442). Within six months, the international
debate had begun; Argentina, on June 26, 1970, submitted a set of draft
principles toward an agreement on remote sensing (UN 2). This draft
highlighted the crucial issues of the right to collect and dissiminate
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resource information (UN 2, Art. 5,6; C-14,443). It also suggested that any
resource information data banks should be available to all countries with
special attention to the needs of developing countries. It further
emphasized the sovereign rights of states, especially their exclusive rights
over natural resources, which were to be governed solely by national laws
and regulations (C-9c, 27). While at the time of its submission, there
seemed little hope of its proposals being agreed upon, it provided the
impetus to begin working towards a treaty. The debate which followed took
place in the context of third world calls for a New International Order and
continued East-West conflict.
In the meeting of the UN Committee o,'i the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS) the various strategies of the countries debating the initial
stages of remote sensing issues as raised by Argentina began to emerge.
They centered around two primary thrusts. The one, an "operational" thrust
emphasized the development of the technology with attendent legal
regulations to be developed following the proof of technology. The
representative of the United Kingdom stated his countries belief (and the
U.S. position as well) in this approach: "We should now await decisions
concerning technical regulations whic' will govern remote sensing by
satellite before proceeding with consideration of associated political and
cultural problems" (UN 3, pv.86, 9/70, pg. 46). In this vein the U.S. also
issued an open invitation to foreign experimentors and through NASA offered
international workshops to acquaint foreign users with the technology and
its appl4cation potential. At the same time another position was
developing--an organizational approach, pushed by the Swedes and the
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Italians (see a/ac.105/c.l/Sr.2). The Swedish representative suggested that
the UN "should ultimately aim at a far-reaching internationalization of
earth resources satellites within the framework of the UN ... only in that
way can we hope to overcome national sensitivities concerning the use of
data-collecting earth resources satellites; and only in that way can we hope
to safeguard the principles of non-discrimination and free access to data,
which should be the basis for our deliberations on this topic" (p-e. 86, UN
3, 9/20, pg. 72). Here then a position develops which suggests that the
U.S. policy of open dissemination and equal access to the data is favorable,
but rather than let the technology evolve an organization ought to be se. up
to guarantee the "international i zation" of the data, and the protection of
states rights. While the USSR was largely silent in the 1970 meeting, the
position of the UAR foreshadowed the Soviet position which would serve as
the counterpoint to the US and UK position. The UAR representative stated
in 1970 that "in our view, the legal aspect of earth resource survey
saellites should, indeed, be considered in the light of the principle of the
sovereignty of state over their natural resources" (pv.86, pg. 101). While
this position was not as legalistic as the Soviet position would be, it
suggested the basis of the third position to develop in the UN--that of the
primacy of state soveriegnty which would lead to desires for legal
regulation and a prior consent regime.
In fact the Soviet position was not tar behind. At the 1971 meetings
of the UNCOPUOS the UN representative from the Soviet Union stated that
in addition to technical aspects," remote sensing of the earth
resources "... gives rise to many other political and economic problems. It
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involves above all, the matter of respect for the sovereign rights of
states. A state has the exclusive right to do what it deems fit with its
own natural resources and with information regarQ^ng them ... it is obvious
that the only lasting basis possible for the application of artificial earth
stellites to remotely survey the earth's resources must be grounded in large
scale international cooperation; its foundation must be strict legal
regulation of activities in space" (UN 3, pv. 100, Sept. 1-10, 972, p. 62).
Note that not only is state sovereignty over its own natural resources
emphasized, but also the sovereignty of a State over information about those
resources. This is taken a step forward to explicitly suggest a legalistic
approach to controlling the technology and its application. The dichotomy
of beliefs between sovereignty over information and an open dissemination
policy and their attendent approaches in the UN--that of a
legalistic/regulatory approach and an operational approach were now set in
place. A middle line of thought, represented by the Swedish among others,
was supported in 1971 by the French. They seemed to believe that access to
remote sensing systems should be kept as free as possible while preserving
the "maximum sovereignty for each country concerned" (UN 3, pv. 100,
9/1-10/72, pg. 29).
Meanwhile, the U.S. continued to report on the progress of its first
satellite, launched in July 1972. "As of mid-August [1971], 104
experimentors from 32 countries and 3 international organizations had
responded to" the U.S. open invitation to experimentors. Interest in the
program was clearly beginning to expand.
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In 1972, at the meetings of the UNCOPUOS, opposing positions seemed to
harden. The Soviets reaffirmed their position strongly: the legal problems
of remote sensin- satellites "arise from the absolute and exclusive right of
states to control their own natural resources and information about those
resources" (UN 3, pv. 111, 9/72, p. 27). "It is quite obvious that the only
sound basis for scientific cooperation in the use of satellites for remote
sensing of earth resources is the international legal regulation of
activities of states in the field" (UN 3, pv. 111, 9/72, p. 27). This
position was taken the next step by the Egyptian delegate. "To conform with
the principle of sovereignty, the consent of the state in question is
indispensible before the survey of its national resources by remote sensing
is started" (UN 3, pv. 115, 9/72, 7). This position was strongly supported
by the Arcintinian delegate (UN 3, pv. 113, 9/72, 56). The push for some
sort of legal regulation also seemed to be accepted fully by the Swedish
delegation which from the outset had "stressed the organizational and legal
aspects of remote sensing activities, namely the questions of who should
manage the technology and who should exploit its results." And questioning
their own previous policy of open dissemination and equal access, they
suggested that "it is a debatable question whether openness as such also
means that all have the same chance to utilitze the results of the
technology. The contrary may well be true, especially for countries with a
weak technological base and limited abilities to access and make use of
' International legal regulation refers to efforts to guide the development
and application of remote sensing technology usin, a legally binding treaty
or principles.
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information" (UN 3, pv. 111, 9/72, p. 46). The Swedes therefore tied the
issue of technical assistance to the U.S. policy of open dissemination.
They believed in open dissemination, as suggested earlier, but felt that an
organ-i zational/legal approach was the best way to achieve that end. This
contrasts with the U.S. approach as this approach was summed by the delegate
of the UK. He suggested that "we need not be in too much of a hurry to
examine the legal and organizational aspects of remote sensing. To do so
might result in our wasting time over problems which in practice will turn
out either to be nonexistent or very different from what we now imagine"
(pv. 114, 33). In other words let the te0nology develop a.nd let it govern
the legal and organizational forms that develop. This position was strongly
rebuffed by the Italians. Their delegate expressed surprise over the U.S.
and UK position. He reminded the committee of GA Resolution 277b (XXVI)
that stated that the working group on remote sensing would "make
recommendatiuns for possible development, provision and operation of remote
sensing data collection and utilization systems in the UN or other
international framework, taking into account the economic, social and legal
implications for the international community that might arise as a result of
selecting any particular system." This overview of the competing
perspectives set the tone for the UN efforts to develop legal draft
pr•i-ciplEs for remote sensing satellite. The effort to draft legal
principles was in some ways doomed to ultinate failure in that the U.S.
amongst others, lid not think they were necessary and pursued an operational
strategy in any Case.
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On April 18, 1973 the Soviet Union submitted "Model Draft Principles
Governing the Use of Space Technology by states for the Study of Earth
Resources" (A/AC-105/L.88). This Soviet draft, meant to signal the Soviet
position, reaffirmed the right of state sovereignty over its own natural
resources and suggested that any information obtained about a state should
be transmitted to that state without such information being made available
to third countries (C-9c,276; C-14,445). This is a position which the
Soviets have largely adhered to, with minor modifications, until the
present. In May, the French submitted "Draft Principle Governing Remote
Sensing from Outer Space (UN 5). This draft also reaffirmed a states right
t ,) permanent soveriegnty over its own resources. In addition, any state
being sensed was to be informed of that fact and it suggestd that
documentation on one country could not be transmitted to a third party
without that country's consent (C-9c, 276). In early February 1974, Brazil
joined the debate, submitting a "Treaty on Remote Sensig of Natural
Resources by Satellites" (UN 6). This treaty supports a prior consent
regime for both sensing and distribution of the data (UN 6, Art 3,7); it
supports participation by a sensed state in all sensing activities going on
over their country (UN 6, crt 7,8); and implores tr ,e technologically
advanced countries Lo aid the less developed countries in the use of this
new technology (UN 6, crt 9; C-14,446; C-9c,277). Tne Brazilian and
Argentinian drafts seemed to estblish the issue of legal overflight and to
insure prior consent from a country before pictures are taken (C-37,10).
In essence this broke the issues into two parts--data ac quisition and data
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dissemination. Data acquisition never amounted to much of an issue--it was
largely a moot point, and seemed to be covered under the Outer Space
Treaty. The real issue focused on what happens to the data once it is
obtained. In fact, a joint Soviet-French submission (UN 19) on May 27, 1974
largely ignored the data acquisition argument pushed by the developing
countries and focused on what has become the center of a restricted
dissemination regime. It suggsts that documentation resulting from remote
sensing activiti3s may not be communicated to a third party (UN 19, art 5),
except in the case of natural disasters and phenomena which can be
detrimental to the environment in general (;;N 19, art 5c; C-13,61-63). It
reinforces the principal of national sovereignty (UN 19, art 2) and the
"right of an over orbited nation to participate in experiments should it so
desire (UN 19, art 5). The emphasis is clearly on restricted dissemination
of the data and the full participation of sensed states. It does not
explicitly state that a state has rights to data obtained about its
resources. A joint Brazilia.n/Argentina effort submitted in October 1974,
"Treaty on Remote Sensing of Natural Resources by Means of Space Technology"
(UN 20), adds to the Soviet/French principles. It agrees that all sensed
states have the right to participate in all sensing activities and the
states have an exclusive right to exploit their own natural resources
(C-14,449; C-13,61-63). But it adds that states have a right to access to
all information obtained through sensing activities, prior to that data
being disseminated to a third party and that states have a right to
technical asistance (C-14.449; C-13,61-63). This treaty was supported by
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Mexico, Chile and Venezuala. In essence, developing countries were worried
about being left behind in an open dissemination regime because without the
technology and without technical expertise remote sensing data is useless.
Hence, they pushed hard for technical assistance--and technology transfer
(C-2i, 155) within a closed or restricted dissemination regime.
The push for a restricted or prior consent regime was not immediately
met with a counter proposal. In fact, the sharpest debate arose over the
question of legal aspects of remote sensing. Some delegations took the view
that there was a need for the elaboration of principles to govern the
activities of states engaged in remote sensing. Other delegations do "not
share this view" (UN 3, pv. 123, 6/28/73, p. 22).
The U.S. agreed that principles were not necessary. The Austrians
condemned the overly legalistic approach which postulate legal problems
before they have been well defined" (UN 3, pv. 132, 7/2/74, p. 32). At the
same time, a middle position--one pushing for continued work on technical
questions as well as legal questions--came to the fore. The Swedish
delegate suggested that organizational and legal studies should move along
together (UN 3, pv. 136, 7/5/74, p. 71-72). The Japanese, Brazilians,
British, French and Indians all agreed on this view (UN 3, pv. 136,
7/5/74). Finally, a thrust to pursue organizational aspects drew support.
The Swedes proposed to study organizational possibilities stating that if
applications were carr ; ad out "in full awareness of the political and legal
issues involved, sours of the problems might be solved automatically as the
organizational structure was put into place" (UN 4/SR 123, 1974, p. 55).
The Indians followed the Swedes, stating that while many legal questions
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must be worked out, there was no reason not to Ciscuss what steps to
immediately take (UN 4, SR 123, 1974). The Australian delegate thought that
a study of the implications of the var'ous organizational possibilities was
a good idea because it would then put the discussion of legal aspects in a
practical and realistic context. (UN 4, SR 123, 1974, p. 65).
This idea was rebuffed by third world and Eastern bloc countries. The
delegate of Brazil suggested that a study of organizational aspects "might
set i n motion an organizational process which would prejudge the study of
the legal questions related to remote sensing. ..." (UN 4, SR. 124, 1974,
p. 53). These two positions illustrated two trends which had emerged.
The first trend focused on the issue of data dissemination. Une side
accepted the principle of free collection and distribution of data; and the
other favored a more strictly controlled collection and distribution,
possibly subject to the agreement of sensed states.
That was the real crux of the problem. In order to meet the concerns
of those who wished to see such activities regulated in such a manner as to
protect the rights o` sensed states, some new -^echnologies would undoubtably
have to be devised, and at present there was some
uncertainty as to whether that was possible. Conversely in order to satisfy
those who would prefer remote sensing activities to develop in accordance
with the principles applied thus far, some new legal principles would have
to be adopted, and it was by no means certain that ate states were prepared
to change their laws to accommodate such a polio; (UPI 4/SR 1.23, 1974, p.
51).
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The second trend focused on the approach to be taken by the U.N. Tne
first would "give priority to the organizational aspects, in order to
facilitate the solution of the legal problems, and the second would settle
legal questions first so that the organizational problems could be solved
more easily" (UN 4/SR. 123, 1974, p. K).
In February 1975 the U.S. finally joined the debate. Bound in some
sense to support the legitimacy of the UN process, but opposed to any notion
of restricted dissemination, the U.S. submitted a working paper stating its
position (UN 7). This document affirms a U.S. open data dissemination
policy; but has no discussion of sovereignty questions or prior consent
regimes. It suggests that nations are welcome to participate in U.S.
training programs (C-26,26-30). The U.S. did not see any necessity for a
treaty in that the Outer Space Treaty covered remote sensing. This position
did not recognize the impact of dissemination of data on natural resources
and a state's national sovereignty.
On reviewing the remote sensing working group documents it is clear
that developing countries regarded the U.S. practice of open dissemination
of their natural resource information as a direct challenge to their
sovereign power over their own resources (C-37,216). A part of the
international debate then, turns on whether an interpretation of the Outer
Space Treaty would respect sovereignty over natural resource information and
thereby limit U.S. freedom to disseminate information without the consent of
the nations concerned" (C-13,47,48), or whether this position neglects "the
fact that exploitation cannot really take place without the knowledge and
effective cooperation of the country in which the resources lie" (Nosenball
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Speech, C-13,50). The question is clear. Is information about resources a
national resource? Does the principal'of state sovereignty extend to such
information? These questions tie into the complex problem of understanding
the impact of natural resources information on trade and resource
exploration negotiations.
Out of this international debate seven arenas of contention can be
discerned. These include 1) questions over international and/or regional
cooperation for peaceful purposes; 2) questions over sovereignty--both over
resources and information; 3) questions over state responsibility for remote
sensing activities regardless of whether it is a government or private
sector enterprise; 4) the question of access to data--should here be open
dissemination or prior consent; 5) authorization to use data--should it be
given by the sensed state; 6) what to do when disputes occur; and 7) what is
the role of the UN to be? (C-2b,26-30; C-37,10).
To briefly recapitulate: through the late 60's and early 70's,
domestic political activity was focused on the bureaucratic machinations of
launching the first ERTS satellite. The key issues focused on the
technology to be flown, whether or not ERTS would be a cost effective tool
and the potential international sensitivities to high quality, easily
available remote sensing data. International political activity during the
early 70s *Focused on efforts to develop some sari, of international regime to
guide the dissemination of data, the use of the data, the availability of
technical assistance, and the role of the UN. As ERTS-1, later renamed
Landsat-1, began to collect data it intensified the debate in the UN. As
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international debate into idle rhetoric. However, the debate was justified
in that the U.S. system was considered experimental and used experimental
radio frequencies. When the domestic debate shifted to the development of
an operational system that would use other frequencies, domestic and
international issues were joined, irrevocably linked in the policymaking
process.
Domestic Politics - An Operational System?
In 1974, two bills were introduced in the U.S. Congress - S.2350, the
"Earth Resources Survey Act of 1974" and S.3484, the "Earth Resources
Observation Administration"--to initiate an operational earth resources
remote sensing program in either NASA (S.2350) or The Uepartment of the
Interior (S.3484). The debate over these bills focused on three things.
First, the worth and potential of Landsat data. Here many university
experts were brought in to counter the OMB's charges that little rigorous
analysis had been done to understand the use and worth of such data (C-9,
C-11). Second, the debate focused on which agency should house the
operational Landsat program, NASA or Interior. Proponents for a
user-oriented approach favored Interior, those with a more interest in
advancing the technology and technological expertise favored NASA. Finally,
the domestic political question of an operational system was brought
together with the international debate. Dr. Franco Fiorco, then chairman of
the UN working group on remote sensing of the earth by satellite, stated
that while the international community was generally in agreement "on the
need of continuity in the supply of remote sensing data" it was experiencing
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wide "disagreement on the U.S. policy of 'free dissemination' of the data
acquired from space" (C-11, p. 226). Further, "many countries, and amongst
them some which are already beneficiaries of such a policy, have clearly
expressed their views that their acceptance of such policy in today's state
doesn't imply at all that they favor it for future operational systems ..."
(C-11, p. 2261. Moreover the Department of State was firmly against
enacting legislation to create an operational system. The U.S. had repeated
in the UN that no plan existed for an operational system. Therefore the
data dissemination regime applied largely to the experimental system. A
Department of State spokesman stated that "... we have consistently said
that our present data dissemination policy applies specifically to
experimental systems. We will have to face the specific question of whether
or not our dissemination policy will also apply to an operational system
..." (C-9,243), and continued that "if the U.S. were to declare-an
operational system the international community might conclude that the U.S.
was prejudging the proper means of using this technology while international
arrangements ... were still under consideration" (C-9, 284). To go a step
further, U.S. representatives had stated that "if a consensus should develop
in the UN ... expressing the view that the U.S. ought not to permit the
dissemination of country B's data to country C" the U.S. would "consider
ceasing that dissemination" (C-2f; C-2i).
the debate here was clear. Remote sensing satellites are inherently
international: Could the US develop an operational system nationally
without some sort of operational international system? And if it is an
international system by nature, does that imply that the question of whether
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.xperimental or operational was not really the question? The
real question was whether or not they (the UN countries) are going to play
an influential role in determining the worldwide use of the system (C-9,
293).
Several U.S. policy analysts have noted the importance of balancing
domestic and foreign policy considerations (Desther, Willard). In this
case, the domestic goals focused primarily on meeting the resource
information and environmental monitoring needs of the federal, state and
local governments. This pushed the U.S. toward an operational system.
U.S. foreign policy considerations included developing better international
relations with other nations through application of space technology to
their national problems; strengthening the UN and other international
organizations by including them; "minimizing the potential international
administrative, legal, regulatory, economic and political difficulties
arising from an operational earth resources sensing system; by early
involvement of individual national and international organizations" toward
the smooth transition from an experimental to an operational system; and the
removal of a contentious issue from world politics by opening up the program
to international participation (C-5,59; C-35). Responding to these foreign
policy objectives meant that "despite increasing foreign use and interest in
Landsat an emphasis on Landsat as an experimental rather than an operational
tool is recommended by foreign policy considerations" (C-9,282-83).
Up to this point private sector interests were not strongly engaged in
the debate. But already domestic goals and bureaucratic politics had been
joined to foreign policy considerations stemming from the international
debate taking place in the U.N.
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The U.N. Debate; Part II: Compromise and Stall
During the early 197Us the U.S. proceeded to build its international
constituency. As Landsat-1 and then Landsat-2 (launched in January 1975)
continued to monitor the earth, the U.S.--in an effort to develop better
global coverage and in the interests of international cooperation and
acceptance--began to spread ground receiving s-.ations around the globe.
Each station is made available under a bi-lateral agreement which provides
for making all data collected by a foreign ground station available on a
non-discriminatory basis to all users (C-8x,13). Such agreements were put
into effect with Canada in 1971 and again in March 1975; Italy in May 1974;
Zaire in January 1975; Chile in September 1975; Argentina in 1975; and
Brazil in May 1976. While many bilateral agreements have been signed,
including one with the Peoples Republic of China (NY Times, -16, 1/9/80),
perhaps the most important were with Argentina and Brazil. These two
countries "reversed their protectionist position and adopted the U.S. policy
of 'open data' agreeing to permit "unrestricted public availability of all
earth resources satellite data of areas within range of the (respective)
ground station" (C-13,441;C-14,60). [MOU-Brazilian Commission for Space
Activities and the U.S. NASA, 5/14/76 and MOU-Argentina, etc.] It is not
surprising then that Brazil, Chile and Argentina--the vanguard of the
developing world in the U.N. debate are no longer "dogmatic in asserting
their sovereign rights with respect to remotely sensed data" (C-12,10).
What had happened in the U.N. debate was that Brazil and Argentina, both of
-3L
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which had been advocates of some sort of prior consent and restrictive
dissemination regime, began to pursue principles instead of such a treaty."
At the same time Mexico, which endorsed the Latin American Uraft
Treaty. exprssed disappointment that the committee had abandoned the drive
for a draft treaty. It is written into the constitution of Mexico that the
'state' has the right to dispose of all data relating to its natural
resources. and has rights to all studies and expoloration regarding natural
resources. In order to meet their constitutional requirement the U.S. may
offer Mexico all data on its territory, thereby (hopefully) reversing
Mexico's present position (C-13. p. oo ).
The U.N. debate had changed comtplexion. It began with a debate over
the U.S policv of free overflight and open data dissemination. The prior
issue had never amounted to much. The second had been at the crux of the
debate. A consent regime developed, originally supported by the Soviet
Union. France, Canada. Sweden. Brazil, and Argentina (C-8a. 311-31).
However. the third world bloc retreated from this position. Sweden, which
now has a ground station has withdrawn its support (C-8a.3U.31). And
Canada. in the 197b meeting of the legal subcommittee, endorsed the policy
of open dissemination of data. However, Canada "proposed that processed
Information or analysis of imagery of a sensed state should be restricted to
access by the sensed state" (C-13.59, UN 8). This was an effort to
compromise between the open dissemination policy and the restricted regime
" A treaty would be legally binding intern4itional agreement; principles are
non-binding guidelines. They have also become less dogmatic about a
restricted dissemination regime (C-13. pp. 5b-57).
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iea--but would have been very difficult to enforce. Canada also signed a
ive year agreement with the U.S. in 1976 which, in part, guaranteed open,
m-discriminatory access to data taken by Canadian ground stations.
In March 1976, in the science and technology subcommittee, the Soviets
Abmitted a working paper proposing a breakdown of the data into 'global'
id 'local' data; global data to be freely disseminated, local data to be
distributed subject to internationally established legal principles
(UN 9;C-13,71). This paper, introducing the concept of a need for a
resolution cutoff point contained no definition of what that cutoff point
should be. It was to this question, in fact, that the debate now turned.
The Soviets (and the Eastern Bloc) found themselves suddenly isolated. And
a West German attempt at draft principles -eemed to reinforce that isolation
(UN 10). This set of principles was largely a compromise position,
emphasizing the promotion of economic and social progress in developing
countries (UN 10, article 6), emphasing the right of the sensed state to
participate in the estimates of the sensing state (UN 10, article 6), and
recognized the impracticality of a prior consent regime. But it did not
discuss soveriegnty (C-14,451,452). In fact the document asserted the
"American point of view that the issue of sovereignty is not germane to this
type of technology" (C-14,452). However, it did little to molify the fears
of the Soviet Union about military exploitation of the data and the fear
that the U.S. might, gain an important economic and/or diplomatic advantage.
In May 1976 on the heels of the German document, Mongolia submitted a
draft principle parroting the Soviet position on sovereignty over
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This drew a sharp response from the delegte of the United Kingdom, who
insisted that sovereignty over natural resources did not extend to
soveriegnty over information concerning those resources. This was in line
with the standard western position on the free flow of information 	 1
throughout the world (UN 12, sr. 263, 5/28/76, p. 7).
Also in May of 1976, a new development in the negotiations occurred.
India submitted a note confirming its intention to build its own satellite
and regional ground station, with the launch being done by the Soviet
Union. Because both the Soviet Union and India are opposed to an open
dissemination regime, this had the looks of starting up a competitive remote
sensing system. By inviting U.N. sponsorship of the ground station they
hoped to gain U.N. endorsement of a limited dissemination system. It seemed
that because agreement was beyond reach, international competition would now
begin (C-13,71-72).
In any case, by the end of the working session in May 1976, the U.N.
working group on remote sensing met and formulated the text of five draft
principles which were based on common elements of earlier draft treaties and
principles. These five included:
1. that remote sensing be carried out for the benefit of all mankind,
with special attention to the needs of the developing countries;
2. that remote sensing be carried out with respect for international
law;
3. that international cooperation was essential and to maximize
benefits should regional facilities ought to be considered.
4. that remote sensing should be used to protect the environment-, and
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5.	 that states participating in remote sensing shall make technical
assistance available to those wishing it, on mutually acceptable
terms. (UN 13, C-13,143; C-14,454).
However, no agreement could be reached on data and information
distribution policies. This was left for future work (UN 21, Annex
III,pp. 4-5). These 'agreed upon' principles did little to settle the
question of open dissemination and the sovereignty of the sensed state over
information pertaining to its natural resources.
On the other hand, the technical assistance principle is critical.
"The limiting factor ... in the use of this technology by developing
countries is the underdevelopment of their own information systems,
untrained people, and uninformed leaders ..." (C-17,86). In essence, this
training issue "seriously calls into question the twin premises of U.S.
policy that maximum dissemination assures maximum benefit and that equal
access guarantees that no one state will benefit to the disadvantage of
another" (C-37,201). And is it really an open dissemination system at all?
"Embedded within the complex technological realities of the entire remote
sensing operation is the fact that the multispectral data obtained from the
orbiting satellites are virtually useless to the untrained interpreter
lacking the proper computer hardware and facilities" (C-37,199). In fact,
the U.S. has developed a largely global system in line with its own policies
and desires. What seems to be the mode of obtaining acceptance of that
system is the trade-off of technical aid and international participation.
For those already using the system, the lack of a U.S. commitment to an
operational system kept them from using it more (C-17,91).
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A third phase in the 'international' debate began in February 1977.
The Soviet Union submitted a working paper regarding cooperation between the
Soviets and other states in remote sensing (UN 14). The Soviets wished to
affirm their "willingness to make available the achievements of Soviet Space
Science and Technology" (UN 4). The Soviets emphasized their desire to
cooperate with other states by making all data obtained by remote sensing
surveys available to them in the spirit of "equality in accordance with
international law with due regard to the unalienable right of states to
exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources including the
right to dispose of their natural resources and of information concerning
them" (UN 14). They further guaranteed restricted dissemination of data
with resolution better than 50 meters. So called global data, with
resolution greater than 50 meters had no guarantees on dissemination. And
nothing is said about the 'rights' of non-cooperating states (C-14,454-56).
This submission seem to signal the Soviet intention to establish a global
system competitive with the U.S., and a Soviet belief that little would be
accomplished in the U.N. to establish acceptable principles for guiding
remote sensing activities. As such, the international debate moved, in
part, from the realm of multi-lateral negotiations to the realm of
competition amongst national sytems, and the possibility for developing a
global regime was largely cragmented.
The Domestic Debate--Part III: Enter the Private Sector
On February 7, 1977, Senator Ford introduced the "Earth Resources and
Environmental Systems Act of 1977" (5.657). This bill would have directed
NASA to continue R&D and to establish the space segment of the system while
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the Interior Department established the data handling segment of the
system. In this bill, state and local government needs were to be taken
into account and the Director of the Office of Science and Techrnlogy Policy
was to "determine the benefits of participation or management by the private
sector in providing the products and services for the system ..." (S.657,
pg.8). A new wrinkle had been added to the bill--the possibility of private
sector involvement in the operation of the system--if not its ownership. In
the same year, President Carter reaffirmed a U.S. comnilment to
international cooperation in remote sensing--offering Landsat technology as
a component of U.S. foreign policy in a speech to the Organization of
American States (C-18,9). The establishment of an operational system,
again, was the focus of the domestic debate in 1977. However, it now took
on, in part, distinctly international importance. The chairman of the
UNCOPOUS (Ambassador Jankowitsch) testified that in fact "there is a growing
consensus in the international community on the need for a global
operational system of remote sensing satellite guaranteeing to users a
continuity of data within a specific time frame" (C-18,467). However, this
does not mean that the system can, necessarily, be set up on U.S. terms. He
further commented that the U.S. program is seen as experimental and as such
complaints about U.S. data dissemination policies had lessened. However, he
warned that "there may well be a different situation when remote sensing
systems become operational and ,equests for data are on a regular basis"
(C-18,469). While much of the demand for a restricted dissemination regime
seemed to have dissolved, the "... establishment of a U.S. program which
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international participation" might well reinvigorate demands for
international restrictions (C-18,518). As translated into U.S. policy and
plans, "other nations must have a voice in the structuring of the global
earth resource information systems that may be developed ultimately"
(C-18,9). This points to a major point of question in the debate over an
operational system and the extent of international involvement. "It can be
argued that remote sensing technology and information about earth resources
are valuable assets which should be closely controlled to protect the
technological lead and economic power of the U.S." However, "it can also be
argued that an international system would best serve the interests of the
U.S. on grounds that benefits accruing to other countries would result in
international goodwill which would more than offset short range U.S.
technological and economic losses" (C-24,18). In either case, while
technology transfer and the development of foreign expertise has mitigated
international concern over Landsat, and while international participation in
the U.S. program has created dependence on the U.S. program, there is also a
presumption in the international community that the U.S. program will
continue (C-18,518). As such, "any decision by the U.S. to establish an
operational resource sensing system will inevitably have international
consequences" (C-17,125). To proceed with an operational system,
particularly a domestic system, "would have significant influences on U.S.
relations with many foreign contries" and "should take fully into account
both the international cooperative programs" already developed and the role
of the U.S. system in the interest of an nternational system which the U.S.
or other countries might develop in the future (C-11,125; C-18,517).
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Whatever system is developeet, it must be remembered that fears of economic
exploitation have been dealt with largely "by providing and encouraging the
development of expertise in many areas of the world as well as providing
cpen access to the data" (C-18,510,519) and that U.S. diplomatic efforts
will be hurt by a protective U.S. policy. In a sense, "the integrity of the
U.S. commitment to assisting others in their own struggles for economic
development" is at stake (C-18,519). Put in these terms the issue of an
operational system--what had been a domestic policy question to start
with--is heavil.; constrained or impeded by international pressures as they
are translated into foreign policy considerations. In some sense the U.S.
is tied by its previous pol i cies encouraging technological aid and widespred
participat;on. These policies were successful in defusing initial
international sensitivity. To change those policies in 1977 would,
according to U.N. and Department of State representatives, have
reinvigorated international concern. While private sector considerations
challenged this policy NASA took "the position that at least the initial
receipt and preliminary processing and distribution of data in an
operational system should be handled by the U.S. government to ensure equal
treatment of all Landsat users" (C-24,18). Hence the debate began to take
shape on where and who should operate the operational system. From an
international viewpoint, the responsibility clearly resides with ;he
government.
State governments, in general, heartily agreed with this appraisal. In
fact they allied with it. "The Public Service aspects of this particular
enterprise and the sensitivity of international issues upon it make
-40-
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government control and regulation its natural path" (C-17,65). In fact on
several issues "public sector" and foreign policy considerations were in
consonance. One such issue was that of continuity. OMB had argued that
Landsat C' was not critical to continuation of the program while the
international community insisted that "continuity is vital to increasing the
demands of users from the developin g world" and that, as mentioned above--it
seemed tacitly understood that the U.S. program would continue. To back out
on a U.S. program which had generated a great deal of foreign investment
would not aid U.S. diplomatic or foreign policy efforts. The same is true
of state and local governments--who are concerned about continuity before
making further investments in Landsat equipment (C-17,126; C-13,281).
Another issue that arose was the matter of pricing and this ties into
the question of open dissemination. If one must be tained and rich to buy
the aata then freedom of information becomes freedom of the "well to do."
Thus, high price would discriminate against poorer developing countries and
probably rekindle restricted regime proposals (C-37,202). State and local
governments, the public service community, also die "not want to see the
inclusion of private industry causing )roduct prices to rise to unreasonable
levels" (C-17,287) as price increases "must be weighed against the limited
resources of local and state agency data uses" (C-18,107). And like the
international community, state and local users are insistent on a role in
the decision making process (C-18,107). However, over the issue of
dissemination, state and local governments favor open disseminatioi, with no
restric'ions whatsoever (C-17,207).
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It is not immediately clear why a private sector initiative should have
gained mcmentum in an atmosphere in which government control is favored.
However, this is an atmosphere, as well, of Light budget constraints and a
sense of declining U.S. technological productivity and superiority. With
the success and lessons learned from the satellite communications industry,
it was generally thought that this system provided an opportunity to develop
a U.S. industry which would be a world leader and provide a general example
of government-business cooperation in bringing technology to the
marketplace. However, the desire for private sector ownership contradicts
on-going U.S. practice, and creates splits between the bureaucratic agencies
involved and the other groups participating in the program. It is the
demands of the private sector, and the contradictions and conflicts they
produce. to which we now turn.
Private Sector Concerns
The U.S. private sector interests must be broken down into three
groups; those companies which are satellite and system manufacturers, the
value-added services industry and the private sector user community.
Generally they are in agreement on Landsat policy issues. I :.iiil largely
focus on the manufacturers, pointing to disagreements amongst them as I
proceed.
Private sector interest in Landsat had always been high, from the late
bUs when fifteen companies submitted proposals to the USGS to design an
Interior Department satellite. At the same time a mineral and oil
exploration company had discussed a proposal for owning and operating a
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satel,ite for remote sensing, but the government had rebuffed these
overtures. However conditions have changed and this section on private
sector interests becomes a discussion of the conditions, in the late 70's,
under which the private sector would assume an ownership role; conditions
for both the private sector and the goverment.
The private sector strongly desires the system to be implemented on an
international scale, with a policy of "open" dissemination, thereby assuring
the largest possible market (C-17,76). But their concept of open
dissemination needs clarification. While they were concerned "that a legal
regime would be adopted to govern the acquisition use, and distribution of
data which would unduly and unnecessarily limit ... the market for data
products and services" (C-17,225) they further argued that "it does not seem
necessary ... at this stage to guarantee by law that foreign users shall
have completely equal access to all products of the systems" including
summaries and conclusions from "reduced" data (C-17,239). To avoid
international difficulties, and under the assumption that the institutional
framework for establishment of an operational system by the U.S. can proceed
prior to the resolution of all questions involving international
participation (C-18,189) the private sector suggested that a domestic system
should be established first, prior to the development of an international
system--but should allow international participation.
The system obviously has strong international overtones, but it should
proceed as a U.S. National system initiative because of the tremendous
difficulty in organizing any initiative involving the multitude of
nations which have an interest, each with differing capabilities and
objectives. (C-20,373 in C-18)
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Data ought to be distributed subject to international rules but "a
requirement to place value-added data products in the public domain may be
inappropriate since a large portion of the market for products and services
would be eliminated" (C-18,640). In addition,
U.S. businessmen may be seriously offended if they find that a program
paid for by their tax dollars puts them in a disadvantageous position
vis-a-vis foreign competitors as a result or suboptimal arrangements
for processing and distributing the data. (C-18,213).
More to the point, if the desires of those countries who were and are in
favor of a restricted dissemination regime were met, it would render the job
of making Earth Fescurces Remote Sensing financially viable more challenging
than it already is (C-12,11). However, the private sector notion of open and
the international community's notion of open are two very different things;
"any effort to make a subset of the data proprietory would inevitably lead
to strong opposition from the sensed countries" (C-12,12).
The private sector believed that the government must stay in the remote
sensing business until a market existed and the investment risk became
tolerable. In fact they wanted (and still do want) the government (1) to
guarantee a market by satisfying -its own data requirements through purchase
from the private sector (C-18,70); (2) to continue R&D (C-17,218); and (3)
to assure users on data continuity (C-20,285),(C-17,224) and the
availability of data in a timely manner (C-17,244). The bigge,. step the
government should take, according to private sector interests, is to
eliminate direct competition with the private sector. "Government should
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any organization not directly involved in their projects or programs"
(C-18,514). In particular when the government stops competing in the supply
of services, private sector interest is likely to increase (C-18,170). Here
the value-added services industry was adamant, particularly in regards to
eliminating part of the Department of Interior's EROS program. In
testimony, one value-added services industry member suggested that he had
"lost directly very substantial sales from private industry where we have a
capability which is at least as good as that capability nor , being provided
by Sioux Falls" (home of EROS)(C-18,230). Paradoxically, therefore, the
private sector wanted the government to aggregate the market (C-18,208)
while getting out of the services and technology transfer business. However
state and local governments insisted on the need for a Federal Technology
Transfer program (to be further discussed shortly) and so too with developng
countries and the foreign market. In fact, both the state and local
government and the international market are likely to expand over the years
and increase their share of the total market.
To do this, however, some technology transfer will be required. Some
analysts argue that such technology transfer is a small price to pay for the
political and economic benefits which would accrue to the U.S. (C-12,12).
In an effort, as stated earlier, to maintain the widest possible
market, international control was seen to be totally infeasible as all
policy questions would hopelessly bog down (C-17,213). This raises another
issue, however, because "it is unavoidable that a system for civil remote
sensing from space be in some sense international" and that "there will
continue to be involvement in one form or another by other countries ..."
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(C-7,22). This raises the question cf international participatio;;. In
fact, giving developing countries an input into the decisionmakinj process
would grant them participation and hopefully result in trong support for
the system. Failure to gain this support could result in business being
transferred from the U.S. system to other competing systems (C-12,11-12).
While this nets a bit ahead of the story, it is important to remember that
this technology has a special problem ( which communications satellites
didn't)--that is that users must be developed along the way, they do not
already exist (C-17,87). This suggests that user input could be important
to their participation as buyers. And if anyone had hopes of establishing
an international system, including international participation, moving the
system to "the private sector is probably just not compatible with the
notion of a more international approach ..." (C-17,90).
In sum the question of private sector involvement raised questions
about the possibilities of international involvement in system management,
government involvement in technology transfer and data processing, about
control over U.S. foreign policy and most importantly about the type of data
dissemination system to be adopted by the U.S. and the international system.
At this stage, all of the major actors were visable. The political
conditions stemming from the interests of these actors began to reflect the
compexities of a global technology. They involved, according to one
government study,
1. means for effective participation by other nations in design,
management and cost-sharing of the system;
2. arrangements that demonstrate and support continued U.S.
technological and comr^ercial leadership;
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3. technological restraint to avoid international sensitivities on
resolution;
4. arrangements guarnteeing the rights of remote sensing and open
dissemination;
5. provision of a return on U.S. investment, and possible privte
sector participation;
6. means for effective U.S. influence in whatever international
system develops; and
7. defusing the image of U.S. exploitation of technology and avoiding
the continued appearance of developing country technological
dependence.	 (C-7,23).
These are clearly not completely complementary. And in fact, the
addition of a much firmer state and local government position, provides a
sharp contrast to private sector interests. Domestically, the issues now
crystal i zed.
While the federal government and the private sector expressed concern
about potential markets, state and local governments tended to couch the
issues as constraints on their use of Landsat--i.e., the constraints on
developing state and local markets. They pointed to the following issues:
-	 lack of a federal commitment to an on-going system;
-	 inadequate technology transfer activities;
-	 ill-defined federal agency responsibilities;
-	 lack of involvement in Landsat decisionmaking;
-	 lack of federal understanding of state governments operational
nature
-	 data problems, including timeliness, resolution and preprocessing
(C-26,17)
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Their prescriptions, however, differed widely from those of private
sector interests, in some cases, and were more similar to those of the
international community, in most cases. Along with the private sector and
the international community, state and local governments realized the need
for an operational system. "As long as the Landsat program remains
experimental rather than operational, state governments will hesitate to
invest in the development of trechniques, staff and equipment to make full
use of ... Landsats potential" (C-26,18). This is one of the catches to
satisfying OMB's requirements for successful demonstration of cost-benefit
ratios. For, providing quantitative results requires successful
demonstration, but users are unlikely to make the investment necessary to
make operational demonstrations effective without some Federal commitment
insuring that the investment doesn't go to waste (C-7,10).
On technology transfer, however, where the private sector wants the
government to allow it to do whatever technology transfer is required, state
and local governments are in sharp opposition. "A major constraint to the
state and local government use of Landsat has been the lack of coordinated,
well structured, and adequately supported technology transfer programs"
(C-26,19). Such a program must, according to state and local interests,
include a clear mandate for undertaking staff training, information
dissemination about Landsat, technical assistance and consultation,
demonstration projects, and software development and dissemination
(C-26,41).
On the question of participation in system decisions, whereas the
private sector has high input, state and local governments again agree with
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been used regularly by non-federal interests and agencies because they had
no input in the design capabilities of the satellites" (C-26,35). This
suggests that "it is crucial that state and local governments be provided
the opportunity to participate in decisions regarding Landsat policy,
technological capabilities and system characteristics" (C-26,39). As such,
"there is a need for some institutional mechanism designed to assure user
participation in systems planning and policy making" (C-26,25).
in relation to the systems characteristics, state and local
governments were particularly interested in a continuation of MSS data.
However, they also welcomed increased resolution imagery. If higher
resolution, satellites develop states would increase their overall use and
application of Landsat data (C-26,5-9). 	 In general "many users favor
higher spatial resolution ... however as spatial resolution increases,
military security issues become obvious (C-24,17). While the U.S. expects
most countries to react favorably (UN 15) "it is likely that countries
already pressing for urgent development of a restrictive regime will argue
more strongly" (C-17,136). A further trouble with higher resolution is that
it "will result in a much greater volume of data for a given area." There
was concern "that this increased volume of data will exceed state and local
data handling and financial capacities" (C-26,28-29).
Finally in regards to private sector involvement, where the interests
of state and local governments collide head on with the private sector, "it
should be emphasized that the vast majority of states are planning to
develop their own internal Landsat data analysis capabilities and will not
rely heavily on the private sector for these services" (C-26,53). As such,
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and "due to the public service nature of" Landsat, it "should be federally
owned and operated, for at least the near term" (C-26,52). According to
public sector interests, the private sector ought to provide specialized
software and equipment; provide specialized or unique products and services;
provide analysis service to local governments; and provide consultation on
systems design and development (C-26,54).
Early in 1979, two more bills were submitted to Congress--S.875, the
"Earth Resources Information Corporation Act" to set up a commercial earth
resources information service, and S.633, the "Earth Data and Information
Service Act" to set up an earth data and information service in NASA. The
push for private sector involvement is fully evident in both these bills.
5.875 would set up, within two years, a quasi-government, public
organization along the lines of Comsat, while the other establishes an
operational system within NASA, ncluding a seven year interim period
(between inception and actual operational status. In this second bill,
however, the established service would determine, after the interim period,
what type of operational organization should run, the earth resources
satellite system. In response, for the first time, the Prsident committed
his administration to an operational system ... although it was left
completely undefined (C-29,49). While this ended one debate--whether or not
to move from an experimental to an operational system--it opened a whole
range of new issues, controversy and debate continues.
The Department of State, mirroring international considerations changed
its position, stating that an "operational system would improve the context
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However, despite a seeming commitment to an operational system, continuity
of data remained a major consideration. "An un0 rlying concern on the part
of those cooperating with us now ... is the lack of formal assurance that
the U.S. will provide ..." data continuity (C-29,162). And as the
administration moves to an operational system it must still recognize "...
the question of sovereignty over information pertaining to natural resources
... many developing countries are considerably concerned that advanced
countries and companies within advanced countries, might be able to exploit
them" (C-29,172). While the U.S. has never subscribed to this view it must
keep in mind that from a foreign affairs perspective, the major issue is not
whether the system is publicly or privately owned, but whether or not the
U.S. operates it in accordance with some agreed upon set of international
principles (C-29,114). And these principles are still (as will be discussed
later) in a state of flux.
While state and local governments continued to insist that the most
important issues are over a firm commitment and data predictbility, they
suggest that "the costs of a pay as you yo system would effectively
discourage use at a time when the user base needs to be expanded so that it
can become self-supporting" C-29,107) and that a ban on data reproduction
would undermine the cost effectiveness of state use of Landsat data
(C-29,108). They therefore felt that the "service's charter should reflect
a public service concept and that Landsat type data should be considered in
the same context as census mapping and weather data ..." (C-29,107).
The private sector, on the other hand, suggested that a private system
operator would have to be able to retain appropriate data proprietary rights
and increase the price of data products in order to make the system
-51-
VOLUME II, PART iV.A.2
	
983
commercially usable (C-27,18). From one user's perspective, the government
should commit to timely and continuous data; agree to purchase its own data;
coordinate an international interface and it should establish international
copyright laws (C-27,77). These are seen as essential for encouraging
private sector interest and increasing the private sector market.
For the private sector, the major international issue remained "the
extent to which the consent of a country should be required prior to
dissemination of remotely sensed data or information on that country ...
this will largely determine the extent of the utility of remote sensing
satellite technology and the market for remote sensing satellite data"
(C-27,30). Hence, because restrictions on data dissemination will dampen
the potential market for private sector involvement and "any effectively
preclude private sector undertakings in this area" (C-27,31), the private
sector prefers an open dissemination system; but they also insist on
copyright or proprietary data restrictions in order to protect the
commercial viability of the system.
The development of competition from foreign countries became a further
consideration. The European Space Agency (ESA) and France in particular are
planning satellites. The ESA is planning a Land Applications Remote Sensing
Satellite (LASS) and a Coastal Ocean Monitoring Steliite System (COMSS).
These systems would be tailored to meet the needs of Europe and the
Developing Countries" tC-27,18). Further, the ESA is setting up Earthnet
"for the reception, distribution, analysis and sale of remote sensing data
obtained from United States remote sensing satellite systems" (C-29,182).
This would be in direct competition with the U.S. value-added service
sector.
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Further, the French are planning to launch SPOT." They are already
F
selling Landsat compatible ground stations in competition with United States
}
companies. They have sold one to Brazil and are undertaking to provide one
to Bangladesh--a country where the U.S. is very much involved in remote
sensing.
Finall y . the French have "made a proposal to the GEOSAT committee,
whose members are mostly U.S. corporatinns interested in natural resource
exploration, to modify the SPOT satelli°a to meet the needs of the GEOSAT
users. "The nit effect of these initiatives could be a reduction of U.S.
technological ledership in space and the U.S. commercial position in the
provision of space services" (C-29,182). All of these things push the U.S.
government to move to an operational system, and to aid the private sector
in competing effectively with other countries in the international market.
Government Studies
As the positions of the various actors took shape, the goverrw., nt
studied the question. In a large study entitled the "Private Sector
Involvement Study," the government undertook to determine the feasability of
private sector ownership and operation of the system. This included the
means of subsidizing private sector involvement and how much that subsidy
would have to be. Generally private sector and public sector viers clashed,
as described above. However a few new insights into private sector concerns
emerged.
" Satellite Probatoire d'Ubse:vation de la Terre. This satellite will
contain two pointable multi-linear array sensors capable of operating in
both multi-spectral and panchromatic modes. Data will be 20 m and 10 m
resolution with possible steroscopic coverage.
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On the emerging issue of foreign competition, the private sector
suggested that an operational system was needed imm3diately. They expressed
concern "that future foreign systems, especially if subsidized by their
governments, may divide and undercut the market" (C-23, Appendix 5). They
also felt that the U.S. should rethink its data flow policies. In light of
potential competition from foreign companies wh will be using U.S. data, it
may be necessary for the U.S. government and U.S. companies to cooperate
vis-a-vis foreign companies who have the suport of their own governments
(C-23,Appendix 5).
In conclusion, the private sector was not seen as ready to own and
operate a remote sensing satellite system. They wanted the door left open
to privdte sector involvement until tiie market is well understood (C-23, 7
and Appendix 5). Whjle they felt that a mix of public and economic
potential exists to keep the system flying they are concerned about limits
on the data needs of some potentially large users. "Most firms cannot now
assess the relative needs for repetitive as against non-repetitive use of
Lands °x data." They are concerned that some users will satisfy their long
term data needs fairly quickly. In any case, private sector interests
believed that without enhanced system capability, the market will drop off
in the next few years (C-23, Appendix 5). Due to the uncertainty of the
market, "the private sector considers that government subsidy and/or strong
market support to private operations ... will be necessary in view of the
markets current size and the public interest value of the system" (C-23,8).
Interestingly enough, the private sector is able to use the public ser^,ice
argument to justify a government subsidy which would limit the risk of such
an entrprise to private sector operators.
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Finally, on the various options for private sector involvement,
including a public sector corporation along the lines of COMSAT, a
specialized market satellite targeted for a particular user, a leased
services satellite, etc. most private sector users felt that a "pre-emptive
designation of a national remote sensing entity, similar to Comsat ... would
not be in the country's bast interest at this time." However, they also
agreed that whomever becomes the s) stem (,,,erator will have to be assured of
ownership and operation for a long period of time (C-23, Appendix 5). The
private sector is not adverse to assuming the responsibility for the system
if the government provided market support to make the risk acceptable.
The outcome of the study, was that the government would now assume that
it was in the "nationa `. interest" to have a private sector owner and
operator because the private sector would perform more efficiently and
economically than the government, would n . ,)re aggressively market the data
and would stimulate technological development and transfer and would become
more responsive to both public and private sector users (C-23,3).
The International Debate Drags On--1977-1979
During the 1977 meeting of the U.N. working group on remote sensing the
members finally described in an orderly manner the system elements and data
fljw involved in remote sensing from sQ^ellite. These included
1. Data acquisition ( satellites and command stations)
2. Data reception ( antennae and receivers)
3. Data pre-processing (formatting and recording)
4. Data storage and dissemination ( archiving and reprodiction)
5. Data analysis ( interpretation or user processing)
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6.	 Information utilization (practical application by users)
(UN 15, pp. 8-9; C-42, 110)
Also in 1977 the Soviet Union had submitted a working paper which introduced
the concept of classifying data on the basis of spatial resolution. It
broke the data down into three categories--local, which ranged from several
metres to 30-50 metres; regional which ranged from 50-100 to 300-500 metres
and global information which ranges from 500 metres to several kilometres
(C-42, p. 111). Thii paper touched off a debate in the 1978 working session
of the working group which brought into "sharp focus the different views on
the significance" of the matter of spatial resolution.
The Soviets reiterated their position fully at the 1978 meetings. They
suggested that the subcommittee should "take action to develop promptly
international legal rules governing the dissemination of data and
information derived from remote sensing of the earth, because what was at
stake was not only the economic sovereignty of states but also their
territorial sovereignty ... dissemination of primary data over 50 in spatial
resolution is allowable but any better data or any analyzed data ought not
to be disseminated to a third party without the consent of the country
involved" (UN 4, SR 195, 1978, p. 7).
This proposal met with approval only from countries closely allied with
the Soviets--those Eastern bloc countries including Hungary, Poland, E.
Germany, Czechoslovakia--and to some extent India. It also drew strong
attacks on two grounds. First, there were those who felt that there was no
scientific and technical justification for a spatial cutoff point. (Canada,
Japan, Romania, etc., UN 4, SR. 194, 1978, p. 4-8). Second, there were
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those who felt that such a proposal did not go far enough in protecting the
sovereignty and rights of the sensed state. The delegte of Chile expressed
this concern, suggesting that global, regional and local classification for
dissemination of information was not a suitable base for the limitation of
remote sensing data dissemination (UN 4, SR.195. 1978, p.3).
At the same time international principles reaffirming national
sovereignty and the right of states to participate in remote sensing
activities and obtain technical assistance ballooned the number of working
principles from the five that the committee had in 1975 to 17 in 1978. Some
of these went back to the old arguments--including a principle on "full and
permanent sovereignty of all state and peoples over their wealth and natural
resources" "on advanced notification to a State whose territory will be
sensed" on "consultations between the sensing and the sensed states." and on
dissemination of remote sensing dta or information" (C. 42. 114). Perhaps
most importantly.
Oil May 19. 1978, with Moscow, a convention was signed on the transfer
and use of data received through the remote sensing of the earth from
space. The signatures on that cvonvention were the representatives of
Bulgaria. Hungary, East Germany, Cuba. Mongolia. Poland, Rumania, the
Soviet Union and Czechosiavakia.
The basis of the convention is the principle of respect for the
sovereign rights of states over their natural reources. There is no
question that this also refers to information about the natural wealth
of sovereign countries (UN 3. pv. 183. 0,30!78. 41).
k
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This convention endorses 50 m resolution and analyzed information
restrictions, and a prior consent regime. It reaffirms the Soviet belief in
the restricted dissemination of data which touches upon the defense and
other sovereign rights of states." (UN 3, pv.183,6/30/78,pp. 41,51)
This seemed to signal the withdrawal of serious Soviet participatin in
the development of a global remote sensing regime. This convention and
several other proposals were carried into the 19th working session of the
UNCOPUOUS. These other proposals included a U.S. working paper which would
ensure that all countries undertaking a remote sensing program would report
to the secretary general, to the fullest extent possible the nature and
range of its program (C-42, 115). A Romanian proposal reasserted "full
respect for the principle of permanent sovereignty ... including the right
to access to information relating to: their natural resources (C-42, 115,
UN 17). And a second USSR proposal which would require "a sensing state to
inform a sensed state of the data acquired, and to transfer such data or
information to the sensed state by mutual agreement" (C-42, 115, UN 18).
The issues of sovereignty and rights to information and the debate over
the importance of classifying data by spatial resolution and then imposing a
prior consent regime have led to a stalemate in the U.N. debate. While some
progress has been made in developing principles, these key issues have not
been resolved.
The French delegate summed the stalemate up soberly.
Can we at this session entertain any great hope of success with regard
to remote sensing of the earth by satellite? ... the sen!A tivity of
the question, the rapidity of technical progress and its complexity
lead me to doubt that we can. 	 (LIN 3, pv.193, 6/20/79)
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In fact, any acceptance by the U.S. of principles limiting the
dissemination of data by spatial resolution, or which ensure the transfer of
data to a sensed country would run directly counter to U.S. policy to
establish a commercial venture. The international debate and the goals of
the government program to conmercialize the system conflict with each
other. This conflict was made clear in early 1980 when the executive branch
reported its program. Although not a complete plan, as it left open the
options to be pursued, it should serve as the focus of policy in the
1980's. In it, the following international policy objectives were listed:
--	 "fostering international receptivity to and acceptance of U.S.
remote sensing activities."
--	 "developing a worldwide market for U.S. commercial data products
and associated hardware and services."
--	 "enhancing the technical quality and scope and reducing the cost
of the U.S. land remote sensing satellite program."
--	 "encouraging the utilization of land remote sensing satellite data
and techniques in the national and regional development programs
of developing nations."
--	 and "maintaining U.S. commercial and technological leadership in
the field of space remote sensing" (C-10,107).
It is clear from these policy objectives that U.S. confidence in any
U.N. effort to develop an internationally agreed upon set of principles
toward the formation of an international regime which was in the interests
of the U.S. had diminished. Hence, the failure of regime formation
activities led the U.S. to pursue remote sensing activities from a
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domestic base and through direct agreements with those countries
participating in its program. Efforts at coordination are constrained by
U.S. private sector interest and the prospects of foreign competition from
the Soviets, the French, the Japanese and the European Sdpace Agency. It is
these international considerations, as well as to the debate over access and
dissemination of information which now impact U.S. policy.
The Government Reports
In defining the key issues is developing an operational system the
Executive Branch asked the following questions: First, what changes in
Landsat should be made in developing an interim operational system? Second,
what performance capbility should be developed for the next generation fully
operational satellite system; third, what policies should be adopted to
provide financing; fourth, how can eventual private sector ownership and
operation be achieved and fifth, how should U.S. plans for an operational
system be interrelated with the operational system plans of other
countries? (C-31,5)
In undertaking to answer these questions, the executive branch report
began with the following assumptions: The government will ensure the
continuity of data; an operational system will ensure appropriate
reliability and timeliness of standrd data products; users requirements, and
projected demand and cost will determine system design characteristics;
private sector involvement is a goal; prices should be set to ensure maximum
recovery of system costs consistent with the public good; a policy of open





the data; private sector ownership and operation of the system will be
conducted under government regulation, consistent with U.S. domestic and
foreign policies; the system will respond to U.S. federal interests and user
requirements with "due regard" for foreign interests; NOAA is to be the lead
agency for Land Remote Sensing Satellite Activities; (C-10,3) and "... a
fully operational satellite and ground system responsive to user
requirements could not become operational until 1989 a: _he earliest"
(C-10,23).
These assumptions leave a large number of questions in the open. For
instance, what does "consistent with the public good" mean when discussing
price increases? What does "due regard for foreign interests" mean? How
are "projected demand and costs" going to be determined? And while the
government will ensure data continuity it is unclear whether they will
actually be able to achieve this unless the current satellites stay
operational past the launch of Landsat 0, which has been delayed by
difficulties with the thematic mapper. It is these questions which the
report addressed, in part. The results of the study did not make any bold
new assertions, but outlined various options which could be pursued.
On the issue of government competition, the report suggested that the
impact of government technique and development training programs denied the
private sector access to some markets. Federal programs clearly compete
with private sector companies (C-10,91). Federal competition in services
includes inhouse preparation of information products which could hamper
technology transfer and the value-added services industry, and the
distribution of information by the government to non-federal users severely
limits the size of the potential market (C-10,90).
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On pricing, the report suggests that while a premium price for
privileged access to Landsat data would increase the system's payback,
non-discriminatory availability increases the number of potential users and
is consistent with a carefully considered U.S. policy (C-10,88). However,
on data ownership, control over data and standardized products seems
essential to private sector ownership. Copyright laws limiting resale and
reproduction must become effective, dissemination of the data and products
must take place only with appropriate fees being charged (C-10,81). While
acknowledging the above considerations the government study concluded that
market expansion is critical to private sector involvement. Such expansion
required data continuity so that users could safely make investments in
training and processing equipment (C-10,99). To encourage market expansion
the government intends to tailor the system to user needs and to develop
user benefits, this include training, applications development and
applications demonstrations.
There is one difficulty, however, in tailoring the system--because the
needs of the various users do not completely overlap (C-10,39-53). Further,
helping develop users' benefits will force government programs to continue
their role in technology transfer and the dissemination of data. This
conflicts with the goal of private sector involvement. A Catch-22 pops up
again in that the private sector will not take the risk until the government
fully develops a user market which minimizes that risk and the government
cannot do this without some user-oriented programs. This in turn is
criticized as competition with the private sector and the private sector
wants such competition stopped.
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The private sector is also wary of cooperation with foreign satellite
operators. While coordination and complimentarity are fine there is a
concern that this "may preclude the development of U.S. satellite system
which could provide high market value and standardized data products ..."
(C-10,92). This will also lead to a situation where U.S. industry will be
competing with foreign companies who are assisted by their governments.
Hence, some form of industry-government cooperation may be necessary. It
may take the form of a subsidy or market guarantee. And it must be a long
term commitment because the private sector doesn't want to get a government
subsidy or guarantee only to have it suddenly disappear (C-10,92).
The pressures from the private sector are balanced by the caution of
the state department. On prices, "it is essential that price increases be
phased in gradually over time so that foreign ground station operators and
other foreign users can accommodate the price increases into their planning
and budgetary cycles" (C-16,64). One spokesman added that "to avoid
international suspicion we need to provide direct readout, phase in price
increases and have non-discriminatory access to data ... If we change these
policies, which I think is essential in the course of turning the system
over to a private operator, then I think the concerns that would be
associated with private sector ownership would be very considerable indeed"
(C-16,70). Essentially, from a foreign affairs perspective, the system can
only be owned by a private sector operator with a great deal of regulation
(C-16,71).
Needless to say the state and local governments were not pleased with
the emphasis on private sector involvement, however, they suggested that
they could accept a private sector owner if there is federal technology
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transfer program, if there is state and local representation in system
management and design and if prices are not increased too rapidly
(C-16,87). In fact, they suggest that the price of data "should be limited
to the cost of reproduction and handling and distribution." "Otherwise,
some state and local government entities may be completely priced out of the
market. A corrolary to this recommendation is the need for states to be
able to reproduce land remote sensing data for their internal use"
(C-16,83).
It becomes clear then that the thrust for private sector involvement is
blunted by at least three things. First international concern over a
private sector owner, state and local government objections to measures
needed to bring about that ownership and the private sectors reluctance to
take the risk of an operational system without an almost full government
guarantee.
During the 1980 session of the U.N. Working group on remote sensing no
progress was made toward resolving the critical issues on data
dissemination.. And some delegations expressed concern over this lack of
progress (OS961,p.8 (1980)).
In fact, to this date little progress has been made in reaching some
form of agreement on the most basic questions regarding sovereignty over
information and the type of dissemination regime to be implemented. In
large part, those now pursuing the use of remote sensing data are likely to
work things out in a local jr regional context, as opposed to any global
regime.
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However, the working group was F-icourged by the full committee to keep
working toward the resolution of the policy conflicts (C-42, p.117).
More importantly for the U.S., "the challenge posed by foreign
initiatives in the remote sensing arena" was becoming "commercial as well as
technological" (C-27,19;. In sensor technology, the French will be flying a
multi-linear array in 1984, the Japanese in 1984, and the U.S. not until
1989. There is also a good deal of foreign competition in ground station
technology (C-10,113). The French will launch SPOT in 1984. It will
include a 10 meter resolution pointable imager. And it will include a
capability for limited stereo data collection. They are working in
conjunction w;th Sweden and Belgium who will provide an onboard computer and
ground receiving equipment, respectively (C-8a,21). Further there has been
a "cordial" exchange of letters between GEOSAT and the French regarding the
SPOT system. The tone is "cordial" but it appears that in addition to
trying to meet the needs of the developing world, they will also try to
tailor the system to the needs of the GEOSAT users (C-27,139-140).
The Japanese are planning an initial launch of their Marine Observation
Satellite (MOS-1) in 1985, to be followed by five further satellite missions
in the yars 1985-1993. These will be for ocean and land observations
(C-8a,27).
Brazil and the Netherlands are beginning discussions regarding the
launch of their own national remote sensing satellites (C-8a,28). India
developed "Bhaskara," a rudimentary remote sensing satellite which failed
shortly after launch. Another is planned for launch in 1981. Also they
have plans for an Indian remote sensing satellite to be launched in the 1985
timeframe (C-81,25).
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The European Space Agency has plans to launch two satellites, one an
ocean monitoring satellite and one a land monitoring satellite. They are
looking for compatibility of nationally owned systems, and they have
tentative plans for Canadian cooperation--an exchange of ground processing
hrdware for direct readout of data from the two satellites (C-8a,23,24).
And finally, the Soviet Union, although they have not started a "civil"
program they have done some testing of coarse spatial resolution
multispectral scanners on board their "Meteor" serites of meteorological
satellites. And they have made data available through bi-lateral agreements
(C-8a,27).
One Department of State spokesperson suggested that in looking to the
future, "countries might be less satisfied with access to U.S. data than
they might be with a system over which they have some measure of influence"
(C-17,132). In line with this it is thought that charging a high price for
Landsat data might allow foreign competition to undercut the U.S. "market"
(C-10,112). Another spokesman cautioned that in the midst of growing
competition in remote sensing it is well to recall that "a positive
international climate will be invaluable as the U.S. pursues continu^d
development and application of this important technology" (C-8f,7). In
establishing an aura of cooperation through discussions on complementary
systems, the U.S wishes to maximize potential usefulness of remote sensing
data and to minimize duplication of effort. While limiting U.S. costs, the
U.S. wants to limit possible dependence on other countries (C-10,116). This
desire to establish complementary systems will constrain the scope of an
operational system. This introduces "major uncertainties" in the evolution
of a market which might eventually be self sustaining (C-12,9).
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Following this report, and Congressional Hearings on the Executive
Branch's plan, the Congress (Senate Democrats) submitted a bill to put most
aspects of the plan into law. It was not passed. Meanwhile, the Executive
Branch began moving system responsibility from NASA to NOAA. And the budget
fight over Landsat funding continues. Not surprisingly, President 7eegan
and the Republican Senate are particularly interested in private sector
initiatives in this area. Comsat again (it did so in 1979, 1980), has
submitted a proposal for its taking over all civilian operational remote
sensing satellite systems. It is apparently being considered, although
other satellite manufacturers are not said to be happy with this.
Landsat D is slated for launch in late 1982 and observers can only
speculate on the chances that Landsats II ?nd III will provide data
continuity. NOAA's present plan for the near term (the 1980's) calls for
one operating satellite with one ground based backup to be used in case of
satellite failure. Most obser-vers feel that a one satellite systet ►--with
18-day overflight intervals--will limit many application areas. The
evolution of a civilian remote sensing satellite system is still largely in
flux.
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Part III. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
This section of the paper will take the discussion developed in Part II
and attempt to point out the policy tradeoffs which have come to the fore in
the on-going debate. In addition I will try to suggest the policy dynamics
which underly the development ' of these tradeoffs. In other words, I think
that the policy dilemmas now facing the U.S. are 3 function of its own
policies and the nature of the technology. It is these things which I hope
to illustrate in what follows.
In order to accomplish this task I have used a set of policy oriented
questions developed at the Yale law schoG1. These questions should paint a
complete picture of ary policy situation and allow one to isolate not only
the relevant actors and their positions, but also the ctinamics of the
situation, in overview form, these questions are as follows:
1. Who participates?
2. With what perspectives/demands?
3. In what situations?
4. With what cap,Ir2jlities?
5. Using what strategies?
6. With what short term outcomes?
7. And longer term effects.
As these questions are answered in the following analysis, I believe that
their utility for isolating important tradeoffs and policy dynamics will
become apparent.
-68-
)00	 VOLUME II, PART IV.A.2
Who are the participants/actors?
For the sake of simplicity and clarity we can break down the
participants in Landsat into two types--domestic and international. On the
domestic side the actors include state and local governments, the private
sector (including the satellite manufacturers, the value-added services
industry and the private sector buyer), the federal government includes the
Departments of Agriculture, Interior, State, Defense, Commerce and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Congress.
Internationally, countries can be divided into a set of categories,
including Western developed countries, the Soviet bloc, and the developing
countries. Generally there are countries which have the technology and
support the "free flow" of information; there are countries with the
technology who support absolute sovereignty over resources and information
over those resources and there are countries who don't have the technology
but are desirous of using it (C-23).
One of the primary differences between the creation of Intelsat and the
potential for an international Landsat organization similar to Intelsat can
be foun A
 here--the actors involved. Intelsat was created by the U.S. and
other western countries. With Landsat, the entire community of nations is
represented.
2.	 What are the perspectives (demands and expectations) of the actorsT
involved?
Here I will outline the perspectives of the various domestic actors
involved in the policy process and then discuss the 'policy stance' that the
U.S. as a whole presents to the international arena. There are a set of
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issues which can be touched upon, including the following (most of which are
tied up in the question of private sector involvement and the
commercialization of the system):
--	 pricing
--	 technology tansfer and technical assistance
--	 data copyright and reproduction laws, including proprietary data
--	 open dissemination of data, -.dual access to data products
--	 system compatability
Pricing
Clearly, if the private sector is to take over management and ownership
of the Landsat syste^►--if the system is to become commercially viable--then
prices must cover the costs of the commercial operation. This implies an
increase in the price of Landsat data and products compared to present
charges. The private sector, therefore, both the potential owners of the
system and the value-added services industry expect the price of raw data to
increase in the near future. However, they have generally agreed that a
phased increase is critical so as not to hinder market development
activities. Private sector buyers are not concerned, in general, about the
potential for an increase in the price of data, however, they would like to
see some form of data protection (proprietary data laws) in conjunction with
price increases.
State and local governments have been adamantly opposed to price
increases. However, they have become resigned over time to the likelihood
of phased price increases. They believe that remote sensing data ought to
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be offered to users much like weather data--as a public service of the
Federal government. While they have resigned themselves to the increase in
prices they argue that private sector participation is not desirable. In
general, they have adopted a strategy of trying to convince the Congress
that their market will be largely taken care of with in-house capabilities.
The Federal government and its attendent agencies are in some
disagreement over the issue of pricing. Generally, parts of NASA and NOAA
agree with the OSTP and Congress that prices will have to increase. However
they are less convinced that private sector participation in ownership of
the system is inevitable. Only in NASA and in the Congress--along with the
OMB, are people convinced that this is a commercially viable system and that
it will indeed and should be transferred into the private sector. Many
government officials (whom I have talked to) suggest that if Landsat is
transferred into the private sector it will have to be heavily regulated.
Particularly in the foreign affairs community there is less than
overwhelming enthusiasm for private sector involvement.
In the international arena, the U.S. has presented a desire to move the
system into the private sector with government supervision and
responsibility. There have been complaints that this will reduce the
potential for an international approch. However, from the discussion in
Part II it should have been evident that with competing systems being
developed and with the Soviets and the U.S. seemngly (at this time)
deadlocked over a legal agreement in the U.N., the possibility of an
international solution is improbable at best.
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However, the issue of pricirg is important from two other
perspectives. First, in building a market for Landsat products the U.S.
faces the same problem with the international users as they do with domestic
users--an immediate, large increase in the price of data would dampen
whatever market growth is takin g place. Second, the French are likely to
price their data product: in a c.,mpetitive fashion, and the Soviets may also
offer terms favorable to fo;•eigr users. As such the U.S. may find itself in
a bind. In trying to make the system commercially viable by increasing
prices the U.S. may find `Izamselves dampening the potential market for
^andsat products. This is policy tradeoff number one: Increasing prices
may increase the commercial viability of the system, but it may also allow
foreign competition to undercut the U.S. share of the international and
domestic market. A second important point is that raising the prices of the
data and products may undermine the validity of U.S. international policies
of open dissemination and equal access to the data in the system. If prices
are increased to a commercially viable level, then the open dissemination
and equal access system becomes an "equal access" for the rich, and not for
the poor. This is policy tradeoff number two: Raising the prices of
Landsat data in response to commercial pressures may contradict a carefully
thought out U.S. foreign policy--and drive foreign users to other systems.
In the following discussion, the interdependence of the various issues will
become increasingly evident. Repetition may occur, however, think it is
important to recognize the linkages amongst the various issues and the
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Technology Transfer and Technical Assistance
As with the pricing issue, the private sector and the public sector in
the U.S. are at odds over the issue of technology transfer. The private
sector feels that this is an area in which the government competes
needlessly with private sector firms. Generally, the private sector feels
that it should be doing the technology transfer job--and that the
government, particularly the EROS data center and NASA's technology transfer
program ought to be cut back. At the same time, however, the private sector
(those potential owners of the system) demands that the government
is
	
or develop, the market and remove much of the risk of private
sector ownership before the private sector will buy into the system. This
forces the government to build the market without technology transfer and
technical assistance. This is not likely to work. This is policy tradeoff
number three: If the private sector wants the government to build the
market then they will have to accept the government's role in technology
tansfer and technical training and assistance, for the time being.
State and local governments are adamant on this issue. They suggest
that the state and local market will only grow if there is a proper means of
technology transfer from the government to them. They further argue that
they must have help from the federal government as they cannot expect to
make an investment to use the system without knowledge of whether or not the
system is goiong to be worthwhile to them.
The Federal government runs several technology transfer and technical
assistance programs both domestically and internationally, including those
in NASA, AID and the Department of Interior. Beyond the bureaucratic
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self-preservation motive, these programs were seen as essential to building
a political constituency for Landsat and are now seen as essential to the
market building process. In particular, technical assistance programs in
developing countries are an integral part of U.S. foreign policy regarding
Landsat. Since the opening of the international debate on remote sensing,
the U.S. has offered technical assistance and training to the developing
countries. This seems to have made the open dissemination policy more
palatable. If technical assistance was not available then the open
dissemination policy would only be open to the technically sophisticated
countries of the world. This is policy tradeoff number four: If the U.S.
stops its international technical assistance programs it is likely--in
international forums--to undermine the long standing U.S. position on open
dissemination and technical assistance. It also might drive foreign users
to another satellite system. In fact, as noted above, competition is
emerging. Clearly if these competitors offer to the developing world terms
more attractive than the U.S. can, they will undercut the U.S. share of the
international (and perhaps the U.S. domestic) market.
Data Copyright and Reprodution Laws
Another issue tied up with potential private sector involvement in the
ownership of the Landsat system is that of data copyright and reproduction
laws. The private sector, in order to maintain and develop the commercial
viability of the Landsat system requires that some form of data copyright
and reproduction laws be instituted. Further, they may require that Landsat
data, where possible, become proprietary. The mineral exploration community
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has suggested that they would pay a great deal more for the data if it was
proprietary.
While this may be an essential step in developing the commercial
integrity of an operational/commercial Landsat system, other actors are
against it. State and local governments are again adamant in opposition to
such laws. They suggest that they need to be able to reproduce the data
once they have it in order to make Landsat a cost-effective tool. If they
are not allowed this type of in-house capability they are likely to return
to more traditional methods of data collection. (This is unlikely in the
opinion of this author.) In other words, any sort of proprietary data or
copyright laws would discrourage state and local government use of Landsat
data. In the international sphere this type of policy would run into
similar problems with the foreign users--particularly those developing
countries who are worried about the use of Landsat data by multinational
corporations to exploit the resources of the developing countries. Also,
forbidding data reproduction would make it harder for them to justify
Landsat in that its cost-effectiveness would decrease.
The Federal government is split on this issue. Those agency's which
are user agency's are more in favor of not having copyright laws while those
that are pushing for commercialiation think that such a law is essential to
the health of the enterprise. These are policy tradeoffs five and six: If
the government institutes some form of copyright or proprietary data laws
for Landsat then they are likely to dampen the potential mrket due to the
decreasing cost-effectiveness of Landsat. However, the remaining market may
be willing to pay more for data. And if the government institutes a
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restrictive policy it will undermine the U.S. policy of "open
dissemination" and equal access to the data internationally. (Here, open
dissemination would mean that anybody could buy the data, on the condition
that they are eligible under the copyright laws or that they somehow meet
the proprietary law requirements. What is an open dissemination policy to
the U.S. may not be an open dissemination policy to the rest of the
developed world and particularly no to the developing world.)
Open Dissemination and Equal Access to the Data
Up until now the U.S. has presented a strict policy of open
dissemination and equal access to Landsat data on a nondiscriminatory
basis. This policy is fully supported by state and local governments and by
most federal agencies, strongly by those who deal with foreign affairs.
However, due to the push for commercialization, this position might have to
change. As private sector actors have become increasingly involved, there
have been suggestions to the effect that guaranteeing access to data may not
be in the "national interest" at this time. At the same time restrictions
on data reproduction and data dissemination due to copyright laws may be
seen internationally as posing unfair restrictions on access to the data.
Foreign actors have a range of views on this point. First the Soviet
bloc believes in a restricted dissemination regime--with an emphasis on
prior consent--i.e., that data on one country would not be given or sold to
a third country without the expressed consent of tht third country. At the
same time, data on a country must be made available to that country from the
sensing state. The developing countries are even more adamant in this
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stance, although their actions in signing "open dissemination" agreements
for their ground stations make their policy position a bit hollow. They
strongly believe that the data should be completely available to the country
sensed but that prior consent is needed to send the data to a third
country. The French, who started out adamant in their support of a "prior
consent" regime have now softened their position, although they still claim
to suport such a regime. This may have something to do, as does the Soviet
position, with trying to gain a share of the market for remote sensing data
by catering to the demands of the developing work!. However, as the
realities of operating an operational system approach, they will--it is the
guess of this author--be forced to continue to soften their position on
restricted dissemination of data in the sense of a prior consent regime.
Here is the crux of the issue. The U.S. believes that an open dissemination
regime guarantees the widest possible potential market. However, they
believe that given that anybody can buy data about any other
country, there will have to be copyright and proprietary data laws to
protect the commercial integrity of the system. The developing countries
are in favor o' a prior consent regime which would surely dampen the
international market. However, even those that have come around to support,
at least tacitly, an open dissemination policy would likely be put off by
such copyright laws. Hence, policy tradeoff number seven: If the U.S.
decides to go ahead with these laws there are likely to be repurcussions
amongst foreign users--particularly the developing countries who are like'iy
to see this as an unacceptable form of restricted dissemination. At the
same time, these laws which are inscituted to enable a commercial system
-77-
VOLUME II, PART IV.A.2
	 1009
might dampen the market for Landsat data as foreign users move to
competitive systems whose technology and policies is tailored to their
needs.
System Oonispatibilit-
As remote sensing systems move into an operational phase, the question
of whether the various national systems will be complementary or competing
has been raised. In general the users of the data, whether they be foreign
or domestic, believe that system compatibility is extremely important. This
would enable a user to use one set of equipment to take advantage of several
sets of data. However, those putting the satellites up are a bit wary of
developing completely compatible systems due to fears of over specialization
and losing parts of the potential market. Private sector firms in this
country are not likely to be in favor of system compatibility because it
tacitly implies foreign input into their business decisions. No American or
foreign firm is likely to support such a development. However, there is
likely to be a push for those who are funding the system to develop
compelementary systems in hopes of keeping the cost of the total operational
system as low as possible. This leads to policy tradeoffs numbers eight and
nine: If the government decides to develop complementary systems in order
to please users and keep operational system costs down they are likely to
discourage potential private sector investment. If they push for competing
systems they may well find parts of the potential market pulled out from
under them as well as finding technological leadership slipping away. This
may leave U.S. industry in a disadvantaged position, in that most foreign
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competitors will be working in conjunction with their governments, thereby
putting U.S. companies in competition with foreign governments. This is not
a place U.S. companies want to be.
In sum, on the theme of actors and their perspectives, state and local
governments and foreign actors stack up as opposed to the private sector.
This has put government agencies into a difficult position. Rather than
trying to solve the particular policy issue confronting the government, I
will complete this analysis with the hopes of uncovering the dynamics by
which this sticky situation has come about.
3. In What Situations do the Actors Participate?
There seems to be two situations or levels of activities which emerge.
First, there is the everyday--what I will call short term--activity. A
second level of activity--which I will call the long term or negotiating
activity--is that activity which goes on in order to regulate the technology
in the future. The reason for this distinction will become apparent
shortly. In general, what an actor suggests they want, and what they are
actually doing are not always one and the same thing. While this might
strike one as being somewhat contradictory and irrational, in fact, it may
well be a quite rational thing to do.
4. With what Capabilities do the Actors come to Policy Process?
Here we will focus on the technological and market capabilities which
each actor comes to the process with. While this leaves out the idea of
"bargaining capability" I suggest that such a capability is much less
knowable and hence more difficult to factor into any policy analysis.
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In terms of technological capabilities we can distinguish at least
three types. Those countries which have the cpability to launch and
maintain an operational satellite system will be countries with "high"
capability. Those countries who do not have that capability and do not wis?i
to develop it, but have sufficient technological expertise to utilize the
data from the technology will be said to have "medium" capability. Those
with neither will be said to hove "low" capability.
In terms of market capability we can classify actors by the size of
their potential market. While this is quite a bit more elusive than
technological capability it becomes are important factor in discussing the
policy process--and who gets attention paid to their perspectives.
Generally, state and local actors are seen as having a relatively small
market potential, privte sector actors as having larger potential, the
developing countries still larger and the federal government as having the
greatest potential market. In terms of technological capabilities the U.S.
(as an actor) is seen as having high capability, the Soviet Union and France
as having high capability, developing countries as having from low to medium
capability and other developed countries somewhere between medium and high
capability. Internally to the U.S. state and local actors are moving from
low to medium while the private sector actors range from high to medium
depending on whether one is discussing the satellite manufacturers,
value-added services industry or the buyers. It is important to note that
this is where these countries and actors are now--this is not where they
started. The process by which countries gain technological expertise and
thereby change their level of capability is important for the policy
imp'H cations of this analysis. That will come shortly.
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5.	 What Strategies do the Various Actiurs Use?
First, in the international sphere--because all actors operate on two
levels sim:;ltaneously we woud expect two sets of strategies.
In the internatinal negotiating arena there are three main strategies.
The first we will call legalistic. This is pushed by those who believe that
remote sensing data is a threat to national soveveignty and desire some form
of prior consent dissemination (and acquisition) regine. A second strategy
is the operational strategy. This strategy is pursued by those who have the
technology or have adequate access to it, are against a prior consent
regime, and want to develop the technology first and regulate secs-
third strategy is a middle strategy which suggests that there is 	 a
fundamental contradiction between sovereignty and the free flow of
information and which tries to run a compromise course between those who
desire a prior consent regime (the legalizers) and those who desire an open
dissemination regime (the operationalizers). There is another type of
policy much akin to the operational strategy that of the organizational
strategy. This strategy suggests that the development of proper
organizational strcutures/institutions would define more clearly the type of
legal rest, •aints needed.
Developing countries--those with low capabilities--have pursued a
policy in the international negotiations of regulation first. Believing in
the need for a prior consent regime they have pursued a "legalistic"
strategy. However, at the same time they have made an effort to improve
their technological capability. This has meant dealing, in large part, with
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either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. In gaining technological expertise
they have had to give up some things--generally policy support. In short
term activities then they have tended to accept the policy of the country
from whom they received technical assistance, while at the same time
maintaining a position eemingly contradictory in the international
negotiations. This was justified, and has been up until nuw on the basis
that the systems were experimental and that what was being debated in the
international sphere was an operational system. I will return to the
importance of short-term activity taken in the context of an experimental
system in the next two sections.
The legalistic strategy is also being followed by the Soviet Bloc.
This is for two reasons. First they believe strongly in the absoluteness of
sovereignty over re , . ,Jurces and information and the need for a prior consent
regime (this also has to do with their worries over possible military uses
of the satellite against them). Second, this is an effort to cater to the
needs and desires of the developing world. Whether it is seen as a
political struggle for world dominance or an economic struggle for markets,
the fact is that the U.S. and the Soviets compete for the "hearts and
minds," and pocketbooks of third world leaders. Hence, in the short term
they pursu,: the same strategy--that of building a political constituency
around their particular political preference. This includes the trading of
technical — sistance and policy promises for policy support in the
international forum. Hence, while the developing nations are building their
capabilities and their market: potential, the superpowers, as the other half
of that process, a e building what they hope will be an effective political
constituency.
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In the longer term the U.S. and its western allies are pursuing an
operational policy in response to their belief in the "free" flow of
information and their opposition to a prior consent regime. However the
Western allies are, at the same time, building up their own capabilities
which may shift their position in the long term negotiating arena.
Finally, there are the French. They began with an ambition to break
into the space power club and a belief in the strictist sense of sovereignty
over resources and over information about those resources. Hence, they have
pursued a legalistic approch in the international negotiations while
developing on their own a capability for remote sensing. This is likely to
thrust them into a new role--and we are likely to see their politics change
in response to that new role.
In particular, as the French move into operational competition we would
expect them to begin a political constituency building process--which in an
operational system is the same as a market building effort. The U.S. at the
same time. will also be looking to build a market as the system goes
operational and we have already seen how this is made difficult by various
competing actors. In fact, as I will try and point out in the next section,
it was the politicai constituency building process which makes it now so
difficult to change course and turn to a short term policy of market
building and commercialization.
b.	 What have been the Short-Term Uutcomes of These Actions/Strategies?
The outcomes of these strategie4 has been a solidifying of the Soviet
Bloc around a policy of prior consent ano regulation of remote sensing
satellite systems. For the U.S. and the developing world the outcome has
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been a gradual shift away from the dogmatic positions which the developing
countries originally brought to the international negotiating process. As
the U.S. built its political constituency through the use of technical
assistance and international participation in the Landsat program
(particularly the spreading around the world of ground stations with written
agreements on cpen data dissemination) the vanguard of the developing
world--Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and Chile--backed off a bit on its push
for treaty provisions. While still maintaining their strong position on
abolsute sovereignty and prior consent, they have eased off on rhetoric and
the drive for a treaty. And the U.S. has gained wide acceptance of its
satellite system. At the same time the French have become a high capability
power in this area--with plans to launch a competitive system called SPOT.
This makes at least three nations with plans for remote sensing satellite in
the next few years, with the Germans, Japanese, Indians and the European
Space Agency not far behind. As such, in the short term, the capabilities
of the various international actors involved have changed radically, in part
due to the U.S. strategy of political constituency building and in part due
Lo an explicit desire to "compete." This includes the development of
competition in Europe via Earthnet, a ground station system which wil.
compete with U.S. ground stations, and ground station builders for the
internationa l. market.
In general as countries have moved ahead technologically via short term
policy decisions, they have maintained their position in the longer term
negotiations. What they have given up is the short term political support
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this support does not bind the developing countries--who can simply move to
another system unless the U.S. and the French (in particular) can come to
some agreement on system sharing. As such, the U.S. has been through its
policy of constituency building, successful in isolating the Soviet Bloc and
forestalling the development of a prior consent regime and a legalistic
approach. In fact, their operational approach has been dominant. However,
the cost has been the creation in part, of competition and a set of "weaker"
actors who are now in a stronger bargaining position due to their increased
capabilities and the reality of competing systems. In particular, as the
U.S. now tries to commercialize the system, they may find themselves running.
into opposition from those very countries in which they created the future
potential market during the political constituency building stge of their
strategy.
In sum, the short-term outcome of the various strategies has been a
redistribution of capabilities amongst the actors involved and the formation
of "coalitions" of actors a round the various viewpoints developed in the
international arena. At the same time the technology has moved well along
toward an operational phase.
7.	 What are the Longer Term Effects of the Policy Process?
The longer term effects of the various policies pursued will become
evident in future negotiations and short-term activities. They are impacted
by the short-term outcomes summarized directly above. We can expect that
those countries whose capabilities have changed will change their long term
negk)tiating strategy. In particular we can expect that developing countries
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will now push hard for system complementarity. At the same time, having
failed in an initial legalistic thrust--moving into an operational period--I
would expect the developing countries to develop regional programs and
bi-lateral agreements for governing remote sensing activities.
I expect that the Soviet Union will continue on its present
course--pushing for a modified prior consent regime with some sort of
resolution cut-off point. As they develop an operational capability they
may well set up an alternative system. They will change their strategy if
they desire to capture more of the world market and as they respond to the
demands of the developing world.
The U.S. will likely continua its push for an open dissemination
system, hoping to maintain the potential for the largest possible
international market. They are likely to be more favorable to system
complementarity as the prospect of U.S. firms competing with foreign
governments emerges. Genera',. the negotiating process should stall until
the time (if and) when the U.S. and the French agree that the system is not
commercially viable. At that point interests may converge enough to enable
the development of a successful international treaty or regime.
Domestically, however, there is no reason to think that the primary
thrust to move the system into the private sector will change. Until, as
noted directly above the private sector declares or the government realizes
that the system is simply not commercially viable, the effort to make the
system commercial will continue.
However, once again short-term strategies may outrun the long range
negotiations and change the picture drasticlly. As the developing countries




VOLUME II, PART IV.A.2
French, the U.S. and the Soviets off against one another to get the best
deal, they may well drive the governments of those countries to the
realization that the system is too political to be commercially viable. At
the same time the U.S. will be, and the French are likely to be, in the
midst of a market building strategy. However, at least in the U.S. this
strategy is being carried out for the time being in the government, in
NOAH. If the seven year interim period is seen through to its entirety the
difficulty of moving an entrenched bureaucratic program into the private
sector might be too much. As such, the possibility for a compromise and
international arrangement is likely. Again, it hangs on the commercial
potential of the system.
The ironic thing in all of this is that the U.S. may have
created--through its long delay it moving to an operational system and
through its political constituency building strategy--the very conditions
which will make it impossible to commercialize the system. These same
conditions making comercialization impossible will make the possibility of a
successful international negotiation more likely.
Summary
In sum, this section has been an effort to systematically outline the
policy issues facing Landsat policy makers at this point in time, with an
emphasis on the development of the policy context they find themselves in.
The primary lesson to be learned, I think, is an old one--we lie in the bed
that we have fashioned. The decisions we make today will create the
domestic and international environments in which we will have to work
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tomorrow. In particular, policy makers ought to remember the following
thi ngs:
1. Technology is nearly impossible to control--it will diffuse and
competitors will develop. Technological monopolies will not
last. This may in fact be part of a conscious policy to develop
acceptance of the new technology by allowing technology transfer
and international participation.
2. The process of political constituency building will speed the
transfer of technology and the building of capabilities in other
actors. This will change the shape of the "negotiating" table and.
will also make those actors important as part of the potential
market for an operational and commercial system. With the
development of competition, this wi l l further strengthen their
negotiating position.
3. The very policies that we adopt in order to gain support for an
experimental system may stand in the way of policy choices for an
operational system. In particular, the decision to push for an
open dissemination/equal access data regime during the
experimental period will make it very hard for the U.S. to now go
back and reverse its policy in deference to private sector needs.
4. The process of building a political constituency for an
experimental technology increases not only the capabilities of
other actors but also their legitimate claims upon the 'system.'
In fact, by building a political constituency, you also create
that many more potentially legitimate competing claims on policy
makers.
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The moral of this paper can be summed up in three major points. First,
technology doesn't stand still. As it moves from an experimental stage into
operational use, the intrests and perspectives of the various actors chnge.
Second, the interests and capabilities of the actors change through time in
response to their own policy decisions and the efforts of the high
capability powers to build political constituencies. Third, and most
importantly, the policy decisions taken in early stages of technological
development will shape the environment of the later stages. And in fact
they will be hard to change. Unfortunately they may well be in opposition
to the changed interests of the country which introduced the emergent
technology in the first place.
As will be discussed in the conclusion to this paper, it is thought
that undertaking the exercise gone through above at the outset of a policy
process might help to form a policy with not only an eye to present
circumstances but the likely emergence of changed capabilities and
interests.
rnnrliieinn
This paper has been an attempt to accomplish three things. First, it
attempted to outline the development of policy regarding Landsat. This
should be Lseful as an historical document in and of itself. Second, I
attempted to show that one can systematically analyze the politics, and
economics which are involved in making policy regarding emerging
technologies. And, third, I used this systematic analysis to clarify the
trade-offs which confront policy makers today.
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In sun, the conclusion of this paper are simple enough. The decisions
and policies which we pursue today constrain and limit our policy options
tomorrow. We create our own political and economic environment and hence
short-term policies should be calculated with that in mind. And I believe
that certain patterns of technological development can be isolated which
have general applicability. These include the maturation of the technology
from experimental to operational status; the diffusion of technological
capabilities regardless of protections against technology transfer and
particularly if policies of political and/or market building are followed;
and as the technology moves into an operatio nal phase, and as it difuses,
the interests of the various actors involved--including the technological
leader--will change. It will be useful to think of these things in the
context of policy making regardng direct braodcasts satellites, the
technology for exploiting the oceans, an oceans remote sensing satellite,
future weather satellite systems, weather modification technology and the
technology of transborder data flows--computer information networks.
Finally, in facing a complex and interdependent future it is hoped that
a political systems study such as this one will enable more efficient and
effective policy making by pointing out the inherent and inevitable
trade-offs between the politics and economics of emerging global
technologies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of establishing a permanently-manned space station
in Earth-orbit is not a new one. Scientific work on this subject
dates back to the early 1900s, and studies have identified many
possible design configurations for such a facility. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently formed an
office to study the multi-purpose Space Operations Center (SOC),
which now appears to be a likely candidate for a manned U.S.
space station.
Early studies of the economics of the SOC have raised an
interesting question: could a facility such as the SOC be built
and operated for profit by a private organization? Government
and industry are likely to find this question increasingly
relevant as man's role in space expands. As the
^o ►nmercialization of space communications is followed by the
opening up of markets for space processing, space energy systems,
and space habitation, the opportunities for profitable endeavors
in sp^ze will multiply. A space operations base would play a
pivotal role in this entire industrialization process, and
private ownership of a space station would be consistent with
American ideals and historical precedent. As this paper will
point out, such an enterprise might also be financially
attractive.
II. THE SOC MISSION MODEL
The major obstacles to the private financing of a SOC are
similar to those for other proposed space projects: a large
up-front investment, long lead-ticae, and high risk. Unlike
programs such as the satellite power system, however, the SOC
would provide a wide variety of basic services, most of which are
essential for the realization of widely-accepted near-term space
goals. The versatility of the SOC would guarantee an active
market for SOC services, and would help to insure financial
success in such operations.
By the early 1990s a SOC could be involved in dozens of
independent space operations. These can be divided into three
categories: basic operations, military operations, and
specialized operations. Basic operations are those whose
profitability are easiest to predict, and which would be most
likely to provide economic stability during the critical early
years of SOC operations. Basic operations consist of launch
services (from low-Earth to geosynchronous orbit) for
communications sa:_ellites, and space science services. Military
operations are potentially as valuable as basic operations, but
cannot be assessed without the involvement of high-level defense
authorities. Military operations could include the launch,
-1-
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storage, repair, and protection of military satellites, Earth and
space observations, and possibly even space construction.
Whether the military would be willing to have these services
provided by a private organization is questionable, but such
cooperation between the military and industry would not be
unprecedented. Finally, specialized SOC operations would offer
the potential for the long-term growth of SOC activities,
although the SOC could be involved in such functions by the early
1990s. Specialized operations include launch services for
non-communications payloads, satellite servicing, and, most
importantly, materials processing in space (MPS). MPS alone
could provide several billion dollars of SOC revenue annually by
the end of this century. Other specialized operations such as
space construction and the processing of non-terrestrial
materials are also compatible with, if not dependent upon a SOC,
but will not be considered in this financial assessment.
TII. BASIC OPERATIONS
One of the major functions of a Space Operation Center would
be the delivery of communications satellites to geosynchronous
orbit. The SOC would be located in low Earth-orbit (LEO), within
range of the Space Shuttle. Communications satellites could be
launched from Earth via the Shuttle, and then transferred at the
SOC to reusable, chemical-propulsion orbital transfer vehicles
(OTVs). The OTVs would have a payload capacity of about 12,000
pounds, and could deliver as many as four satellites at a time to
geosynchrono us orbit. It is likely that two OTVs could be
berthed at the SOC at all times.
The profitability of launching communications satellites via
the SOC would depend upon a number of factors. These include,
primarily, the demand for space communications and the cost of
operating the SOC OTVs. Since we have had considerable
experience with space communications and various types of launch
vehicles, it is not impossible to evaluate these conditions.
Demand for the launch of communications satellites is expected to
increase dramatically by the 1990s, with over 150 communications
satellites expected to be in orbit by the year 2000. Many of
these satellites will be very large in comparison with today's
.,ommunications satellites, and the SOC would be particularly
valuable for the launch of these large payloads. Table 1 shows
projections of the demand for launches of various sizes of
communications satellites over the next twenty years. To support
this level of traffic, approximately 100 OTV flights would be
required during the 1990s. (ref.  1) .
The costs of utilizing SOC (or space-based) OTVs for delivery
of these satellites can be broken down into three components:
development costs, unit costs,and operating costs. Development
costs (DDT&E) for SOC launch services consist of the cost of
developing the OTV launch system, which can be estimated at about
$1 billion. The unit cost (cost per OTV) could range from $35
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cost of periodically refurbishing the OTVs (estimated at $20
million to $50 million every ten flights, plus $60 million for
transportation of the OTV to Earth and back to the SOC each
time), the cost of delivering communications payloads to the SOC
via the Shuttle ($12 million per OTV flight) , and, most
importantly, the cost of delivering fuel for the OTVs to the SOC
(about $42 million per OTV mission). These costs are summarized
in Table 2; the high cost estimates have been used for
conservatism. The total cost per OTV flight, including
amortization of development costs, is slightly over $81 million.
(ref.  2) .
The best way to estimate the profitability of SOC
communications launch services is to compare the cost of
utilizing the space-based OTVs with other possible launch
methods. The cost "savings," or the difference between the cost
of using the SOC OTVs and of the other launch vehicles,
represents an upper bound on the profitability of the SOC launch
system. The SOC OTVs could be compared with today's expendable
launch vehicles (Delta, Titan, etc.), but since the expendables
are almost certain to be obsolete by the 1990s, this would not be
a valid comparison. One exception might be Europe's Ariane
expendable launch vehicle, which is expected to provide NASA's
Space Transportation System with stiff competition for launch
services for certain types of payloads. When relable data about
the costs and capabilities of Ariane's future syatems (Ariane II,
III, and IV) become available, it could influence the results of
this assessment.
Another possibility is to compare SOC OTV costs with the
expected costs of the Shuttle upper-stage boosters, the SSUS-D,
SSUS-A, and IUS. The upper-stage costs are shown in Table 3.
When compared with the SSUS and IUS, the space-based OTV shows a
dramatic cost advantage, with average annual savings of over $500
million during the 1990s. Figure 1 shows OTV savings as a
function of the demand for the launch of communications
satellites. Even if demand varies from current projections, the
space-based OTV is likely to have a significant cost advantage
over the Shuttle upper-stages.
However, the Shuttle upper-stages may also be obsolete by the
1990s, even though they have never been used to date. If the
upper-stages were the only alternative to the SOC OTVs, a company
operating a SOC could conceivably earn annual profits of close to
a half a billion dollars on communications satellite launch
services. It is not difficult, however, to envision other launch
systems capable of competing with the SOC OTVs. The closest
competitor appears to be a single-stage Earth-based OTV, which
would be launched directly from the Space Shuttle and which would
resemble the proposed Shuttle-Centaur launch system. It too
would be likely to have tremendous cost advantages over the
Shuttle upper-stages, as illustrated in Table 4. (Table 4 also
includes data on a 2-stage Earth-based OTV system which would not
depend upon the Space Shuttle. This system is not competitive
with the other options.)
Given optimistic cost-estimates for the single-stage
Earth-based system (a worst-case condition for the SOC, again a
-4-
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conservative assumption), the profit potential of the space-based
OTV system is reduced froth over $500 million per year to under
$80 million.	 Figure 2 summarizes the cost savings (i.e. maximum
profit potential) of the space-based OTV in comparison with the
Shuttle upper-stages and the Earth-based OTV. Figure 2 also
illustrates the significance of the propellant delivery costs to
the SOC. If the cost of delivering fuel to low Earth-orbit could
be reduced from $42 million to some lower cost, the SOC OTVs
would look much more attractive. For example, if 80 tons of
propellant could be delivered to the SOC for "free" each year by
draining excess fuel from Shuttle external tanks, or by using
liquid oxygen as "ballast" in the Orbiter cargo bay, then the
profitability of the SOC OTV system could be increased by a
factor of three. Another possibility shown in Figure 2 is
delivery of OTV fuel to the SOC by a heavy-lift launch vehicle
(HLLV), a Shuttle-derived "tanker" which reduces lift costs from
Earth by about 60%. This would provide an even greater cost
advantage than the Shuttle fuel "scavenging" scenario. A more
ambitious alternative is to process liquid oxygen from lunar ore,
which could reduce propellant delivery costs to $ 5 million per
OTV flight or less. Since this is a highly speculative option it
is not included in this aialysis, but it is conceivable that SOC
launch operations could provide sufficient economic justification
for the establishment of a lunar mining operation aimed at liquid
oxygen production.
Using the SOC as a base for the launch of communications
satellites could generate annual profits of $80 million to $280
million or more by the 1990s. Although other SOC operations
would ultimat--ly be expected to have even greater profit
potential, the SOC OTVs could provide financial stability and a
guaranteed income as the other SOC operations develop. Another
basic operation which could be presumed to have profit potential
during early SOC operations is space science services. -the SOC
could play a vital role in the advancement of scientific research
in space, particularly in the area of life sciences.
Unfortunately, much of the SOC's value to space science is
qualitative, and is difficult to evaluate. For example, iow much
will it be worth to have the ability to conduct long-duration
studies of living systems on the SOC? How is this value
translated into SOC profit potential? These questions are
further complicated by the fact that the government would
probably be a major consumer of SOC space science services.
We can, however, develop a simplified model of SOC space
science operations, and obtain a rough preliminary estimate of
the dollar value of such services. Consider, for example, the
option of making the European Spacelab a permanent element of the
SOC design. Aside from increasing the maximum duration for
Spacelab missions from one week to several months or years (a
tremendous benefit in itself), this set-up would have an obvious
economic advantage: the Spacelab module would not have to be
launched into space more than once, saving tens of millions of
dollars in transportation coats on Spacelab missions every year.
A SOC-Spacelab mission would require the launch only of
-10-
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experiment racks and support personnel, which would require at
most one-third of a Shuttle flight. Integrating the experiment
racks into the Spacelab in space would be more complex than doing
so on the ground, but would cost only a tiny fraction of the $36
million which would be saved on every Spacelab mission by freeing
twc-thirds of a Shu:.tle flight. Assuming 4-8 Spacelab missions
per year during the 1990s, savings on Spacelab transportaion
costs could range from $144 million to $288 million per year.
In addition to transportation, there could be large savings
on daily SOC-Spacelab operation:.. The cost of operating the
Spacelab at the SOC would entail a relatively small marginal
increase in basic °OC operating costs, and could therefore cost
$200,000 to $500,000 per day less than operating the Spacelab in
the Shuttle cargo bay. If it is assumed that the Spacelab would
be in use at the SOC for at least 2 to 4 months per year, then
total savings on Spacelab transportation and operations could
range from $160 million to $350 million per year. Using the SOC
as a permanent base for the Spacelab would also represent a far
more efficient utilization of the Space Transportation System
than if the Shuttle had to be used for every day of Spacelab
iAeraticns.
Many space science experiments will also have the potential
to lead to commercial applications. of space technology. The
SOC-Spacelab would have an advantage over the Shuttle-Spacelab in
its provision of facilities for expansion to commercial-scale
space operations. For example, materials processing in space
experiments during the 1990s are likely to result in the
discovery of pha:maceuticals, electronics materials. and other
products for which zero-gravity space processing would be
economically advantageous. The SOC wo u^d have the space, energy,
manpower, and mission duration capabilities For commercial-scale
processing of many products that the Shuttle would not be able to
provide. The SOC would also serve as a base for space
construction, and could ultimately evclve into a full-scale
"space factory." Revenue from basic operations would not be
dependent upon such long-term developments, but the basic
operations could eventually lead to a SOC monopoly of space
manufacturing capabilities, which could be of enormous value.
IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS
During the 1993s and beyond, military uses of space are
likely to expand as rapidly, if not faster, than civilian spaces
applicati ,:Pns. It is almost certain that a
	
fined station in low
Earth-orbit such as the SOC would be valuable, if not essential,
for national defense. This could turn out to be a positive
influence on the commercial viability of a SOC venture, but the
financial picture of SOC military operations needs much
clarification. Assuming that the military would be interested in
using a privately-operated space station, it is still very
difficult to assess the value of such operations to the SOC
o-nershio. Tnis is primarily because of tt;e secrecy involved in
-1t-
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the planning of future military space activities.
Launch of military payloads to geosynchronous orbit is a
possible SOC service which could rival the launch of civilian
communications satellites in financial importance. The
Department of Defense (DOD) could also be presumed to have an
interest in various types of space science activities,
particularly those involving human beings in space for extended
periods. Various reports have indicated that the military also
has a profound interest in a manned "battle station" in space.
(ref.  3) . Its functions would include storage, servicing, and
protection of military satellites; construction of large space
systems such as power systems, particle-beam weapons, and energy
shields; and manned coordination of military space activities.
For these reasons it could be assumed that SOC revenue from
military space operations could be as great as revenue from SOC
basic operations, but for the purposes of this analysis it is
also assumed that military SOC applications could be
non-existent.
Even if the military were not willing or able to use a
private SOC, however, its interest in space could indirectly help
to make development of a private sr---e station possible. The
military could, for example, deve' p :*_s own space station, and
subsequently make the results of its DDT&E work available to the
private sector. This would greatly reduce the cost of building a
separate private space station, since as much as 85% of the cost
of a facility such as the SOC would fall into the general
category of research and development. One way in which the
military and the private sector could share SOC costs would be
for the DOD to pay a firm to design and develop a military space
station, and for the firm to then build its own space station on
the basis of the same R&D work. The second, commercial space
station could perhaps be financed from profits made on
development of the first (DOD) space facility. A private
organization wi.-h an interest in establishing a SOC could pursue
negotiations with military officials to assesss the possible role
of the DOD in such cooperative activities. A financial picture
of the SOC would be incomplete without thorough consideration of
such alternatives.
V. SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS
Whereas basic operations and perhaps r_ so military operations
could provide a reliable source of income during the early years
c'! SOC activity, there is a much broader r ange of specialized
operations upon which the financial prospects of the SOC would
ultimately depend. These specialized operations would make the
SOC not only a focal point for space communications activities,
but also for the development of space processing, space energy
systems, arid, in the long term, space habitation. It requires a
bit of Imagination to envision all of these as thriving
industries, but the same was true of the now explosive space
communications ind-istry two decades ago. Not only would the SOC
-12-
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have applications in
absolutely essential




all of these fields, but it could indeed be
for the development of these industries.
oiould have great influence over the
industries, as well as the financial
be realized through such pioneering
As space activities continue to expand, demand for assorted
launch services should increase. In addition to the basic
operation of launching communications satellites, a SOC could be
involved in the transfer of non-communications payloads to higher.
orbits. These could include remote-sensing and other science and
applications payloads, as well as experimental structures, such
as prototype satellite power systems. There would probably be a
relatively small number of such payloads, since low -Earth orbit
would suffice in many cases, but non-communications payloads
could probably increase usage of SOC OTVs by 5-10 % over that
required for communications satellite launch services. This
could represent an additional $ 4 million to $28 million per year
in SOC profits.
Satellite servicing is another specialized SOC operation with
a measurable profit potential. Despite the fact that
communications satellites have relatively short operating lives
(8-10 years) , repairing, refurbishing, and upgrading these
satellites in space could become an important SOC function.
Estimates of the value of such services run as hig ', as 408 of the
total value of the satellite serviced, which is frequently in the
tens of millions of dollars. Assuming a rather conservative
profit of $2 million to $5 million per satellite serviced on ten
to twenty such jobs per gear, the SOC profit potential from
satellite servicing can be calculated at $20 million to $100
million per year.
The most important specialized operation for a Space
Operations Center, however, would almost certainly be ;materials
processing in space. The profit potential icvuI space processing
during the i^90s and beyond is enormous, and, unlike other SOC
operations, MPS has virtually unlimited growth potential.
Unofficial industry projections of the gross annual sales of
space-processed materials range as high as $50 billion by the end
of this century. It can be safely stated that MPS is likely to
be a „ y to the financial success of any SOC venture.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to verify estimates of the
value of space processing. We are only beginning to understand
the effects of zero-gravity on materials, and years of expensive
research will be required before commercially viable space
processing operations can be identified. NASA and industry have
identified certain types of pharmaceutical products and
electronics materials which may be significantly cheaper to
produce in space than on Earth, ; nd it is widely agreed that
space processing will eventually become a thriving industry. But
nobody :mows exactly how or when.
A sma-1 number of companies have invested significant
resources in MPS research, and some expect to begin commercial
-13-
1046	 VOLUME II, PART IV.B.1
space processing activities within this decade. Because of the
high stakes involved, however, firms engaged in MPS are generally
reluctant to publicize the results of their scientific and
marketing research. McDonnell -Douglas Corp. ( MDAC) has probably
done the most to demonstrate the profit potential of space
processing, but much of the company's work is shrouded in
proprietary secrecy. MDAC has teamed with Johnson & Johnson to
produce pharmaceuticals in space, and will begin flying
experiments on the Space Shuttle as early as the summer of 1982.
To date, tens of millions of dollars have been committed to this
project by these two companies and by NASA ( with whom a
Joint- Endeavor Agreement has been signed), but it will still be
several years before the commercial viability of these space
processing operations can be proven. It may very well be worth
the wait; annual sales of pharmaceutical products which are
strorn; cand'xdates for space processing are in the billions of
dollars, s nd it can be safely assumed that MDAC is aiming for a
significa .!1 share of this market.
Similarly, there are a number of electronics materials which
have stung MPS potential. S?ace-processing of high-purity
gallium- arsenide (GaAs) could revolutionize the electronics
industry, and could generate a lively market for the product at
several hundred thousand dollars per pound. In addition to
pharmaceuticals and electronics materials, perfected glass
products and exotic alloys might also be produced in space with
results which could not be achieved on Earth, and at great
profit.
There are few if any published estimates of the potential
sales of space-manufactured products, but a survey of experts
involved in MPS research would yield estimates of gross annual
sales of space products in the range of $200 million ( in 1990) to
550 billion ( in 2('00). This broad range of estimates illustrates
the great degree of uncertainty with regard to the future of
commercial MPS, but also demonstrates clearly a high level of
confidence in the potential of space processing. For the
purposes of this analysis this range can be narrowed to a more or
less conservative $ 1 billion to $6 billion in gross annual sales
as a 1990s average. If 20% of MPS sales could be allocated as
"rent" to the SOC, then the SOC revenue potential from space
processing would be in the range of $200 million to $1.2 billion
per year by the Mid-1990s.
Despite the uncertainties involved, it is evident that MPS
could become the single most profitable SOC operation by the end
of the 1990s. With continued growth in commercial space
processing applications, the Space Operations Center could
ultimately evolve primarily into a space factory, regularly
shipping a wide varie *.v of important medical and industrial
products to Earth. Ground-based MPS research and small Shuttle
experiments over the next several years should help to resol^,e
the uncertainties invo , ed in commercial space processing, and
should also help to clarify the SOC financial picture.
-14-
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VI. SOC REVENUE SUMMARY
The revenue projections for SOC operations are summarized in
Table 5. Many possible SOC operations, such as space
construction, are not included because of the difficulties
involved in evaluating their profit potential. Those figures
which are listed, however, are certainly open to debate as well.
Many assumptions went into the form • ilation of these estimates,
some of which are presented in Table 6, the SOC sensitivity
analysis. Here the impact of a 50% cahnge in the assumed or
mid-range values of SOC operations and underlying assumptions are
listed. For example, a 50% change in the mid-range value of
military operations ($315 million/ year) results in a 10% change
in SOC revenue. Similarly, a 50% change in the assumed demand
for communications satellite launches (estimated to require 100
OTV flights from 1990 to 2000) causes a 6% change in SOC total
revenue. The value of the sensitivity analysis is that it shows
which SOC operations are most important to study in order to
develop a more firm financial assessment of a SOC enterprise.
VII. SOC COSTS
Determining the cost of a Space Operations Center, although a
formidable task in itself, is somewhat less risky than attempting
to predict the profitability of SOC operations. Experience with
Skylab, Spacelab, and previous generations of launch vehicles has
provided a basic understanding of the major costs involved in the
development and utilization of orbital space facilities, and the
level of costs associated with the SOC would probably not be out
of line with that of other large projects of the past. In fact,
the SOC would probably cost only a small fraction of what Project
Apollo cost (10-20%, at most), and less than half of what NASA
has already invested in the Space Shuttle.
NASA is currently sponsoring in-depth studies of SOC costs,
but fairly detailed first-order estimates have already been
achieved. For a full "growth" SOC capable of the types of
operations described in th' , paper, total development and
production costs have been estimated at between $5 billion and $7
billion, with the actual hardware production costs accounting for
only about $1 billion of this total. The major contributors to
SOC costs are DDT&E for the SOC habitat and service modules,
systems testing and evaluation, and program support, which
together comprise about half of the total. These cost estimates,
however, are based on the assumption that NASA will be the
builder and operator of the SOC. If the SOC were built by a
private company, a total cost reduction of about one-third would
not be an unreasonable expectation. Possibilities also exist for
the reduction of SOC costs through simplification of the SOC
design and utilization of existing hardware. A SOC fabricated
from the Shuttle's external fuel tanks, for-example, could
greatly reduce the costs of the expensive habitat and service
modules. Such possibilities need to be investigated thoroughly
-15-
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before a committment is made to full development of any
particular SOC design.
In addition to development and production costs, there would
be basic costs involved in the support of the SOC crew and
operations. A very rough estimate of these SOC operating costs
is $400 million to $1 billion per year, which corresponds to
approximately $1 million to $3 million per day. These costs
would obviously increase with the expansion of SOC activities,
but for the operations described in this paper over the given
time period (1990-2000), it is unlikely that baseline operating
costs would exceed $1 billion per year. It should be emphasized,
however, that these figures do not include variable costs
associated with particular SOC operations, such as OTV costs
(previously estimated at about $81 million per OTV flight) and
the costs associated with changing Spacelab equipment and
personnel ($20 million minimum per mission). These variable
costs, however, are accounted for in the SOC revenue model;
revenue from communications satellite launch services, for
example, is calculated as the net difference between the variable
cost associated with operation of the SOC GTVs, and the cost of
launching communications payloads with other systems (e.g.
Shuttle upper-stage boosters).
VIII. SOC PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS
One method which can be used to evaluate the attractiveness
of the SOC as a private business venture is to perform a
discounted present-value analysis. Figure 3 shows a "worst-case"
present-value assessment for private SOC financing. Through a
combinat' n of tax credits, design modifications, and
private-sector efficiency the actual undiscounted investment
required is reduced from the estimated $5-7 billion required for
the NASA SOC (ref. 4) to $4 billion. This is not an overly
optimistic assumption. The analysis also assumes a real discount
rate of 10%, a pessimistic assumption, and covers a five-year
development period and the first decade of SOC operations. Based
on the SOC revenue and cost models presented in this paper, three
separate scenarios for the growth of SOC operating revenues are
considered. On the high side, SOC profits begin at $1 billion
per year and grow at the rate of $100 million per year. On the
low side, the SOC starts off by losing $200 million per year, and
improves At the rate of $50 million per year. In the median
case, ta,^  SOC grows at a rate of $75 million per year following
initial annual earnings of $400 million per year. The discounted
present-value of the SOC enterprise, evaluated in thL; initial
year, is measured on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis
represents the duration of the investment horizon. If the median
growth rate for SOC earnings were achieved, for example then the
estimated present-value of the first ten years of the enterprise
would be abut -$1.6 bil l ion. With the investment horizon
extended to fifteen years (through the year 2000, in this
example) , the present-value would be approximately -$0.25
-18-
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billion. In this assessment the present-value of the SOC ranges
from a loss of $3.3 billion to a gain of $2.9 billion. It should
he noted that with an assumed 108 real discount rate, a
significant risk expectation has been included in the analysis.
The payback period in this worst case ranges from ten to twenty
years.
Figure 4 shows a present-value analysis based on a set of
more optimistic (and probably more likely) conditions. In this
case it is assumed that through some type of joint private-public
endeavor, the private investment is limited to the $1.1 billion
SOC production cost, and that SOC operations begin after a
three-year investment period. The most likely means of achieving
a SOC through this level of private financing would be for NASA
or the DOD to fund SOC research and development, and for the
.rivate sector to become involved at the conclusion of such
efforts, financing only the actual construction of the facility.
There are, however, other possible means of reducing private
outlays to the $1 billion-range, including the earlier-mentioned
options of tax credits and cost-saving design modifications.
This "best-case" present-value scenario also assumes a real
discount rate of 78. The growth of SOC earnings is considered in
the same three cases as the "worst-case" present-value analysis:
The results of the best-case present-value analysis are
striking. Present-value ranges as high as $8.6 billion, with
payback periods as short as 5 years. Even the low-growth
scenario results in a positive present-value if the investment
horizon is extended slightly beyond the year 2000, and the median
case yields a present-value of nearly $4 billion. Why then, are
private companies not stampeding to work with the government to
develop a privately-operated multi-purpose Space Operations
Center? There are three major reasons. First, these cost and
revenue projections are all very "soft" and will require large
expenditures of resources for confirmation. Second, the
companies most qualified to undertake such a venture (such as
aerospace and defense firms) have a vested interest in working
through more traditional charnels, and the concept of a
privately-financed SOC will take some time to gain acceptance in
the industry. Finally, companies (and non-aerospace firms in
particular) tend to view all space projects as enormous,
long-term, high ris ►, investments, and if the SOC is an exception
to this rule (which it may or may not be) it can be proven only
at considerable expense.
The Space Operations Center is an exciting concept whose time
may be coming. It may happen within this century, or it may take
awhile longer to develop. While there is a broad spectrum of
financing alternatives which might be applicable to the
development of such a facility, the fijures in this paper
demonstrate that there is a chance that a SOC could be developed
privately or semi-privately at a considerable profit, with the
potential for particularly impressive long-term financial
returns. Although this study is not in itself justification for
;uch a venture, it does, in the author':, opinion, present a set
.Nf fascinating business opportunities which merit careful
consideration.
-21-
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Appendix A - Decision Trees
The present value assessments performed in section VII
considered only two of many possible financing alternatives for
development of the Space Operations Center. SOC financing
options can also be viewed in the context of a decision tree,
which goes a step beyond calculation of discount rates in the
evaluation of project risk. In the decision tree in Figure 5,
the branches 1 through n emanating from the decision node D
represent distinct SOC financing alternatives, and are },ence
"decision variables." Decision branch 1, for example, could
represent a case in which the SOC is financed solely by private
funds, which would be partially analagous to the "worst-case"
present-value scenario in section VII (Figure 3). Decision n, at
the other extreme, might represent a case in which the SOC is
financed in full by the government.
Each financing alternative has associated with it a range of
possible outcomes with regard to SOC value and earnings.
Included among the outcomes for decision 1 might be the high,
median, and low SOC earnings outcomes associated with the
worst-case SOC financing scenario. In the SOC present-value
analysis in this paper these outcomes were treated as discrete
(distinct) growth rates for SOC earnings, each representing a
particular present-value. The present-value associated with
branch lb in Figure 5, for example, would be the median growth
scenario for the worst-case financing alternative, or -$0.2
billion.
A vigorous comparative study of the values of various SOC
financing options would have to attach many more than three
possible value outcomes to each SOC financing alternative. In
fact, discrete value outcomes might be discarded in favor of
"continuous" distributions on earnings. For (undefined)
financing alternative 2, for instance, present-value could
perhaps rang e from -$2 billion to $2 billion, with an infin—
number of possible value outcomes in between. To calculate the
probability of attaining any particular present-value within this
range would require knowledge of the "probability distribution"
over _OC earnings for that financing op t ion. A more thorough
study of SOC financing alternatives would also have to better
define SOC "present-value" and "earnings." In this paper, the
value of the SOC was viewed primarily from the perspective of a
private company engaged in a SOC enterprise, hence present-value
was calculated in terms of dollar profit and was of course higher
for the case in which much of the SOC financing was undertaken by
the government. If instead total "social" costs and benefits
were taken into account, the differences between the "best-" and
"worst-case" present-value scenarios might not have been as
great.
The final goal of the decision-tree analysis would be to
associate with each SOC financing alternative a range of possible
value outcomes and a probability distribution over each range.











financing alternative, and the optiin with the greatest expected
value could then be selected. As was just mentioned, however,
judgment of the relative merits of each financing alternative
would depend greatly on how SOC "value" is defined to begin with.
FIGURE 5
A Decision Tree for Various SOC Financing Alternatives
-23-
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Appendix B - SOC Military Operations
In discussing SOC military operations, it is not the author's
intent to advocate the militarization of space. The major
purpose of this paper, in fact, is to explore possibilities for
the rapid growth of peaceful applications of space technology.
It should be recognized, however, that military uses of space can
and have aided world stability by providing reliable
communications systems, verifir-ation of compliance with arms
control treaties, and the security which comes with knowing what
other nations are doing militarily. It is hoped that it is these
military operations which will be continued, rather than the
development of space weapons systems which could undermine
international stability and the balance of power. In order to
prevent the latter possibility from becoming reality, it is the
author's opinion that terrestrial and space arms control
negotiations should be pursued vigorously, and that all civilian
and military uses of the SOC and other space facilities shoo!i be
carefully designed to enhance, rather than to weaken, the cause
of woz ld peace.
-24-
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ABSTRACT
After two decades of performing numerous studies on various
space station concepts, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) appears likely to achieve an initial
"permanent manned presence" in space by the end of this decade.
Although the government would play an active role in the
development of any space operations base, private investment in a
manned space station may represent a viable alternative to
complete government sponsorship of such a program. Since
private-sector interest in space stations is likely to increase
as the public strengthens its commitment to maintaining a manned
presence in space, it is desirable that NASA and other government
agencies understand the implications of manned space operations
from a business perspective. This report outlines the most
significant problems which would be faced by a private company
involved in a space station enterprise, and suggests possible
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The expected need for a permanently-manned space station by
the end of this decade presents an intriguing opportunity for
American industry. The first company or companies to own and
operate a space station could be in a positi3n to play a
leadership role in all aspects of space industrialization, a
high-technology field of emerging importance. A space station
could play a pivotal role in the development of space
communications and materials processing in space, both of which
are expected to become multi-billion dollar industries by the
1990s, and might also have business applications in the areas of
life science, space energy and transportation systems, and space
defense systems. These activities could represent a combined
profit potential of close to $3 billion annually in space station
support services by the end of this century.l
The barriers to commercial investment in a space station„
however, are formidable. Judged by alncst any commonly accepted
business standard, a space staion would be a high-risk venture
with potential for large financial losses. Such an endeavor
would also raise a wide range of sensitive political and social
issues, creating unique problems which would require equally
visionary solutions. For a vast majority of free-market players,
these barriers are sufficient to discourage any large investment
in a manned space station.
For these reasons it is unlikely that a space station could
-1-
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be built without considerable support from the government. This
raises still another important issue: to what extent should the
government provide incentives to attract private investment in
space projects? While on the one hand space is being touted as
the site of an impending "third industrial revolution," it is
also true that premature development of space resources by the
private sector could have serious adverse consequences. The
argument for private investment in space is that it will help to
establish an industry which is sensitive to actual market
conditions, i.e., the needs of the people. Yet if the government
steps in to make such investment possible, the industry which is
spawned could be more responsive to the government incentives
than to the underlying reasons for the incentives. A period of
rapid, artificially stimulated growth could thus be followed by
stagnation and continued dependence on government intervention.
The railroad and automobile industries are excellent examples rf
this unfortunate phenomenon.2
This report will not fully answer the question of whether
the government should actively stimulate private investment in
space. It will, however, take a necessary first step in this
direction by defining the barriers to investment, and suggesting
steps the government might need to take in order to reduce these
obstacles. Before we attempt to decide what the government
should do to increase the attractiveness of space investments, we
must understand the bases on which such investment opportunities
are judged. This will lead to a recognition of those relevant
actions the government is capable of taking to encourage such
-2-
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investments, a requisite understanding for deciding if such
actions are warranted.
Investment Considerations
Most business opportunities are judged according to three
primary considerations. These are the amount of money invested
and recovered, the expected time over which the returns accrue,
and the level of risk in the investment. 3 Although the primary
attraction of the space station is its potential for large
economic returns, particularly in the long-term, the investment
required would also be tremendous, perhaps as great as for any
single privately-financed project in American history. Estimates
of the total cost of a space station range from $2 billion to
over $20 billion, depending on the configuration of the facility
and the mode of financing. 4 Even at the lower end of this range,
the financial liability involved in such a venture would be
enormous.
On the basis of the second investment parameter, investment
horizon (also referred to as "payback period"), the space station
investment opportunity is equally suspect. Space operations
would probably not begin to generate revenue until five to ten
years after the initial investment in the space station, and
investment recovery ("break-even") would probably take at least
ten to fifteen years. By comparison, most venture capitalists
require not only economic recovery, but an extremely high return
on their investment, within a period of three to five years.5
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initial investment within a period of five years or less, are not
unheard of in the venture capital industry.
The greatest obstacle to private financing of a space
station, however, is risk. There are five major types of risk
associated with large investments: technical risk, market risk,
financial risk, institutional risk, and business risk. 6 With
regard to four of these five factors (business risk is detrmined
by internal organizational characteristics and will not be
considered here, the other four factors will be discussed in
greater detail in Section III) a space station enterprise could
only be characterized as a high-risk venture. Although there are
many actions a company could taka to minimize risk (whereas
investment level and payback period are relatively fixed
requirements), the high levels of perceived and actual risk
involved in a space station enterprise are the most critical
factors to be dealt with in order to make such a project
commercial'y feasib'.e.
In addition to these "investment-specific" factors, there
are other general conditions which could influence the prospects
for success in a space station investment. These include
primarily economic factors such as inflation and the rate of
interest, and also include such lets obvious conditicns as anti-
trust and appropriate regulatory laws, government appropriations
for space activities, and national security considerations. The
following three sections provide more detailed discussion of all
of these factors, as well as recommendations on how the
government can act to reduce the dissuasive effect of these
factors on private investment in space operations.
-4-
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II. Space Station - Investment Level and Investment Horizon,
The most obvious deterrent to private financing of a space
station is the enormous cost which such a project would entail.
The multibillion dollar price tag of a space station would exceed
the average venture capital investment of one to two million
dollars by a factor of several thousand, 7 and could even rival
the $10 billion cost of the trans-Alaska Pipeline, the most
expensive privately-financed project to date. Even if there were
very little risk involved in such a venture, financing of a
manned space facility by private sources would represent an
unusually bold and complex business enterprise, which would
require new and innovative government/industry relationships.
It is difficult to pinpoint the minimum investment which
would be required to initiate p —fit-making space operations.
Space station cost estimates made by NASA and other government
agencies do not necessarily reflect the levels of investment
which would be required if such a project were built privately,
since the mode of financing has a significant impact on project
cost. Recent NASA estimates of space station costs can bp
useful, however, in developing first-order assessments of
investment. requirements.
The least expensive design concept under consideration at
NASA is the "minimum space station," estimated to cost about
$2 billion. As its name suggests, however, the minimum space
1068	 VOLUME II, PART IV.R.2
Consisting only of a small three-man habitation module and
perhaps one or two other small compa.tments for science
experiments, the minimum space station would have little, if any
commercial value. A space station capable of generating
sufficient revenue to turn a profit would probably more closely
resemble the 8-man "Operational"-phase Space Operations Center
(SOC) , which Boeing has estimated would cost NASA about $8.0
billion. 8
 The Operational SOC would include logistics and
service modules for space science experiments and materials
processing, and facilities for basing at the SOC a fleet of
reusable chemical-propulsion orbital transfer vehicles (OTVs).
The OTVs would carry payloads from the low-orbit SOC to higher
orbits, and might generate substantial revenue by delivering
communications satellites to geosynchronous orbits. The SOC-OTVs
could also be involved in the potentially lucrative business of
satellite-servicing and retrieval. Although satellites become
obsolete relatively rapidly, retrieval and reuse of expensive
satellite components could be highly cost-ef.fective.9
At present these appear to be the most marketable services
which a space station could provide. A space station could
provide space science services, for which the government would be
a primary consumer, with greater capabilities than the
Shuttle-Spacelab configuration, and at a lower cost. Space
station materials processing capabilities could be attractive to
certain private users, such as McDonnell-Douglas Corporation,
which anticipates the development of a multi-billion dollar
market for space-processed pharmaceutical products by the 1990s.
-6-
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A fleet of reusable OTVs based at a space station might provide
launch services marketable in both the public and private
sectors. On the order of five hundred communications satellites
may be launched into geosynchronous orbit over the next twenty
years, and theoretically nearly all could be placed in their
proper orbits via space-based OTVs. The government, in
particular the Department of Defense, might also require launch
capab.lities to geosynchronous orbit which could be provided by a
space-based OTV fleet.
With the cost of the Shuttle flights required for deployment
of the SOC included, the total investment required for achieving
the operational capability just described would be about $6-.LO
billion, spread out over a file to ten year period. Clearly the
magnitude and timing of this investment limit the range of
possible participants in a space station venture. If the
Operational SOC were developed privately, the costs and
investment horizon could perhaps be reduced significantly by
circumventing bureaucratic regulations and inefficiencies
frequently associated with large government projects. In such an
optimistic case, however, the investment requirements would still
be prohibitive by any business standard. Even at $3 billion, for
example, a fully operational space station would still be beyond
the means of most private investors, and nearly a hundred times
more expensive than the largest venture capital enterprise ever
undertaken.10
Although a fully private urlertaking of such a venture
cannot be completely ruled out, it is almost certain that the
-7-
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government would in some sense have to be a "partner" in such an
enterprise. In fact, there are numerous incentives which could
be provided by the government to reduce space station investment
requirements, perhaps to within acceptable ranges. NASA c:,uld,
for example, develop a space station "core," consisting of
habitation modules, solar power arrays, and communications
equipment. A private cr-,rrpany could then add to the space station
core the specific facilities required for doing business in
space. A space science module could perhaps be added at a cost
of $500 million to $1 billion. A commercial materials processing
facility might be provided for half as mach. Development of an
OTV and OTV support equipment could probably be achieved
privately for $1-1.5 billion. A company could therefore provide
services on a space station for an investment as small as 5-108
($50OM/S10B - 5%) of the cost of a full NASA space station.
Thus, the cost of developing these service capabilities
independently are well within the means of private investors.
Another joint-venture scenario might call for the government
to perform the research and development required for a space
station, with private companies responsible for production and
operation of the station. Contractors could perhaps finance
production of some of the required space station hardware with
profits earned by designing the components for NASA. In exchange
for sponsoring the initial design and development, NASA might
require owner-operators of the space station to provide services
to the government at a reduced rate. Such an arrangement could
reduce space station investment requirements co acceptable levels
-8-
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because the actual hardware production would comprise only about
30-50% of the total space station cost.11
Joint public-private ventures of this nature would raise a
number of new policy problems for the government, but through its
Joint-Endeavor and other programs NASA has demonstrated an
ability and willingness to work with private companies toward
common goals in creative ways. Joint arrangements for space
station development could be attractive from the government's
viewpoint because they might reduce the appropriations required
to establish manned space operations. This would free funds for
space station utilization; a major problem with the Space Shuttle
is that its high Development costs have limited NASA's ability to
design uses for it. (The Space ':shuttle presently consumes nearly
two-thirds of NASA's research and development budget12).
Moreover, private im-estment in a space station could be a
significant first step toward the establishment of a new,
space-based industry with a large tax base and other social
benefits. Reducing the investment requirements for space station
operations to acceptable business levels might therefore be
within the -neens and in the interests of the U.S. Government.
-9-
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III. Space Station - Risk
Risk is by far the greatest impediment to private investment
in a space station. The high cost of a space station could be
considered acceptable for investment purposes if the risks
involved in such a venture were sufficiently small. As mentioned
earlier, the degree of risk in a space station venture is
tremendously high with respect to the four major types of
investment risk considered here: technical risk, market risk,
financial risk, and institutional risk. It is almost certain
that the government's assistance would be needed in order ro
reduce the risks in a space station enterprise to acceptable
business levels.
This dependence on the government, however, would in itself
► apresent a significant risk; as a par ner in a long-term space
station enterprise the government would be highly suspect. For
example, a government delay in providing expected support during
space s'-ation development, such ar NASA's two-year delay in
developing the Space Shuttle, could spell disaster for the
private partners in such a venture. A change in presidential
administrations, or a key NASA personnel change, could also
adversely affect the government's ability to follow through on
such a long-term commitment. For reasons such as these, any
joint p. ivate-public venture would need to be backed up b} firm
agreements, where all parties (including the government) w-)uld be
legally boun( to meet their obligations. Special legislation
-10-
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might even be reguire ,i to ensure ttie availability of government
funds for the duration of the project. From the viewpoint of any
pr ivate F : tnor, the government's involvement in a space station
enterp-ise- would paradoxically be necessary for reducing risks,
but also a substantial risk in itself. This chapter deals with
many of the types of risk which would oe involved in a space
station venture, and the ways in which the government might need
to be involved i:-i order to diminish these risks.
Technical Risk
Technical risk involves all uncertainties with regard to how
well a product will function. A space station involving
thousands of complex technological components fu. • ctioninq in a
hostile and unforgiving environment would entail possibly the
greatest technical risk of any private project ever undertaken.
Not only would the possibilities for technological, scientific,
or human failures be great, but the costs associated with such
Brea:0owns could also be enormous. Particularly in a private
space enterprise, the temptation to cut costs and achieve quick
results would be great, exacerbating the problem of technical
failure.
Through its ongoing research and development programs the
government is constantly working to reduce the technical risks
which such projects usually entail, and the benefits of this
baseline work would almost certainly be available to private
organi z ations involved in a space station enterprise. Beyond
this, the government Could set up 3 program within NASA to assist
-11-
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the private sector in evaluative and overcoming the technical
risks involved in early space operations. Such a program could
help transfer technical knowledge and expertise from NASA and
high-t = :hnology industries to a broader cross-section of
potential investors, with the specific goal of maximizing the
private sector's contribution to (and benefit from) manned space
operations. Such a program would probably be most effective in
providing potential investors with an initial basic familiarity
with space investment opportunities, since investors with limited
technical expertise or R&D facilities would probably ultimately
contract development work out to better-equipped companies such
as aerospace firms.
Market Risk
Whereas technical risk is the risk associated with creation
of a product or service (supply), market risk is the risk
involved in selling a product (demand). The development of any
commoeity or service is always preceeded by some type of market
analysis to define such factors as total product demand, price
sensitivities, product distribution, and advertising. The market
risk which would be involved in developing space operations is
particularly acute because of the possible emergence of competing
alternative technologies. During the long lead-time preceeding
the operating life of a space station, other means of
accomplishing the space station's intended tasks could be
developed. NASA's Materials Processing in Space program has
demonstrated, for example, that improved ground-based processes
-12-
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may frequently compete effectively with space processes. This
could also happen in other areas critical to the success of a
space station, such as space transportation. During the long
development time of the Space Shuttle, the European Space Agency
developed a strong competitor for commercial launch services: the
Ariane expendable launch vehicle. Since materials processing and
space transportation could be two of the major services which a
space station would provide, these examples are particularly
meaningful.
The possible emergence of competing ground-based
technologies is only one of many important elements of space
station mission modeling and marketing which require extensive
further study. Previous studies of space station uses have
focused almost exclusively on technological capabilities, without
ever addressing the question of who would pay for space station
services. This is perhaps because it is exceedingly difficult
and risky to forecast demand functions for commodities and
services which do not yet exist.
Another type of market risk which should be examined regards
the ability of users to pay for space operations. In the absence
of competing technologies, the demand for space station services
might be fairly inelastic over a certain price range (i.e. not
very responsive to changes in price) , but at some point demand
could suddenly drop dramatically given any additional price
increases. The advantage of manufacturing certain high-value
products in space, for example, might be so great that relatively
large increases in the cost of space processing would not deter
-13-
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investors from using a space station's processing facility. As
the cost of space production increases, however, a point may be
reached beyond which Earth-based processes are more economical.
(See Figure 1) . In the case of such revolutionary services as
space operations, i l  is particularly difficult to determine where
such break-points in product demand will occur.
The government might play a key role in reducing market risk
by essentially guaranteeing a market for certain space station
services. Obviously NASA has a strong interest in utilization of
such a facility or the space agency would not be considering the
development of a space station as a major new project. Instead
of developing a station on its own, NASA could agree to use a
private space station for space science services, for example,
and promise to pay a certain sum of money to the space station
operators annually. Use of a space station for science could
possibly save the government several billion dollars over an
extended period, so the value of such a market guarantee to the
government could be considerable. 13 Similarly, the government
could agree to utilize other space station services, such as OTV
flight support for NASA payloads.
Contracting to "rent" the services of a privately-owned
space station as needed might be more cost-effective for the
government than building and operating the entire space station,
and would eliminate a large degree of market risk for the private
owners. Although such a market guarantee would raise legal
issues concerning government procurement practices and creation
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government-guaranteed markets, most notably the Terrestrial Data
Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) . The TDRSS was developed
privately and will be leased by NASA for a ten-year period
beginning in 1983 for approximately $2.3 billion.14
From the perspective of a private space station operator,
government use of a space station could present another marketing
problem. The government would probably desire priority over
other space station users during times of national emergency; the
possibility of such a government "priority override" might create
problems for commercial users. This is another issue regarding
government support and use of privately owned space facilities
which requires further itudy.
Financial Risk
Financial risk, another important element of risk in
business ventures, is the uncertainty pertaining to the
investment level and payback period. These aspects of a space
station venture, which were discussed in the previous section,
represent a high degree of perceived risk for such an endeavor,
primarily because of the enormous up-front investment which would
be required before any profits could be realized. In the case of
a space station, financial risk would also include the great
ranges of uncertainty regarding development and operating costs,
which in such high-technology projects often exceed initial
expected by large margins. Financial risk would also be
exacerbated by the long lead-time preceeding actual space station
operations. In one sense, however, the space station venture
-16-
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fares favorably with regard to financial risk. The very high
long-term potential for financial gain is a primary reason that
businessmen may ultimately be willing to face the risks involved
in a space station venture.
The government's role in reducing financial risk would
probably be limited. Financial risk is a primary "acid-test" for
investment opportunities, since it bridges the requirements of
investment level and risk management. The government could only
influence financial risk by altering the nature of the business
task itself, i.e., by sharing the cost of building a space
station with the private sector. By developing a space station
core, for example, the government might substantially reduce the
amount of hardware a company would have to provide, and hence the
investment required for initiating marketable space operations.
Institutional Risk
The most critical area of government involvement in a
private space station enterprise would be with regard to
institutional risk. This is the risk associated with the
logistical support services and equipment necessary to carry out
a designated task. Institutional risk also encompasses a broad
spectrum of uncertainties with regard to the economy, legal
rulings, taxes, the availability of government support, and other
factors. Institutional risk is in fact the one area in which
government cooperation, or at the very least non-interference, is
essential to the success of a private space station venture.
As a major example, it would be the government's duty to
-17-
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ensure the availability of the Space Shuttle flights required for
space station deployment, support, and operations, since NASA is
the sole operator of the Shuttle. Uncertainties regarding the
availability and cost of Shuttle flights are in fact often cited
as primary factors in the reluctance of businessmen to become
involved in space development. NASA's Joint-Endeavor program,
which offers free Shuttle flights and other sera-r ices to companies
which are willing to explore new markets for space products, has
to date attracted only three industry participants. A primary
reason for this is that in Joint-Endeavor Agreements NASA can
only promise to use its "best efforts" to meet the industry
participant's Shuttle flight requirements. 15 Maintaining an
affordable and reliable fleet of operational Shuttle Orbiters,
one of NASA's major agency goals of this decade, will be critical
to the management of institutional risk in all types of space
endeavors.
Government tax incentives (and disincentives) could also
play a great role in determining whether a space station project
would represent an acceptable risk to the private sector.
Although the government would expect space-based industries to
ultimately provide a large tax base, temporary tax incentives
during the embryonic years of space development might be a
pre-requisite for private investment in such activities. During
the development phase, tax credits for research and development
expenditures could reduce the investment requirements for such a
project considerably. During the early operational stages, tax
incentives for operators could reduce financial risk, and tax
-18-
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breaks for space station users could reduce market risks. These
tax incentives could be phased out as the market for space
operations develops, and tax revenues from space operations could
eventually far exceed the value of the early tax breaks.
Other relevant government actions which would influence
institutional risk include anti-truEt rulings, environmental and
safety regulations, and even international agreements regarding
the use of space (although no such agreements have yet been
ratified within the U.S.). Department of Defense interests in a
private space station are another institutional matter to be
considered; the military could become a major customer for space
station services, or might alternatively deem private ownership
of such a facility a threat to national security. The status of
a privately-owned space station vis-a-vis the military would have
to be determined at the earliest possible time.
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IV. Space Station - Other Considerations
The attractiveness of a space station venture to the
investment community shall be judged over the next several years
primarily on the basis of the factors discussed in the previous
two sections. Clearly these are but a few of the many important
considerations affecting a project of such magnitude and scope.
The government will have ample opportunity to influence investor
attitudes toward the marketing of space operations, becoming, to
a certain extent, a partner in any space station enterprise.
In addition to the investment and risk considerations
previously discussed, there will be a number of other factors
affecting space station investment decisions over which the
government and industry will have little ccntrol. One such
factor is the rate of interest. When the rate of interest is
high, as it is now, long - term projects become unattractive
relative to short-term business ventures. The discounted
present-value of any income stream rapidly approaches zero, due
to the oppportunity cost of forgoing other high-yield
investments.
Consider, for example, the income streams of two
hypothetical investment opportunities (See Figure 3) . Option A
is a short - term project requiring an investment of $200 million
per year over five years (years 1 through 5) , and yielding an
income of $300 million z 1nually over the following five years
(years F through 10). Option B is a longer-term investment
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opportunity requiring an outlay of $200 million per year over ten
years (years 1 through 10), with a payback of $800 million per
annum during the five years afterward (years 11 through 15). The
undiscounted present values of Options A and B are $0.5 billion
and $2.0 billion respectively, that is, if the interest rate were
zero, the value of Option A would be $0.5 billion, and Option S
would be worth $2.0 billion. With an interest rate of zero,
Option B (the long-term investment) would clearly be the better
opportunity, with four times the value of Option A.
Consider what happens, however, as the interest rate rises.
At an interest rate of 5%, the discounted present value of Option
A is $151 million, and Option B is worth $582 million. The
long-term investment is still superior, althougn the value of
each investment is less than one-third of ita undiscounted value.
If the interest rate were to rise further to 10%, the present
value of each investment would drop below zero, and Option B
(present value: -$59 million) would no longer be superior to
Option A (-$52 million). Similarly, a long-term space station
project which appears attractive relative to other investment
opportunities when the prevailing interest rates are low might be
less attractive, and perhaps highly unprofitable, at higher rates
of interest.
The rate of inflation is another factor which would
influence the attractiveness of a space station enterprise. By
the time a space station becomes operational, its services might
be far more expensive to provide than originally anticipated.
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be several times more expensive than was originally expected, due
to the combined effects of the general inflation rate and real
increases (over the rate of inflation) in the cost of the
program. The aggregate impact of the inflation rate and real
cost overruns could similarly reduce the profitability and
attractiveness of a space station venture.
Any entrepeneurs considering a space station investment
woulO also need to consider their enterprise from a non-business
perspective. The sncia. costs and value of such a project would
have to be taken into account, especially in light of the
government support which would undoubtedly be sought by any
investors in such an enterprise. NASA, for example, would
probably be more inclined to support an effort to produce
life-saving drugs in -Dace than to support a scheme to
manufacture "space-jewelry" or other novelty items. In a bre-ider
sense, entrepeneurs proposing to "help" NASA to build a space
station would almost certainly be asked to demonstrate how their
participation in such a project would benefit space station users
or the general public.
A space station venture unlikely to generate benefits for
society would probably receive little or no support from NASA or
other government agencies, and might even run into government or
public opposition. Compering efforts from more public-minded
private investors might further unaermine an endeavor which
failed to reflect the public interest. Just as NASA would
require insight into the businessman's perspective; on such a
project, the private sector would need to be sensitive to NASA's
-24-
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V. Summary
The investment level, risk management, and other
considerations outlined in this report provide a lens through
which the space station concept can be viewed from a business
perspective. Government and industry should work together over
the next several years to focus this lens, to determine the most
effective private sector role in space station development. The
next step in this process is for interested organizations in
private industry to evaluate the space station as a business
venture, an exercise which would assess the interplay of the
factors described in this report, and which would be aimed at
ultimately calculating the return on investment, the bottom line
in any business plan. Whether or not private industry becomes
actively involved in early space station programs, the government
should adopt creative and flexible development strategies in
order to maximize the opportunities for industry involvement in
all phases of space station activities. The government is likely
to find that, as its commitment to a manned space station becomes
stronger, private-sector interest in space operaLions will also
increase. When industry picks up the initiative, the U.S.
Government should be supportive, since every dollar contributed
by the private sector represents money potentially saved by the
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